THE YEAR BOOK OF EDUCATION

1951

THE YEAR BOOK OF EDUCATION 1951

TRAINING COLLEGE MADRAS.

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INTRODUCTION

THE Editorial Board accepts full responsibility for the selection of contributors to the YEAR BOOK, but it accepts no responsibility for the views they express. It believes that they are qualified by experience to form opinions about educational matters in their respective countries which are worth the attention of educationists everywhere. It is the earnest desire of the Board that each contributor should write with complete freedom from his own political and national standpoint. Accordingly, the Board exercises no censorship nor does it attempt to criticise or evaluate the opinions that are expressed. It is for the reader to assess the authority of each article by the professional reputation of its author and by the internal evidence it may afford of constructive educational thinking.

This policy has been consistently pursued since the foundation of the YEAR BOOK, and it is based on good reasons. Educational thought and practice inevitably take different forms in the circumstances of different countries. There is no more illuminating experience to the educationist than to see the same principles as those upon which he endeavours to base his own work finding new and often strange forms of expression in other countries. It is an illuminating experience because it so often enables the educationist, by appreciating the variety of form which may arise, to understand more fully the nature and import of the principle that lies behind the form. It is illuminating for a second reason of no less importance: it enables the educationist to discern that there is a unity of educational purpose which transcends wide differences of creed, politics, and social philosophy. These are the beliefs upon which the Editorial Board has based its policy, and it ventures to hope that they have been vindicated in the experience of many readers.

It is by no breach of this fundamental policy that, each year, the Editorial Board invites its contributors to focus their attention upon a general theme, and this serves to give coherence to each volume. The theme chosen for the present volume is Education and Morals. Few will dispute that it is an important aim of education to produce men and women ready to see and to accept responsibilities, able to discern between right and wrong, and to order their conduct accordingly. Yet how different are the implications of this statement to different people. To one it means that our aim should be that our pupils should be well grounded in the faith and practice of the Catholic Church; to another, that our

pupils should learn to place the well-being of the country to which they belong above every personal consideration. Both will agree that you cannot even begin to form a nation or a community out of people who have no standards of right or wrong and that educationists have an important part to play in the formulation, establishment, and maintenance of such standards.

As this volume will show, the theme leads educationists to realise their unity with others within their own national groups. The slightest inquiry reveals the great diversity of ways in which the present generation moulds the attitude and character of the next. The family, the church, the school, and the State each plays its part, but there are other and more subtle influences at work. Conditions of employment, the prevalence of unemployment, methods of advertising, opportunities for entertainment, the development of social and security measures, all these and many other features of economic and social life exert a potent effect. The educationist can work effectively only within a wide field of co-operation within his own national group.

A study of the volume will also reveal that educationists in different countries have at least this in common—they are all facing new problems in the field of moral education. The old patterns are going or have gone. The old incentives to right and moral conduct no longer hold the sway they did. Everywhere the question of training the young to accept the responsibilities of freedom and adulthood is more complex than it was. The fuller embodiment of the concept of social justice in social institutions faces the educator with the task of developing in the young a clear awareness of his responsibility towards that social whole from which he claims benefits and to which he owes duties. No country is exempted from the burden of these problems. In no country have they been solved, even in the temporary sense in which alone it is possible to say that any social problem has been solved.

Again, by no breach of our policy, the Editors have contributed an introductory article in which they have endeavoured to provide a general theoretical framework within which the separate contributions would fit and from which they would gain added meaning.

Finally, the volume is offered in a spirit of educational inquiry and research. As a small group of educationists sitting on the Editorial Board in London, we found ourselves intensely interested in a problem of vital importance, the answer to which we did not know and could only strive to attain. In our perplexity we wrote to friends in many parts of the world, and the answers we have received are here offered to a wider public. We hope that our readers will find them rewarding and stimulating to further work and effort.

G. B. JEFFERY.

SECTION I

SPECIAL STUDIES

CHAPTER ONE

EDUCATION AND MORALS

At the very beginning of human history, those in charge of the tribes were already concerned with the problem of giving adequate moral training to the new generations, lest the conquests, the spiritual and social achievements of the ancestors, be lost. For centuries, great thinkers have considered how best to provide religious and political instruction. Although every community and religion has proposed a solution, absolute and unqualified success continues to elude our grasp. Men still exhibit those traits of unsocial behaviour, cruelty, and deceit which were recorded in the far-off past. It will be evident that the Editors do not think that a ready prescription for the ills of humanity is to be found in this volume. They wrote to eminent contributors from many lands, representing different national and religious traditions, as well as to scientists in various fields of research, and invited them to discuss the relation between education and the formation of moral attitudes. The answers are gathered here and present, perhaps for the first time, an authoritative symposium on the general question.

The task of the Editors in this introduction is a very limited one. It is simply to classify, to analyse, and to summarise briefly the various points of view and in this way to help to clear the path for a better understanding of the problem itself. Here, therefore, we neither take sides nor make our profession of faith. No doubt, as Europeans reared in a Christian atmosphere, we have a bias which may, despite ourselves, come to the surface. Nevertheless, our intention is to treat all religious and secular traditions objectively, and without comparing or evaluating the spiritual and moral values they embody. It is for the reader himself to weigh the evidence, to consider the logical arguments advanced, and to accept or reject their validity. There is, however, one fact, a somewhat astonishing one, which we should like to record right from the start. In spite of initial assumptions which are utterly different or even opposite, the amount of common ground between the various points of view expressed is far greater than might have been expected. Here, perhaps, lies the truest hope for the future of mankind, and to make plain what such agreement implies is our

editorial task. What is, perhaps, equally unexpected is that almost all our contributors, coming as they do from all parts of the world, are troubled by problems which resemble one another very much and which seem to spring from the same roots.

The volume is divided into two distinct parts: the first two sections expound points of view based on fundamental attitudes derived from religious or ideological convictions or else from scientific investigations. The second part comprises the remaining sections and presents a factual survey and an interpretation of the actual situation in various countries. But the two parts are intimately connected. The fundamental views are expanded and made more concrete in practical application, whilst practice cannot properly be appreciated without the study of fundamental postulates. The two parts should, therefore, be read together and continual cross-reference will be found necessary.

Rural Communities

Before turning our attention to the contributions gathered in the first part of this YEAR BOOK, it will be useful to consider very briefly those features in the social background of our times which make the whole problem of moral education at once so urgent and so perplexing. What we are witnessing, of course, is a transformation scene. No sooner do we fix our attention on a particular feature than it changes or at least seems to change because of different illumination. Never have human beings had to construct their social world out of such fluid elements; never have they experienced the impact of so many discordant influences. Let us recall the environment, the habitat, of the rural community in which most children grew up until comparatively recently and, indeed, in many parts of the world still do. First, they were brought up with the companionship of brothers or sisters whose ages were not very different from their own. Groups of families, related by blood or marriage, lived in the same locality, and all the members of these families knew one another intimately, person to person. Thus, the children constantly met adults whose loyalty and affection were not in doubt, and who never hesitated to correct and instruct them. Again, for the most part children were born and spent their early years on a farm of some sort, in close contact with the soil, with growing things, with the processes of food-production. Everyone they met had a clearly realised and definite function in the economic and social world. The parents themselves produced the greater part of the food consumed and even of the clothing worn, and the children helped them in their work. The family, together with the neighbouring families, constituted an almost autarkic producing and consuming unit. And it was highly integrated and homogeneous: it kept together for work, for worship, for recreation. Its chief members—the father and mother

—were equally important and equally necessary human beings with much the same range of experiences and interests. Everyone met by the children—the miller, the baker, the blacksmith, the carpenter—had a well-understood place in the community; clearly and evidently the well-being of each was the condition necessary for the well-being of all. Everyone said much the same thing: all spoke with one voice and praised or condemned the same actions. Nor was there any disagreement about fundamentals: everybody accepted the same explanation of the functioning of the universe and of the nature of man. As for offences against morality or convention, they were few or non-existent. How, for instance, could one steal in a place so small that everyone knew what everyone else possessed? How break taboos when all were watching? It was a small world, that of the rural community, and it allowed small scope for individual liberty or for diversity, but it was well-mapped, coherent, understandable, functional. It provided a firm and stable foundation for the growth of the moral and social personality.[1]

In writing thus of the 'rural community' we have had in mind chiefly the villages and hamlets of Europe before the Industrial Revolution began to disintegrate them. But *mutatis mutandis* what we have written is largely true still, say in India or China. It applies less directly to the small communities of the Pacific Islands or of Africa. Yet there are clear overlaps, as a reading of Professor Piddington's article will show. For example, in all these cases one finds a high degree of cultural homogeneity, the absence of which singularly complicates the problem of moral education.

The Modern Industrial Environment

The application of science to the process of making goods, the development of mass production together with a high degree of division of labour, and the development of capitalism have combined to transform the scene. In industrial communities, productive functions have been concentrated in the father, who has become the money-getter; consuming functions usually in the mother, the money-spender. Food, clothing, even amusements are purchased for cash. The family probably does not go to church at all and rarely goes out as a unit—different members visit the cinema, the club, the dance-hall, or the public house at different times. There is a prevailing sense of insecurity: war or unemployment may cause disruption or destruction, bringing about misery or death. "Enough unto the day—let to-morrow look after itself" has become a very prevalent sentiment. The old peasant virtues of saving and sobriety are no longer as highly regarded as they were. In a word, the family is no longer the safe, secure, simple haven of

[1] The educational bearing of such points is discussed in *The Content of Education,* University of London Press.

refuge which it once was, and no longer offers the rich and educative experiences it did. Now, if there is one point on which all our contributors agree, and which Dr. Rickman's article considers in some detail, it is the importance of the unplanned and unformulated education provided in the bosom of the family. All of them see in the partial disintegration, the great weakening of this most fundamental of institutions, one of the chief sources of the prevalent frustration and moral weakening which seems characteristic of our century. In his remarkable book, *The Fear of Freedom*, Eric Fromm considers this and cognate aspects of ongoing change and points out that we have here conditions for the development of those sadistic and masochistic character-traits which facilitate the acceptance of autocratic or oppressive government and which render difficult the growth of healthy and free personalities.

In modern cities, social classes are, to a large extent, segregated from one another and the processes of production are carried on in closed factories where mysterious machines turn out an endless and variegated stream of products. Home and workshop, garden and field, are separated. Services are provided by impersonal institutions: the 'Gas Company'; the 'Bus Service'; the 'Railway'; and so on. There is no obvious coherence; the high degree of integration of activity which, in fact, exists, can be apprehended and understood only through an intellectual and imaginative effort beyond the conceptual power of most people. Few make the effort: they are content to accept the mystery and to live in a society the structure, the functioning, and the controlling of which they do not understand. A premium is put upon acceptance of irrationality and the moral fibre is weakened.

In this growingly puzzling world, where everything changes quickly and nothing seems stable and fixed, the young look for firm guidance and counsel. What do they find? A world of adults as puzzled and uncertain as they are themselves. So much has changed, so much has been proved wrong, everything seems so different: old ideas and conventions are no longer respectable simply because they are old or widely accepted. Should the rights of private property always be considered sacred? Are extra-marital relations always wrong? Is absolute freedom to be desired above all? Can one believe stories of miracles? Should one accept the dogmas of religion? Is the profit motive a morally acceptable one? The list of questions could be extended indefinitely and no easy and assured answer can be given to any of them—or, at least, few would dare to give it or would be listened to if they did. Fixed standards, it seems, have gone; the barriers to thought, speculation, doubt, and heresy are down. It is in this world of shifting, changing values that the child and the adolescent of to-day has to build his spiritual habitation. The task is formidable and there is a

crying need for all the help that education is capable of providing.

Schools, however, are themselves deeply affected by the dilemma faced by the societies they serve. The purposes they strive to realise are those acceptable to the communities which nourish them —and when the latter fail to find coherent and compatible ideals, the schools are largely reduced to impotence. For example, in the home and the Church, every effort is made by precept and example to teach the young to be loving, helpful, and co-operative. The school and the business world, however, foster competition and individualism. Or again: young people are stimulated to desire early economic independence since it is only by earning their own living that they can become free from the tutelage of their seniors and secure a fully adult, respected status. At the same time, all sorts of obstacles are put in their way: the period of training and education lengthens continually; salary scales are arranged so as to favour the old and the childless. Or, as a last example, consider the enormous stress which is laid in films, advertisements, novels, radio, and even in school and home on the importance of 'getting on', making a lot of money, and becoming rich. It seems to young people that only through wealth can happiness and full freedom be secured. Yet, at the same time, the growth of large-scale industry and of bureaucratic organisation make the path to fortune an increasingly difficult one. To stimulate material wants excessively, while offering inadequate satisfactions, leads to unhappiness and frustration.

Plural Societies

Evidently, in the above passages, we have deliberately exaggerated in order to make the central problem clear. We have spoken of "a society that is organised, highly inter-dependent, impersonal, and institutional; a society in which social contacts are usually secondary rather than primary, personal status is insecure, change is accepted as the order of the day, the tempo of life is quickened beyond the dreams of a hundred years ago, individual culture is variegated, and the future is always unsure."[2] Adolescents growing up in this complex and heterogeneous culture seek value standards that will guide them, and they seek them from those they love and respect. What do they find? Let us quote Margaret Mead's amusing account[3]:

> . . A girl's father may be a Presbyterian, an imperialist, a vegetarian, a teetotaller a believer in the open shop and a high tariff, who believes that woman's place is in the home, that young girls should . not smoke, nor go riding with young men in the evening. But her mother's father may be a Low Episcopalian, a believer in high living,

[2] Quoted from *The Social Studies in General Education* (Appleton Century, 1940).

[3] *Coming of Age in Samoa*, by Margaret Mead (William Morrow); copyright U.S.A. 1928.

a strong advocate of States' Rights and the Monroe Doctrine, who reads Rabelais, likes to go to musical shows and horse races. Her aunt is an agnostic, an ardent advocate of woman's rights, an internationalist who rests all her hopes on Esperanto, is devoted to Bernard Shaw, and spends her spare time in campaigns of anti-vivisection. Her elder brother, whom she admires exceedingly, has just spent two years at Oxford. He is an Anglo-Catholic, and enthusiastic concerning all things mediaeval, writes mystical poetry, reads Chesterton,. and means to devote his life to seeking for the lost secret of mediaeval stained glass. Her mother's younger brother is an engineer, a strict materialist, who never recovered from reading Haeckel in his youth; he scorns art, believes that science will save the world, scoffs at everything that was said and thought before the nineteenth century, and ruins his health by experiments in the scientific elimination of sleep. Her mother is of a quietistic frame of mind, very much interested in Indian philosophy, a pacifist, a strict non-participator in life, who in spite of her daughter's devotion to her will not make any move to enlist her enthusiasms. And this may be within the girl's own household. Add to it the groups represented, defended, advocated by her friends, her teachers, and the books which she reads by accident, and the list of possible enthusiasms, of suggested allegiances, incompatible with one another becomes appalling.

Let it not be thought that such puzzling situations exist only in industrial societies of the Western type. On the contrary—things are worse still in Africa and Asia. Here, whole populations are being called upon to change in a few short years from the stone axe to the aeroplane or from Confucianism to Marxism. Here cultures and religions clash openly and people are pulled in several directions at once. Industrial white man and rural black or brown man face one another and fail to understand one another. Dr. Beecher, in his article on Kenya, discusses one such situation, and the article on South Africa describes another, perhaps even more difficult. But the truth is that all countries, all societies, are nowadays plural. Antagonistic cultures, diverging creeds, incompatible beliefs face and affront one another. The old and the new; the urban and the rural; the scientific and the pre-scientific live together in the mind and in the heart of each of us. Everywhere men look for a secure compass, a fixed set of value-judgments, a guide relevant to the situations they face.

Incentives and Moral Education

We have had in mind so far chiefly the effect of changing social conditions on habitual actions. There is a further aspect which has a direct and immediate bearing on all this: that of incentives. In many countries of the Western world, the old goads to work and to moral action have gone or, at least, their sharpness has been blunted. The penalties of poverty have been diminished, over-employment means that even slackers need no longer fear being thrown out of work, social security measures diminish the penalties for extravagance and laziness, the police force is gentler in its methods than it was, prisons have become somewhat less terrifying places. Accompanying, and indeed reflecting, these ameliorations,

schools too have grown into more pleasant places where children are treated with gentleness and kindness. Physical punishment—whipping, caning, birching, slapping—is very rarely or never administered; insults, browbeating, nagging by teachers are somewhat rare; bullying and fighting among the children in the playground are frowned upon by the staff. Teachers rely on kindness, praise, tolerance, reasoning—often, it must be admitted, with results which are far from satisfactory. Bad work, slackness, rudeness may earn no more than a mild reproof. The more general adoption, too, of progressive methods of teaching, aiming at freedom and self-government, should, in theory, lead to more strenuous and purposeful effort but, sometimes, because badly planned, it produces instead a lazy, lackadaisical, careless atmosphere conducive to waste of time.

No one but a brute would express regret at the growth of kindliness, amiability, and freedom, or at the decay of cruelty and brutality. But, yet, we feel that we should here note that, just as in society at large, so also in the schools, the old incentives have gone before people have become sensitive and responsive to the new. In addition, psychologists are of the opinion that the effect of punishment and reward upon the growing personality is a more complex matter than might be thought, and some go so far as to assert that harsh treatment of the young may not be as unmixed an evil in its ultimate results as most of us suppose. Without going into these obscure and controversial matters, we should at least point out that there is a close connection between incentives and moral education. Indeed, from one point of view, we might almost say that the central problem of moral education is precisely that of discovering ways of sensitising human beings to high and worthy incentives to right, moral, and ethical conduct.

There is here wide open a vast field of research to which not only analytical, individual, and social psychologists, but also practical teachers could make a contribution. It is satisfying to note that the British Ministry of Education some years ago called the attention of the National Foundation for Educational Research to this problem of rewards and punishments.

The Effect of Wars

There is yet one facet which we have not mentioned. Many countries—a growing number, alas—have during the last thirty years experienced total war and occupation by foreign troops. The effect of this on the mental health and moral values accepted by the young was considered at some length in the 1948 YEAR BOOK, and it must suffice here to recall some of the main points. Factors such as forced evacuation or deportation; the presence of enemy soldiers; bombing; shock due to arrests or murders; the absence of the father, and the break-up of the family combine to shake

the feeling of security necessary for healthy and balanced growth towards maturity, while the disruption of the family greatly weakens its possible beneficent effect. Further, resistance to the invader often serves to weaken the social restrictions, customs, and traditions that are essential to the preservation of moral values. Children's powers of discrimination are too immature to draw fine distinctions between what is legal and illegal, right and wrong, in different sets of circumstances, and to recognise the moral necessity for a law-abiding way of life while forced by necessity of a different kind to pursue unlawful activities. For those who see lives saved by lying, what stigma can be attached to untruth? Lying indeed may become an act of sublime heroism—lying may spare parents anxiety; dishonesty and cunning may obtain food for them. Again, children often witnessed their parents trading in the black market and learnt that the law might be an obstacle standing in the way of the family getting enough to eat. What of a law which was backed and enforced by the enemy?

Starting as a means of obtaining food, money-making often becomes for some children a habit and an end in itself. There may be few other examples before their eyes than that of everyone around concerned with this same problem of earning enough to satisfy hunger. An adolescent, considering the example given by the adults around him, may be proud of his skill in putting through difficult transactions and may congratulate himself on his astuteness. It may never enter his head that it is wrong to get the better of another, to cheat or to scrounge. What little moral or spiritual training he has been given may appear to bear little relation to life as he sees it.

Even worse, the young may actually witness and participate in acts of revenge, brutality, cruelty, or murder. In the eyes of a great number ' Might ' and ' Right ' tend to become synonymous.

In brief, the experiences, at first or second hand, of fighting, of war, and of enemy occupation, produce widespread apathy towards moral values and spiritual ideals, they accustom everyone to brutality and cruelty, they weaken respect for law and right. At the same time, the institutions which educate men in civilised ways are to some degree corrupted: the courts of law, for example, may no longer protect the weak against the strong, but instead may become instruments of oppression. And institutions, such as the family, which hand on to the young moral insight, and valuable rules of conduct, are disrupted and disintegrated. The results are clear: growth of delinquency, dishonesty, lying, fraud, theft, crime. The child or adolescent learns by copying his elders as well as by listening to and taking to heart the precepts taught by moral leaders. What happens, however, when the examples given do not deserve imitation and when the voices of the leaders sound muffled and confused? What worthwhile lessons can now be learned from

teachers such as the popular press, the glossy magazines, the cheap 'comics', the sensational cinema?

The Growing Activity of the State

In her article, Miss P. M. Doyle considers the combined effects on the personality of the factors mentioned above. And she draws attention to another which has not yet been fully taken into account by sociologists—the growing activity of the state apparatus and of the bureaucracy. The results of such activity, in many obvious respects, are altogether good: material security and well-being are increased by it; medical and dental services become available to all; schools and hospitals are built; the old, the weak, the sick are better looked after; parks and museums are provided. But in subtle ways, and rather unexpectedly, results follow which are the opposite of what was desired. Feelings of personal responsibility and of the need for individual endeavour are weakened; respect for property diminishes; opportunities for cheating the public purse grow and are taken advantage of; saving money and resources seems less important. Children are more and more removed from the healthful atmosphere of the home and to an ever greater extent become wards of the state. The close unity of the family is still further loosened.

Another point, connected with this, is of particular importance in this study. One aspect of the modern state's activity is the provision, at public expense and under public control, of a comprehensive system of schools attended by all the children. It would seem clear that these schools should concern themselves very actively with moral education. Historically, however, moral education has always been closely associated with religious instruction and in most countries more than one religion is practised by large fractions of the population. The state, in many cases, has found it well to maintain absolute neutrality in religious matters, and this policy, of course, is reflected in the public schools. As a result, explicit moral as well as religious training may get left out, or nearly so, from the normal curriculum of such schools, even though teachers do their best to look after the development of character and though moral training may be given informally. Again, before the days of compulsory and universal education, any religious denomination which could find the necessary money was able to set up a school and did so without great difficulty. Now, however, religious bodies find it hard to obtain the funds necessary to develop a school system and for the most part they ardently desire to obtain public money without losing control. In many, if not most, countries this question of the control of schools and of state subsidies to schools provided by the religious denominations is extremely acute and has powerful repercussions. We return to it later in this study, and

here we shall merely note that it provides yet one more instance of the complications created by the state's own activities.

The Decay of Faith in Religion

In spite of such conflicts, there is fairly general and growing conviction that the formation of the moral and ethical personality is an important part of the business of any school. It is possible that the training appropriate to such an aim could be given without any reference to any religious creed—but, for the most part, teachers do not in fact know how to give it in that way. In the traditions of most countries, a plea for strengthening the moral aims of education is taken as implying a demand for more and improved religious instruction.

Yet, in this twentieth century, to demand a more openly avowed religious purpose in education and a greater place for religious instruction raises a major difficulty and a great danger. The difficulty is that many people feel that the advance of science and the triumph of scientific modes of thought have made traditional religions obsolete and irrelevant—proved them, so to speak, to be wrong and harmful. The danger is that by stressing religion and making people more clearly aware of doctrine we may deepen the existing cleavages inside each nation and, equally bad, intensify the gulf between Christian, Marxist, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu nations—this at a time when the world must move towards political unity or perish. Religion, in a word, which should pull men more closely together may prove an element of conflict—a divisive rather than a uniting force. And this may result from the fact that, as a rule, religious education aims not only at intensifying man's response to his cosmic environment but also at developing an understanding of particular forms of that response.

It is with the object chiefly of studying these two questions that we invited the experts, whose contributions we print in the first part of this YEAR BOOK, to express their views on the relations between their own religious systems or scientific disciplines on the one hand and moral education on the other. With regard to our difficulty—the impact of science on religious thought—it is clear that none of our contributors in fact finds any real clash. It is true that during the last century a number of discoveries of great importance have been made—the theory of evolution and analytical psychology, to name only two—which have made necessary a reformulation of certain parts of religious doctrine, just as did the acceptance of Copernican and Galilean astronomy and cosmology at an earlier time. After all, every religious system embodies in itself a view not only of the metaphysical nature of man but also of the physical constitution of the universe. The latter, however, is as a rule merely taken over, often rather uncritically, from the commonplace outlook of contemporary science. Its connection

with the central doctrines, dealing with faith and morals, is somewhat remote and, to some degree, fortuitous. Enlightened religious leaders never hesitate to separate matters of scientific fact from the rest of their beliefs and they are usually ready to employ to the full the most recent findings of science—as the observers and calendar-makers of the Vatican employed Copernican theory in the sixteenth century.

This particular question—the relation between science and religion—has already been rather fully discussed and explored in numberless volumes.[4] The other point, alluded to earlier on, whether the different religious or humanist systems existing in the world to-day pull in different directions or whether, indeed, they contain a common core capable of serving as a unifying and integrative principle, needs closer study.

Classification of the Points of View

Philosophers and theologians consider there are three possible sources of knowledge: experience, reason, revelation. Religious men accept all three but, on the whole, ascribe the highest value to the third. Experience is derived from contact with a world created by God and reason is the reflection of the divine spirit in the human mind: therefore both rank below a direct revelation of the divine purpose. Some philosophers and scientists tend to reject direct revelation as a source of knowledge, though they are not necessarily atheists on that account. Some go further and assert that belief in God and in revelation, both being human responses, must be tested by reason and experience before being either accepted or rejected. In all cases, however, the three sources are distinguished and the 'truths' derived from them are given different weighting in accordance with the general point of view adopted.

We need not discuss the fundamental problem of the *prima causa*: it will suffice if we accept this distinction of the three sources. Correspondingly, we find that our contributors can be classified into two main groups. Some base their conclusions on experience and reason alone; others, while accepting and using these, rely in the last resort upon revelation. Both groups, of course, use experience and reason selectively. Scientists engaged in proving some hypothesis may disregard 'irrelevant' experience, and theologians may ignore scientific facts if it looks as though these contradict direct revelation. But whilst in the first case the fallacies can be made plain by further experience or closer reasoning, in the second case faith can never be disproved, since it rests upon a free act of the believer who accepts an inner experience beyond the sphere of reasoning. Here, then, we meet a first division among possible approaches to moral problems. Anthro-

[4] We would note here the remarkable volumes published since 1941 in New York by the *Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion.*

pologists, sociologists, psychologists, secular humanists, and Marxians do not assume revelation as a valid source of knowledge, and their fallacies are thus the result of insufficient experience or faulty reasoning. Theological fallacies, on the other hand, are the result of accepting as direct revelation something which is not revelation or else arises from a wrong interpretation of a true revelation. Since *errare humanum est,* there is a great variety of religious philosophies which often contradict and oppose one another. We do not draw a sceptical conclusion from this—on the contrary. Consistent scepticism, denying not only absolute values but even a relative graduation of values, is not represented at all in our symposium. It is questionable whether such a point of view could be held consistently and, in any case, it could give no help in solving a problem the very existence of which it denies.

The first of our two groups, consisting of those who accept what might be called a 'secular' point of view, is represented by those whose approach is anthropological, sociological, psychological, humanist, or Marxian. Historical religions represent the religious point of view. All the branches of Christianity—Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Anglicanism, Calvinism, Lutheranism, and the minor denominations, not represented in the symposium for lack of space —are revealed religious traditions based on the Bible. Judaism is a revealed religion based on the Old Testament and the Talmud, Islam a revealed religion based on Koran and Hadith and accepting the Bible as well. Buddhism and Hinduism should also be considered as based on revelation and undoubtedly belong to the religious group. A certain doubt may be expressed concerning the classification of Confucianism. In fact it is a philosophy of life and not a religion. However, Confucianism has acquired all the attributes of a religious tradition, and although its central books do not assume direct revelation, it is more akin to the second group than to the first.

The secular approach to the problem starts with the assertion, in Professor Farrington's words, "that the unifying principle of humanistic education could not be sought in a supernatural revelation. Equally inadmissible [he continues] is the claim that there is a system of values universally recognised at all times and in all places." We must point out the careful wording of this statement. It does not blandly deny the possible existence of revelation or of a system of absolute values, it simply states the fact that both the revelation and historically conditioned values are not *universally* recognised and therefore cannot serve as the foundation of a *unifying* principle of education. By implication it admits that a chief problem of moral education consists in finding unifying principles, which would be universally recognised. Our Marxian contributor says quite plainly: "Every moral theory, historically conditioned and relative, contributes to the elucidation

of the universal morality of the future and in that sense contains an element of the absolute." Thus our secularists, whether humanists, scientists, or Marxians, whilst denying the *a priori* accepted absolute values, do not deny, it appears, a system of relative values graded in their historical evolution and capable of being improved. They are all, in fact, in search of 'unifying principles', but confine their search to the *civitas terrestra* and surrounding nature. The anthropologist hopes to find these principles in the study of primitive tribes, thus observing their first appearance; the sociologist analyses social phenomena, hoping to find the basic laws of social life; the psychologist in his analysis delves into the depth of the human mind, hoping to find there the unifying explanation of human behaviour; and finally the Marxian, in his economic interpretation of history, is in search of the same thing. The secular humanist, often an adherent of philosophical idealism, comes nearer than others to the religious point of view in his appreciation of the cultural historical heritage. None of them, however, denies the actual importance of religious beliefs as one of the factors moulding human destiny. All simply state that the revelation, as historically known, cannot supply the universal principles of which they are in search. For them such principles should be based on experience and reason alone. By the unavoidable necessity of division of labour each of them concentrates on some aspect of human life with comparative neglect of other aspects. Whether the predominant factor thus selected be cultural, sociological, psychological, or economic, it is evident, to an unbiased observer, that taken in isolation it is not sufficient to explain the totality of human life. But each of them pursued by experts with the efficiency of modern scientific methods opens a new vista leading to a better and more complete understanding of human beings both as individuals and as social communities. These separate approaches, however necessary and enlightening, lack an integration of the studies of the varied sides of human nature into one philosophy of life. And when these secular experts attempt an integration they inadvertently build their philosophy on too narrow a foundation.

The religious approach quite candidly confesses that experience and reason unaided by revelation may lead to the recognition of absolute values, but adds that this recognition will be so vague and undefined that it will never lead to a strong conviction of their positive and particular content. Only faith and direct revelation of the divine purpose can fill the vague idea of the Absolute with positive and intimately felt content. If there had been only one revealed religion, universally believed, this position would have been unassailable. An approach to that situation was attained in mediaeval Christendom, and it is no wonder that many Christians feel a nostalgia for the Middle Ages. In modern times, however, the weakness

of the religious approach lies in the fact that there are so many rival claims for the universality of some particular revelation, and in the inability of believers to agree among themselves on the interpretation of each historical revelation. Although each particular religious tradition succeeds in presenting a consistent philosophy of life, the 'universality' of it is not universally recognised. Moreover, the interpretation of the revelation, by using experience and reason, is unavoidably influenced by the results of secular scientific and historical research, and thus unconsciously or even consciously adapts the revelation to more modern views. This modernisation and adaptation is still going on in all religious traditions; in all branches of Christianity, in Judaism and Islam, in Buddhism and Hinduism, and even in the ethical teachings of Confucius. We observe, therefore, a gradual convergence of various points of view. The more the secularists become expert in their special approach, the more do they recognise its limitations and its insufficiency for the explanation of the totality of human existence. The believers of all religions, influenced by secular research and modernising their interpretation of the revelation, approach each other and the secularists to a degree which not so long ago would have been deemed quite impossible. Yet the dividing line remains and the fundamental gulf is unbridgeable. They believe in the direct revelation, whilst the secularists do not. But mutual intransigence has lost its previous embittered character. On both sides we notice a conciliatory attitude. The point where they all meet is the recognition of freedom of conscience, the freedom of the act of faith or of unbelief. We find ample evidence of this attitude in many contributions to our symposium. Even the open hostility of Marxians to any religion has given place to a peaceful co-existence of the Communist Party and the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. Thus we sincerely believe that the way is open for a search for a common ground.

The Nature of Man

The most important conception which is the foundation of all theory and practice of moral training is the interpretation of the nature of man. Was man, whether created by God or evolved from a lower species, originally pure and innocent? Has he become depraved as the result of an original Fall or as a result of having to live in an increasingly corrupt society? Or is he simply a *tabula rasa,* on which anything can be written? It is just here that different points of view used to clash most irreconcilably. If a new-born child, like a primitive savage, is originally pure and innocent and only subsequently corrupted by adult society, then Rousseau in his *Émile* is right, and the best moral training is the freedom of natural growth without the intervention of adult-made codes. If, on the contrary, every child is

depraved by 'original sin', then the orthodox Calvinists are right, and the best way is to impose strict discipline. If finally the child is a *tabula rasa,* then the physical and social environment is decisive and the Soviet scientists are right in asserting that by a suitable change in the environment new traits can be, so to speak, created. Recent research in all fields of scientific investigation, as it appears to us, have made all three points quite untenable in their original rigidity—a fact recognised both by modern theologians and modern scientists. Not one of our contributors holds such extreme views. As a rule they accept the duality of human nature and represent the human personality as a hierarchy of powers. It is not a new conception: Plato already divided the human mind into three hierarchically co-ordinated powers, and the Christian division into body, mind, and soul is also hierarchical.

The duality of human nature is common ground in all religions. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, following the Old Testament, believe that man was created by God in His image, after His likeness, and afterwards through disobedience he fell into an 'original sin' which is inherited by all human beings. Thus man harbours in himself the seeds both of good and of evil: human life becomes a constant struggle for supremacy between the two. Under the influence of St. Augustine, some Christian theologians, Calvin for instance, exaggerated the dominance of 'original sin' and considered human nature as essentially depraved. Modern theologians, however, reject this view as well as Calvin's doctrine of predestination. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that many theologians nowadays are not averse to appealing to anthropological and psycho-analytical research in order to back their conception of human nature. On the other hand, anthropologists and psychologists have come to acknowledge the duality of human nature and the presence of opposite sides within it. According to the former, the primitive tribe from the start adopts two codes of behaviour, one directed 'inside', towards its own members, and another directed 'outside', towards strangers. Within the tribe, love, honesty, self-sacrifice, and respect for human life are accepted as the code of behaviour, which is promoted by tradition and training. Outside the tribe, murder, deceit, hatred, and cruelty may be allowed. In his *Essays,* Sir Arthur Keith argues that this duality of behaviour is the necessary consequence of the biological law of evolution. In order to fulfil its evolutionary destiny the tribe must live in isolation for thousands of years, and any physical or cultural intermingling with 'outsiders' would defeat that end. Hence the two codes of behaviour observed in the primitive tribe. Having thus evolved from biological necessity, the two attitudes have become permanent features in the human mind and later gave rise to the notions of good and evil. The anthropologist, however, does not consider this original duality of codes from an

ethical point of view. Neither was the 'inside' code good, nor the 'outside' code evil. They were just two sides of evolutionary adaptation. Gradually small tribes formed larger groups through conquest and amalgamation, and the application of the 'inside' code was extended to larger areas and larger communities. With the appearance of multinational and multiracial empires the 'inside' code became the law of the empire and gradually acquired a 'universal' character. With the birth of universal religions the application of the 'inside' code was extended to the whole human race and a moral judgment was pronounced declaring the 'inside' code good and the 'outside' code evil. But the influence of the 'outside' code was strongly implanted in the human mind, and often side-tracked the universality of religions themselves. Schisms and reformations split the universal religion into warring factions and resulted in the persecution of heretics and in religious wars. Modern nationalism is thus in some ways a reversion to a tribal code.

Although with widespread miscegenation and the disappearance of tribal isolation the original purpose of the 'outside' code has lost its meaning, it still remains as a strong impulse in human behaviour. But now it is recognised as a source of evil. The most advanced and civilised nations may, however, fall victims to this influence, as the recent crude outbreak of Nazism in Germany shows. Until the 'inside' code becomes truly universal and completely subdues the influence of the 'outside' code, the duality of human nature as seen by the anthropologist on the social plane will remain.

The psycho-analysts, through the study of mental disorders, have come to the conclusion that the human mind is not a harmonious whole but is hierarchically constructed. There are two main parts: the conscious part, amenable to reason, and the subconscious part, which exercises its influence independently of reason. Unsocial behaviour, crime, and mental disorders are the result of the struggle between the two. The complicated hierarchy of 'Libido', 'Ego', 'Censor', and the rest created by Freud and his pupils also implies 'good' and 'evil' sides in human nature. Some theologians are even tempted to identify the conscious part with the divine reflection and the subconscious part with 'original sin'. As a matter of fact, the Freudian 'libido' is in some ways akin to St. Augustine's *concupiscentia.* Thus Christian religious thought and secular research appear to converge in the acceptance of human dualism. It is not a peculiar feature of our Western civilisation closely bound with the Christian tradition. Judaism and Islam both accept the doctrine of 'original sin', and other Oriental religions have similar conceptions: the struggle between Ormuzd and Ahriman is a Persian formulation. Confucianism, the least dogmatic of all great religions, also accepts the original duality of

man and connects it with ideas of good and evil. Even the economic interpretation of history by the Marxians is not free from this moral dichotomy of human nature. Capitalist exploitation based on the egoistic motive of profit represents the evil side, whilst the classless society based on the ideal of social service represents the good. The class war may thus be interpreted as the war between the two sides of man, " the struggle between falsehood and truth ", as our Marxian contributor says.

Universality of Ideals

Human nature provides the raw material; moral ideals, the form into which it should be moulded. Tribal morality, as we have seen, resulted in a dual code which has impeded the peaceful evolution of humanity in the past and is a hindrance at present. The necessity of a universally valid and accepted code is recognised by all religious and secular philosophies of education. But here we come to a fact which at first appears an insurmountable obstacle. There is not a single religion or ideology which in predictable time may become universally recognised and accepted. They all claim universal validity, but base their claims on assumptions unacceptable to others. Let us analyse the claims and assumptions in our attempt at finding a common ground.

The three monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—base the universality of their moral ideals on the direct revelation of His purpose by the Universal God. All three accept the Old Testament as the basis of that revelation. This collection of writings has often been interpreted as a revelation addressed only to the Hebrews and thus having a limited character with the features of a tribal religion, with its two codes. Dr. Roth in his article convincingly shows that there were indeed two levels in the Old Testament—a tribal and a universal, but that the universal level embraced and surpassed the tribal. However, the tribal part of Judaism was always an obstacle to its universal acceptance. Historically, Judaism has remained the religion of an isolated minority, but two outgrowths from it, Christianity and Islam, were addressed to the whole of mankind from their very beginnings. Nevertheless, one must confess that remnants of the tribal code persist. In spite of the fact mentioned by Dr. Meguid that " Islam is considered to be a religion suitable for all communities and all ages ", the Koran contains passages implying definite distinction in right behaviour towards Muslims and towards unbelievers. Thus, there is the command: "Fight those who do not believe in God and in the day of judgment ", which was interpreted by some Muslims as involving the duty of killing unbelievers. Christianity, on the other hand, is unequivocal in this respect, and its moral code draws no such distinctions. Of course, the history of Christian communities has often displayed the crude reappearance of the tribal code—but

this was always an openly acknowledged perversion of the original faith.

The universalism of Christianity has dominated Western civilisation for a thousand years. As Father D'Arcy remarks, "We are for the most part unconscious how deeply we have been affected by Christian philosophy . . . the presuppositions of our law, of our customs and habits, our attitude to women and children and to family life . . . are, in reality, ingrained habits formed by centuries of Christian teaching." This is true not only of Western idealistic and rationalist philosophies, but even of the clearly secularist and materialist approach of the Marxians. It is doubtful whether modern Socialism and Communism could have grown on any soil but one, like the European, permeated by Christian tradition. Chiliastic expectations of the Kingdom of God here on earth are of Christian origin and do not lose their appeal when camouflaged by a scientific or Marxian vocabulary.

The secularists have discarded traditional belief in the revelation, but they have retained both the universality and the ethical teaching of Christianity. If we divest the Marxian Communist morality of its technical terminology it amounts to a restatement of Christian morality. Boris Ziherl says: "It is the proletariat which gathers in the most complete way the cultural heritage of the past and transmits it to future generations. It creates conditions for the realisation of the most generous aspirations of past generations to form a truly universal and humane morality, in the fullest sense of the word, the morality of a classless society." Certainly both Christians and Communists, when wielding political power, use all kinds of sophistications to justify straying from the universal ideal so solemnly declared. However, we are not here discussing political actualities, but moral ideals. The real difference between the Christians and secularists is not in their acceptance or rejection of absolute universal ideals, but in their attitude towards the revelation of this ideal. Whereas the Christians believe that universal absolute truth was completely revealed in the historical fact of the life and death of Jesus, the secularists believe that the absolute truth is not 'given' but 'posed' (*aufgegeben*, not *gegeben*, in Hegelian terms). As Boris Ziherl says: "Man progresses through an infinite series of relative truths towards the recognition of the absolute existence—towards the absolute truth which he will never attain in all its completeness." The believers in revelation conceive morality as static, whilst the secularists represent it as a dynamic force or, if one may so express it, as a constant and gradual revelation of the absolute ideal.

What is this universal morality spoken of by all our contributors? It was clearly stated in the sermon on the mount: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." Or as Kant said: "Each maxim of behaviour must be

tested by practical reason as if it were a universal natural law." If that test is applied no dual code is possible and the tribal attitude is surmounted. Whether we believe that this truth was originally revealed through Christ or attained by our own logical reasoning based on experience is of no great importance as regards its application to social life. We do not minimise the fundamental difference between believers and unbelievers, but if a universal truth can be recognised by all without being indissolubly associated with a revelation it should not be rejected. Thomist theology accepts this position and, as Father D'Arcy says: "The groundwork is laid by reason, and in the strictly philosophical treatises on Ethics by Catholic thinkers no appeal is made to any authority outside reason." Once a universal code is accepted it is possible for men of different creeds and ideologies to live peacefully together in the same community. Thus universality of ideals presupposes tolerance towards different traditions and diverging religious or philosophic conceptions. What is rejected most decisively is the dual code with its intolerance towards 'outsiders'. It is interesting to note that this view finds support in C. S. Lewis's book *The Abolition of Man.* Lewis collected a number of leading values, on the importance of which universally recognised sages and religious teachers from different culture-areas agree. He lists them as follows:

(1) The law of beneficence: to show goodwill towards all other human beings is virtuous. To do murder is evil.

(2) The law of justice and good faith: honesty, truthfulness, sexual justice.

(3) The law of mercy.

(4) The law of magnanimity: the virtues of courage and loyalty.

(5) The law prescribing duties to parents, to elders, and to children.

Freedom and Discipline

Even if one found general agreement regarding the nature of the fundamental values which all men must accept and endeavour to apply if human civilisation is to endure and flourish, there would remain the problem of securing their acceptance by all. Should they be, can they be, enforced by law, and can power, say the power of the state, be invoked on their behalf? Here we find an unambiguously negative answer given by all. To use force to compel acceptance destroys the thing itself which one wishes to see accepted. To be universally recognised the universal morality must be based on an experience shared by all and on reasoning evident to all. Religious persons must not impose on others beliefs which owe their value and validity only to an inner experience of contact with God, which those others may not have had. Nor should secularists impose on others, who feel it as an outrage, their

rejection of revelation. The act of acceptance or rejection must, in each case, be free and independent if it is to be moral. According to Kant's definition, to follow a universal code under the external constraint of physical power or social authority may make the behaviour legal but not moral. Historically this distinction is of Christian origin and it is accepted by theologians, as is clear from the articles by Father Zenkovsky and Professor Vialatoux. All moral behaviour, therefore, is a function of a free human spirit, free not merely in the negative sense of freedom from constraint, but free in the positive sense of being able to accept or reject the universal law. Elucidating this conception Kant used the Greek terms of *heteronomy* and *autonomy*. Heteronomy of the will does not lead to universally valid values, as it is opposed to the principle of morality itself. The autonomy of the will is the sole basis of moral law. This Kantian thesis is not entirely in agreement with Christian theology, which, whilst recognising the act of choice as the foundation of individual faith and morality, derives it from the grace of God. Both Kant and modern theologians recognise, however, that to arrive at this stage of freedom a long apprenticeship is needed, whether in individual or in social life. There is no easy single jump from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom. Before autonomy is reached the will must be disciplined and trained. The Marxians accept this sequence of stages but interpret them in social terms. Society has to be subjected to dictatorship before it can attain freedom or autonomy. Here we note a deep difference of approach. Religious traditions and idealistic philosophy conceive the final goal of freedom in an individual sense. Each individual has to be disciplined in order to choose freely on his own responsibility. Marxians contend that only social communities possess this right of free choice: the individual must submit and conform. The individual has freedom of thought and of faith, but not of action.

The application of Kantian ideas to moral education was elaborated by Paul Natorp in his social pedagogics, and later by Sergius Hessen in his *Foundations of Pedagogics*.[5] Hessen's original idea was to relate the three stages of moral development, which he called 'anomy', 'heteronomy', and 'autonomy', to each of the three stages of human growth—childhood, adolescence, and maturity, and to give them an external expression in the organisation of education into a pre-school period (anomy, early childhood), school period (heteronomy, late childhood and adolescence), and higher education period (autonomy, maturity). Thus

[5] Professor Sergius Hessen is well known to our readers by his two outstanding contributions to the volumes of 1948 and 1949. The editors invited him to contribute to this volume a special study on moral education, and he gladly consented. To our deep regret, Professor Hessen died in Lodz on June 2nd, 1950, and his article remained unwritten.—EDITORS.

Hessen reconciled the apparent contradiction between discipline and freedom. Discipline is a preliminary training for freedom: without such a goal it degenerates into mechanical drill and intellectual indoctrination. Freedom, autonomy, is unattainable without preliminary disciplining of the will and intellect. We see in the article by Father Zenkovsky the adaptation of such ideas to orthodox theology, although this is only a part of his exposition of the orthodox point of view. The importance of the free act as the basis of faith and morality is emphasised also by Catholic and Protestant alike. On this point, theologians and philosophers, Christians and secularists, converge and can find a common ground. Unfortunately, not all actual realisations of this ideal follow it in practice. Both Christian and secular political leaders in their practice in some countries remain in the stage of heteronomy and thus in fact deny the individual citizen real freedom of choice. In our analysis of actual situations in various countries this point is elucidated.

Morals and Ideals

A human society consists of persons who, in their mutual relations, follow well-understood and generally-accepted patterns of behaviour which are always, at least to some degree, formalised; that is, there is a body of custom, of habit, of etiquette—what are called the *mores* of the group. Since action can never become completely routinised, absolutely standardised, there are bound to be departures from the normal. These are judged and evaluated in the light of principles or standards not merely of behaviour but of right behaviour. The departures will be approved if it can be shown that they were motivated by a desire to model behaviour in accordance with an ideal pattern to which high value is generally attached.

The *mores* have thus at least two aspects. They consist in part of techniques and skills, modes of behaviour, which have to be learned, chiefly by imitation. The other, the internal, part consists of ways of thinking and feeling about actions and possible actions —and these mental patterns also have to be acquired by a process of learning and adaptation. In simple communities, all forms of education—physical, technical, social, and moral—are closely united, and the whole group functions as the educating unit. There are occasional ceremonies at which the more formalised and doctrinal parts of the code are presented to all with solemnity and ritual, in order to ensure their continued effectiveness.

In the course of time, and with growing leisure, human beings have also formulated beliefs about the nature of man and of his relations to the unseen powers behind visible phenomena. Such religious or philosophical systems, it seems, have no necessary connection with *mores*: it is not universally assumed that 'right conduct' is 'conduct pleasing to the gods'. Only in religious

traditions affiliated to the Judaic is this connection thought of as essential, and even then the social and moral content of religious teaching has been accorded primacy only in some varieties of Christian Protestantism. In the light of these facts, and considering the urgency of the need for bringing about a higher degree of cultural and political unification than exists in the world, it is pleasing to have been able to note, as we have done in preceding paragraphs, that all world religions agree on certain fundamentals, and that the moral codes taught in different parts of the world have a common core of belief about what sort of conduct is right.

We have just noted that in simple communities the *mores,* the codes, the religions, are so to speak acquired or imbibed by imitation and participation, as well as by simply listening to the precepts, proverbs, and wise sayings repeated by adults. In the more complex societies, as various institutions crystallise out, this largely unplanned handing-on of the traditions no longer suffices. Learning still goes on in the home, the workshop, the gang, the club, the market. But more and more does the church or temple, the centre of the religious life of the society, and the associated religious corporation, look upon it as their proper business to educate the young in the correct manner of worshipping the gods and, at first incidentally, to learn about right conduct to man.

The Control of Schools

The first schools everywhere grew up and developed in the shadow of the temples and were controlled by the priests. Even in mediaeval Europe, the provision and supervision of elementary education were entrusted to the parish priests, while the control of secondary education, whether provided by individuals, by city councils, or by other groups, was placed in the hands of the bishops of each diocese. The Reformation, while leading to the development of a partnership between Church and state in the provision of educational facilities, left control to the ecclesiastical authorities. With the rise of national states, however, and especially after the Industrial Revolution, a new feature appears: the state claims the right not only to provide money for schools at all levels but to control and supervise their operation. In 1794, the fundamental law of Prussia stated that " schools and universities are state institutions charged with the instruction of youth in useful information and scientific knowledge. Such institutions may be founded only with the knowledge and consent of the state ". In 1808, Napoleon's decree stated that " no school, no establishment of instruction whatsoever, may be set up outside the Imperial University and without the authorisation of its head ". It is easy to understand that such claims are always very strongly resented and resisted by the Churches. Those who control the schools determine what shall be taught and how: it is they who ultimately

decide what the new generations shall believe, and who mould their attitude to existing institutions. Guardians and defenders of their faith and of insights which they consider precious, the clerical corporations would be false to their trust and to themselves if they meekly submitted to the loss of such control. Yet they are in a difficult situation. On the one hand, they readily admit that the state has a duty to provide the schooling and training needed to maintain the economic and social well-being of the population and they would, indeed, welcome the opportunity of themselves taking charge of such education. On the other, the economic revolution which has been going on since the sixteenth century, first in one part of the world, then in another, weakens both their social and their financial resources precisely at a time when the demand for education grows more than ever before. They are thus forced to rely increasingly on the money provided by the state. Their problem is thus that of retaining full control of an expanding educational system while asking the state to accept an ever-growing burden. In a word, the desire of the Church is to call the tune, while leaving the state to pay the piper—the justification being that the latter has no musical tradition of its own and is largely tone-deaf.

Evidently, the whole of this question of the control of schools is but one aspect of the general problem of that relation of Church to state which, as the historian Ranke said, provides the content of history. And the nature of the solutions found and applied in each country depends upon a multitude of factors: historical development, nature and vitality of the religious traditions, degree of industrial development, origin and distribution of the population, political constellation, and so on. These are briefly described and analysed in the articles published in this volume. It will be found that they can be classified roughly into five principal categories.

Category 1.—This consists of states where the overwhelming majority of the population belongs to a single Church or religious denomination and where very few are actively hostile to it—for example, the Irish Republic, Portugal, Sweden, Pakistan. Here the situation is particularly simple, and no difficulties arise in reconciling the claims of Church and state, especially since the former is not particularly linked to any nationality, language, or political party. The schools include religious education and moral training in their curricula as a matter of course and in response to the general wish of the parents. The principle of freedom of conscience, however, is everywhere accepted by the provision, in the school laws, of a clause permitting parents to remove their children from the lessons on religion, if they wish. Under such conditions, whether the Church or the state actually and legally controls the school is felt to be a matter of small consequence. The exact solution adopted depends upon local circumstances. In

Sweden, where it is said that 98 per cent. of the population belong to the State Church, and where it is asserted that " the Swedish people as a whole, considered from a religious angle, is the Swedish Church ", only members of the Lutheran State Church may enter training colleges. Furthermore, the local school boards must see to it that the parents provide adequate religious instruction or permit their children to attend religious instruction in the public school. In the Irish Republic, deeply Roman Catholic, the authorities, conscious of the influence which the measures they adopt will have on the attitude of their English neighbours towards their own Catholic minority, insist on the rights of parents to determine the character of the education given to their children. In practice, the schools are completely Roman Catholic, but the small Protestant minority can maintain Protestant schools at public expense. In Pakistan, as the article by Abdul Ghafur Chaudhri shows, the state is increasingly committed to the propagation of Islam through its schools as the principal means of drawing together the widely separated eastern and western parts of the country. It is worth noting here that some states may be explicitly secular, in the sense that their Constitution says in so many words that it should remain entirely neutral in religious matters. Nevertheless, if the population is dominantly of one religion, it is likely that its schools will serve to propagate that religion especially if they come under the effective control of local school boards. For instance, village schools in the Indian Union will undoubtedly serve to maintain Hinduism, and schools in Siam, Buddhism.

Category 2.—This consists of countries in which only one religious denomination has a large number of adherents, but its claim to control education is repudiated by many citizens; for example—France and Belgium, where the whole population has a Roman Catholic background and the number of Protestants is very small, but where for historical reasons many have left the Church and describe themselves as free-thinkers, agnostics, humanists, or atheists. In such cases, it is customary to find at least two educational systems existing side by side—that of the state and that of the Church—and both are important. Often a fight rages round the question of public subsidies to the Catholic system, and the situation changes according to the political complexion of the government. Subsidies may be given to elementary and not to secondary schools; to intermediate but not to technical schools; they may be increased or withdrawn altogether.

It must be borne in mind, when considering such events, that quite often there may have been unavowed alliances between political parties and the Church. In Belgium, the Conservative Party was long called the Catholic Party and was originally started to defend and increase the financial subsidies given to the

Catholic schools—its opposition to the official schools is not yet extinguished. Thus, it is widely felt that to subsidise Catholic schools is to help one particular party to propagandise its beliefs among the young.

In theory, the official or state schools maintain absolute and rigid neutrality in religious and ethical matters. In practice, observers usually feel that, though most teachers do in fact endeavour to maintain this neutrality and to uphold their professional integrity, there is about the *écoles laïques* or *écoles officielles* a certain slightly aggressive non-religiosity which easily slips into an anti-religiosity. This is probably an inevitable result of the polarity introduced into the whole system by its marked duality and by the intervention of political influences. The point to be noted particularly is that the 'secular' schools of, say, the U.S.A. or Australia are very different in atmosphere from the *écoles laïques* of France. It should be added immediately that many supporters of the *école laïque* are distressed by the fact that the existence of the two systems tends to disrupt the nation, widening social and political cleavages, and by the further fact that the state school often pays too little attention to moral training.

Category 3.—This consists of countries where several religious denominations are found among the population, not one of them being really dominant, and none of them strongly objected to; for example, England, Scotland, the U.S.A., Australia, Canada, the Netherlands.

We should here distinguish two cases: either the population is, so to speak, nuclear as regards religious distribution (e.g. French Catholics in Quebec) or else the various denominations are evenly spread so that some members of them are found in all areas.

(*a*) In the former case, it is usually possible to find a way by which the whole, or nearly the whole, of the cost of denominational schools is met from public funds. The reason, presumably, is that the concentration of the population into religiously homogeneous groupings increases their political self-awareness and at the same time makes it possible to provide denominational schools without irritating too many citizens or without laying too heavy a burden upon the public purse. The exact nature of the arrangements varies from country to country.

In Canada, most Catholics are French-speaking and most of them live in Quebec. An interesting formula has been found for allocating the grants ear-marked for education as between Protestants and Catholics: the arrangement seems to work well. In Holland, the south is predominantly Catholic; the north, Protestant. In Scotland, Catholics tend to congregate in Glasgow and in some Highland districts. In both cases arrangements have been found which give satisfaction to the denominations. The conditions for success are: (i) the population as a whole must be

favourably inclined to education of a religious kind, (ii) the religious groups must be nucleated and not dispersed. The nature of the arrangements is that the public authority hands over part of its educational duties to religious bodies, treating all alike.

(*b*) In the second case, the various denominations are evenly spread and mixed. For instance, Catholics are found everywhere in Australia; while in almost every town and village of the United States one comes across several denominations. Where, as in England, the denominations had established school systems before the state set up its own, they may carry on with the aid of increasing subsidies. Elsewhere, as in the U.S.A. or Australia, quarrels among the denominations regarding the allocation of grants led to the establishment by the state of a secular system which is neutral in religious matters and which, in the course of time, has almost extinguished all others except the Roman Catholic. In the typical case, no grants whatever are paid to denominational schools, since this would mean infringing neutrality.

The nature of the 'secular' school in these countries is markedly different from that of the *écoles laïques* of France or of the Continent. No real deep-rooted hostility to religious teaching as such exists—rather the contrary. Nor are the denominations closely tied to particular political parties. The point is merely that the schools, so it is felt, should not proselytise at public expense for particular denominations. When, as in England, the various parties concerned can agree on a syllabus of religious instruction, dealing with the Christian beliefs common to them all, this is followed in the public schools—or, at least, can be considered for adoption. The article on New Zealand illustrates this point in a somewhat unusual way. In the U.S.A., however, this point is not conceded—and this for many reasons, chief of which is the fear of Roman Catholic influence felt by many.

A point worth noting is that many teachers and educators are unhappy about the secularisation of education, feeling that it weakens the influence of the school in the formation of social, moral, and spiritual ideals.

Category 4.—This consists of countries of various religious complexions where the state has established an educational monopoly, i.e. where no schools may be run without the close supervision of the public authorities. In all, the officially accepted doctrine is Marxist and this doctrine is taught in schools, a good deal of time being devoted to it. No teaching of the doctrines, say, of the Orthodox Church is permitted, but the Church is allowed to maintain, under state inspection, seminaries for the training and education of the clergy. The list of such countries includes the eastern European States, the republics of the Soviet Union, and China. In the last-named country, the instructions given by the new government state that education must be based on Marxism-Leninism and

the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung, "which are scientific, because they conform to the needs of the people . . . in particular education must be opposed to all religion, which is superstition."

It is worth noting that in some respects Category 4 represents one stage of Category 2. In countries which have established a state monopoly of education, the Church was at one time closely allied to conservative political parties. The present governments have come to power as a result of revolutionary action against the conservatives and the Church has lost many of its subsidiary institutions and privileges as a result.

Category 5.—This would be a list of countries, some of which would normally appear in other categories, where a special problem exists through the existence of schools established and maintained by authorities outside the country. For the most part these schools are mission schools run by religious denominations, but they may also be established by governmental agencies (for instance, there are French schools in Iran and Afghanistan and Chinese schools in Malaya, the East Indies, Borneo, etc.). The list of countries concerned would include all colonial and non-self-governing territories and many quite independent countries in the East and Middle East. To some degree, in all these cases, the schools present a political problem capable of becoming acute. It might be noted that they also present a complex cultural problem, since they exist to foster *mores* and codes of ethics different from those accepted by the surrounding community and more or less foreign to it.

Moral Codes

There are thus many possible arrangements regarding the control of schools. One finds the acceptance of state monopoly, as in the U.S.S.R.; the recognition of Church supremacy, as in Spain or Quebec; the recognition of parents' supremacy, as in the Irish Republic; forms of dual control by both state and Church, as in England and Wales. We turn now to the various means and methods through which moral codes and ethical standards are taught to the young.

The first consideration which strikes one is the enormous importance in this matter of the unplanned, unformalised agencies, which are often the most effective. The fact that, in discussion, they frequently receive only cursory mention before more direct means are talked about probably reflects on the one hand the over-intellectualised outlook of theoreticians and, on the other, their customary lack of knowledge of social psychology. Take, for instance, the ways in which English children learn to co-operate with one another, acquire respect for the rule of 'playing fair', are taught to resist bullying of the weak by the strong—all of them moral values. Evidently what is said at home counts for much,

but the chief agency employed in schools is the playing of football and cricket—means with a well-recognised moral purpose ('development of character') but not planned chiefly to that end. One might here, indeed, contrast the playing of these team-games in England with the concentration on field athletics (running, jumping, etc.) in schools on the European continent and note that the former reflect and strengthen the 'team spirit', the latter a prevalent individualism. Or, as a further instance, consider the ways in which the popular magazines and the newspapers, by their stories and their advertisements, lay stress upon material standards of comfort, codes of honesty and commercial morality, the importance of ambition and progress, etc. As for the cinema, its effect in shaping standards of sexual morality and behaviour as well as in standardising speech, dress, ways of eating, fashions in clothes, has been described very often, though the result on the more subtle attitudes and upon ethical values has, perhaps, not been sufficiently appreciated.

The second main consideration is the large number of agencies and institutions through which moral training is given, quite apart from the school. In most countries, nearly all young men now spend a year or two in the armed forces, where they learn many things besides the military trade and where habits of laziness and 'scrounging', of getting what one can for nothing, are all too easily picked up. The authorities in most countries are becoming aware of such points and the increasingly important roles allotted to the education officers, political commissars, etc., reflects their concern. There are also agencies such as those grouped under 'Service of Youth' or 'Youth Movements' which exercise great influence on young people: the effect of the *Wandervögel* movement in Germany in fostering romanticism, nationalism, readiness to obey leaders, capacity for self-sacrifice, and devotion, has been described more than once. Adult educational movements also have their importance: the moral outlook of the Danish farmer, for instance, is considered by good judges to be the creation of the People's High Schools, which served as the channel transmitting Grundtvig's ideals.

A somewhat surprising feature, emerging from a reading of the articles collected in this YEAR BOOK, is widespread unanimity regarding the small importance of the universities as influences shaping the moral outlook of young men and women. Equally surprising is the fact that none of our contributors has paid attention, at the other end of the scale, to nursery schools and their effects. Perhaps this is due merely to lack of precise data in both cases.

Ethical Standards

As for the more formal teaching given in schools, it will be convenient to consider separately each of the first four categories listed in previous paragraphs.

Category 1.—Here the schools are controlled by religious denominations and the teaching is therefore impregnated by the doctrines of the particular denomination. Care is taken to ensure that all the children become well acquainted with those doctrines and that their loyalty to the Church or to the religion develop strongly. On the whole, the idea is fostered that their own religion is superior to others as a more or less exclusive carrier and transmitter of absolute truth. Usually a good deal of care is taken to ensure good and righteous conduct, in both personal and social relations, and to encourage honesty, truth-telling, courage, austerity. All subjects are thought of as possible vehicles for moral and religious instruction.

Category 2.—Here the schools run by the religious denomination proceed as do those in Category 1. But the schools run by public authority, and in principle neutral, face a difficulty. The authorities and the teachers fully appreciate the importance and value of moral education, but they are precluded from providing it within a religious framework. For instance, they cannot invoke supernatural sanctions as the ordained punishment of the wrongdoer who does not get ' found out '. Attempts have been made to provide *une éducation morale et civique* within a secular framework. For example, the 1909 programmes of the *écoles primaires supérieures* in France laid down that the aim to be pursued in the courses on morals was " to create and to maintain in the pupils a system of moral attitudes which will prepare them for social life '. The teachers were told to appeal to the heart, the mind, and the will: to the heart, by recalling the sentiments evoked by the mother in early childhood; to the mind, by explaining and demonstrating moral truths; to the will, by forming good habits and giving appropriate opportunities for their exercise. The courses dealt with topics such as: social justice; brotherhood; the duties of the citizen; the importance of the family; the state and its laws; the rights of man; the proper relations between nations. It is only right to say that such courses have not produced all the results desired. Teachers find it extremely difficult to give adequate and inspiring lessons and, moreover, these courses were intended to complete and perfect moral training which should have been, but often was not, given in the home. Professor de Coster, in his article, mentions more successful attempts now being made in Belgium.

Category 3.—Here again schools controlled by religious denominations proceed as in Category 1. But in those controlled by public authority, a different situation exists. It is easier than it is in Category 2, since the schools are not expected to maintain neutrality between a religious and a secular view but only between different sections of a single religion, usually the Christian. Nevertheless, the teachers are precluded from the fully dogmatic teach-

ing of the denominational schools and often tend to avoid what are felt to be dangerous and controversial matters. In England, as Dr. Yeaxlee's article describes, use is now made of syllabuses of religious instruction agreed by the various denominations, except the Roman Catholic. In the U.S.A. use is made, for moral education, of instruction centring round 'The principles of democracy', 'The democratic way of life', 'The American way of life', or some such title, and the polar concepts of American and un-American are quickly acquiring moral and ethical connotations.

Category 4.—Here schools pay great attention to explicit formulation of Marxism-Leninism, dogmatically taught under the name of 'social and political education' or 'philosophy'. In addition, as reference to Professor Medynsky's article in the 1948 YEAR BOOK shows, use is made of codes of conduct formulated as rules. The appeal is chiefly to social value, to group loyalty, to patriotism, and no use whatever is made of transcendent or supernatural ideas.

It should be added that in all cases where religious instruction is provided in schools controlled by public authority, and where no alternative schools exist, freedom of conscience is guaranteed by giving the right to parents to withdraw their children from such teaching. Religious toleration is a reality everywhere.

On the other hand, in cases where the official schools do not provide religious instruction, one frequently finds that ingenious arrangements are made, often sanctioned by law, for providing religious instruction by ministers of religion who are permitted to make use of the school buildings for that purpose. In addition, these ministers also frequently teach children on certain days—for example, in Sunday schools. One meets this even in certain Communist States.

Effectiveness of Moral Education

As regards the effectiveness of religious education in fostering moral conduct and in encouraging the acceptance of spiritual values, very wide divergence of view exists. Everyone seems to agree that there is great need for strengthening the foundations of life, but while some think that this can be done only through an education that is frankly religious, others incline to the view that this has little importance, and that motives of conduct have always come from sources other than the religious. However this may be, it must be noted that the general social climate of industrial communities is singularly unfavourable to the growth of assured respect for moral ideas and ethical values. As was pointed out earlier in this study, these are all plural communities with no generally agreed set of standards or values. Furthermore, they consist of machine minders and machine users, whose occupations and preoccupations habituate them to very simple push-

and-pull ideas of material causality while desensitising them to spiritual appeals. Professor de Coster considers these and related questions at the end of his article. As he says: " Moral education is an expression of the political and social state of a nation. Education forms, indeed, a factor contributing to social stabilisation. If harmony does not exist between education and society one finds oneself faced by a division pernicious as much for the one as for the other."

We touch here the true dilemma. It is society, the whole of society, which is the great educator, the medium in which and through which men become more fully human and grow to full stature. And if society itself is distraught, torn, divided, unsure, where shall individuals find stability and firm ground? Only when there is harmony in society can the explicit teaching of the religious traditions really help to shape the moral character. It is, of course, this point which explains why the moral education provided in fully residential establishments, whether they be boarding schools or seminaries for priests, is more effective in influencing individuals than that in part-time or day schools. In the former case, the pupils are, so to speak, insulated from the distracting and antagonistic effects of the outside world, until their defences against it have become strong enough. In the latter, the pupils, finding little correspondence between what they hear in school and what they find in ordinary life, are not much affected by the excellent precepts. And if the success of Christian teaching in the days of the later Roman Empire be adduced as evidence contradicting the view here proposed, one could answer that this teaching was indeed successful in spreading Christianity but not in stabilising either society or individuals. And the saints who sought harmony between inner spiritual feeling and outer experience had to retire to the desert or to the monastery.

Yet there is no need for black pessimism: the roots of social life and moral conduct go very deep and are not easily shaken. Those who have experienced heavy aerial bombardment tell how, in the mornings, they expected to find their cities dead and the pattern of social life destroyed. Yet life went on and all fulfilled their duty. So, too, a tempest of change is blowing across the world: we live in the midst of a great revolution. What is being wrecked, what is going, is often not worth preserving: it may have been splendid without but hollow and rotten within. Those who witness change usually think of it as change for .the worse: it is the succeeding generation that sees it was change for the better. T. G. Masaryk, in his book on *Modern Man and Religion,* summed up the matter when discussing "The disease of the century " by quoting Musset: " Everything that was, is no longer; everything that will be, is not yet. Do not look elsewhere for the secret of our evils."

EDITORS.

CHAPTER TWO

AN ANTHROPOLOGIST'S VIEWPOINT

Primitive Culture

THE science of Social Anthropology is primarily concerned with the study of those societies which we call 'primitive', that is, very broadly, communities which are pre-literate and which live by hunting and food-gathering, by pastoral pursuits, or by the practice of simple methods of agriculture at a level of subsistence economy. The ways of life of such communities differ, sometimes spectacularly, from our own, and they also vary greatly among themselves. The vast majority of modern anthropologists reject the suggestion that such differences and variations can be correlated in any way with the physical characteristics which we call racial. There is no scientific evidence that any of the human races —Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid, or Australoid—differ innately from each other in either temperament or intelligence.

Variations must therefore be explained in terms of differences in *culture*—that is, the sum total of material equipment, knowledge, belief, and moral values which each community hands on from generation to generation. Culture is the specifically human form of biological adjustment. It is essentially an adaptive mechanism whereby a group of human beings are enabled to satisfy their biological needs, to adapt themselves to their environment and to live together in a morally ordered society.

Viewed in this way the apparently irrational, bizarre, or shocking behaviour of primitive peoples becomes comprehensible in terms of a scientific analysis of how each culture satisfies human needs. This is particularly important in the field of moral behaviour. Since man is an animal, he is actuated by certain fundamental needs or drives inherited from his anthropoid ancestry. But since he lives in society, these drives so far as they are individualistic and anti-social are apt to come into conflict with the needs of social order. The sort of primitive anarchy envisaged by Hobbes does not occur in any primitive community. Every such community possesses social mechanisms whereby the disruptive and anti-social tendencies of individuals are restrained from uncontrolled expression.

On the other hand it is necessary to stress the fact that such restraint is never perfect. Some writers have mistakenly spoken of primitive man obeying his moral codes 'slavishly' and 'unwittingly'.

According to this view, primitive morality is characterised by 'automatic conformity' to the dictates of custom. Actually, no society lives in this way. Every human being who has ever lived has at some time or other been tempted to flout or shirk his or her social obligations, and in all societies we find occasional criminals, malefactors, and sluggards.

The study of the social sanctions whereby society encourages approved behaviour and seeks to restrain deviations from it is a most important problem for the social anthropologist. It may be divided into three parts: (1) The actual rules of moral behaviour found in primitive societies; (2) the mechanisms whereby such rules are maintained in the day-to-day life of the community; and (3) the ways in which the young are trained to observe moral codes. These subjects will be dealt with in the following three sections.

Systems of Morals

The heading of this section conveys a somewhat limited impression of what anthropologists study in examining the social codes of primitive peoples. It is better to speak in rather wider terms of the normative system, embracing not only morals but also the rules of law, religious injunctions, and aesthetic standards. The importance of this lies in the fact that it is often hard to classify different types of rules in their application to human behaviour. For example, in our own society, murder is morally wrong, is a sin in terms of current religious belief, and is also a crime in the eyes of the law. It is, therefore, better to consider the normative system as a whole and, in our example, to describe murder as a social wrong which is discouraged by moral, religious, and legal sanctions.

This is even more important in dealing with primitive communities, where the various sanctions—social, legal, and magico-religious—interlock and reinforce each other to a greater extent than among ourselves. Approaching the normative systems of primitive peoples in this way, we find that there are certain universal principles of right and wrong behaviour even though their specific interpretation and expression vary greatly from one primitive people to another. One anthropologist has aptly remarked that a list of moral wrongs in any primitive society shows a very close correspondence to the Ten Commandments, making allowance for the variations of which we have spoken and which will be exemplified later. Rules protecting life, property, reputation, and marital rights are universal, as are ethical rules prohibiting breaches of the magico-religious code, breaches which in our society we describe as sin or sacrilege.

In addition it should be mentioned that in many primitive societies there exist rules prohibiting sorcery or witchcraft, rules comparable with those which existed in our own society not so many centuries ago. These, however, do not constitute an excep-

tion to the above generalisations because witchcraft is merely a means to an end, a way of injuring, killing, or damaging the property of the victim. This is clearly seen in many Oceanic societies, where the use of sorcery is condemned or approved not in itself but according to the end for which it is used. Dr. Ian Hogbin has aptly compared the use of sorcery in such societies to a weapon such as a dagger. If used for malicious or selfish ends, its employment is wrong; if used as a righteous punishment or in justifiable retribution for some wrong committed, its use is approved. As we shall see, such use of sorcery often acts as an important moral sanction in the societies concerned.

In all societies there exist rules prohibiting incest, that is, sexual intercourse between members of a family (with the obvious exception of husband and wife) or other close kin. The range of kin proscribed as mates is usually wider than among ourselves and in most primitive societies incest prohibitions are extended to cover wider kinship groups such as clans. The reason for such prohibitions is that sexual intercourse is apt to lead through jealousy to outbreaks of violence which produce social disruption. Such acts are inconsistent with the close solidarity and co-operation necessary within the family or other kinship group.

A word should be said in conclusion concerning primitive attitudes towards property because these have often been defined by the phrase 'primitive communism', usually in an attempted justification of the Marxist theory of social evolution. It is true that in primitive society, goods, food, and land are shared to a greater extent than among ourselves, because in our own society the closely co-operating unit of the individual family is the only group within which there is extensive and largely unorganised sharing of property and privileges. In primitive society kinship groups are very much wider and we may find, for example, members of an extended family cultivating fields together and sharing the produce. But this is not a system of communism in the sense of lack of individual rights, but rather a very complex interlocking of such rights, just as in our own individual family the willing discharge of obligations is by no means a negation of the specific rights of father, mother, and children, rights which are recognised explicitly in our system of law and morality.

In spite of the above general similarities in the normative systems of primitive peoples, there also exist important variations. A number of these arise from the specific social constitution of primitive societies. Many of these societies are organised into small groups such as extended families or clans, or into small tribes of only a few hundred or thousand people. The large tribes of West Africa running into millions are quite exceptional in primitive society, and at the other extreme we find in parts of Melanesia small autonomous village units of less than one hundred individuals con-

stituting the only political units of the society. The bearing of this on the character of primitive normative systems is that the moral backing of rules protecting life, property, sexual rights, and so on is usually limited to the social group concerned. For example, it may be regarded as wrong and contemptible to steal from a fellow villager or to seduce his wife while theft or adultery committed against someone of another group is not morally condemned provided that the individual does not involve his own group in trouble as a result.

Apart from differences arising from the various types of social grouping found in primitive societies, there exists a wide range of variations in the character of rules governing human behaviour. As an instance we may take the moral evaluation of aggressive behaviour. At one extreme one finds the intensely warlike communities of the Plains Indians, where acts of violence by individuals against other groups brought enormous prestige. Again, many Bantu peoples were extremely warlike, and before the setting up of European administration were engaged in vigorous aggressive expansion, the Zulu being the best-known illustration. Other communities, as found, for example, in the south-west of the United States, had no tradition of aggressive warfare and placed no premium upon prowess in battle. They were, nevertheless, prepared to fight vigorously against outsiders when they were attacked. Finally, one finds extremely peaceful peoples such as the Eskimo, among whom organised warfare was completely unknown; or, again, the Semang of the Malay Peninsula who when attacked simply melt away into the jungle, having no respect for fighting even in self-defence.

Other illustrations of variability in primitive normative systems are to be found in the sphere of sexual morality. Considering first the attitude towards pre-marital sexual intercourse, certain primitive communities condemn this even more vigorously than we do, and prohibit even the most innocent association between young people before their marriage. At the other extreme, one finds the well-known but very exceptional codes of the Trobriand Islanders, among whom no objection whatever is taken to pre-marital intercourse provided it is carried out with decency and decorum. Another type of variation is found among those Bantu peoples who place a high value on virginity, prohibiting pre-marital intercourse, but allowing and even institutionalising intimate erotic play between young people to an extent which we would regard as far from decent.

The attitude towards extra-marital intercourse is likewise highly variable. At one extreme are peoples such as the Eskimo, the Tahitians, and the Australian aborigines, among whom wife-lending is a recognised and socially approved practice, a husband being expected to lend the sexual favours of his wife to a friend or rela-

tive as part of the obligations of hospitality or in recognition of his good feeling towards him. This he usually does quite willingly, since this type of intercourse is not held to be in any way an infringement of his marital rights. An interesting sidelight on the husband's attitude in such cases is the recorded instance of an early explorer in the Pacific, who had entered into the relationship of *tayo*, or bond-friendship, with a Tahitian chief, a relationship which regularly included wife-lending. The chief was offended and the explorer embarrassed when the latter refused to avail himself of this particular privilege of friendship.

At the other extreme one finds many peoples in Africa among whom adultery was punished with great cruelty in pre-European times. Punishments included the cutting off of the adulterer's hands, tying the guilty couple together and burning them alive, or burying a faithless wife up to the neck in the ground and leaving her to starve to death.

The above examples illustrate extremes in the possible attitudes towards extra-marital intercourse. The vast majority of primitive societies lie somewhere between these two extremes. Most commonly adultery is expiated by the handing over of material goods by the adulterer to the wronged husband.

A study of these and other variations in moral behaviour has led anthropologists to formulate the *principle of cultural relativity*, the principle that any act in a given society must be considered scientifically in terms of the normative system of that society, whatever ultimate ethical judgment we may pass upon the system itself. Thus we may condemn systems of head-hunting as wrong in terms of ultimate ethical standards, but we cannot blame young men for taking heads in a society which regards this act as an essential proof of manhood.

An important consideration in the study of primitive normative systems is that we should not seek to describe them as being either more lax or more rigid than our own, for we find that primitive societies which tolerate acts which we regard as immoral at the same time condemn acts which we regard as normal and permissible. For example, we have referred to the freedom of pre-marital intercourse in the Trobriand Islands, a code which would be regarded as immoral by our standards. But this does not mean simply that Trobriand sex morality is more lax than our own, for the Trobrianders have rules of decency and decorum which we lack. For one thing, it is regarded as wrong for a young couple to eat together in public—as Malinowski remarks, the Trobrianders are just as indignant of the idea of a man sharing his sweetheart's meal as we are at his sharing her bed. Again, it is a strict rule of Trobriand sex morality that there must be no physical contact, even of the most innocent kind, between the sexes in public. The Trobrianders view our practice of men and women dancing in

public with their bodies pressed closely together very much as we regard the amorous expeditions carried out by young Trobriand girls who visit neighbouring villages with the express purpose of being seduced.

We have reviewed some of the differences in primitive rules of conduct. There are also important variations in the evaluation of individual moral and personal qualities. In all societies some individuals are regarded as of higher social status than others, but the basis of the evaluation is highly variable. Thus, among the Eskimo it is prowess in the chase which gains for a man social reputation and material privileges. Among the Australian aborigines, it is the old men who wield power, have prestige, and are allowed special privileges. There is, incidentally, a very good reason for this, because the hunting and food-gathering economy of the aborigines is based essentially upon a detailed experience and knowledge of the local environment, and especially of the availability of food resources. Such knowledge and experience are possessed by the old men to a greater extent than by others, and it is therefore appropriate that they should constitute the privileged class in Australia.

In other communities we have seen that valour and prowess in battle are the highest marks of honour. Elsewhere the accumulation of material wealth constitutes the high road to prestige. The best-known example is the potlatch of the north-west coast of America, in which vast quantities of food and other goods were distributed for consumption or even destroyed in an ostentatious display of wealth, through which social prestige was achieved.

Most politically organised primitive communities attach great importance to hereditary rank, whether inherited in the patrilineal or in the matrilineal line. In this connection it should be noted that this respect for hereditary rank is often tempered by realistic considerations. If, for example, the rightful heir to a chieftainship is incompetent or unpopular he may be passed over in favour of some junior or collateral relative who possesses the qualities appropriate to a chief.

In conclusion we must refer to the relative homogeneity of cultural standards in primitive society. In our own civilisation we have a variety of political creeds, religious beliefs, and moral standards. Our culture is characterised by innumerable societies for promoting this or suppressing that. Advertisement and propaganda have reduced to a fine art the various techniques for arousing emotional responses, which often conflict with one another. Patriotism in wartime is held by many to be inconsistent with Christianity, while our cherished ideals of equality are manifestly contradicted by the realities of social class and economic privilege. In contrast to these varying and conflicting standards and values, those of a primitive society are much more homogeneous.

Everybody is agreed as to what is right and what is wrong. As we have said, this does not mean that individuals always do what is right and avoid doing what is wrong, but nobody advocates moral principles different from those current in the society concerned. People may break taboos from their own individual impulses, but they do not question the validity of those taboos. There are those who offend against magico-religious standards, but there are no heretics or atheists. In politically organised societies, individuals may fail to pay respect and tribute to chiefs, and if a chief is unpopular he may be deposed or even assassinated; but nobody opposes the institution of chieftainship. One could go on indefinitely enumerating the various moral spheres in which there is general agreement in primitive society but which in our own are the battleground for rival sects, political parties, and ideological factions.

The Dynamics of Social Conformity

As we emphasised at the outset, primitive man does not conform spontaneously or automatically to the moral dictates of his society. Many of these dictates run counter to individual passions such as lust, ambition, greed, or jealousy, while others impose long hours of irksome effort or make demands for courage and self-sacrifice. Such dictates could never be obeyed 'spontaneously' by all members of society; in actual fact, individuals are from time to time tempted to shirk, evade, or flout the normative rules of their community, and in all societies certain individuals do occasionally succumb to such temptation. These instances are, however, exceptional, and in the vast majority of cases we find individuals conforming to the normative system of their culture.

The problem of social conformity is thus twofold: We must ask firstly why the norms of primitive societies are obeyed in the vast majority of cases, and secondly what happens in the far less frequent cases of breach or evasion.

One of the most important factors of social conformity in primitive society is the pressure of public opinion. It must be remembered that such societies are usually organised into small and compact local groups such as villages, where everybody knows everybody else's business, and where there is ample scope for gossip and backbiting. Members of such a community are dependent upon one another for the maintenance of their self-esteem as well as for the social and material benefits which accrue from a good reputation. The overwhelming power of public opinion is best seen in those primitive communities where public indignation at certain heinous acts is strong enough to force the offender to commit suicide or to go into voluntary exile.

Another important factor in social conformity is the existence in the majority of primitive societies of systems of mythology which

include legendary accounts of how the world came into being, accounts which are firmly believed by the natives. These myths usually tell how the physical environment was created and also how normative rules and social institutions were established in primordial times. Thus, among Australian aboriginal tribes, certain myths tell how legendary ancestors established hills, water-holes, rock out-crops, and other features of the landscape at the same time as they instituted social customs. The impressive circumstances under which such myths are recounted give validity to social tradition. Morality is thus, as it were, embedded in the physical reality of the environment, which thus provides tangible evidence of the binding force of mythological traditions in the social and moral spheres.

Apart from the formal narration of myths, language acts more extensively and more subtly in maintaining normative standards. Proverbs, maxims, and terms of praise and blame serve in all societies to force the individual into the mould of socially approved behaviour. This is often related to the social prestige of the group. For example, in the Polynesian island of Ontong Java, a father will reprove his son by saying, " If you behave like that people will think you come from Malaita," expressing in this way respect for the Ontong Javanese way of life and contempt for their Melanesian neighbours. Besides language, other forms of symbolism may express the normative values of society. Thus, among the Batak of Palawan a young couple who marry within a prohibited degree of relationship in defiance of public opinion may be forced to eat rice mixed with filth in public, together with a dog, which eats from the same basket. The symbolism of this act is that the couple's conduct is no better than that of animals, which mate indiscriminately and without regard to prohibitions based on kinship.

Apart from these forces of social conformity, there are purely material factors which induce people to honour their obligations. Such factors are reflected in the very important *principle of reciprocity,* the rule in all societies that the giving of a gift or the rendering of a service places the recipient under an obligation to return a similar gift or service at some later date. This is not equivalent to barter or purchase, as we understand these terms, since there is usually no stipulation as to the nature or the amount of the return to be made; but such a return is very definitely expected and its nature is determined by tradition. The significance of the principle of reciprocity is that within the network of closely interlocking social bonds in primitive society, an individual who fails to play his part in the complex system of reciprocity will soon find himself denied the favours and services which he has failed to render to others. In the vast majority of cases people do honour their obligations founded on the principle of reciprocity, but we occasionally find individuals who are insensitive to the

pressure of public opinion and to the moral values of their society. Usually they are at a disadvantage materially as well as being despised socially.

Again, normally law-abiding persons may be induced by violent passion to commit some serious offence. We are, therefore, driven to inquire what happens in cases of breach and what sanctions arise in primitive society in such cases. The most striking difference of primitive society from our own in this respect is the universality and ubiquitous importance of magico-religious sanctions. These do not usually take the form of supernatural rewards or punishments after death, but rather envisage practical consequences for the offender in the more immediate future.

Magico-religious sanctions vary greatly from one primitive society to another, but they may be broadly classified under three headings. First of all, a very large number of primitive communities practise some form of ancestor worship and this usually includes the belief that ancestors are angered by the anti-social acts of their descendants, and will visit punishments upon them. This is a common explanation of illness, death, or misfortune, and the fear of these necessary hazards of human life thus acts as a strong deterrent against anti-social conduct.

The second group of magico-religious sanctions are those broadly referred to as taboos. These taboos, as understood by anthropologists, refer not merely to prohibitions in general but to those prohibitions which are connected with the belief that certain breaches of social codes lead automatically to illness or other misfortune without the intervention of any spiritual being. In the words of the Baganda: " It is the sin itself which kills."

Thirdly, there are practices which are generally referred to as sorcery and which are based upon the belief that by the performance of certain rites, by the employment of magical substances, or by the recitation of certain spells, a sorcerer can inflict injury upon some other person. We have previously compared sorcery with material weapons; like such weapons it acts as a deterrent against injuries to individuals who might retaliate. Many native peoples, and particularly those of Melanesia, are genuinely afraid of sorcery and individuals refrain from injuring others from fear of magical retaliation which they believe would lead to illness, death, or other misfortune. This is particularly significant in connection with the exercise of authority by chiefs and headmen, who frequently have a high reputation as sorcerers or through their wealth are able to employ specialists in the black art. This belief in the power of chiefs or headmen to use sorcery against those who offend them is a powerful buttress for their authority.

In the more practical sphere of human life, we find sanctions comparable with those which we associate with law in our own society. The use of the term 'law' in connection with primitive

communities is fraught with difficulty, since many of these communities are organised into small, autonomous units such as clans and have no courts, judges, or systems of legal procedure and punishment. In such societies sanctions are imposed by the clan, which inflicts punishment upon, or exacts compensation from, any individual outside the clan who has done injury to one of its members. Within the clan, which is a closely knit group with a strong feeling of solidarity, the pressure of public opinion and the shame felt at doing any injury to a fellow-clansman are usually sufficient to maintain harmony.

Some primitive societies, for example the Bantu, do have legal institutions, which apart from the lack of a written legal code and differences in procedure are comparable with our own conception of law. Such differences in procedure, however, are in themselves significant. Thus, many Bantu peoples have a hierarchical system of courts presided over by chiefs, sub-chiefs, and local headmen, appeals being allowed from a lower to a higher court. The procedure at trials varies from our own in many respects, particularly in the fact that when the court is assembled anybody, whether connected with the case or not, may express an opinion, while the final ruling of the chief or headman who acts as judge must represent not his own personal opinion but a crystallisation of the consensus of opinion reached by prolonged argument and discussion. It is not unknown in Bantu courts for a successful litigant to renounce the compensation which he has been awarded, being entirely satisfied by the public vindication of his claim. Judgments given under these conditions are thus a formal expression of the force of public opinion, the importance of which we have stressed previously, in contradistinction to our own society where judgments are based upon formally codified law and are sometimes felt even by judges themselves to be inconsistent with our own ethical standards.

The interpretation of punishment is an important problem for the anthropologist. There are certain objections to generally accepted theories of punishment, such as that its aim is to reform the criminal or to deter others from following his example. These interpretations are not altogether applicable to primitive society. Primitive people are not interested in reforming the characters of individuals who have offended against the social code, while the deterrent theory of punishment is not consistent with the widespread existence of the principle of collective responsibility by which, for example, vengeance may be exacted not upon the actual offender but upon a member of his family or clan. There are, too, other instances in which the principle of guilty intent or *mens rea* does not operate, and individuals may be punished for injuries which they have done unintentionally. A general interpretation of punishment which is consistent with these examples is usually

referred to as the kathartic or expiatory theory and is associated particularly with the name of Professor Radcliffe-Brown.

All normative systems depend for their existence upon moral sentiments in the minds of members of society. When an offence is committed, the community is shocked, and there arises an impulse to give expression to the indignation felt at the blow which has been dealt to the moral sentiments of society. The writer recalls a casual conversation in a shop on the report of a particularly brutal murder. One of the persons present remarked with obvious feeling, "I hope someone swings for it." The psychological state of mind implied in such a statement is not nearly so sophisticated as would be implied in the reformatory or deterrent theories of punishment.

The reaction of anger and moral indignation produced by a wrongful act may take various forms: one is the destruction of property. In the Melanesian island of Wogeo this is a regular way of expressing moral indignation. For instance, a man whose wife had been unfaithful and who for various reasons can take no other action may destroy or burn down his house as an expression of indignation. Again, the reaction of society to a wrongful act may take the form not of punishment but of imposing taboos upon the offender. For example, among several Amerindian tribes a homicide was forced for a long period to submit to irksome taboos and restrictions.

In spite of these unusual examples, however, the most common reaction of society to a wrongful act is the infliction of some punishment upon the offender or the exaction of some form of compensation from him. Such sanctions reflect the damage done to the moral sentiments of society, and in doing so keep these sentiments alive and active. According to this view, offences are punished because they are wrong, but they are also wrong because they are punished.[1] The reciprocal relation between overt acts of punishment and the inner moral feelings of members of society is a fundamental and universal principle governing human relations, however much it may be overlaid by ethical, psychological, or humanitarian rationalisations.

The Socialisation of Children

The young of the species *Homo sapiens* take a very much longer time to reach maturity than those of any other animal species. The infant is at first helpless, must be cared for over a period of several years, and must slowly acquire the behaviour patterns appropriate to the culture in which he lives. This is how anthropologists

[1] It is noteworthy that Professor Piaget in his work, *The Moral Judgment of the Child,* finds the genesis of moral sentiments in European children in the fact of punishment; for the very young child, the definition of what is 'naughty' is that which is punished.

understand education, namely, as a cultural mechanism whereby the individual organism is trained to adapt itself to its culture and whereby that culture is transmitted, with or without modification, from one generation to the next. Culture may be regarded as something through which a series of human organisms flow, new members of society acquiring the appropriate cultural adjustments as the older members die off.

It will be clear that education for the anthropologist means far more than mere schooling. The cultural adjustments which are learned in the educational process may usefully be divided into two kinds. Firstly, there is a body of practical knowledge and skill, including techniques employed in the getting of food and in the production of artefacts: this may conveniently be referred to as technical education. Secondly, there are the social values and sentiments which enable human beings to live together in an ordered society. Indoctrination in moral values enables them to acquire an integrated attitude towards the society in which they live: this may be referred to as social education.

As regards technical education, since primitive societies have no special educational institutions apart from certain initiation ceremonies which will be mentioned later, the young learn by watching and later by participating in the activities of adults; there is very little formal instruction. A girl will go with her mother to the fields or a boy will accompany his father on a hunting expedition, playing an increasing part in the activity concerned and passing gradually from the phase of mere observation to a full participation in adult activity. Adults may and do instruct their young incidentally, but this almost always occurs as part of an institutional activity directed primarily towards ends other than that of instructing the young. Education takes place in real as opposed to training situations. Primitive technical education might thus be loosely described as learning on the job. Apart from actual participation in adult activities, children also learn through play, which is usually patterned on the institutional activities of adults to a far greater extent than among ourselves.

The fact that primitive education is characterised by participation in adult activities means that children acquire at a very early age the adult outlook and values in regard to institutional activities, most of which are concerned with the getting of food. There is thus very little need for disciplining in matters of technical education. The child realises very clearly that it is acquiring knowledge and skills essential to the well-being of members of society, including itself. Many primitive children know from bitter experience the meaning of food shortage, and are eager to acquire the skills necessary to exploit the environment.

Social education, also, among primitive peoples is characterised by early maturity. For instance, primitive peoples are usually

much less reticent about the facts of life and death than we are, and the child realises very early its destined role as a member of society. Social education, however, differs from technical education in that the moral codes inculcated in the young often run counter to their spontaneous impulses. Consequently, there is a greater need for discipline in this sphere. The nature of this discipline varies greatly from one primitive community to another. At one extreme one finds in Polynesia and elsewhere easy-going communities in which physical punishment is never or only very rarely inflicted upon the young. At the other extreme there are communities like the Chaga of Tanganyika who employ stringent methods in disciplining their young, such as tying up a child naked in a bag of nettles and then shaking the bag. In communities which do not practise such drastic methods, children are nevertheless disciplined by such mechanisms as the angry voices of adults, the jeers of their companions, and the fear of the awful results which may follow from breaking taboos or offending ancestors.

In connection with the punishment of children in primitive society, it may be mentioned that where this occurs it is usually more spontaneous and less calculated than among ourselves. For example, Dr. Ian Hogbin records the case of a small boy who persisted after repeated warnings in interrupting the work which his father was doing. The latter slapped the boy, saying, "You interfere with me, I interfere with you." Punishment given in this spirit, and based implicitly on Bernard Shaw's principle that a child should never be punished except in anger, differs profoundly from the Victorian pattern of "punishing the child for its own good". It is probably more healthy psychologically, and less conducive to morbid feelings of guilt, derived from the conception that the naughty child has struck a blow at the moral foundations of the universe.

It follows from the informal character of education in primitive society that there are few specialist teachers. A child learns most things from its parents, adult neighbours, or older children who, as it were, pass down the knowledge which they have acquired from adults to their juniors. The main exception to the informal character of education in primitive society is to be found in the widespread, though not universal, practice of initiation ceremonies. These ceremonies are carried out more frequently in the case of males than of females and usually take the form of trying or painful ordeals which accompany the instruction given. As regards this instruction it should be noted that it is not usually concerned with technical education but with the imparting of magico-religious knowledge and the reiteration of moral precepts. Thus, apart from the instruction in secret lore which often accompanies initiation ceremonies, these ceremonies do not in fact teach the initiate very much which he

did not know before. But by the collective gathering of kinsfolk, by the pain and teasing inflicted upon the novice, and by the impressive circumstances under which the rites are carried out, initiation ceremonies produce a profound psychological effect upon the initiate, making him feel that he has acquired a new and important status as an adult and that he must conform to the social codes of his society.

In conclusion, we must refer back to what was said previously about the homogeneity of cultural standards in primitive societies. This has important implications in the field of social education. The growing child is increasingly faced with situations in which its individual impulses are curbed or frustrated, but it is not torn by moral conflict arising from the divergent values of home, school, play-groups, voluntary societies, and the mechanisms of propaganda. This is probably a factor in the low incidence of mental abnormality and psychological maladjustment in primitive society. Conflicts of loyalties do occur, but they are not explicitly fostered by divergent moral values as they are in our own society.

The Impact of Civilisation

The preceding sections have dealt with morals and education in relatively untouched primitive cultures. But such cultures are to-day largely a fiction. European expansion during the past two centuries has brought influences from our own culture to the majority of primitive peoples, sometimes to an extent which has meant the virtual extinction of the indigenous culture as it existed before the coming of the white man. This situation of culture contact has increasingly claimed the attention of the social anthropologist, and we may indicate very briefly some of its implications in our present field. The treatment of this vast and complex subject must necessarily be superficial, and it must be emphasised that there are important differences, both of kind and of degree, between culture-contact situations in various parts of the world. Space does not permit us to deal with such differences, and we shall merely indicate some of the more common, though by no means universal, effects of culture contact upon primitive normative and educational systems.

The most significant forces which have operated in the culture-contact situation may be roughly classified as economic, religious, and political, the typical agencies of which have been respectively traders and employers of native labour, missionaries, and administrative officers of colonial Powers. These have exerted different, and often conflicting, influences on indigenous primitive cultures.

European economic expansion in territories inhabited by primitive peoples has created a demand by Europeans for land and labour which has had serious, and at times disastrous, effects on native economies. The acquisition of native lands by Europeans

has at times meant that the people have been left with insufficient resources to maintain their indigenous subsistence economy. Furthermore, the demand for native labour has drained off from the native economy a large proportion of its manpower, still further aggravating the difficulties of economic adjustment. The wages earned by labourers, and cash crops produced by natives on their own lands, by no means offset the disruption created in native economic systems. Whether the economic development of backward areas will in the near future have a beneficial effect in raising native standards of living, and the means by which this may be achieved, are economic and political problems with which we cannot deal, but which demand the thoughtful attention of all citizens in modern democracies.

The effects of the work of missionaries upon native welfare is a subject on which anthropologists have been critical—often too critical. In this connection it must be remembered that there are missionaries and missionaries. Furthermore, mission policies as a whole have changed very greatly during recent decades. The early missionaries, with a few exceptions, had little understanding of native culture; they imposed unnecessary and frustrating restrictions upon native peoples; and they failed to appreciate the positive and integrative functions of native magico-religious institutions, some of which have been indicated in an earlier section. The effects of their work among primitive peoples was therefore often disruptive. Modern missionaries, however, tend to have a more enlightened viewpoint. They are becoming increasingly aware that native culture is worthy of respect, and that Christianity must be introduced gradually and in such a way as not to produce a sudden disruption in native systems of values. The Christian religion when introduced in this way provides a substitute for indigenous magico-religious beliefs which are in any case doomed to ultimate extinction as a result of other European influences—economic, political, and educational. Furthermore, missionaries as a class have been the only agents in the culture-contact situation who have practised as well as preached the doctrines of human equality and the brotherhood of man under conditions of economic exploitation and racial prejudice which are a direct negation of these cherished ideals of our civilisation.

The influence of European administration has likewise undergone modification in recent years. Instead of governing native peoples by means of European institutions and according to European standards, modern administrators have become increasingly aware of the importance of encouraging native peoples to develop their own institutions to meet the challenge of the twentieth century and ultimately to achieve self-government in a world of free democracies.

What have been the broad effects of these agencies within our

own particular field? In the first place, the rapid Europeanisation of native peoples has usually led to a breach between the older and younger members of native communities. Wages earned by young men have made them economically independent of their elders, and this has undermined the authority of the latter. European education has often led young educated natives to acquire a contempt for the moral values of their parents and has thus too often driven a wedge between the older and younger generations. A similar effect has been produced by some missionaries, who have frequently dismissed the traditional beliefs and morals of the older members of the community as 'savage superstition' or 'barbarous customs' And in other ways the various European agencies of change have often tended to undermine the authority of chiefs, headmen, and elders.

It will thus be seen that the homogeneous system of moral values and the special types of educational systems found in primitive cultures have been disrupted by the introduction of European ways. While it appears neither desirable nor possible to revive them in their pristine form, it is nevertheless necessary to preserve them to some extent during the present transitional period in order to minimise the malaise and social disruption which characterise the culture-contact situation. At the same time it is also necessary to introduce innovations—educational, economic, and administrative—which will prepare native peoples for their destined role in future world development. In the educational field this implies expansion of facilities of all kinds. Mass education at the primary level must go hand in hand with secondary and university education; literary education must be supplemented by increasing emphasis on technical and scientific education in order to produce a cadre of native technicians and craftsmen able to command the technological resources necessary to progressive development. And this introduction of European knowledge must be carried out in the light of respect for traditional standards and emphasis on the moral value of many features of native culture.

How this twofold policy can be implemented, and how far change should be slow or rapid, are problems for which no panacea can be provided. Because of the variability in culture-contact situations, each must be considered on its merits. It is the task of European agencies, and of educationalists and administrators in particular, to formulate and implement policies related to problems in their particular areas in the light of such general considerations as have been outlined in this section.

Primitive Culture and Some Modern Social Problems

The social function of science is to provide recipes for human conduct which will serve to increase man's control over his environment and over his own behaviour in the interests of human welfare.

The comparative study of human behaviour within widely varying social environments, which is the province of social anthropology, can lead us to a better understanding of 'human nature' which is vitally relevant to most contemporary social problems. Many forms of human behaviour which are ascribed to human nature are found to be merely norms peculiar to our own culture. Whether man is essentially aggressive or peaceful, individualistic or co-operative, and so on, are meaningless questions in terms of the innate constitution of the human organism. Such terms refer to specific types of behaviour produced by different cultures or in different social situations. And the comparative study of such behaviour patterns, in the light of the principle of cultural relativity, leads us to consider our own normative standards as well as those of other cultures in terms of how far they satisfy or frustrate the biological and social needs of man, and how far they conduce to human happiness or misery.

While this is one of the ultimate goals of social anthropology, a word of warning is necessary. The social sciences are young, and it is only during the last half-century or so that we have begun to think scientifically about human behaviour. The precision of our techniques and the elaboration of our theories are not comparable with those found in the physical and biological sciences, as is manifest from the existence of 'schools' which are not found to the same extent in the more established sciences. Our recipes for human conduct must at present be tentative, pending the acquisition of more extensive and detailed knowledge about how human beings behave. It must, therefore, be emphasised that the following observations represent the personal opinions of the writer and not the established conclusions of science. Other observers may and do draw different inferences from the same range of data.

We have referred to the homogeneity of moral values in primitive society, in contradistinction to the divergent standards of our own civilisation. We are undergoing a psychological as well as an economic and political revolution, reflected in the increasing incidence of neuroses and social maladjustments of one kind and another. The homogeneous and consistent type of normative system which is found in primitive societies, and which survived in our own down to Victorian times, is gone for ever. It will be for our generation and those which follow to produce a pattern of moral values appropriate to a world society, in which individuals and groups with widely differing personalities and values must somehow learn to live together in a morally ordered society. Tolerance is necessary but is not enough—we must avoid the extreme of ethical nihilism if a positive morality is to emerge from the normative chaos of to-day. Certain basic rules and restrictions are essential to human symbiosis, and anthropology may well contribute to an understanding of how these may be defined.

As an illustration, we may refer to the special problem of the social control of sexual behaviour. A comparative study reveals such variations as we mentioned earlier. It would be fantastic to suggest that we should seek to imitate the moral conceptions of the Eskimo or the Trobriand Islanders. Such conceptions are quite inconsistent with the whole pattern of our culture. Our civilisation could not persist as we know it without such moral standards as we possess. But a comparative survey suggests that we take them too seriously, and attach to them a degree of emotional value which is not necessary to the preservation of social order. For example, most primitive communities regard adultery as wrong, and require some form of expiation from offenders. But such societies cope with cases of adultery by measures far less drastic and disruptive than those of our own society. The psychological reaction of the wronged spouse may be violent, but is usually more transient and less deleterious in its effect on the marriage relationship. Rarely is a single act of adultery a cause for divorce, because primitive peoples attach a relatively greater importance to other aspects of the relationship between husband and wife, such as co-operation in daily life and getting a living, common social activities, and, above all, the joint care of children. Greater relative emphasis in our own society on these very real factors in the stability of marriage might help to minimise marital tragedies arising from sexual jealousy, the futility of which Somerset Maugham, among contemporary novelists, has often delineated with such poignant realism.

Let us consider another problem of contemporary society, namely the marked increase of crime, and of juvenile delinquency in particular. We have moved far from the punitive conceptions of the nineteenth century. The writer, being an Australian, has seen the remains of grim convict settlements to which youths in their teens were transported for petty thefts and other minor offences. The change in our attitudes has stemmed from a growing humanitarianism and also from developments in psychology and psychiatry which have tended not so much to condemn the offender, as to understand the causes of his maladjustment to society. But we have succeeded in pouring out the baby with the bath. Harsh punishment is a rough-and-ready way of curbing delinquency. A better way is by remedial treatment which seeks positively to create a readjustment in the personality of the offender where this is possible, and which may or may not include enforced seclusion from the community or other traditional forms of punishment. We have rejected the former but are still far from realising the latter approach to the problem of delinquency. Our society is paying the price for an unsatisfactory compromise between the punitive and the humanitarian attitudes. Mere leniency actually contributes to the increase in delinquency. Perhaps the growing tendency to

treat human problems scientifically will lead us to methods of dealing with delinquency which will preserve our necessary moral standards while at the same time recognising that moral responsibility is something which cannot be assessed without reference to the social background and life-history of the individual delinquent.

Similar principles apply to punishment in the educational field. We have seen that the incidence of punishment in primitive societies is highly variable, and that it is not essential to the social order. Most of the indulged and physically undisciplined children in Samoa grow up to be good little Samoans, just as Chaga children who undergo violent physical punishment grow up to be respectable Chaga adults. So many other forces of social conformity are operative that corporal punishment is not essential to effective socialisation of the child, and our moral order is not doomed to extinction because of its diminution in recent years. The real case for corporal punishment (and the writer believes that it is a good one) is that it is in the interest of adults, who are also human. It is the most effective way of preserving peace in the home and classroom, and of teaching the child the importance of reciprocity in human relationships. This applies to the vast majority of normal children. Occasional deviants who react atypically are subjects for the clinical psychologist and psychiatrist.

In the field of formal education in schools and colleges there are many problems with which educationalists are familiar and in which the anthropologist is also interested. For example, the importance of making the child aware of the practical and social implications of education is being increasingly recognised. The study of primitive education, with its close relationship to adult life and the awareness of children of the significance of the educational process, offers some interesting parallels with the work of modern educationalists.

In conclusion, there are two problems of our civilisation with which educationalists are directly concerned and on which the anthropologist may offer some suggestions. The evolution of human society has been marked by an increase in the size of social groups, from nomadic bands of hunters to isolated villages, through tribes, nations, and empires to the present situation in which we shall presently see a single world society, whether imposed by conquest or achieved by rational co-operation. A large part of the educationalist's responsibility is to prepare the minds of the young to accept the standards and values implicit in this situation. There are two major obstacles to this—racial prejudice, with its associated mythology of racial differences in mental capacity, on the one hand, and class antagonism on the other. As regards the former, we stated at the outset the view generally accepted by modern anthropologists. Educationalists, particularly if they have some knowledge of anthropology, can help to produce a social atmosphere in

which there will be—as there must be—increasingly close and co-operative social relations between different races. As regards class antagonism, the work of Professor Lloyd Warner and his associates has demonstrated the significance and complexity of the class systems of America, an analysis which makes nonsense of doctrinaire Marxism. It is probable that some form of class system is a necessary correlate of technological development in all modern nations, including the U.S.S.R. The goal is, therefore, not to create a classless society, or to foster class antagonism which may lead to 'the dictatorship of the proletariat', but to create a class system in which equality of opportunity in the economic, social, and educational fields shall become a reality instead of a social myth.

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CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHARACTER

NOTHING is more difficult than to free ourselves from the belief that a Utopian idealisation of our own way of life is the absolute 'good.' Any fair study of the springs of human behaviour, however, must start at the point at which we may ask: "What are the possibilities and limitations of human behaviour?" Then, as scientifically as we can, we look at human beings as specimens; our logic is bound by test and our theory by data. Writings about ethics and morality have not been so bound in Western civilisation, and have become too-easy targets for the biologist, psychologist, or sociologist. However, these same scientists when faced with the problem of elaborating a theory and logic for social norms become quite ethnocentric. In the following pages there is an attempt to develop some ways of evaluating normality in any society by describing the kinds of equipment and processes man and his society have for the acquisition of norms.

For most people, ancient notions that honesty, politeness, decency, and good taste are instinctive no longer hold. We know that training and experience make the difference; we know that hereditary, constitutional factors make some difference. There is, however, some difficulty in relating biological variables to social variables, and there are still many arguments concerning the relative importance of heredity and environment. The physiological functioning of man has been far more intensively studied than the social functioning. Modern psychology is making the understanding of the mechanisms of emotional adaptation clearer. What the physiologically and psychologically defined individual adapts to is not so clear. Sociology is the study of the social environment to which the individual adapts. This social environment is, however, the product of a group of individuals adapting in a more or less patterned way. Society is a set of abstractions from data provided by observing the behaviour of many individuals. It is assumed that all behaviour is adaptive, and that the unrealisable, perfect adaptation is in achieving an equilibrium similar to what the physiologists mean by homeostasis in the organism. Social adaptation is double-barrelled—there is the individual's adaptation to the environment, and yet a large part of the environment consists of other people simultaneously adapting to him. Society is not only a

set of abstractions for the social scientist, but is also a set of regulations to guide its members.

Individual adaptation which is considered successful or adequate by oneself and by others with whom one must live and interact can be said to be evidence of good character. In discussing the relation of character to social interaction, it is necessary to follow an admittedly circular path from general sociological considerations through some adaptive mechanisms of the individual and back to some analysis of the social environment to which the individual adapts.

The simple fact that it is natural for human beings to live in organised social groups produces some complexities and variations not equalled in the rest of nature. Some still erroneously claim that social living is an imposition on the individual in that it controls his biological impulse gratification. It is more reasonable to say that social living is a way of guaranteeing the satisfactions of all needs and drives, through time by the regulation of behaviour and through space by the distribution of goods and privileges. Society extends the possibilities of the human being for existence but not without limits. There are limitations to human behaviour which arise from our physiological and psychological structure. We increase our understanding of human behaviour by combining our knowledge of the organic, psychic, and social limitations and possibilities.

The modern scientist in any field finds it difficult to combine many variables at once without giving precedence or greater influence to any one. Our intuitive reactions to other people, however, tend to combine these variables into a general impression, but even here our impression is made up of values derived from our own experience which always interferes with our perception of the whole person. The best that the social sciences can do is to broaden our perceptiveness by supplying new categories and sharpening present values. The application of scientific knowledge about human behaviour will be through its intuitive use by those who are in positions to influence people.

What are some of the natural functions of society? First of all, man is singularly unfitted to cope with the natural world by himself. The human child is more completely dependent upon others for a greater proportion of his life than are other animals. This is related to and compensated for by the fact that the human child has a great ability to learn. Furthermore, the human brain is so constructed that it can project past experience into the future and keep the fruits of experience by use of symbols. Human beings organise themselves into societies by which they protect and sustain each other and pass on experience from generation to generation. We can say that society has three main functions: (1) Relating a number of families to their common environment, or the techno-

logical function; (2) relating these people to each other, or the social organisational function; and (3) relating these people to their past and future, a symbolic or, if broadly understood, a religious function.

The technological function concerns the exploitation of the environment for the satisfaction of many of the needs and drives —food, water, protection against the elements and the other living forms with which they are in competition in the environment. It requires the learning of many techniques, the development of tools, maintaining co-operation, and the knowledge of the behaviour of the natural environment.

Social organisation involves the distribution of labour, rights, and privileges among the people so that the fruits of technology may be used to satisfy at least the minimum requirements of all. Other than that everyone be given the chance to satisfy his basic needs, there are no universally accepted norms or principles for the distribution of rights and privileges. Each of us may have some opinion or set of beliefs, such as the Ten Commandments, "The greatest good of the greatest number", "To each according to his needs", and so on. In any event, there is an adaptation to each other which is developed into a system of rules of privilege and respect passed on from generation to generation.

The symbol system relates the members of society from the present to the past and to the future by providing common categories of things, feelings, and events. The symbols, whether they be words, gestures, or tokens, are cues for learned behaviour which have become accepted ways of dealing with the world temporally, spatially, and interpersonally. It is certain that the most outstanding characteristic of man is that he does not have to solve his problems within every life-span, but the accrued experience of his ancestors can be passed on so that he does not have to suffer too many errors in his trials. This ability to project past experience into the future may permit of avoiding pitfalls, but it unfortunately also means that we can develop anxieties and fears about what might happen out of all proportion to reality.

The individual learns to cope with his environment, to understand and handle the symbol system by participation in the social organisation—by being a child in the family, by being male or female, by playing with his peers, by working, by courtship and marriage, by being a parent. From these experiences, the individual develops character, by which is meant the abilities, both learned and inherent, which enable him to conform to the rules and traditions of the society of which he is becoming a member. The character of a person may be understood to mean both the development of adequate motivation and also the satisfaction of these motivations in the right way at the right time in the right place. Personality, as used by most authorities, now refers primarily to the motivational structure of an individual. For

example, it may be that in two different neighbourhoods of a city, youths with similar personality structures may be seen as juvenile delinquents in one neighbourhood and Boy Scouts in another. Conversely, the 'good' boys in one neighbourhood may have similar personality distortion to those who are problem children in another. In this instance it is the social behaviour which is assessed as character, but deeper study of the motivational pattern indicates similar personality processes which have different behavioural content.

Character sums up the learning an individual has experienced in becoming an adequate member of his society. It is the social *learning* process that is most important but most complex. There are physiological and intra-psychic learning processes and there are interpersonal aspects of learning to be understood, for learning usually requires two or more persons. It is not possible to set forth all the ramifications and contradictions of learning theory here, but it is necessary for further discussion to present some of the major notions—that learning is somewhat mechanical and reflective; it involves specific items in associative patterns and it is a total experience of the whole living organism.

A fundamental rule of learning is the behaviouristic notion that acts which are satisfying or rewarding to the individual are repeated and those which are unsatisfying or punishing are avoided. It would be simple if this were the whole story. The personal and social definition of reward and punishment is difficult enough but minor in comparison to the problem of defining what is rewarded or punished. Is the individual, a part of the individual, or an act rewarded or punished? One learns early to break up and define or categorise the world. Many of these categories concern matters which are desirable or to be avoided. As the categories become more or less universally rewarded or punished, they become values by which the individual judges his past behaviour, guides his present behaviour, and plans his future.

One of the limitations of the potentiality for symbolic behaviour is that the categories symbolised do an injustice to reality, which is not broken up but is a continuity in time and space. Although a given categorised act may be rewarded or punished, the activity around the act in both time and space is also felt to be rewarded or punished. If a boy is having a rewarding social experience in the classroom, arithmetic is also somewhat rewarding, and conversely, if arithmetic is a punishing experience, the boy may try to avoid the classroom. Maturity involves the ability to separate these associative reactions, but the limitations of the emotional structure of man make complete dissociation almost impossible. Because the associations are not symbolised, they are retained unconsciously, to be known later in many situations as intuitive feelings of expectancy, apprehension, guilt, or vicarious pleasure.

Not only is there a learning of the total situation; the whole person does the learning. This is a reflection of the development of learning ability in the infant. In the beginning the infant does not differentiate between the self and the rest of the world. All early experience is, in a sense, intrapersonal. Mother, father, other adults, brothers, and sisters are soon differentiated from the self but the past feelings of oneness are not given up, so that the child also develops the ability to identify with the others around him, to feel himself as if he were someone else. Combined with the ability to imitate, identification provides a way to learn the unsymbolised overtones of acts observed and imitated. When the young boy puts on his father's shoes and clomps around he also assumes as much of the total behaviour and attitudes of his father as he can. The emotional meaning of his father's acts are learned. Sociologists refer to this kind of learning as 'role playing.' The development of the characteristics of masculinity and femininity comes primarily from the assumption of roles—playing houses, cowboys and Indians, or soldiers.

Another aspect of learning as a whole person is one for which we might use the term 'transference.' The clinical psychologist uses this term to mean something very specific in psychotherapy, but the sociologist gives it a much wider definition. By transference we mean here that having learned how to behave in a well-defined relationship with a person, we can transfer that reaction to another person of similar characteristics. When the child relates to other adults, he does so with reactions he has learned to be successful with mother, father, governess, brother, sister, grandmother, grandfather, teacher, to name a few. Transference is the basis of all learning of social relationships. We not only 'learn our place', but learn what to do in 'our place.' If there is not a strong fear of punishment after death, one does not stay alive if the totality of living is more punishing than rewarding. The child often needs the reassurance that life is tilted to the rewarding side and identification provides it. Transference provides a way of continuing to retain types of relationships which are generally rewarding and to avoid those which are more punishing. The social nature of man makes people the most important items in the general associative pattern, so that it is the interpersonal relationships which play the most important part in learning.

Learning involves acquiring techniques for the successful achievement of an adequate relationship with the environment, other people, and the past and future. Frequently situations occur in which one has not adequate techniques and the individual is then frustrated. This frustration leads to the development of energy to overcome the block in behaviour. This energy, mobilised to extirpate the obstacle, is what is meant by the term 'aggression.' Aggression arises out of very primitive impulses to attack any

obstruction to the satisfaction of a need or drive. Because of the slow development of the human being and the requirements of social life, there is considerable frustration for the human and hence a great deal of aggression. Societies, however, cannot allow overt aggression, as people might soon kill each other off. Children and parents frustrate each other to extremes, yet the expression of aggression is held in some check. Many of a society's most important rules, both formal and informal, regulate expression of aggression. A society also provides for substitute ways of getting rid of some of the extra energy produced by frustration in ritual behaviour and in such activities as sports. Watching a boxing match may provide a vicarious way for the expression of some aggression, but a residue is left as feelings of hostility against frustrators. It is inevitable that there will be these latent feelings of hostility towards authority figures, as these are not only the people who set up many of the frustrations for the individual as he adjusts to the social rules, but who also appear to be responsible for frustrating the very expression of aggression itself. There is a vague awareness of these complicated feelings, and some outlets for their expression or formal behaviours for their avoidance are provided. Hallowe'en is a culturally defined ritual occasion in which children let off some steam as they taunt the adults in their life. Formal and joking relationships develop when there is both a persistent fear of expressing aggression and a fear of being the object of aggression. Typically in Western societies, the relationship of a son to his father, a student to his teacher, or employee to his employer is either formal, controlled and distant, or a joking one.

Not only do inadequacies of techniques for satisfying impulses produce frustration, but societies have many rules which limit the manner, time, and place in which the inherent needs and drives may be satisfied. Eating, elimination, resting, working, sexual satisfaction are all patterned by the society without much regard for the immediate impulse of the individual. This frustration is frequently exaggerated in our society by providing us with two or more ways of satisfying our wants, so that the individual is in conflict. Real conflict, in which we cannot make up our mind, is also a frustration. The choice between the foods the school nutritionist tells us to eat and those our mother tells us are good is a difficult one which often ends up with our condemning one or the other person.

Aggression is the basic reaction to frustration, and we always direct it against people; if the frustrator is not a person but a thing, we personify it, such as kicking and swearing at a door because it blocks our way. There is an alternative reaction to aggression which is regression, in which the individual turns away from the frustration and denies the motivation altogether. In effect, in regression one says, " I didn't want to do it, anyway." It is a flight behaviour, a turning about and going back. Human

regression usually appears as a going back to an earlier satisfying behaviour, a childish behaviour which was satisfying for all needs and drives. The infant stops all pain by eating and gets much help by weeping. An adult may try to recapture these successful techniques. All severely regressive behaviour is infantile, and in our society is condemned as a sign of poor character unless it is universally practised and therefore a cultural trait, such as eating sweets, chewing gum, smoking, or cleverly disguised and elaborated, such as the behaviour of the harassed father who retreats to his study to think!

Problem solving is the overcoming of frustration by a combination of well-controlled aggression and regression, by which past experience is mustered to attack the frustration in its weakest spots.

Culture is the way the members of a society act to satisfy their needs and drives. There is, however, always a submerged culture which suggests in more or less vague ways how these needs and drives could be satisfied in psychologically more primitive ways. Many societies have rules against acts which never take place. This is often true of incest rules, for instance, and certainly the rule is there because there is the possibility in the human personality that the act might be committed. Obscenities, dirty jokes and limericks, movies and writings often indicate the submerged culture of possibilities of need and drive satisfaction and the expression of aggression and regression.

As the individual learns the rules, he develops a conscience, an internalised authority which tells him what not to do. The conscience is a self-frustrator which leads to aggression against the self, or self-induced regression when desired satisfactions are prohibited. It may lead to self-punishment for guilt when the rules are broken. Suicide is not the only kind of self-destruction—accident proneness, many aspects of illness and disease, inefficiency and other poor uses of potentialities are other examples. The conscience is the sum of the learning of the negating rules. In learning to do what is correct and socially desirable, we develop a super-ego which can properly be described only by an objective outsider. It is the positive and less bothersome aspect of learned behaviour.

The person of good character is he who does the approved thing at the right time and does not break the rules when he faces inner temptation. The process of learning these positive and negating regulations is socialisation, fitting the impulse-ridden infant into the order of social living.

Socialisation is accomplished through mediators of the society's culture, and it is possible to generalise about mediators and their types. A mediator is one who provides a learning experience with more or less understanding of the social situation and the potentialities of the learner. The more successful mediator has the greater

ability to understand the limitations involved in the learning experience. The mediator, as a sort of buffer between the learner and social realities, tries to balance the potentialities of the learner with the requirements of society. The successful mediator keeps aggression at a minimum by reducing the frustration which results when greater demands are made on the learner than can possibly be met. The mother is the most important mediator who, recognising the impulses and limitations of the infant, gradually teaches the child to conform to meal-times, sleep-times, control of aggression; at the same time she protects the child from danger and other situations which the child is unable to cope with. The mother is a product of the culture and normally cannot avoid trying to reproduce herself socially. In a relatively unchanging culture the mother is better able to do this social reproduction with sureness and without anxiety. In much of the world to-day the adults feel unable to cope with their present problems, and in bringing up their children, often try to develop a person who will be better able to deal with the realities. The anxiety derived from self-abasement is multiplied by not knowing what the society's problems will be like twenty years from now. Mothers thus hurry to new books on child care, infant welfare conferences, and lectures on how to be maternal. Even in these anxious and changing times the mother succeeds in a great deal of social reproduction, thus giving her children an individual twist to the accepted norms.

The father is another mediator whose influence can be little or great, depending on the culture of the society. Parents give children the first models with which to identify and the first persons with whom to develop relationships which will then be transferred to others. A most important function of the father is to provide a modification of the mother's social self-reproduction. Both the mother and child learn from the father, so that there is no pure familial culture mediated to the child but rather a mixed culture derived from both the father's and mother's families. Familial cultural inbreeding may be as bad as biological inbreeding, and incest rules may have both a biological and a sociological function.

The father and mother figures provide through transference and identification the basis for sex roles. A girl learns femininity from her mother and by identification with the mother in her relationship to the father, the daughter learns some of the fundamentals of feminine attitude to men. The son learns masculinity from the father but his first social relationship is with his mother. In the usual family there is more learning of feminine behaviour in boys than masculine behaviour in girls. If the father or father-surrogate is too distant or inadequate the son may have many difficulties and conflicts in assuming the masculine role.

In those societies which are more complex, familial culture can-

not be relied upon to provide the child with the rules and regulations of the total society. There must be other mediators. The Church officials or priests are communal father figures and are found in most societies to provide the members with knowledge and acceptance of the facts and mysteries of the past and future and the moral code which everyone must try to live up to. When the actual patterns of satisfaction for needs, drives, and socially given impulses are so many and complicated and the skills that society's members must have so varied, institutions to provide other mediators of the culture develop. In our society these institutions are schools and the teachers are the cultural mediators. Leaders of children's play and activity groups have similar positions. These teachers are primarily parent substitutes whose activities are more or less public as differentiated from the privacy of the home. They are publicly approved and often licensed mediators. The child is likely to look at the teacher first as a parent figure, but soon modifies this, so that the teacher takes on a distinct social personality and becomes a new kind of person with which to identify and develop a transference. The relationship with the first teacher sets a pattern for the child which gets transferred to later teachers. There are many other institutionalised mediators: policemen, physicians, nurses, social workers, actors in the movies, authors, politicians, the royal family. All of them count on certain potentialities of the individual for whom they are the mediators and, when most effective, perform their mediation within the limitations of the individual.

In growing up there is an increase of potentiality and a greater understanding of limitations. Society gives more rights and responsibilities to its members as they mature physically. There is a basic set of social structures to define rights and responsibilities in keeping with biological and experiential potentialities. Usually they are age-grades or well-marked steps through which the individual grows and accepts increasing responsibilities for self-dependence, care of others, and economic productivity. With these responsibilities go some rights and privileges. These changes of age-ranks are often marked by some ritual or initiation ceremony, so that both the person changing and the society are aware of the assumption of the new rights and responsibilities. Universally the most important of these changes take place at adolescence, marriage, and becoming a parent, although there are certainly socially-defined changes involved in being a dependent infant, a walking and talking child, a grandparent, and an aged person. The mediators of the culture have the responsibility of impressing upon the person the social rights and responsibilities of each age-grade before and during the initiation into it. Those who successfully carry out their responsibilities and who do not abuse their rights are people of good character. Character, then, is a matter of the individual's lifelong

learning which reflects the teaching of the cultural mediators. Within the biological potentialities and limitations, the mediators provide the individual with character. When the mediators are unsure, the character development will be faulty but probably not irremediable.

Adolescence provides a good example in our society of the effect of unsure mediators. We find it impossible to define the rights and responsibilities of the adolescent. We ask of the adolescent an increasing degree of adult responsibility with no increase in rights. Even worse, we do not clearly define the end of adolescence. The adolescent must often try to avoid responsibility which physiologically, psychologically, and socially he is unable fully to assume, and he must simultaneously test those around him to discover his rights. Shirking his duty and impulsively exploring are often qualities of the inadequate development of character, yet we provide the pattern of this behaviour and do not provide any well-defined end for the age in which this might be acceptable. No longer is getting married or having a job or voting or going to a university a sign of being an adult. A great problem of modern society is the fact that many of its members still have adolescent characters because of inadequate social definition of age-grades and consequent uncertainty for the mediators, especially parents and teachers. The lack of definition of this age-period is derived from the changeful nature of the society and the false expectation that to-morrow the world will have more stability. In the meantime the flexibility of undefined adolescence is considered to be a good condition in which to wait. Then, too, there is the belief that the adult world is so complex—responsibilities are so great and rights can be so abused—that it takes a longer training period. Often what this accomplishes is to make adulthood so fearsome that it is avoided. The mediators who themselves are trying to accept adulthood and find it so burdensome, try also to protect the adolescent from having to face the adult world. In part, we prolong the years of schooling and training for these reasons.

One kind of cultural mediation is frequently overlooked, and that is the peer group made up of play or gang mates. From fellow-members of an age-grade are learned the techniques of getting along interdependently. Much of what was earlier called the submerged culture is learned in the peer group. Adults have vaguely defined fears about the learning that goes on in peer groups, but it is important in the development of conscience. For instance, it is probable that sex education from peers is not harmful, it is only inadequate, and adult mediators need to add to, not eradicate, this kind of learning. The peer group provides the only way to learn self-directed conformity and reduces both dependency on the more powerful and hostility to authority. Its development is absolutely necessary for a democratic society. There has been a trend away

from self-directed play groups in young people and the substitution of organised and adult-directed activity which may have serious effects on the democratic process.

In learning to live in society there are three kinds of relationships to master: to superiors, to subordinates, and to equals. Relating to authority is learned from parents, teachers, and other more powerful figures. To control aggression and to avoid hyper-regression are the major tasks. To accept dependency as a human trait is the essence of relating to the more powerful. Mediators who themselves have not learned to accept dependency and understand hostility make the learning of subordination difficult. To be a superior without anxiety and to relate to subordinates is not easily learned. With faulty notions of democracy we try to eliminate training experiences for leadership. Usually, training for leadership and the comfortable acceptance of authority takes place in the family as older siblings assume responsibility for younger siblings. With the decrease in the size of the family and familial activity, this training is defective. Schools are neglecting this kind of learning experience in part because the anxieties of the mediators concerning dependency and hostility are overwhelming; they project their own repressed hostility on to the child and so fear that the child in an authoritative position will be too primitive. Learning to get along with equals requires that the adult mediators allow the young to practise at group activity without interference. Another sort of peer relationship is with oneself, and opportunity for self-directed activity must also be allowed for. In general, self-acceptance is developed in peer-group activity by the process of identification. Those who have not learned to relate themselves to others as superiors, subordinates, or equals are going to be pointed out as having faulty character structure.

A person is a member of a society in so far as he reacts similarly to the same cues. In large societies, where there is a detailed division of labour, the area of similarity is large and sub-divisions or sub-societies develop. These sub-cultural divisions achieve similar goals in a somewhat different manner. It is comfortably idealistic and Utopian to believe a society can contain sub-groupings with different cultures on an equal status, but in fact the different culture groups are given a prestige rating or rank order. Occupations, religious sects, and associations are sub-cultural groups and are given varying prestige in a society. Neighbourhoods and regions are other prestige-giving factors. Because they are often segregated and isolated, racial groups make up sub-cultural groups. Inasmuch as some occupations, religious and associational membership, neighbourhoods and regions, and perhaps racial and ethnic groups occupy about the same positions on a prestige scale, a society is divided into social layers which are known as social classes. A society may be divided into two or more social classes.

Each class has a variation of the culture, with similar goals and somewhat different ways of achieving them. A major characteristic of a social class is that people participate more intimately more often with their fellow class members than with people in other classes. Each class has its own norms for good and bad behaviour and for good and bad character. In a class structure it is possible to change one's behaviour and participations and move from one class to another, either up or down. This is what is meant by social mobility. There are, however, some status structures from which one cannot move. These are called castes. In the Western world, where castes exist, they are made up of different racial groups and are called colour-castes, the white Caucasian being an upper caste and the other racial groups the lower castes. In the lower-caste groups there are also classes which are equivalent to the classes in the upper caste. Although the middle-class people in a lower caste participate more intimately with one another than with the lower-class or upper-class people, they do not, however, participate with upper-caste people of the middle class. Class lines in different countries vary in the difficulty with which they can be crossed, but caste lines may not be crossed.

In countries with a frontier, possibilities of social mobility are greater, and as the frontier disappears the class lines become more rigid. Social mobility in the stable democratic country consists of a whole class becoming more like the class next above it in the social hierarchy. Privilege is less unevenly distributed and the social distance from the top to the bottom of the social range is decreased. Revolutions involve the rearranging of the social classes.

Where whole social classes are mobile, there are fewer character problems, but when individuals are socially mobile, there are more frequent character problems. In a more stable class system it is always possible to evaluate people in terms of their own class norms, but when there is personal mobility, the individual involved and those around him are in doubt as to which norms to apply. In cases of meagre individual mobility a person is evaluated by two groups of people, those who are very much like him and hence understand the norms by which he lives, and those who are official mediators who tend to be middle-class people, respectful to the upper classes and disrespectful to the lower classes. Typically, then, most people officially labelled as having poor character development are lower-class people or those who behave like lower-class people.

Psychologically, character concerns the ability of the individual to organise his life patterns so that his inner controls are not in constant conflict with social controls. Sociologically, character refers to the way in which the individual conforms to rules of a specific social structure. The social structure is seen only as a set of rules and the person who can be observed to clash least with these rules is the person of good character.

In a social structure divided up such as ours is, there is a two-fold evaluation: First, there is an evaluation by those with whom we are intimately associated, so that a gang of thieves, for instance, has a moral code by which their fellows are judged. A social class has its own variations of social norms.

Secondly, there is a moral code which is more or less official for the society. It is the core and model for which social classes and other sub-groups have variations. In our society it would seem logical that the upper class with its great prestige and power would have the official set of social rules. Actually, the official rules are those of the middle-class, although these are made up of what the middle-class people believe to be the ways of life of members of the upper class. In a sense the middle class makes up a core culture. It is as if we think of lower-class people being in a range from bad to good, the middle class from good to better, and the upper class better to best. Certainly such terms are used in discussing people; people are heard to discuss others as coming from bad homes, good homes, better homes, and best homes, and these are usually correlated with general social prestige. Official institutions such as Church, school, and health clinic try to expose all people to the core culture values. Those who accept them and internalise them as their own will be said to be of good character and able to get ahead.

A trait most necessary to get ahead in the social world is to be able to put off immediate gratification for more remote satisfactions. Sacrifice, thrift, honesty, hard work, politeness, etc., are all self-denials. They are frustrations, and the aggressive energy produced leads to harder work and greater sacrifice while underneath is a great store of hostility. Emotional instability is one of the great problems of members of the middle class because of the conflict of their envy of those who tend to gratify their impulses more immediately and their fear of the loss of status and class position.

There are also emotional problems in lower-class children, particularly when they meet the official code which is different from their home code. When the child is taught different rules at home and at school, his relationship to authority is confused and his security jeopardised. His emotional reaction will be doubt about who is wanting to do right by him. Because of early identification he most likely accepts his familial culture, but with enough anxiety to express hostility against people and institutions of the official culture. Certainly much juvenile delinquency has some such basis, and the delinquent acts are rarely directed against one's own group but against outsiders and officials. School buildings are desecrated, property is stolen from teachers and others similarly representative of the core culture.

Emotional and specific characterological problems of the upper

class may develop as they are deprived of having subordinate positions and must be continuously aware of their high prestige. Sometimes they suffer from a 'status fatigue' and develop behavioural patterns which are not related to such high prestige, especially when impulse and personal gratification are involved. The rest of society is much more disturbed when the upper-class person falters than when a middle-class person is a non-conformist, because in some sense the highest prestige is everyone's goal, and when the models falter, one's whole direction and life pattern are threatened.

In growing up, the individual develops an increasingly complex value system by which he guides his behaviour in meeting recurrent and new situations. The values are passed on from generation to generation, but the specific order in which they are learned, and the relationship with those who are the mediators of the cultural values, produce variations of personal value systems from individual to individual. If the variations do not involve inadequate relationships with peers and subordinates and overt hostility to authority, if aggression and regression are channelised in socially acceptable ways, the individual has a normal character. Essentially, the acceptance of socially approved values comes about as the cultural mediators, parents and teachers especially, understand the limitations and potentialities of those who are their charges. If the child is pushed or neglected, or if for inherent or social reasons the child cannot understand what he is asked to do, he develops character distortions. If the child is deprived of satisfactions for basic needs and drives, his hostility and anxiety may make the understanding and acceptance of approved value systems impossible. A child once really starved will always have some anxiety about food and other items of personal security. He may steal or he may develop into an adult who will be extremely careful to do well on the job, and disregard the welfare of fellow-workers so that there will always be food in the larder. Whether he steals or becomes the ardent lone-wolf worker will depend on whether his cultural tutors provide satisfying experiences in one or other direction. If the adolescent peer group prefers crime which may not be condoned but is not severely punished by the parents, then the child heads in that direction. If property is highly protected and offences against property severely punished, other outlets may be found.

Poor character development can therefore arise in several ways. First, if the cultural norms are not taught to the child; secondly, if the teaching is inadequate; thirdly, if there is constitutional inadequacy; and fourthly, from traumatic and atypical experiences. Many constitutional defects and traumatic experiences can be overcome or their effects diminished by mediators with understanding. Parents, and especially mothers, by the intensity of their relation-

ship to their children, more readily develop an understanding. Official mediators, such as teachers, social workers, physicians, and policemen, can improve their understanding and hence their relationships with children by trying to understand themselves and by scientific knowledge of organic potentialities, psychic mechanisms, and the variations in social learning.

Character changes are not likely to be successfully brought about if one expects sudden and complete changes. In the changing social conditions of to-day, the successful mediator works to help the child or an adult to change behaviour in a direction acceptable both to the individual and to society. At best the result will be a compromise. At worst, change will appear to be punishing and frustrating and lead to either aggressive attacks on those who promote change or a mere regressive acceptance of the old way of life with its known rewards and punishments.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL FUNCTION

One of the social functions of the educator is to provide a transitional community (Appendix A) between the culture of the infant and the culture of the adult. The culture of the adult is a learned reaction which nevertheless cannot be taught. Despite this fact, however, the role of the educator is important, though not essential, in effecting a smooth transition from the one culture to the other.

That transition is most effective when the development of the moral function of the individual has a tempo that is within that individual's capacity (Susan Isaacs) and has a direction which is in general conformity with the custom of the time; thus the educator has no absolute standards, no final goals (save in his own incommunicable imagination), but must employ the methods of society (which, however, he can vary within limits) in order to further one of the functions of society in respect to the child, viz. to absorb it.

In an adult world, children are a minority group without adequate power of representation in that world (M. Crichton-Gordon, 1950); one of the functions of the educator is to be such a representative of this minority, and in this role to protect the developing child during the important phase of transition; the educator is thus an interpreter of the adult world to the child, and the culture of the child to the adult world.

Unlike the lower animal kingdom, the human species is not governed by rigid patterns of behaviour common to all members of the species. During the development of the human individual there is great scope for the acquisition of behaviour of a widely varied kind (far more varied than occurs in any other animal); one of the means by which this flexibility and adaptability are achieved is through the medium of the moral function.

The type of behaviour possible in the human species, though very wide in variety, is limited in range in any individual. The limitations of range are of two kinds, a conscious will or choice and an unconscious force operating within the mind or personality, which in some directions restricts, in others develops the scope of action; of the two sorts of limitation the latter is by far the more

important. Thus mankind has not a conscious control of his destiny, neither has the individual. The latter often thinks he has, but this is an illusion fostered, indeed sometimes cherished, to give him temporary peace of mind when faced with crisis.

Man shares with other animals the capacity to pass on to the next generation a genetic (gene-governed) structural and functional pattern of growth and behaviour. Man also passes on, but not by the physical medium of germ-plasm, a cultural pattern of behaviour which is most transmissible during the years when the individual is most plastic, i.e. during development. At this time the teacher may exert a limited but lifelong influence on the individual.

The culture pattern transmitted from one generation to another is mainly a product of the influence of the moral function upon the developing individual. Much in a culture that seems on first observation to be unconnected with these ideas or ideals on closer examination is found to be intimately related to them.

The pattern of a culture is a unity; it cannot be *constructed* by an individual, however tyrannical and powerful or clever and persuasive, out of the 'raw material' of humanity, it can only be modified. That is, man has not complete mastery even over 'cultural inheritance'; when he has more knowledge of the origin of the moral function and its influence on human personality he will be in a better position to control his destiny. Mendel's and Bateman's discoveries have made the plant and animal breeder less dependent on empirical methods when evolving new shapes of plant or animal, but the laws governing the transmission of cultural inheritance are even more difficult to understand. Psychologists are making a beginning in this direction, notably those who take cognisance of the unconscious as well as the conscious processes in the mind.

The pattern of a culture is a unity. Even a great deal of knowledge about its parts does not necessarily tell us much about the whole. As in the case of a culture, so in the case of an individual, the greatest circumspection must be employed in making generalisations from studies of particular 'unit elements'; nowhere is this more true than in the case of the origin and development of the moral function.

Yet another difficulty in making an objective study of the moral function lies in the fact that the observer is usually either a part of the culture to which the person studied belongs, or else he is a stranger to it and liable to the distortions of ignorance as well as of prejudice. The major difficulty lies in the resistance roused in the observer's mind to any disturbance of his own equilibrium: it is very rare that there are not 'internal defences' against the implications, to the self and to others, of what is seen when the minds of others are looked at objectively. This notion of 'internal defences' is important for an understanding of the

moral function. Most of the confusion and sterility of discussions on the moral function is due to lack of attention to this process of defence.

In the foregoing paragraphs the word 'culture' has been frequently, and perhaps too widely, used. It includes in this connection—though this use is admittedly irregular—the 'culture' of the infant's and small child's mind. The gulf between the mental processes of childhood and those of adulthood is greater than between those of the European adult and the blackest of darkest Africa's inhabitants; to admit the possibility of prejudice in the latter example is not only common, it is now culturally demanded; to admit and really accept it in the former example is alarming; it means that we have a tremendous task in even beginning to understand our own children and our young pupils. We erect cultural edifices upon sites of our choosing without being able to explore the foundations of those sites, and in those edifices not only then, but in later years, when we in turn become dependent again, we too will have to live.

One of the tasks of the educator is to interpret the culture of the child to the adult and the culture of the adult to the child: it is an awkward fact that important mental and emotional elements in childhood are repressed and remain unconscious, which is apt to make 'reading the child's mind' almost like guess-work.

At this point, if indeed not earlier, the writer should perhaps have made reference to the modesty of his equipment and the tentative nature of his conclusions; but now I say simply that I am grateful for this opportunity to address another profession than my own, and just a little doubtful whether my readers will be as interested in my approach to this matter as I am in theirs: for in becoming a doctor and a psycho-analyst I had to be educated, whereas to be a teacher it is not necessary (though it may be an advantage) to be psycho-analysed.

First Approach to the Problem

In the preceding section a hint was given of the approach to the moral function, which will be followed in this paper: it will be viewed as a combination of a biological and a social function. Its roots lie in our animal nature and at the same time it is in part shaped by the experience of childhood and, to a less extent, adult life. No animal, however much it is brought up as a human being, would develop a moral function at all comparable with that of a human being; and no human being brought up, if it were possible, apart from human society would, it is believed, develop a moral function such as ours. There is thus something peculiar in the animal nature of the human infant which makes it susceptible to the influence of human society, and maybe there is something in adults which makes them wish to influence their offspring more

thoroughly and earnestly than grown-up animals train their young. This human peculiarity appears to turn on two things: the infant is more immature in executive function than in emotional *needs*; the capacity 'to put two and two together' and to organise his behaviour so that it shall satisfy his requirements is less developed than the recognition of what he wants and does not want. Though there is a clear perception of *things* desired, there is a poor control over the *means* for attaining the objects or goals desired. Infancy is thus a period of intense frustration and, just as no man of developed sensibilities would willingly and for long exchange his human attributes and immerse himself in the community of animals (Freud, 1929), so no one, however hard his lot, would be likely to exchange his adult world for the emotional turbulence and frustrations of infancy. Between us and the beasts there is a gulf of incomprehensibility: between us and infancy there is the veil of amnesia—we do not desire to know, really to know and feel, with the impact of an unscreened perception, what life was then like. True, there are moments, most precious for confidence and courageous progress through difficulty, when in the earliest days there was utter satisfaction in living (W. C. M. Scott, 1948). But it is the times of frustration, baffled by unknown forces, which contribute to the mental pains which we adults screen from our memory and fondly imagine never existed, or at most were only the moving shadows of a passing cloud.

Our infancy, the foundation of our mental lives, is no solid rock of sturdy animal nature, but a condition of constant adjustment to rapid ups and downs, earthquakes: the infant's greatest need is for a stabiliser—one component in this stabiliser is the moral function. When disordered—all functions are liable to disorder—what should be a stabiliser may itself become an agent for more disorder within the personality; even the stabiliser is not always reliable.

The mind may be pictured as a regulating apparatus whose function is to keep tension as low and constant as possible. The moral function is a protective function. The thing protected in the first place is the self, later, and by a curious mutation of instinct, it protects the community.

The Span of Life and the Observers

"We start as specks of jelly," as a writer once said in *The Lancet*, "and we end as life-size corpses." Between these terminal events a person goes through many changes. Who observes those changes? Does anyone observe all of them?—No. Does anyone observe more than a few of those changes? Even that simple question cannot be easily answered: no one observes the important first nine months of life; after birth a few people may observe the first few years; after that, observation is divided between parents and teachers, pastors and doctors, later between parents and employers,

and so on; even in marriage the most devoted partner sees only a part of the other's day; only in old age is observation of behaviour reduced again to a few persons, perhaps in the end to a partner in marriage or a nurse.

It is well to state the embarrassing conclusion as clearly as possible: *direct* observation by an individual of the behaviour of another individual over long and significant periods of change is rare. Where the period of possible observation is intimate, as in the case of parents, it does not cover the whole span of life, and where it is long, covering most of the span, as with doctors and clergy who live throughout their lives with the same patients and parishioners, it is not intimate. Teachers see much that is highly important, but only for a part of the day and only for a few years. Even where special techniques of research are employed for examining the mind, the data provided by the investigations do not cover the whole field—clearly we must make do at present with partial answers.

Two Modes of Approach to the Problem

There are two ways of approaching the problem of the growth of the moral function. The older way is to assume that the moral function is implanted in man from an external source, e.g. God, and that throughout life man gropes with greater or less success towards the realisation of the ideal which exists, already formed, in the mind of the Creator. The attainment of that ideal is a task that must from the nature of things be for ever unfulfilled, the act of striving being evidence, for those who experience it, of the presence and power of God within themselves. This way of approach has been employed for several thousand years; it labours, however, under a disadvantage in that there is a basic postulate of a perfection of behaviour to which all men ideally should attain. When this is made the basis of observation and still more of upbringing, there is a tendency for the observer and the guide to consider themselves competent (by reason of age or for whatever other reason) to perceive and interpret the Divine will; this sometimes works to the disadvantage of the child who, besides being rather confused by the different interpretations of his teachers, is not led to accept standands of behaviour which relate directly to his own development.

Another approach to the problem is based on a different postulate, viz. that the growth of the moral function within the personality is a personal achievement in each individual in adapting himself, his animal self, and desires, to the culture of the society in which he grows up, and that investigation should be turned to the processes by which one phase of development leads under the dual influence of instinctual and environmental forces to the next stage of the moral function. On this viewing the moral function

may be regarded as the highest development of biological evolution and not as a derivative of anything lying outside the animal kingdom in its widest aspect.

This paper will be concerned with this second postulate.

What Biological Function does a Moral Function Play?

A creature that lives quite alone has no need for morality; such a function would play no part in its life, and if such isolation had existed from birth or from a very early age it is difficult to see how it would be acquired. Morality is a social function which serves the purpose of attaining and maintaining a harmonious relation with a society which is regarded as 'good.' The moral function is of slow growth and is liable to disturbances of development, which may be noted by any observer or may be seen only by one who has not been subject to the same disturbing influences himself. Thus a person with 'a fierce conscience' is not observed to be unusual by those who through upbringing have acquired the same sort of fierce consciences, but he may be regarded as a very odd sort of person, if not definitely abnormal, when he goes abroad or moves into a company of people with different standards.

The Origins of the Moral Function are Primitive

If we are going to look into the origins of the moral function we must begin with processes which at first sight seem hardly recognisable as such, and, as the earlier we go back in an individual's history the more nearly do we come to a physiological, almost animal, level, we must be prepared for humble origins of what later becomes one of man's greatest achievements.

When we consider the primitive nature of the small child's mental processes and at the same time consider the nature of the demands made on him to regulate his behaviour—in particular the fact that the control of his sphincters is to many children one of the first criteria by which they can please their parents and earn the titles of 'good' or 'bad'—it is not surprising that some psychologists have sought the first stages of morality in 'sphincter morality' (Ferenczi, 1925). This is no more a belittlement of later developments than to say that man's origin can be traced through the lower primates, even to still lower animals, and it is of course only a partial explanation. But there is no gainsaying that in our society the 'training' of the body's habits makes a deep impression on the child and colours his attitude, on the one hand to his body and its functions, and on the other to the relation of friendly co-operation with or hostility to those on whose good regard he so greatly depends. One baby was clean and dry, requiring no diapers even at night, before the age of nine months; forty years later he said, "It has taken me all this time to get over that terrible start, and I am only just learning to relax." With his bowels and

bladder he was 'good', but for the rest he was beneath all resentful and irritable though longing to be—and eventually becoming—charming and easy-going with others where there was no real occasion for protective self-assertion.

Another child, brought up in an 'all-electric house', while still a crawler used to go to the power plugs, extend one hand nearly touching the forbidden switch, and then smack it with her other hand, shaking her head and saying a primitive 'No.' 'Good' and 'bad' behaviour, even among children in the crawling stage, is thus not only a matter of sphincters, but appears to be always associated with movements, i.e. with action, of some kind.

It is desirable to have a frame of reference, perhaps an over-simple one, by which to designate the parts or aspects of the personality engaged in these inner and outer moral controversies. The hand of the crawler extended towards the electric switch had, for the child herself, during that particular game a different 'meaning' from the other hand which smacked. The former was connected with its activities that were influenced by impulses of curiosity, of mastery, and of exploration; the smacking hand was most probably during that game an embodiment within the self, a representative, of prohibiting parents.

A Simple Frame of Reference and Nomenclature

Without a simple nomenclature we shall be tied to illustrations or anecdotes. Freud's (1923) frame of reference (Appendix B) is the simplest which at the same time is at all adequate. If the executive part of the mind or personality is called the *Ego*, the part which checks the ego's behaviour can be called, without giving it an exalted valuation, the *Super-Ego*. That leaves us with the part which manifests itself in urges to action of all primitive kinds, and first Groddeck (1923) and then Freud (1923) called this part the It or impersonal part of the self, or (to keep it Latin) the *Id*.

It was due to impulses of *id* origin that the child extended her hand towards the switch, the *super-ego* part caused the other hand to smack, mediating between these two was the *ego*.

At one time it was thought that the Super-Ego was a part of the Ego modified by parental injunctions, whose "Thou shalt not ." became a part of the child's thinking and self-controlling processes; later (Freud, 1928) the incorporation of the parents' attitude was seen to have another or supporting side. It is as if a part of the Ego accepted the parental attitude as though it were its own so that they no longer had need to say "Do not do that or we won't love and cherish you (or we will be angry with you), or do this and we shall be pleased with you"—such functions become part of the child's own Ego behaviour or rather its Super-Ego behaviour.

Though the Super-Ego is to some extent moulded on injunctions

and encouragements, it would be a mistake to imagine that at any time in the child's development it is a simple matter to modify or mould the Super-Ego, or the child's ideals, or its moral function —far otherwise. The child's Ego, fortunately, is not a plastic lump, like wax, ready to receive whatever imprint the environment shoves upon it. The development of the Super-Ego is an active process within the mind; the Super-Ego meets a biological need (adaptive), and so the total personality is involved in it; but it is an unconscious process and for this reason, until researches into the operation of unconscious mental processes had disclosed their way of working, the development of even this important function was utterly obscure.

The Beginning of Social Life

Social life begins when a person finds it necessary to adjust to two or more persons at once; the human family usually provides this prerequisite condition. But the child is ill prepared for the problem of a three-person relationship; he is emotionally unstable, is dependent on his parents, and has as a background of his own experience a babyhood by no means free from trouble. The boy, for instance, finds himself in conflict with his father particularly in his striving to obtain and retain the central and sole place in his mother's affections. An implacable hostility to a person so powerful and so near would fill his life with fear and anxiety. But there is in everyone a certain tendency to bisexuality and the father is liked and admired as well as being regarded as a rival to be got rid of. The quandary is overcome by a process (apparently peculiar to human beings) in which the attributes of the parent of the same sex are taken into the self, the boy identifies himself with his father and accepts parental admonitions as if they were issued by a part of himself. A part of his own Ego becomes modified by his experience of the environment which is most precious to him, viz. his parents, thus there is an 'inclusion' of the social environment within himself which goes on behaving in a lively way both as part of him and as part of the environment.

The liveliness or the livingness of the portion of the environment included within the self (the Super-Ego) is an important part of its function. It is not as if the parent's "You are *not* to do that" set up a kind of reflex blockage of the impulse to do that particular thing; we do not as adults take into ourselves the sayings of others as if they were telegrams containing just words and instructions, and still less do we do so as children. Our lives are not spent in the execution of formulations like those newly constructed electronic calculating machines into which are fed specific instructions to act in such and such a way—press the button and the machine does the rest. Our lives are lived all the time with people; if through identification with our father we are restraining

ourselves from a desired activity it is as if he was present *within us* holding back our hand.

"But," you may say, "this is all phantasy!" Yes, that is exactly what it is and why it is so important. Our mental life begins, certainly our social life begins—and continues—in the movement and interaction of people in their various relations to one another, now loving, now quarrelling, now remote, now close, but all the time in vital relationships. A child can commit to memory a command or an encouragement, but that does not modify the personality, it does not 'get inside', it does not exercise a 'Super-Ego' function nor alter the moral ideas.

We all know that children people every cranny of their world with creations of their imagination, but these phantasied objects are not entirely new constructions having no relation whatever with what they have experienced before. The phantasied objects, their own little people—or giants, for the matter of that—have attributes some of which are taken from one person, some from another, but blended and recombined to form just such a figure as is needed in the drama of their imagination at the moment. As it is in their imagination—so it is with their inner world, it too is peopled with all sorts of creations sublime and terrifying; all of them immortal![1]

This inner world is no camera obscura which reflects faithfully the outer world in miniature. It is too much coloured by the child's own emotions, and the phantasies shaped by those emotions, for any such photographic analogy to be employed. The inner world is a theatre of operations in which the child (we adults do it too) is for ever playing over and over again the emotional problems which preoccupy him—and most important of these is the relation

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[1] When a reluctant feeder is having porridge spooned into her mouth with the words 'This is for Daddy', then with the next spoonful 'This is for Mummy, . . .' and so on through the whole Table of Kindred and Affinity till the dish is finished, I ask myself this simple question, 'Who is being fed, and *where*?' (*a*) The child is being fed, (*b*) Mummy and Daddy and the rest seemingly are being fed, (*c*) since the child does not turn the spoon to these and others but takes the porridge into herself, these others must get it when it gets inside herself. While I hold fast to the boundaries of anatomy I can get nowhere near an understanding of the mind and social concepts of a small child, but if I assume that when a child accepts such 'play' then there must be some 'meaning' in it—those people are inside somewhere or other. I would not have given such simple nursery experiences had I not found in the course of psycho-analytical work that these 'games' are meaningful, that is to say, they are related to the experiences of the child—and the experiences in his imagination, which are of course in their frame of reference real. "A thing is real," said Kurt Lewin, "if it has effects": these childhood's imaginings have effects, therefore they are real, though maybe only real for the child himself.

I sometimes wish that the philosophers who talk learnedly about 'mind and body' problems would let themselves be bothered with small children's play: from such mouths we learn how little we know.

of the parents to one another, their love-making, their quarrels, their having children, killing children and cooking and eating them, and reviving them again, and so on. The dramas are most varied; now tender, now brutal, according as the child feels at the moment. The parent-figures who play a prominent part in these dramas are not like the real parents, they are what the child at the moment phantasies them to be, but though only made in imagination they are for the moment and in the life and action of the phantasy real.

The term ' inner world ' has been used in the singular; it seems, however, that there is a hierarchy or stratification of these phantasy theatres of operation, the earliest and most primitive being ' deepest ' or least accessible to consciousness, the more recent being more superficial and as a rule more easily made conscious. The phantasy activity in every level has the same purpose, viz. to reach a solution to an unresolved emotional problem, but there is a ' super-objective ', as Konstatin Stanislavsky calls it in *An Actor Prepares*, namely to produce a solution that will solve the problems at every level simultaneously.

All this is getting complicated, and I can hear same readers say, " Heaven above, does every little brat have all that going on within him—spare us from psychology! " Be patient with me, I am soon coming to clearer matters.

We are now considering the beginnings of social life: all this is by way of saying that there are patterns in the inner world which are the most personal and cherished possessions of the child, which affect his outlook on the social patterns which he sees in the world of men and women and children around him.

Let us now go back to the theme of the beginning of this section, the difficult position of the boy, for instance, faced with the two parents he is fond of, but of whom one is a rival. It was said that he identified himself with his father and took him as a model. This, however, is in fact a continuous process, there is a hierarchy of models thus acquired, the more primitive ones are harsher in outline, more all-black or all-white, than the later ones; the earlier ones are hardly human at all, if by human one means that they are a blending of good and bad, of strength and weakness; but once incorporated in the inner society they have their place there no matter how crude and seemingly unassimilable they may be. The word ' models ' has been used; it is incorrect if by models we mean what the conventions of the adult world would call ' ideals '; there can, after all, be models of all kinds, and the ' inclusions ' within our personality are of all kinds, at first, anyway.

But the child soon looks away from home for models. One of the great advantages of going to school (dare I say the greatest advantage?) is that the child is afforded an opportunity to assimilate other models than those of his parents.

There is a propulsion away from home, no matter how pleasant

the home may be; home is a place of conflict and jealousy as well as a refuge and a secure place of comfort. The child needs a wider world where his new acquaintances, among adults as well as children, will be those with whom he is less emotionally involved. But the need for such new acquaintances springs in part—not entirely, his growing curiosity and desire for experiment in social relations supplies the other part—from a satiation with the interaction of the same, ever the same, emotionally supercharged outer world with his inner world, for the interaction of the two worlds is going on all the time.

The Beginning of Moral Feelings

We feel guilt when, and only when, we do or intend an injury to a loved object (person or thing or abstraction such as Truth); if we had no aggressive impulses we would never feel guilt; if we had no love within us, love and a desire to cherish, we would never feel guilt. But we have love and hate within us from the earliest age and for the same person, therefore from the earliest age we are liable to feelings of guilt. If it is preferred that the term 'guilt' be kept for the highly developed response which we know in consciousness as 'pricks of conscience', then we could coin a term for the primitive sort and speak of 'proto-guilt.' The point is not important.

On this view, guilt can begin very early; indeed, since the infant loves the breast and often is angry with it, guilt can begin—'proto-guilt', if you wish—in the first year of life. There is some ground for thinking that it does.

What does guilt 'say' to the Ego? In more prosaic language, what effect does a pang of guilt have upon the executive function of the mind? First it calls a halt to the guilt-provoking action and then, when the love impulses gain momentum, it induces a restitutive response, a making good the bad action done. Under the influence of the restitutive impulse the object is cherished sometimes more fondly than before the guilt-provoking act was done; indeed, the restitutive impulse is a reinforcement of the love impulse in our personal and social relations; in this we are different from the animals, who pine but do not mourn, who caress but do not find themselves in those enduring bonds which we call love.

What has been said about guilt thus far is valid for a two-person relationship, for example the 'nursing-couple' (Merell P. Middlemore, 1941) of mother and child; it acquires a greater richness and power when the three-person relationship of two-parents-and-child are the interacting group. In this case the boy can model himself upon the father so that both the inhibiting element and the restitutive element have guides, so to speak, in which they can run. But it is not easy! The previous section said nothing if it did not make plain that there is interaction between the outer

and the inner worlds, or the outer and the inner society, as I prefer to think of it, and that the inner society is a complex of stratified reactions interplaying with one another. There is not one ' Super-Ego ', in other words, but a hierarchy of Super-Egos or inclusions of external persons (modified by the mood at the moment of inclusion); at least, this is so in the early years, and those are the ones we are considering at the moment.

This is not a stage at which one should stop—it is too depressing, with this entwined mass of unresolved emotional entanglements. Nevertheless I propose to jump to a condition of maturity in the moral function and then work back to the present difficult point, discussing on the way the disorders of the moral function—what increases and what diminishes the likelihood of such disorders.

The Optimum Development of the Moral Function

What are the components of the moral function and what service does it perform in the normal healthy adult? The part of the mind responsible for the moral function is the Super-Ego. It is *vigilant*, it watches the intention to action in respect to loved objects (persons and things and valued abstract ideas). Its vigilance is directed to the protection of good objects from any damage or hurt which they may receive as a result of the action prompted by the instinctual part of the self (the *id*).

Under the guidance of the Super-Ego the Ego looks inwards to the instinctual part of the self and also, without such guidance, it looks outwards to the external world. In a mature, healthy adult the Ego, or Executive, recognising that the instinctual element is as much a part of the self as any other part of it, is ready to assess the degree of its (the Ego's) responsibility for its acts and to compare this both with the standards required by society and with its own feeling for the fitness of the act or intention in the circumstances under consideration.

The healthy, mature adult Ego is neither intimidated by the selfishness and aggressiveness it discerns within the self (the *id* part), nor is it complaisant to its demands for satisfaction. Even under pressure from the Super-Ego the Ego does not find secret outlet for aggression by turning the aggression against itself in an orgy of self-punishment, nor does it allow an orgy of misdeeds to be followed by a severe process of ' un-guilting ' by penitences and the like [2]—the act and the consequences are considered as a unity before the action takes place; finally, the decision as to the rightness or the wrongness of the action (considered in respect to the effect on good objects) has to be taken independently, quite inde-

[2] The old-regime Russians were prone to this behaviour; cf. Gorer, *The Psychology of the Great Russians*.

pendently, of the opinion of the community on the matter, the final decision being taken after that too has been considered.

A person who behaved in this way has some claim to wisdom in the matter of morals, and at least in respect to loved objects he would be gentle. He would not be harsh, either, with himself, for such a person would regard his own self as among the good objects to be protected. His own self? What self? What of all those 'inclusions', that 'internal society' that seemed so bewildering in a previous section: are all of them to be protected too? Even the harsh uncouth parts? This 'optimum' just described combines tolerance with feeling, endurance, and love. Such a combination is not beyond human compass, though there are many forces—often institutionalised forces—which would persuade us that morality is not showing virtue if it does not demand mortification of the flesh and penances of the spirit.

That terrible Greek proverb, "Count no man happy till he is dead", speaks both of the misery which may befall the contented man and of the triumph over calamity which may bring joy in the last days of a life of struggle. So, surely, it is with this matter of the attainment of a mature and wholesome—a life-giving and supporting—moral function: who can say that in the blunderings and struggles of the most wayward there is not at least a tendency to attain tolerance within and without and thus find peace?

Hindrances to the Development of the Moral Function

The poor devil who has to endure the often clamant demands of the instincts on the one hand, the restraints of conscience or Super-Ego on the other, and all the time earn a living and keep a fairly clear slate in the outer world, is of course the Ego, our Executive. Whatever adds to his burden prolongs his task of making a final adjustment of these various claims.

One of the most difficult people he has to deal with in the outer world is the person who is in authority over him and whom he is trying to respect, but who is anxious to take short cuts to morality. There is a proper tempo in the assimilation of problems of morality which is peculiar to every individual, and nothing is harder, just as nothing in the long run is more rewarding, than a perception of that tempo. Short cuts to morality are neither moral nor are they short.

Morality cannot be implanted in a person, it can grow only at its own time and in his own way. Certain types of behaviour can, of course, be forced on a child or on an adult, but that is not morality. Morality is not behaviour in conformity to a standard of conduct, but the expression of a good relationship already existing in the mind and finding expression in everyday action and in crisis.

Morality involves a sensitive perception of the codes of ethics in

the community, but the person must not lose himself in an identification with that community; one of the values of morality is its highly individual quality; perhaps, indeed, that is one of its chief biological (survival) values.

If a child is taught to connect 'good' and 'bad' with actions and not with his feeling about people he will tend to split action from feeling, and the end of that is a rigid type of personality who becomes more and more, instead of less and less, one who goes blindly 'with the crowd.' Those who are concerned with moral education know well that the final result of their endeavours may not be apparent for years after their contact with the children is finished, and that if they look for immediate results visible and satisfying to themselves they may be setting store by superficially polished manners instead of a basic integrity of character. It was not for nothing that so many of the foregoing pages were filled with descriptions, inadequate as I know them to be, of the 'serial deposits of experience', or the 'inclusions of external personalities' within the self, or Super-Egos, nor that I described at such length their interaction; a new experience has to work its way through and into the stratifications in the 'internal society.' To say this is not to belittle good manners, but only that they must come from within if they are to endure stress, and when pressed upon a person from without there is apt to be distortion of the internal processes of social relationships.

Though in our society at the present time a high value is attached to love and indications of aggression and hate are considered to be of themselves antisocial, it is well to ponder on the cost of (and the possibility of sudden reactions from) such a dichotomy. If a small child says to another, "Oh, I hate you!" this is by many considered a dreadful thing. To be sure, for the moment the social situation is somewhat disquieted, and there is an air of expectancy, possibly of some apprehension, but before we pass a moral judgment on a child who speaks thus there are a number of considerations which may pass under our notice. The double love-and-hate feelings are very common in our earliest years, and it is, after all, quite an achievement for us to be able to experience these oscillations without disturbing our relationships with people. This child may be in process of mastering its hate feelings by giving conscious expression to them. Furthermore, we grown-ups heard the child say it to another: were we, who stood so near, not also in the social setting of that malediction—weren't we meant to hear, was it not said to test our tolerance or to force us to aid the speaker to stop his flow of wrath from going farther? I cannot answer these questions (partly because the above is a hypothetical case), but I can say that merely to stop the expression of such emotions because on general principles they are thought unseemly is not, in my view, an aid to the development of a sensi-

tive and tolerant moral function. This is not the same as saying that any child can say and do whatever he likes when he likes; the child needs our help, help to adjust to his inner needs as well as to society's.

In an earlier section it was said that there was a continual pressure to complete in the present the unresolved emotional situations of the past, i.e. the Ego has to face two ways, the outer world and its demands in the present, and the inner feelings (instinct-demands) plus the past as yet unsatisfied dissatisfactions. Those who have to bring up and educate children have ever before them young creatures doing or wanting to do the very things they themselves desired to do and could not do with any real content.

"Those kids stir up my complexes!" as a young teacher once said with enviable insight: she at any rate would not be caught unawares. Referring back to those sections dealing with the interaction of an external and an internal society, the latter by no means entirely harmonious—does not a teacher facing a difficult class feel the discord outside herself awakening responses within herself from the somewhat discordant inner, internalised past experiences? Has not she in such a case a double task to perform: to quell an inner as well as an outer hubbub? What she brings to the one task she will bring to the other. If we are agreed that discipline must be maintained there are still two possible ways of looking at it: one way is that noise and confusion are in themselves wrong; the other way is to regard them as inconvenient and perhaps ungracious. The way taken will depend on the moral attitude of the disciplinarian.

Returning to the Super-Ego again, the teacher is endowed by the child with Ego-Ideal qualities which were originally felt towards the parents. To view any infringement of the code of behaviour as a thing which cannot possibly be looked upon with a sense of humour tends to activate in the child's mind the phantasy of blind and harsh parental disciplining and the phantasy of harsh relations generally in the home. In so far as the child is saddled with much unresolved guilt the experience of stern reproofs will be a temporary assuagement of his guilt feelings; but if the aim of the teacher is to aid the child's Ego to adjust to the claims of impulse, of inner conscience, and of outer society, then rigid schemes of behaviour will be avoided as tending to benumb the recognition and the enjoyment of the inner experiences even though they may need curbing, for when we look with unabashed gaze into ourselves we find enjoyment (albeit with a blush) at many of the thoughts and impulses we prefer not to display or perform.

Now, what part of the teacher's behaviour or personality gets absorbed into her pupils' personalities? Is it her *injunctions* to keep quiet, or is it her *way* of handling the unruliness? Put in

other terms, is it her conscious behaviour or her unconscious behaviour which really influences them most? In my view the latter (the unconscious) behaviour is the most influential, and I think it is a recognition of this which makes some parents and teachers nervous before their charges; they do not feel that they have sufficient control over themselves to be able to handle the parent (teacher)-child relationship.

When referring to the early development of the Super-Ego we had occasion to consider the role of the sphincters in the child's growing self-control and in his social relationships. These bodily functions and sensations, as well as those derived from the genitals, are a source of delight and satisfaction to the child. These excitations enhance and give 'body' to phantasies—those most precious of all human characteristics—and afford a link between the animal, the 'proto-mental' (Bion, 1948), part of ourselves and the nexus of personal relationships in which we live. These phantasies, as we would expect, contain mixtures of loving and destructive components, and in the course of his life each child, adolescent, and adult has to work out for himself the untangling of these two opposing tendencies in his phantasy life and to canalise both of them constructively. It is a task of the greatest delicacy and, perhaps fortunately, most of it goes on subliminally, i.e. outside the range of consciousness.

But those who have the upbringing and education of children inevitably have to face the fact of the child's sensuality. Since the child himself needs help in resolving his conflicts over his sensual feelings he often so shapes his behaviour (rarely by direct requests for help, more often by actions which excite attention and even reprimand) that the adult is compelled to face the issue too. What should be the aim in such a case?

If morality is an invigilating function in the mind to preserve good objects from injury caused by the self, and if what has been said above is true—that love and hate impulses are often closely interwoven—and if the child is troubled, and if the Ego, which has the job of testing reality, is to be supported in its hard but practical tasks—then, though it is difficult, the path is fairly plain. An alliance has to be made with the Ego, not with the Super-Ego (which looks only within) nor with the *id* (which considers only immediate release of tension), and in making that alliance the facts must be considered: the child is troubled because he feels a wrong has been done, so his worry is intelligible and, because he would not worry if he did not love, it seems to the onlooker—and perhaps some day to himself—that the situation is not hopeless, as the child at the moment feels; these double feelings everyone knows to be painful, but they are soluble in the end. Alliances made with the conscience against sensuality, or sensuality against conscience, or on the child's side against the parents, or the other way about, only

add to the burdens of the part of the child's personality which finally has to decide on its course of action—his Ego.

It hinders the child's Ego in its difficult assay and difficult decision if the adult, who is virtually called into consultation—to butt in without being asked is an almost inexcusable trespass—brings forward his own problems for solution simultaneously, i.e. by making this an occasion for the working through of his own problem of dealing with sensuality, conscience, love, and hate, and by taking sides for or against the parents in that (for the child) still unclosed issue of parent-child relationship. In a word, each generation has to solve its own problems and if bridging of generations is to be done in moments of conflict, the points of contact should be the Ego.

How difficult this subject is! For despite what I have just said it is perfectly evident that the vehicle of culture transmissions is via the Super-Ego! But I was also not entirely wrong: in moments of conflict let the bridge be the Ego (any clinician would say the same), but when looking at the general stream of culture transmission we must consider the Super-Ego.

The Moral Function as a Vehicle of Cultural Transmission

Born dependent, impulse-ridden, fickle, egoistic, body-bound, we grow up, if the Fates do but grant us grace, into independent, controlled (but spontaneous), constant, reasonably unselfish, spiritually far-seeing, and yet body-enjoying adults.

One of the means by which this remarkable transformation takes place is through the process of Super-Ego formation. We take into ourselves the personalities of those we lean on and admire; by so doing not only do we get help to curb our wayward impulses, but through the simultaneous action of sublimated love and hate impulses we receive an impetus to acquire from our model skills in social adaptations (and even skills in craftsmanship), through an identification with our model we gain the support of a kindly mentor when we falter and of a comforter in our despair. We use the experience and the love we have for parents and their surrogates to help us in our dependent years, till we have mastered our desires or at least ceased to fear them—then only do we grow up.

The tie with the older generation must some day end, useful and fruitful though it was. How does it end? Is there a shift of the function from one part of the mind to another? From the Super-Ego to the Ego? Does the Ego gain in insight and knowledge of its instinctual part (its *id*), so that the person can decide for himself what is right and wrong without reference to what father taught, what the school code was, what society thinks? All this I believe to be so, but there is a precondition to the attainment of this goal: the pain of conflict must be faced, the fact of frustration and despondency at our own waywardness and hurtfulness is to be

reckoned with as part of our very nature. If we idealise ourselves or our motives or seek to smother our antagonism by over-idealising others, if we work out, in our emotional life in relation to others, problems of our own which only we can face within ourselves—then we shall be for ever dependent on the aid of father's admonitions and of codes of conduct that we must blindly obey.

But as we grow up facing our own troubles as best we may, these 'inclusions', so often referred to, become absorbed as parts of our own Ego, and thus we grow in stature to be the equals of those who were once our teachers and our guides.

There seem to be two kinds of cultural transmission, in the cases where the Super-Ego element is unabsorbed and in the cases where it is assimilated. The former is more noisy, more reforming, more intrusive; the latter quieter and perhaps more wise. The former seeks, but unwittingly, to pass on to the next generation its *defences* against the disturbance deriving from our animal nature; the latter has to be sought out, and if its aid is required it does not flinch from the painful experience of facing again the tragedies of our human lot for another's sake. Between these two kinds of helper Youth thinks he can make a choice, but for better or worse, the decision is made according to unconscious forces in the mind, and over these he has no control.

Perhaps it is as well at the present time that this should be so. The activity of the moral function is one of Man's most precious cultural achievements, and until we know much more about it a dogmatic attitude is more likely to be injurious than helpful. The greatest enemy of the developing moral function is the person who is certain that he knows the answers for others as well as for himself. Morality does not, in essence, consist in *doing* particular things and not doing others, but in the person *feeling* the impulses of the love and hate, first in himself and then in others, and choosing so far as is possible the more constructive, the less disruptive, pathway in social relationships.

The growth of the moral function is best outlined as the change from dogmatism to exploration and choice; from sudden, all-or-none, explosive responses in situations involving moral choice to graduated, controlled responses; from reflex or reactive action to consideration; from automatism to love.

Appendix A.—The Transitional Community

One of the most important ideas in sociology in the last decade is found in the concept of Transitional Communities (A. T. M. Wilson *et al.*) (and what is probably subtly related to it, the 'Transitional Object' of D. W. Winnicott).

The Transitional Community idea arose during the war when the problems arose of settling repatriated prisoners of war.

A. T. M. Wilson, W. R. Bion, T. F. Main, Ferguson Roger, and others realised that to construct a community (Civilian, Resettlement Units) for the purpose of making a smooth transition for a specified body of persons from one community to another involved far more than making a 'transit camp'—it called for a study of the dynamics of both terminal communities and the special needs of a community where transition and not permanence was to be its essential characteristic. The importance of this to education is immediately apparent, not merely as a check to such *clichés* as "In my school we prepare for citizenship", but as stimulus to prior examination of just what forces operate in the community of the nursery and family on the one hand and on the other in the post-school communities which the pupil will enter finally. Integrative studies of this kind are at the moment in their infancy, but they may well revolutionise our views on education. It might be thought that such a subject was irrelevant to the topic of this paper, but the question of morale is central to the effective working of transitional communities, and these depend on the growth and development of the moral function.

Appendix B.—The Ego and the Id

This frame of reference was of slow growth. In 1911 Freud began to view a part of the Ego as an Ego-Ideal; this was further developed in a paper on Narcissism in 1914; in 1916–17, when dealing with melancholia, the relation of the Ego to parental authority and loss of loved objects was included in the concept; in 1921 the relation of the Ego-Ideal, now called Super-Ego, to group psychology was considered, and the three-fold frame of reference, Ego—Super-Ego—*Id*, was published in 1923. Each extension of the general concept was made in response to developments of clinical observation which showed that former theories were not adequate to explain the phenomena observed. The process of extension and change continues: for this reason every use of a technical concept should be given its date.

The work of Mrs. Melanie Klein (see References) has placed the *beginning* of the Super-Ego function still earlier than did Freud—indeed, to the first year of life; this should remind us that the moral function in its early stages is very primitive and does not manifest itself to the casual, or for that matter to the worried, onlooker in the same way as it does later in development. This paper has been greatly influenced by her work, but the responsibility for the views contained in it is mine alone; I would not like to saddle Freud or her with these opinions.

The most important writings for educationalists on the relations of these three institutions of the mind to school life are to be found in the writings of Susan Isaacs.

John Rickman.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

WHEN we speak of ethics we mean certain rules of conduct imposed on men both in their relationship with one another and in their relationship with the community, with society itself. The concept of ethics also includes judgment of man's conduct, of his actions and their classification as moral or immoral.

A code of ethics is not imposed on society from without, as something eternal and absolute, fixed and made holy by a god. It is one of the aspects of social conscience which reflects man as a social being and it is indissolubly bound up with the other aspects of this conscience, with religious manifestations, with juridical ideas, with philosophical conceptions, etc. It expresses in its own particular way fixed social relationships.

As long as society is divided up into classes there cannot exist a single code of ethics which would be universal, valid for all time, everywhere, and for everyone. The great Greek philosopher, Aristotle, was already of the opinion that the concept of good and of happiness is created by men to be in harmony with the life they lead. Each class gives all possible support to the rules of social conduct which tend to strengthen its own position. The ruling class always tries by every means, both spiritual and ideological, to impose its own ethical conceptions on the oppressed classes, to maintain among them out-dated moral prejudices and to prevent them from forming their own moral theory more suited to their social needs and more highly developed. The ethical standards of the oppressed classes take shape during the struggle against those who oppress and exploit them, during the revolutionary movement which works to overthrow the old social order and to set up a new order.

Marx and Engels on Morality

In his very first works, and in particular in his *German Ideology,* Marx has critically examined various moral theories, especially the individualistic and utilitarian moral code of the middle classes, which judges all social relationships from the point of view of their advantages for the individual.[1] Engels has

[1] *Works of Marx and Engels* (Russian edition), Vol. IV, pp. 395–401 and pp. 404–7.

developed in his critical survey of the moral theories of the upper and lower middle classes as expressed by Kant and Feuerbach, a Marxist system of ethics. In his *Anti-Düring* he has clearly set forth the two main points which in this matter must be taken into consideration: first, the class character of the moral theory; secondly, the problem of what the different moral theories have in common; thirdly, the progressive development of the theory; and fourthly, the prospects of the formation of a universally accepted moral theory, valid for all men in the classless society of the future.

Speaking of the class character of moral codes, Engels insists that—

> every moral code yet known has been the product, in its fundamentals, of the economic state of society at the corresponding period. And as until now society has always changed as a consequence of class antagonisms, moral codes have always been class codes; or a justification of domination by the ruling class for its own benefit, or else an expression, as soon as the oppressed class has become strong enough, of revolt against this domination and a formulation of the future interests of those who are oppressed.[2]

Engels then shows that in middle-class society—and on the whole this still holds good for our time—three moral codes exist one alongside the other: feudal Christian ideas of morality, modern middle-class morality, and proletarian morality. All three are practised at the same time and concurrently. Side by side with the fundamental differences of principle which divide these three moral codes, there exist, inevitably, certain common features:

> These three systems of morals . represent three different stages of one and the same historic evolution; consequently they have a common historic basis consisting of many common features. Much more: moral systems which correspond to identical or approximately identical stages of economic development must, of necessity, more or less agree.[3]

Feudal and middle-class codes of ethics, just as the yet older code of a society founded on slavery, have this in common: all of them have framed their rules for men's conduct to suit conditions in which one man exploits another, in which a country and people are enslaved and oppressed by the dominating classes of another country. All these moral theories, beneath the differing concrete forms they have assumed in the course of history, have implicit in them a silent approbation of the exploitation and oppression of the working masses, of the inequality of the sexes, of races, and of peoples. Moreover, to take but one example, the old moral rule "Thou shalt not steal" is valid in all social groups in which private ownership of mobile possessions exists; and under socialism,

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[2] Engels, *Anti-Düring*, Costes edition, Vol. I, p. 136. [3] *Ibid.*

within the framework of the struggle to safeguard communal socialist property, this same law finds expression in a particularly severe repression of anti-social crimes against property. Nevertheless this law will become superfluous and devoid of meaning in a communist society, in which all reasons for theft will be suppressed and in which will be put into practice the principle " From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."

The history of our modern times shows us that certain moral theories already cast aside as out-dated and harmful to progress gain a new lease of life and become necessary once more for those very classes which in their youth had struggled against them and which in their old age, at the time of their decomposition and decline, adopt them again. Contemporary middle-class moral theories, especially those of the most reactionary and aggressive elements of these middle classes, let us say the fascist and racial theories, are like ghosts in which are to be found the most repugnant traits of slave, mediaeval, feudal, and Jesuit morality.

But if a class on the downward path undergoes a profound moral regression, the new and superior moral system of the class which is to take the place of the older one reflects a general moral progress. The shape of feudal society was an advance on the social order founded on slavery, capitalism marks an advance on feudalism, and socialism represents an enormous leap forward from the social order created by bourgeois society. In the same way, the changes in social conscience in general, and especially in moral conceptions, tend to show a positive and ceaseless development, a continual striving after perfection, an unending enrichment.

The setting up by means of a revolution of a new order does not mean the abolition of the old one so that no trace of it is left, but it does mean the abolition of its dialectical basis. Lenin emphasises this point:

> What is characteristic and essential in dialectics is not a pure and simple negation, sterile, sceptic, full of hesitation and doubt—although there is certainly implicit in dialectics an element of negation which is even its most important element—no, it is a negation which acts as a motive force of liaison, of evolution, and which keeps that which is positive, that is to say which contains no hesitation, no eclecticism.[4]

The Ethical Problem

Social and economic developments take shape during the revolutionary struggle carried on by the working masses, and under the leadership of the most progressive classes. During the period of destruction by revolution of the old order and the setting up of the new, during the period when a new class is rising, when the masses enter into a time of even greater vigour, then, at this time, are

[4] Lenin, *Philosophical Note Books,* Moscow 1947 (in Russian), p. 197.

created the most positive political and moral values of the new social order which takes the place of the old. These are its most lasting values of which, at the moment of the dialectical negation of this self-same social order, the most will be kept as a cultural heritage of the past.

Let us take as an example the development of the moral idea of the dignity of man. In the slave system, the slaves, who often form the vast majority of the population of the city of ancient times, are considered as simple *instrumenta vocalia,* 'tools which speak'; and are treated as tools, like beasts of burden which the master can kill if he should so desire. In the feudal world man is no longer likened to a tool or to an animal. The moral ideas of human dignity have raised him to a higher level, but man is still, all the same, something which can be bought or sold. Those who till the soil are bought and sold at the same time as the land. Nevertheless, men are considered equal, at least in the sight of God, since all men are the children of God. The advance of moral conceptions is not only a direct result of the fact that in the feudal system, side by side with feudal property rights, there exist individual rights held by the peasant; these new ideas are also connected with a social conception, which is the expression of the aspirations of the masses oppressed and exploited during the period of crisis and disintegration of the ancient world. The birth of a middle-class world, of which the basis and the most fundamental feature is trade production, the splitting up of society into a multitude of individual producers, brings with it the ethical humanist ideal of the equality in principle of all human beings. Nature has made all men equal: it is not birth and feudal privileges but the true capacities of the individual which decide his place in society—such is the idea which summarised the anti-feudal aspirations of the Third Estate. The deeply humanistic conceptions of the peasantry of the day are reflected in the famous question of the English farmers in revolt: "When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?" The humanistic ideal of the equality of men was created and from then on always exercised a revolutionary influence even outside the framework of the middle-class social order. The proletarian, communist moral theory which, in its turn, takes the place of the middle-class system, and which forms its dialectic negation, tends towards an even more complete realisation of the equality of human beings. But this moral philosophy builds itself up in the thick of the struggle of the proletarian revolutionary vanguard against the negative growths of classical humanism, against the justification of exploitation and oppression under the cloak of the 'liberty of the human person', against bourgeois individualism and all its monstrous consequences. The idea of human dignity is raised in the moral conceptions of communists to such a degree that all exploitation of man and all

oppression of a nation are considered as attacks on this dignity and as contrary to communist philosophy. The communist fosters among the working masses the feeling of the solidarity of those who are exploited and oppressed and a high sense of conscious organisation and discipline. Solidarity, a feeling for organisation and for discipline—these are three qualities which may be called typically proletarian, for it is among the members of the proletariat, thanks to their position in the process of production in our society, to the numbers of them found in large undertakings and to all which links them to the most advanced technical acquisitions of mankind, that these qualities have been developed to a far greater degree than in any other class past or present. These typically proletarian qualities impregnate more and more even the non-proletarian militant members of the movements in which the proletariat has assumed the role of leader, and which it has marked with its stamp. One of the best examples which can be given of this fact is the National liberation movement in Jugoslavia. The philosophic ideas which are strongest in this movement and which also prevail and develop during the growth of socialism in this country, are the philosophic ideas of the proletarian vanguard which is at its head, the communist moral philosophy. It is this which to a certain extent shows the success which the Jugoslav workers have achieved and are still achieving in their struggle for socialism.

Every time an old order is overthrown by a revolution and a new system set up, there takes place at the same time a struggle between falsehood and truth in the deepest sense of these words, a struggle between things which are out-of-date and are becoming more and more false, and those which are growing and becoming ever stronger in their self-evident truth. It is just in the age-old struggle of the working masses against historical falsehoods, against the forces of reaction, that the values most appreciated by the common people develop. Among these qualities are found love of truth, disinterestedness, honesty and fidelity in things undertaken, solidarity, constancy, integrity, courage and perseverance in the struggle for the people's cause. These moral qualities in the minds and feelings of the working masses are in direct opposition to the ways and means to which the reactionary classes have recourse in order to safeguard the obsolete privileges of their class, and with which they make every effort to corrupt the classes and peoples which they oppress.

The proletariat represents the historical tendency towards evolution, which tends to do away with all classes in general; it is the first class which has consciously made the setting up of a classless society its aim. This is the reason why in its evolution—differing from the old ruling classes—there is, in fact, no direct line of descent; it is the class which is the leader in the struggle for the

abolition of the exploitation of man by man and of the oppression of one people by another, and its aim is the building up of a classless society. Indissolubly bound to the other sections of workers it is the creator of the most lasting political and moral values. Even further, it is this section which gathers together in the widest and most complete way the cultural heritage of the past and hands it on to the generations of the future, by creating conditions which permit the realisation of the most fertile hopes of past generations, and the formation of a moral theory truly universal and human in the most complete sense of the word, the moral theory of a classless society.

The moral principles acquired during these age-old struggles for progress make up the fundamental elements of the future moral code for all humanity, and it is for this reason that the classical exponents of Marxism-Leninism frequently oppose them to the ruling morality of the reactionary classes, calling them by such names as 'common morality',[5] 'simple laws of morality and justice', [6] 'elementary rules for living in society, known for centuries',[7] 'human morality',[8] etc.

Absolute and Relative Morality

Engels, in the *Anti-Düring*, expresses the question of the progressive development of moral philosophy and the formation of a moral theory for future humanity in the following way:

> The past, the present, and the future already provide three large groups of moral theories which are simultaneously and concurrently active. Which is the true one? Not one of these is truth in all its finality. But without any doubt the moral philosophy which contains most lasting elements is that which in the present represents the overthrow of the present, which expresses the future: it is the proletarian moral philosophy. .
>
> . . . At the same time [on the occasion of the replacement of one social order by a new and higher social order, B. Z.] there is no doubt that on the whole there has taken place an advance in morality just as in all other branches of human knowledge. But we have not yet risen above class morality. A truly humane morality above class antagonisms and any prejudices left by them will only be possible in a "society which has not only risen above but has even forgotten in everyday life that there was ever class opposition." [9]

While he shows that the truth of various moral theories is relative, Engels guards against all moral relativity. Each class

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[5] *V.* the article of Marx and Engels on the situation in England, published in the *New York Daily Tribune,* September 15th, 1853, and *Works* (in Russian), Vol. IX, p. 202.

[6] *V.* the Inaugural Address of the International Workers' Association of 1864, written by Marx, *Selected Works of Marx and Engels* (in Russian), 1948, Vol. I, p. 343.

[7] Lenin, *The State and the Revolution,* p. 82.

[8] Stalin, *Questions Concerning Leninism,* Vol. II, p. 272.

[9] Engels, *Anti-Düring,* Vol. I, pp. 134–6.

works out its own rules of conduct. This is true. But, considered from the point of view of a progressive historical evolution, all these rules of conduct in their diversity have not an equal value. On the contrary, at any given period of history, the greatest objective value belongs to the moral theory which—since it is in itself the expression of the progressive tendencies of social evolution—contributes most, by its action on the popular masses, on classes, and on individuals, to the transformation of intrinsic tendencies of evolution into reality, to the abolition of the old order and the setting up of the new. Consequently the greatest objective value attaches itself to the moral philosophy of the class which, in its struggle, consciously tries to suppress all classes and, in this way, even to abolish different moral philosophies for the different classes and to form one universal moral theory for all humanity.

Engel's conception of the relativity of moral rules does not exclude the recognition of absolute elements in the everlasting process of successive moral theories. And this is perfectly natural. Moral philosophy is, as we have said, one of the forms of social conscience, that is to say one of the forms in which the social being is reflected in human knowledge. It is for this reason that in its development we find a dialectical unity between the relative and the absolute. Man advances through an infinite series of relative truths towards an absolute knowledge of mankind, of the objective world outside, and of the laws which rule it, towards absolute truth which he will never reach in all its completeness. In the same way each moral theory, relative and conditioned by history, contributes to the building-up of the universal and human moral philosophy of the future, which in its turn will not form something complete, determined once and for all and absolutely final, but something which will continue to develop and to improve as long as mankind endures. In every relative moral theory there is consequently an element, and an element which gets ever larger, that is universally human and, in that sense, an element which is absolute. It stands out clearly from what we have said that the moral philosophy which contains most elements which are absolute in character and universally human is that of the proletariat, the communist moral philosophy. The dialectical unity of the relative and the absolute in morality also follows from the theory of Engels already quoted, according to which different moral theories represent different degrees " of one and the same historical development and have in consequence a common historical background." It is only by assuming this unity that the statements formulated by the classical exponents of Marxism-Leninism and quoted above, which invoke a universal moral philosophy for all mankind, can be interpreted.

The problem of the maximum objective and absolute value of proletarian moral theory is inseparable from the problem of its

scientific basis. It is in this that the moral theories of the proletariat differ most from the moral theories which have preceded it.

Not one of the earlier humanist theories which preached a universally human philosophy, and which were for their time not only progressive but even revolutionary, found in the concrete reality of a class society a basis for its realisation. The minds of the greatest ideologists of the democratic middle-class revolution created, as we have already seen above, the ethical ideal of the equality of all men, but the middle-class reality of a merciless class struggle could not give to this ideal a real content or a vital force. Consequently all old humanist theories had a Utopian character. Even when, after the overthrow of an out-dated social order and the establishment of new methods of exploitation, these theories were formally drawn up as fundamental principles governing the relationship between men and between peoples (theories which the class newly come to power, at least at the beginning of its reign, considered as conforming with its aims), in practice they remained sterile. From the moment when a pretence was put up of not seeing the new and vast social conflicts while at the same time preaching 'universal love' between those who exploit and those who are exploited, these theories became nothing more than empty abstractions and, even worse, a means of abuse and of enslaving even more the working masses.

Rules of Communist Behaviour

The communist ethical ideal of our time: to train men to establish relationships in society which are truly human, is based on a scientific knowledge of the intrinsic tendencies of social evolution. This ideal has a concrete basis for its realisation in the actual stage of development of the productive forces, a stage which demands the overthrow of a relationship in methods of production which is founded on the exploitation of man by man, and further requires the passing of the means of production into the hands of society, the abolition of every society founded on class distinction and the building up of a classless society. At the head of this historic process is found the proletariat, the most progressive class in contemporary society, around which are gathered all the other sections of workers. The communist ethical ideal, the ideal of the proletariat, is consequently an ethical ideal with a scientific foundation.

The builders of a classless society are fashioned during the struggle for the overthrow of the last social order founded on exploitation—the capitalist order—and for the victory of socialism and communism. The decisive part in this struggle falls on the vanguard of the working classes, on the communist party, which unites in its ranks the elements which are most aware of what is going on, the most revolutionary members of all sections of the

workers and above all the working class itself. The communists direct a struggle whose final aim is the building up of a classless communist society, and by this very fact, the creation of a universal moral philosophy for mankind and of truly human relationships in a society in which men will really care one for another and will be men, having equal rights and equal duties, and not subjects or objects of exploitation and oppression. It is for this reason that the behaviour of communists, as much of individuals as of whole parties or their leaders, their conduct in every sort of situation, the example which they give, in short their practical activity, all these form one of the most important factors, if not the most important factor, in the training of the great masses of workers in an understanding of the communist moral philosophy. This is especially true for the communists in countries in which the capitalist power has already been overthrown and which have undertaken the building of a socialist society, or have even already set it up. These countries offer to the oppressed and exploited men and nations of the whole world an example of what their own life will be in the future.

Speaking of the communist moral philosophy, Lenin, in 1920, at the third congress of the Communist Union of Russian Youth, thus outlined its social role:

> It is a moral theory which helps to destroy the old society of exploitation and to unite all workers round the proletariat which is building the new communist society moral theory helps to raise human society yet higher, to free it from the exploitation of work.

A communist must consequently consider as moral those actions which contribute to the victory of the proletariat and of the workers over the last classes to exploit them, both in towns and in the country. The rules of conduct for a communist are, above all, rules for a man fighting for the overthrow of the capitalist social order, for socialism, for a classless society.

When we speak of the behaviour and the conduct of one man towards another, we also imply all the different means which he uses to achieve his aim.

The following questions arise: Do the means of which a man makes use in order to reach a certain goal also depend on moral judgments? Does this mean that the pursuit of an aim permits all means as long as the intention which causes them to be used is proclaimed just and holy? Does it follow that means are independent of the end and of the intention, which would imply that there is no connection between the end and the means? Does this suggest that the communist code of ethics can be reduced to simple and merely technical rules of conduct, useful to communism, and as a result ceases completely, in fact, to be a code of ethics, as Bukharin asserted in his *Theory of Historical Materialism*?

An Amoral Maxim

The history of ethical or moral theories has made famous the Jesuit motto: "*Omnia ad majorem Dei gloriam*", "All things to the greater glory of God", which the Spanish Jesuit Escobar y Mendoza expressed more simply in the seventeenth century in the axiom: "The end justifies the means." This axiom has become the basis of what is known as clerical moral philosophy. This principle is also in fact the point from which springs, in our day, middle-class ethical pragmatism, which judges every act, even the lowest, in the light of its usefulness in the competitive struggle, whether between capitalist individuals, or between capitalist states, and above all from the point of view of the advantages which it secures for the struggle against progressive social forces, against the proletariat and the other sections of workers.

But can this moral—or to be more exact, amoral—principle of contemporary imperialist gangsters and of their feudal predecessors be connected in any way whatsoever with the definition of communist philosophy framed by Lenin and quoted above?

It is significant in this connection to recall a detail of the history of the International Working Men's Movement of the years 1870–80, namely the position taken up by Marx and Engels with regard to the moral theories of the Russian anarchist Bakunin.

According to the precepts of the 'Revolutionary Catechism' of which the author was Bakunin himself,[10] the revolutionary must free himself from all moral scruples. The revolutionary cause justifies all means used for its victory. The revolutionary must "with all his strength and by every means, contribute to the development and expansion of all the miseries and all the evils which are finally to exhaust the patience of the people." He must not scruple to make use of even the most doubtful individuals. On the contrary if they have at their disposal friends, influence, power and riches, he must "blackmail and exploit them in every way; he must impose upon them, confuse them, disconcert them, and, having wormed his way into their filthy secrets, make them his slaves", "compromise them so that it becomes impossible for them to retreat." The revolutionary must "disguise himself and show himself to be something quite different from what he actually is."[11] In short, Bakunin gives to the revolutionary, who must mobilise, organise, and direct the popular masses, the character of a spy.

Marx and Engels called Bakunin the "Jesuit of the Revolution"

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[10] *V.* E. Yaroslavski, *Anarchism in Russia,* Moscow, 1939, pp. 20–21.

[11] The quotations from the 'Revolutionary Catechism' are taken from the Russian editions of the complete *Works of Marx and Engels,* Vol. XIII, Book 2, in the documents relating to the Congress of the First International at The Hague in 1872; the 'Catechism' figures *in extenso* in these documents.

and his moral theory the "height of middle-class amorality." Speaking of the activity of the anarchist organisation of Bakunin, the 'Alliance of socialist democracy' in general and in particular of the 'Revolutionary Catechism' in question, they wrote in 1873:

> A few samples have already been sufficient for us to judge this moral philosophy of the 'Alliance', of which the dogmas are entirely Christian in origin and were worked out in the seventeenth century, first and with all possible care by the Escobars. The Alliance has but developed its character further and has put, instead of the Holy Apostolic Roman Catholic Church of the Jesuits, its archi-anarchist and all-destroying 'holy revolutionary cause.' The Revolutionary Catechism is the code of this moral philosophy, exposed this time systematically and with utter frankness.[12]

Marx and Engels were also in opposition to Bakunin in a series of concrete questions, which were all more or less connected with his moral conceptions. Thus they took up their position against his tendency to build the policy of the International Working Men's Movement on things that were nothing more than pure inventions, on statements that had not been verified and were even fantastic, concerning the position of the revolutionary movement in Russia.

When, on the occasion of the foundation of the First International in 1864, the debate opened on the provisional statutes, the man who had first planned them, Karl Marx, opposed the proposal of elements with proudonian tendencies, which introduced into the statutes, in an entirely abstract way, words like 'truth', 'justice', 'morality', etc.[13] This abstract invocation of moral concepts ran counter to the concrete class conception which Marx had of moral philosophy. But in their turn both Marx and Engels obstinately invoked corresponding provisions of the statutes when they tried to induce the International Working Men's Movement to adopt so-called revolutionary conceptions of moral philosophy, which were in reality archi-middle class. They resolutely opposed the idea that lies, hypocrisy, and deceit should serve as a basis for mutual relations between men who unite with a common aim of social progress. They resolutely opposed the conception that the International Working Men's Movement should inherit *en bloc* all the rules of conduct of a decayed class, while the movement should in truth be the lawful heir only of what is, in the progressive development of humanity, most positive, most lasting, and most noble.

The attitude of Marx and Engels towards the moral concepts of Bakunin was an attitude of principle before the question of truth and falsehood among the workers.

[12] Marx and Engels, *Works* (in Russian), Vol. XIII, Book 2, p. 623.

[13] *V* the letter of Marx and Engels of November 4th, 1864, in the *Correspondence of Marx and Engels* (in German), Moscow 1937, Vol. III, p. 237.

It could be objected: How can one demand of the working classes, under conditions imposed by a class struggle, an attitude of principle in the question of truth and falsehood? Can one demand of the proletarian revolutionary 'love of truth' and 'honesty' when he finds himself, for example, face to face with a class enemy and when his 'honesty', his 'love of truth', may cost the other participants in the revolutionary movement dear, and cause grievous harm to the whole movement?

This example, always seized on most willingly by the moral relativists of the Working Men's Movement, in no way contradicts our general theses: on the contrary nothing could better throw into relief the unity of the relative and the absolute in moral philosophy.

In class conflicts protagonists of two aims confront each other: the protectors of the old and worn-out, in short, the protectors of the historically untrue. By the logic of class struggle 'honesty' and 'truth-loving' before the class enemy *simultaneously* represent a lie, dishonesty and disloyalty in respect to the revolutionary movement and in respect to progress in general. 'To tell the truth' about the revolutionary movement to the class enemy means to betray comrades and to help reaction to crush the revolutionary organisation or its various parts, it means to *break the promise* which is given by anyone joining the movement: as a member of that revolutionary movement one is bound to fight for its victory over the class enemy. The objective moral value of a courageous behaviour and of a consistent defence of the revolutionary cause, e.g. of the *progressive* movement before the class enemy is obvious. Such a behaviour and such a defence of the progressive cause have always met a positive moral value among the (people's) masses. In the moral value given by a man from the people at such an occasion, a sharp distinction is stressed between 'he did not tell the truth' as a synonym for 'he did not betray' and 'he lied' as something immoral and cowardly. The exploited and the oppressed have reached such a distinction through age-long practice of class struggles.

It is evident after all that we have said that this example has no bearing whatsoever on the ethical question which was concretely facing Marx and Engels, nor with the question facing the revolutionary workers' movement to-day.

The opposition established by Marx and Engels between truth and falsehood answers another question which had inevitably to be asked of the order of the day as soon as the organisation of the working class on an international scale began. The internal relations in the revolutionary Working Men's Movement itself are in question, the relations between the revolutionary parties. Their adversary was on this occasion a man who was introducing into the Working Men's Movement the theory of individual property, placing his personal prestige very high above the common interests

of the movement. " He considers the success of the general movement a misfortune if the movement does not bow its head under the yoke of his sect," said Marx and Engels of him.[14] Individualist and ambitious motives also conditioned the means which Bakunin used. And from this emerged for Marx and Engels an important question of principle: *Can the policy of a progressive social movement be founded on falsehoods, hypocrisy, and deceit?* Marx and Engels say " No " in answer to this question. To-day, after more than seventy years, the same question reappears in just as acute a form before the International Working Men's Movement. It is this fact which makes so appropriate to the present time the theses of Marx and Engels, dating from the years of struggle against Bakuninism in the First International.

We have said above that the struggle of progressive social forces against the old order is always a struggle between truth and falsehood in the deepest meaning of these words, a struggle between something which is growing and which becomes more and more truth and something which is only a survival and becomes more and more an untruth.

Truth Based on Reality

All progressive social movements are born from social reality, from its unsurmountable contradictions; they act in the name of the internal tendencies of this reality, in the name of the tendencies represented by the new progressive class. The arguments with which the progressive movement attacks the reactionary representatives of the old order of society are provided by reality itself with its intrinsic contradictions, which blaze forth in broad daylight all the more clearly the more out-dated the old order of things has become. The progressive movement does not need to distort reality, to make improper use of facts; it needs to generalise with a maximum of fidelity the positive evidence of realities, it needs the most complete truth. It is for this reason that the spirit of progress and the love of truth are so indissolubly bound together through all the history of social thought.

If there is one period during which this requirement is more essential than at any other, it is certainly the period of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat during which the proletariat, at the head of all the other working masses of town and countryside, is in the process of overthrowing the last social order founded on exploitation. Before this, revolution meant the ousting of one order by another, another that was certainly better and more progressive but still founded on exploitation and oppression; it is for this reason, among others, that class interests of social forces, even the most progressive, made impossible the recognition, nay, even

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[14] Marx and Engels, *Works* (in Russian), Vol. XIII, Book 2, p. 587.

the knowledge, of the full truth of social reality. But the proletariat creates by its victory the political and social basis of its own negation as a class, the basis for the building of a classless society, the basis for the abolition of all exploitation of the workers and all oppression of peoples. This is the reason why, in its pursuit and knowledge of truth, the proletariat is limited by no class reasons. From this struggle has risen the most just doctrine concerning society and its laws, Marxism-Leninism, ideological foundation of the whole strategy and tactics of the proletarian vanguard.

"The doctrine of Marx is all-powerful, because it is just"; these words, taken from Lenin's article "The Three Sources and the Three Constituent Parts of Marxism", have an immense importance in political philosophy. It is the exactness, it is the truthfulness of the teaching of Marx which has made possible his triumph in the International Movement of the Workers which has made him a veritable force, capable of abolishing exploitation and oppression in general and constructing a classless society. The International Working Men's Movement draws its strength from the Marxist-Leninist truth, in the love of truth which inspires its attitude in the face of reality, in the face of facts, and the movement loses its strength when it strays from that truth, from that love of truth.

"The working class must before all and above all know truth, the working class must be told the whole truth," Lenin used often to say.[15] In the introduction to his unfinished work *Statistics and Sociology,* Lenin, in 1917, especially emphasised reality, the actual state of affairs, "the exact facts, the unquestionable facts", as a basis for the revolutionary politics of the working class.

> In order that this may really be the basis, the facts must not be taken separately, one by one, but all the facts as a whole, in so far as they concern the matter in question, without a single exception, for to omit one would inevitably give rise to the suspicion, and a truly justified suspicion, that these facts have been chosen or put together in an arbitrary way, that instead of an objective liaison and a mutual dependency of historical phenomena in their entirety a subjective *pot-pourri* is being served up to justify a cause which may be dishonourable. And this happens more often than it would appear.[16]

The exact similarity between the aims of the International Movement of Workers and the most progressive elements of social reality is the root cause of the deep attachment to truth which is a characteristic part of its policy. Truth gives it life, falsehood fetters it and slows it down—it is this which makes the attachment to truth in communist policy a matter of moral importance.

This is not at all true of the policy of social reaction. The policy of social reaction is calculated to defend those things, which in the

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[15] Lenin, *Works* (in Russian), 3rd edition, Vol. XXI, p. 36.
[16] *Collected Works of Lenin,* Moscow, 1937, Vol. XXX, p. 303.

real world have lost or are in the process of losing their justification, of all which is gradually becoming more and more remote from truth. An order which is about to disappear from the stage of history because new social forces have reached their maturity, and because the conditions for a superior and more advanced social order have been set up, cannot defend itself with the arguments of reality, with the arguments of facts, in short with truth. All true evolution speaks against reaction. Truth identifies itself with the justification of the aspirations and the struggles of progressive revolutionary forces. It is for this reason that reaction, in its policy, in its propaganda, and in its activity, must distort reality, mutilate facts, and arrange them and change them according to the demands of its anti-popular and counter-revolutionary aims. Falsehood, hypocrisy, tricks, and deceit—these are the instruments which are suitable for a reactionary policy. The desire to maintain at all costs the old social order 'consecrated by God', to justify, cost what it may, exploitation and oppression of the great masses of people, all through history has given birth to the fundamental moral principle of all social reaction, the Jesuit motto according to which "the end justifies the means."

These are the reasons why Marx and Engels called the moral theories of Bakuninism "the height of middle-class amorality", opposing to the policy of the reactionary middle classes, which is founded on falsehood, the policy of the revolutionary proletariat, which rests on truth, and which by this very fact is moral in the deepest sense of the word.

BORIS ZIHERL.

CHAPTER SIX

SECULAR HUMANISM

La matière est; l'animal vit; l'homme crée.
Jean Przyluski.

THERE are two great divisions of knowledge, the historical sciences and the natural sciences. The former are concerned with human society, the latter with its natural environment. The organisation of our universities into the two Faculties of Arts and Science corresponds to this division. It would be foolish to identify humane studies exclusively with what is taught in the Faculty of Arts. Science is a creation of man and has its place among the humanities. But if we turn from the origin of these branches of knowledge and consider their content, the distinction asserts itself. The arts are concerned with the activity of man in society, the sciences with the understanding and control of external nature.

Each of the two Faculties thus has its well-defined sphere, but the fortunes of the two are at present very different. The Science Faculty teaches a unified body of knowledge which is in the main the acquisition of the last three hundred years. It reflects a modern phase of consciousness, which is called its method, and into this every student is initiated. The student is usually aware that a transformation has been effected in his outlook by his scientific studies. He becomes in some sort a scientist. Powerful organisations, like the British Association, exist to define, defend, and propagate his mode of thought. Furthermore, science has a clear social function in the control of external nature. Society is well aware of this. It knows that it could not exist without science.

None of all this is true of the Faculty of Arts. It has narrowed its scope by dropping theology and jurisprudence, which had the advantage of being rooted in fundamental social institutions. It has no central theme. Its subjects of instruction may be political and military history, metaphysical speculation, or literature, representing various places and periods but bearing only a vague relation to one another and adding up to no recognisable whole. There is nothing corresponding to the method in the Faculty of Science. The student does not usually feel that his mind has been transformed by what he has learned. *Abeunt studia in mores* is too much to say of him, the *studia* are so miscellaneous and so little rooted in the great institutions by which men sustain their cor-

porate life. If we said that the arts man becomes a humanist as the science man becomes a scientist, it would not be true. No common consciousness of purpose is created, consequently the arts man has no organisation to define, defend, and propagate his mode of thought. Not being himself clear as to what his social function is, it is not to be wondered at that he cannot make it clear to others.

This is a dangerous thing. That side of education which is concerned with the understanding of human society, and therefore ultimately with its maintenance and improvement, falters and flags. The power to control external nature, which, without the better ordering of society, is aimless and destructive, gathers momentum like a stone rolling downhill. For it cannot be expected that the natural sciences should themselves generate the wisdom necessary to control their use.

The remedies for this situation lie largely outside the educational sphere. But in so far as educational remedies are in place it is not surprising that they should sometimes be sought from the past. Various reactionary movements assert themselves. One is to revealed religion, another to certain supposed absolute values, a third to classical humanism. It is good that those who hold to their belief in these traditional causes should come out into the open and fight for them. Part of the truth is with them. What is new is not necessarily true. *Cognitio cogniti,* acquainting ourselves with what was learned long ago, is an essential of all progress. "Lest we forget" should be among the watchwords of every educationist. Only out of accumulated experience can mental depth be won. Nevertheless the solution of our educational problem does not lie in a return to the past.

This would be so if our present predicament were due to our having fallen away from old standards. And, of course, the movement away from revealed religion is often described as a drift. But this is untrue. It has been a struggle, not a drift. Witness the literature of Humanism, of the Enlightenment, of the scientific movement in various stages, of Rationalism, of Catholic Modernism. Movements such as these constitute not a drift but a part of the intellectual and spiritual achievement of modern man. They are phases in an irreversible process. In the English-speaking world, to confine ourselves to what most directly concerns us, the position now is such that the unifying principle of humanistic education could not be sought in a supernatural revelation.

Equally inadmissible is the claim that there is a system of values universally recognised at all times and in all places which could supply the armature of a modern education. An exposition of this theme by Mr. C. S. Lewis has in recent years acquired some authority. In his *The Abolition of Man* he collects quotations from sources widely distributed in space and time which exhibit a

certain agreement of outlook on certain important points of human behaviour. On this evidence is based the claim that there exists an objective higher law binding on the conscience of all mankind, and the evils of the present are traced to its neglect. The argument is unsound. Human society is, indeed, inconceivable without some rules of behaviour, some *mores*. That societies at various times and places, having reached a similar stage of development, should promulgate similar rules, is nothing surprising. To the extent that this agreement of moral outlook exists we should recognise and use the fact. But this does not constitute proof of the existence of an unconditioned absolute objective code of values. In the *Proceedings of the IXth International Congress of Philosophy* (Paris, 1937), three volumes are devoted to the theory of values. The conclusion is that the progress of various sciences, in particular ethnology, makes it impossible to regard men's changing conceptions of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good as a primitive and permanent revelation.

Still less can we look to classical humanism, as at present cultivated, as the way out of our difficulties. It is probable that the classics are due, not for a further decline, but for a vigorous rebirth. But they will reconquer their place in our educational system not as sufficient in themselves but as an essential part of a more comprehensive conception. The classical tradition of humanism as now maintained in our universities and devoutly championed by the Classical Association deserves each of the epithets with which Sir Walter Moberley dismisses it in one of the best sentences of his *The Crisis in the University*: "As a complete philosophy of life on which to base university education it is too rarefied, too naïve, too static, too limited and, in a sense, too parasitic."

Recognising, then, the difficulties of basing our education on a supernatural revelation, or on a universal system of absolute values, or on classical humanism, on what are we to base it? On something that embraces them all and is at the same time the most modern science that we possess. This is history, the latest and the greatest of the sciences. It is modern in the sense that it is as typical of our age as experimental science was of the seventeenth century. It is ancient in the sense that it takes us back to the very beginnings of human society. It is scientific in the sense that it seeks to elicit its guiding principles from the analysis of its own subject-matter.

This modern conception of history regarded as the basis of an educational system may conveniently be described as secular humanism, provided the word 'secular' be not understood to imply the neglect of the religious side of human history. It appears in some sense in opposition to religion because religion once provided the organising principle for education. But now,

when theological disagreements or indifference have reached a point at which a man so steeped in the religious tradition as Loisy could doubt whether educated men would continue to use the word ' God ', a homo-centric view of history commands a wider allegiance. History, then, in the sense in which it is used here, is the science of human affairs, and its purpose should be to initiate the student into an intelligent participation in the manifold activities of social life in the same way in which a training in the natural sciences initiates him into the control of the natural environment.

History understood in this sense is, like natural science, essentially, though not exclusively, a practical discipline. The late R. G. Collingwood, who has written so well on the present urgency of historical studies, says: " In the kind of history I am thinking of historical problems arise out of practical problems. We study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act." These are wise words. Historical studies lose their vitality if they become antiquarian. The contemporaneity of the study is essential to its effectiveness. The bearing on the present of what he studies should be clear to the student. As his philosophic insight deepens, more remote connections will be discerned, and what would before have been antiquarian will acquire contemporaneity. But at every stage historical knowledge should be presented in such a fashion as to give insight into present problems. This is the meaning of calling history a science. So taught, history can awaken in the student a sense of responsibility for the future of mankind, and create the confidence that the assumption of such responsibility is not incompatible with a proper humility, nor essentially absurd.

The writing of history is an ancient practice, and it was already the ambition of Thucydides to write it in such a way that it would be the school of politics. That was more than two thousand years ago. What reason have we to hope that under present conditions history can prove a more effective discipline than it did in the past? The ground for hope lies in the fact that the progress of historical knowledge within the last hundred years has been so great as not merely to increase the amount of knowledge but to transform its quality. Only now for the first time is it possible to take a synoptic view of man's course on earth from his emergence from the animal state to his present painful but awe-inspiring struggle for a civilisation co-extensive with his planet. The completion of the record has not only increased its length but changed its significance.

It may be well to illustrate this point. Gladstone could still describe the period of Homer and the Bible as the youth of the world. Not knowing any background to these literatures he regarded them as the first utterances of a mankind fresh from the Creator's hand. Their rules of behaviour were a divine revelation.

Their language was a ready-made gift of God to the rational animal, man. This mode of explanation was inevitable, since in Gladstone's day the phenomenon was not susceptible of historical explanation. The later realisation that two thousand years of literacy lie behind the achievement of Greek epic and Hebrew prophecy sensibly altered the conditions of the problem. Placed in their historical setting the Greek and Hebrew achievement became not less wonderful but less miraculous. They became fixed in a definite time and place and were seen to depend on previous achievements of man. They became part of a larger process of which a more complete description was possible.

But this change was as nothing to that which was to ensue. If the code of Hammurabi threw light on Moses, and Mycenean civilisation illuminated Homer, this was merely to extend the record of civilised man. What was truly revolutionary was to reveal his origin. It was not now a question of adding a couple of millennia to the record of civilised man. When the prehistoric archaeologists and the ethnologists had done their work, man had been provided with a past of a couple of hundred millennia, and in that long stretch of time he had transformed himself from a savage to a civilised being. The creativity of man in history had acquired a totally new significance. Man had not only created literatures, he had created writing. He had not only created writing, he had created language itself. Behind the city-dweller lay the neolithic farmer, and behind him the palaeolithic hunter. Behind *homo sapiens* lay *homo faber*. Behind *homo faber* was the ape descending from the trees. With these discoveries the whole record of man became the subject-matter of science. To work for any future for mankind without instructing oneself by knowledge of his long past is to be wilfully blind.

Now it is of course true that all this has entered in some sense into our educational system. Are not our children entertained with it daily by the B.B.C.? Possibly it is just because the new knowledge has been regarded as suitable for children rather than for older students that it has had so insignificant an effect on our outlook. It has been easier to handle as milk for babes than as meat for men. To entertain children on the pots and pans of prehistoric societies rather than on the doings of kings and queens of historic times is not an educational revolution. It is merely to exchange dynastic for domestic history. Yet to some of the deepest minds of our generation the new knowledge has seemed to contain far-reaching possibilities. Examples are the predominantly religious mind of Jean Przyluski in France and the predominantly scientific mind of Gordon Childe amongst ourselves. If one were asked to suggest materials from which educationists might draw a vision of the significance of the new picture of the evolution of man which the science of the last two or three generations has given us, it would

be hard to find anything better than Przyluski's *Participation, L'Évolution Humaine, and Créer.* From Childe's works might be mentioned *Man Makes Himself, What Happened in History,* and *History.*

To many, the thrusting of man's record back into his barbarous, savage, and animal past seems the destruction of all they most value. "If you should ever succeed in persuading me," says such a one, "that it was some kind of a developed monkey that wrote *Isaiah*, you will have robbed the world of all meaning." To which the answer is: "When you have reconciled yourself to that fact, as you will sooner or later have to do, then the world will acquire a fuller meaning than you have yet imagined." The creativity of man in history is much greater than we knew. This creativity concerns the spiritual as well as the material side of life. The secular humanist who insists on the evolution of man from the animal and denies the absoluteness of values does not deny the uniqueness of man. Nor does he belittle the importance of moral values. On the contrary he is perhaps their best defender. He fights for them with, and not against, the best knowledge of our day. "Economic values are relative to *homo faber*, moral values to *homo sapiens*. The first create among men an economic solidarity which suffices to co-ordinate groupings, not found societies. The moral values create between men a closer solidarity, which we have called a moral solidarity and which is the foundation of societies. It is not necessary, then, as is generally believed, to invoke reasons of a metaphysical order to establish the specific quality of moral values. They appear late in evolution because they are relative to a new being, *homo sapiens*, and to a new order, society" (*L'Évolution Humaine*, page 252).

According to Collingwood, as we have seen, we should study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act. In the first page of his *History*, Gordon Childe paints this situation for us in a few sentences:

> Within the last hundred years the societies inhabiting western Europe and North America have achieved conspicuous success in control over external nature. The spectre of famine that constantly haunted ancient and medieval civilisations has been effectively banished except in so far as these societies provoke it by their own bellicose behaviour. . . Control of the social environment—of the relations between individuals, groups, nations and classes—has, on the other hand, achieved no comparable progress. Within twenty-five years two world wars, not to mention continuous localised conflicts, have released forces of destruction that threaten to obliterate all that the productive forces have slowly built up, if not to extinguish mankind itself.

On a later page Childe reminds us of what history teaches, that man's successful handling of this situation, that is to say his survival, depends upon himself.

> There is no guarantee that our society will not vanish like the Mayan or become fossilised like the Chinese, no guarantee indeed that *Homo Sapiens* will not become as extinct as *Archaeopterix* or *Hipparion.*

Przyluski makes the same point: *Le déroulement de l'évolution est suspendu à notre vouloir.* If we are to survive we must will and plan our survival. There is novelty in this situation. Man has never before held in his hands such power for good or ill. The suicide of the human race has become a possibility first in our generation.

It is the contention of this paper that if there is to be found a way out of this disaster an education based on the total history of man is necessary. This must be the basis of an effective humanism, capable of arousing an adequate sense of responsibility and an adequate confidence. How inadequate to this end are humanistic studies as now generally conceived. The great saying

Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto

is taken in a literary sense, as if it meant: I am a man, I am prepared to read anything. We need to give it a new orientation and a wider scope. Man is the true Proteus, and a humanistic education should follow him into his manifold transformations, showing how from an animal man became a hunter, a farmer, a potter, a smith, a priest, a doctor, a lawyer, a sailor, a merchant, a monk, a king, a scientist, a philosopher, a hero, a saint, a martyr—not merely how he became an essayist, poet, or playwright. At every stage of education this should be the underlying theme, the unifying theme, the great concern in relation to which more specialised studies acquire significance.

Meanwhile, instead of our humanistic education being based on some picture of the total achievement of man, literary studies relapse into dilettantism. Subject-matter is discounted, verbalism reigns supreme. This is notably true in the realm of classical studies. Without Greek and Latin we should be robbed of our knowledge of three thousand years of civilisation. This might be regarded as a reason for keeping the knowledge of them alive. But not so many years ago, when the Classical Association put out a leaflet appealing to teachers and parents to save Latin, the first plea advanced was to the effect that it was not impossible that a systematic study of this beautiful and logical language might exercise a beneficial influence on the child's prose style.

Only the other day a champion of the classics in a broadcast talk opined that the content of Virgil no longer mattered. What lived was his metrical tricks and his wonderful turns of phrase. As if the *Aeneid* were not the richest comment we possess from pagan antiquity on the civilisation of the Mediterranean world. As if the *Georgics* were not an inspired meditation on the fundamental pre-

requisites of all civilisation to date—agriculture, stock-raising, and their subsidiary arts.

Tibi res antiquae laudis et artis
ingredior sanctos ausus recludere fontes,

sings Virgil, insisting not only on the ancient renown of the farmer's practical wisdom but on its holiness. It is because he had something to tell us about the meaning of life, because the content of his work is so important to him, that he is moved to seek out his wonderful rhythms and words.

These criticisms may serve to suggest how humanistic education may be rescued from its shallowness. First and foremost it must be based, as we have said, on a total picture of the achievement of man in his ascent from savagery to civilisation. This should include the conquest of the fundamental techniques, the emergence of the sciences, and the progress of the other arts as well as literature. But above all it should dwell on the history of the great institutions without which human life could not exist—on the state and the family, on forms of property and on law, on organised religion, on agriculture, on industry. The achievements of individual men should be put in the setting of the great corporate achievements. We should remember that we are training men primarily for citizenship.

In attempting this it would be wrong to present the students at university level with a rosy picture of smooth progress. Students who enter the university should get a sobering shock which should apprise them that they are soon to enter on adult life. This is supplied in the medical profession by the very nature of the subject. The human body with all its functions, its organs external and internal, are not studied without the overcoming of some repulsion and the acquisition of some firmness of purpose. Sickness, disease, and death in all their forms are subjects of study that force some degree of maturity on the student. Humanistic education would be charged with a similar seriousness if, together with the history of civilisation, were taught the evils which it has overcome, the evils it has failed to overcome, and the evils it has created. As things are at present, humanistic education tends to be an introduction to the refinements of life, even to the entertainments of life, rather than to life itself.

Of great assistance to this end would be the restoration of emphasis on the subject-matter of the great literatures of the past and the teaching of the languages explicitly for this purpose and not only for their stylistic qualities; not that these should be despised. Rather the old saying that the style is the man should be understood in its true sense, that what matters is the man. So verbal, however, has classical humanism become that the style is everything and the man nothing. Thus every undergraduate has

learned to discuss the style of Tacitus and can trot out *ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant* as proof of his capacity for epigram. He is not taught to see in this sentence, and in the speech of the British chieftain to which it belongs, a searching exposure of the destructive aspects of the expansion over the world of Roman power. Yet if humanistic education were directed to the great end of awakening the mind to the realities of the historic process, we should have students learning to read Tacitus not for the sake of his epigrams but for the sake of his judgments on matters of the profoundest human concern. The *lactea ubertas* of Livy may not be so great an appeal to the earnestness of youth as his serious analysis of the causes of corruption in ancient society. Perhaps the highest distinctions in scholarship ought not to go to those who can write a piece of composition 'in the style of', but to those, who, having learned to read an ancient author accurately, have then actually read him and digested his thought. We must aim to produce men, not schoolboys.

If the languages are to be read for the sake of the subject-matter, it is also necessary that the subject-matter should not be accepted uncritically. Profound changes separate us from the ancient world, the just perception of which is one of the ripest fruits of historical studies. In order to foster the growth of this capacity every student in the Arts Faculty should make acquaintance with some of the masterpieces of political thought from various epochs. Examples of these are Aristotle's *Politics*, St. Augustine's *City of God*, Montesquieu's *Grandeur and Decadence*, Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Vico's *Autobiography*, Maine's *Ancient Law*. The real subject of the arts course being society, the great books which open up thought on this subject should be the basis of study. Modern textbooks on political history, together with lectures, would be necessary to introduce the students to these studies.

On this general basis should be erected the special studies in literatures ancient and modern. So far as ancient languages are concerned it is much to be desired that plentiful provision should be made for the teaching of Hebrew as well as Greek and Latin. Students, according to their capacity, might study one, two, or all three of these languages. But it should be recognised that, for any position of responsibility in society where a cultivated mind is required, a wide political education of the kind suggested, accompanied by a first-hand knowledge of one or more of the three ancient classical languages of European civilisation, is an ideal training.

As a matter of fact the ancient literatures in their different ways offer, in the terms suitable to their own age, just such an education as it is here attempted to describe. The Hebrew scriptures, shaped by the force of historical circumstances into a canonical whole, accomplish the task with the greater completeness. The central

theme is the emergence of a primitive people from pastoral conditions into a highly developed form of political life. Their economic, religious, political, moral, and artistic development are all displayed.

The same theme is prominent in Greek literature. From the sketch of the successive ages of mankind offered by Hesiod, through the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus and the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, down to the *Laws* of Plato, we encounter the effort to sum up and generalise the course of human civilisation, to describe what has happened, determine the law that governs the process, and look into the future. For the work of a single man the *Laws* of Plato is a uniquely comprehensive effort to discuss every aspect of the life of society. It would be possible to make other lists equally important. But a student who had read no more of Greek literature than the books listed in this paragraph, provided he had read them in the spirit here attempted to be described, would have a richer education than one who had tasted fragments of fifty writers for the sake of their style.

Four authors in Latin—Lucretius, Virgil, Cicero, and Tacitus—would suffice to reveal the quality of Roman thought on the development and corruptions of society. Other choices could be made that would serve equally well, but there is virtue in limiting the range of authors studied. It is worth reiterating that it is more educative to read the whole, or at least a great part, of a few authors, than to taste a great many. One often hears the thought expressed that it is dreadful to think of a student graduating without having read anything of such and such a standard author. There is nothing bad in this. What is bad is that students graduate without ever having read a single author, or even a single great book, right through. It is quite possible to be able to do unseens from any author with a proficiency that goes far to secure a First Class, without having read any single author seriously. But we should give our awards for ability to understand, not for ability to translate only. It is understood that the course here suggested is designed to produce, not a scholar, but a man with a humanistic training that should fit him for a wide range of employments. Accordingly the reading of translations to increase the acquaintance with other authors should be demanded. Separate provision would require to be made for the training of our future professors. This is not our concern here. One of the weaknesses in our present classical training is that everybody is regarded as a potential professor.

Similar schemes of study could readily be found for those who specialise in mediaeval or modern civilisation. But all should share the same basic education in the general history of humanity and the great institutions on which civilised life depends. This should by the unifying principle throughout the Faculty of Arts. The arts man should feel that he is primarily a student of society, of the

social environment of man, as the natural scientist feels that he is a student of the external, non-human, environment of man. Here should be the basis of his common understanding, of his common mind. This should be the thing that leaves its stamp upon him. In this sphere he should feel some competence and some confidence.

His achievement, if successful, should open to him not merely the door to the teaching profession. The closed circle in which so many students in the Arts Faculty move—from school through the university back to school—is a deadening thing. Teaching should be only one possibility. Apart from that the arts man should feel that he is being fitted for a wide range of employments in public or private life for which his training has been the best preparation. But, whether his future is to be teaching or not, such an education would assist the arts man to acquire some insight into the working of society, some confidence in the possibility of improving it by proficiency in his work, some awe at man's achievement in building the civilisation we possess, and a determination not to let it be destroyed.

BENJAMIN FARRINGTON.

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To the bibliographical indications given in the text should be added the account given in *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences,* July 1950, pp. 788–99, of the UNESCO project for *A Scientific and Cultural History of Humanity.* If the execution of this project should equal its plan it would provide the foundation I seek for an education in the spirit of secular humanism.

SECTION II

RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

Introduction

THE religious traditions, whose connections with morals and ethics are described and discussed in this section, fall into two main groups: the monotheistic religions, which originated in the Semitic Middle East and then spread into all parts of the world, and the religions of the farther East, which exercise little direct effect outside Asia. It is well to note that the spread of all these religions was accompanied by a diffusion of general cultural influences and of a knowledge of skills and techniques. This is well illustrated by the history of writing: the Roman or Latin alphabets spread with Western Christianity; the Cyrillic with Orthodox Christianity; the Arabic with Islam.

The three monotheistic world religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—are all based on writings preserved in sacred books which record revelations of the Word of God. They are thus, to a marked extent, circumscribed by the written contents of the Bible, the Testament, or the Koran. All three accept the story of the fall of man, and this provides common ground for the development of the moral concepts associated with them. Man, they assert, was created in the image of God; man then broke his covenant and fell. Thus, to the idea that the soul is divine in its essence is added the concept of original sin. The life of each human being is then seen as a constant struggle between two principles.

Viewed from such an angle, the problem of providing moral education resolves itself into that of finding ways of training each individual to overcome the influence of original sin and of leading each to the recognition and practical acceptance of the idea that in himself is present the divine essence to which supremacy should be accorded. Thus, the moral problem becomes mainly an individual problem—that of the salvation of the soul. Monotheistic religions do not, however, altogether neglect the social side, nor do they overlook the need for training in social duties, though it must be admitted that they subordinate these aspects to individual salvation. The justification given is that right social action will inevitably follow conversion of individuals and that, in any case, such action could not be fruitfully attained in any other way.

From the organisational or institutional point of view, the Church, the Synagogue, or the Mosque thus has a twofold task: to give social training to the members of the communities in accordance with accepted dogmas and, in addition, to interpret revelation as the sure guide to individual salvation. The sacred orders and the priestly hierarchies are considered as teachers of morality, and it is constantly stressed that civic training imparted by a secular state should be subordinated to the religious and moral instruction provided by the religious organisations.

Such an attitude tends to lead to a demand for conformity and to a formulation and reformulation of the dogmas. The result quite frequently is the partial or complete secession of heretical or schismatic groups or even to full rejection of the whole religious tradition.

The secession of many groups in north-western Europe from the Roman Catholic Church at the time of the Reformation strengthened the individualistic tendencies of Christianity and promoted individual effort and invention. The subsequent industrialisation of the Protestant countries created new moral problems and facilitated a gradual loosening of the hold of the Churches on their members. A kind of compromise with the state was arrived at in all these Protestant countries, which attempted to combine the supernatural aims of organised religion with the secular morality of social and political life.

The Roman Catholic Church refused to surrender its ancient claims to spiritual supremacy and it continues to demand a monopoly of religious and moral education. Thus, all Christian Churches recognise the necessity for social training. But whilst in Protestant and Orthodox countries the role of socialising agency is conceded to the secular state, in Roman Catholic countries the Church appears as a rival to the state, a rival, moreover, reluctant to relinquish its historical right to the monopoly of education. In consequence, the relations as regards education between Church and state sometimes degenerate into a struggle between two hostile camps.

The Eastern religions—Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Japanese Bushido—never displayed the individualistic tendencies of the West but tended rather to subordinate the individual to the social community. It might even be said that Bushido and Confucianism are not real religions but moral codes of social behaviour. Lacking the unity given by Western Church organisations, the Eastern religions are rather easily incorporated by the national states, they do not challenge official legislation, and they readily become accessories of secular national policies. In the East, too, the demands for individual salvation are easily overridden by those of family or community, and it is to such traditions that Easterners conform rather than to the revealed word of a personal God. In

consequence, the leadership of an organised Church and of a priesthood is much less in evidence than in the West. The state has no powerful rivals in formulating the aims of moral training and in fact moulds the rising generations in accordance with its own needs and purposes. This is one of the reasons why we have accorded so much more room in this section to Western than to Eastern religious traditions. The second is that we, as well as a majority of our readers, were brought up in a Christian atmosphere and have been affected by it—hence Christian traditions are dealt with in more detail than others.

In so far as the social aims of moral training are accepted in both West and East, they tend to transform the initial local or tribal assumptions into a universal code. And if we stress the social ideals of all religions, rather than traditional and dogmatic differences, the amount of common faith and common ideal they all accept appears surprisingly large and vital.

EDITORS.

CHAPTER ONE

ROMAN CATHOLICISM

Catholic Approach to Morality

I MUST begin with a note on a common misconception of the relation of the Catholic Church to morals. It is too often assumed that the Church claims the power to make or unmake rules of morality, or at least the power to modify and relax them when it judges good. Complaints are made, for instance, that the Church's ruling on such questions as divorce or contraception or euthanasia are too strict, and that it should be more liberal and humane in its interpretation. This complaint rests on the mistaken idea that the Church is free to change its attitude. This is not so, and it is important for the understanding of the whole subject of morals to grasp a distinction between the rules of conduct which hold for man as such and the rules which are disciplinary or imposed within the organisation of the Catholic Church. Only these latter fall within the dispensing power of the Church. The Church cannot on any ground whatsoever say that murder can be allowed, or lying or injustice. It cannot absolve anyone from observance of what is called the Natural Law or the obligations which derive from it. Now it is because the Church regards the fundamental laws of morality as absolute that she cannot listen to appeals for relaxation and give 'mercy' decisions in 'hard' cases.

Morals, therefore, are founded on the nature of man as such, and a fair and close examination of the nature of man and his due perfection ought to provide a clue to what is right and wrong for man. This would be a philosophy of morals; what Plato and Aristotle attempted; and we have only to look at the section on ethics or morals in any big library to see how earnestly thinkers in every age have sought to provide the proper answer. Theoretically this is a work which can be done by any enlightened layman, and the Catholic Church is primarily concerned with something different. It did not come into existence to be just a support for morals, private or public; it is not just a servant or partner of the state, with the one function to promote welfare in this world. The Gospel is the good news of eternal life, and the Church was created to teach men and lead them to that eternal life. It is not the place here to argue the title-deeds of the Church and justify the use of the word 'supernatural.' It must suffice to say that alongside what

man can do and be by his own unaided efforts, there is a higher level at which man co-operating with God's grace can attain an ideal which is incommensurable with all that man left to himself can dream of. To practise this new life moral conduct must be reinforced by the Eight Beatitudes, and by the precepts and counsels of the Church. The law is: " Seek ye first the Kingdom of God "; and the end is bliss after death. This new ideal is said to crown what is human and to lead far beyond it, and those who are obedient to this ideal live in a visible society, the Church, with its own laws and practices. It is independent of any human society or state, but as it is the same individual who is both in the natural order a member of society and of a state and in the supernatural order a member of the Church, the two orders commingle in various ways and may even clash. In theory they ought to work harmoniously together, the civil community and state having their own proper functions and aims, and the Church supporting and stimulating the moral aims of the individual and the state, and at the same time giving a new dimension to those aims and preparing the individual for a far higher destiny.

From this it will be seen that the Catholic Church, though its aim is independent of the state and of this world, is nevertheless profoundly concerned with the moral good of men and of society. The supernatural cannot survive without the natural; holiness is a will-o'-the-wisp in the absence of the natural virtues, and the practice of the Christian religion can be made almost impossible if a state enforces false principles and immoral values. The stake is man, and his immortal soul, and God is the author both of the natural order and of the Christian ideal. What is an offence against society is also an offence against God, and, therefore, the Church regards itself as the guardian of morals as well as of faith. With this outlook it was inevitable that in the nineteen centuries of Christendom a Christian philosophy of man should develop, and this philosophy can without exaggeration be said to have permeated the civilisation of the West. We are, indeed, for the most part unconscious how deeply we have been affected by this philosophy. The presuppositions of our law, especially the Common Law, of our customs and habits, the attitude to women and children, the sanctities of family life, the purposes of education, the respect for authority properly constituted, the so-called instinctive reactions to pain and sorrow and death, to pure science and art, to war and profit-making and trade, to games and democracy, are, in reality, ingrained habits formed by centuries of Christian teaching. Opportunists and sentimentalists are slow to recognise this fact, and by being 'penny-wise' and advocating indiscriminately the abandonment of an historical custom or way of behaviour they may risk cracking the cement of a great culture.

In the face of modern ideologies this truth should be obvious,

but we are reluctant often to recognise at home, and in what touches our interests, truths which are obvious abroad. The theory that doctrine did not affect practice was more common fifty years ago when many of the Christian beliefs were abandoned in the full confidence that morals would persist and Christian 'values' be maintained. But time has shown that however seemingly remote from one another doctrine and practice are, there are underground connections, and they hold together. The modern ideologies have made this plain, so plain, indeed, that for a short while in the 'thirties young poets and artists took up the heresy that art was worthless unless it were harnessed to a theory and propagandist. The Nazis had no hesitation in enforcing their ideas in morals and art, and the Marxists will not allow any deviation in the carrying out into practice of the Communist Manifesto. Education, science, art, and philosophy are determined down to the last detail by a rigidly held belief. Both Nazism and Communism are examples of an enforced belief and in that respect they differ from democracy. Democracy lays great emphasis on freedom, but that does not mean that ideals of some kind are not exercising a strong and universal influence. Willy-nilly in a democracy citizens take on a definite outlook and swear to the words of some master. Common sense and reason show that this must be so. The mind cannot remain a *tabula rasa*; it is written upon, and after a time the writing tends to become fixed. Moreover, one set of ideas is sure to become predominant and wag the rest. If, for instance, we become hedonists in theory or habit, the whole of our morals will receive a twist. The consistent hedonist cannot look beyond his own interests. The Logical Positivist, again, dismisses all that is not empirically verifiable as platitude or emotional nonsense, but the theory itself carries with it an attitude to innumerable questions whose answers influence conduct. So clear is this that in the more recent writings of the Positivists much anxiety has been shown about the place and meaning of morals in life. In other words, even a theory which denies meaning to ideologies finds itself to be an ideology with repercussions in morals. Aldous Huxley has been advocating a form of mysticism which has its roots in the East. He repudiates the world of matter and time and censors those who instead of sacrificing it make compromises. He does not seem to see that this religion of the Absolute raises far more problems in morals than it settles, and he shuts his eyes to the, at times, deadly effect such a religion has had upon the populations of the East. There, once again, the connection between a philosophy of life and morals is plain to see.

The Nature of Man

The Catholic Church has always been conscious of the importance and influence of a definite philosophy of life, and that is why

it has been so adamant in its demand for denominational schools. The system of morals it teaches is unified and far-reaching, and the conclusions proceed logically from its philosophy of man in relation to God and God's intentions as known by faith. Philosophers have provided us with much material on the nature of man and his behaviour, and the Church has appropriated what it considers most valuable in this material and fashioned it into a likeness we can all recognise. The groundwork is laid by reason, and in the strictly philosophical treatises on Ethics by Catholic thinkers no appeal is made to any authority outside reason. The philosophic account is, however, not the full story, as the Catholic holds that his knowledge by faith enables him to give flesh to the bare bones of reason, to lay bare the roots of man's inconstancy and to assign him a higher lineage and destiny. Owing to the centuries-old tradition of Christian ideas, this philosophy is still alive in the moral sentiment of multitudes of people. The principles, however, and the reasons which should guarantee the sentiments, have been lost sight of, and the result is that morals are becoming a hotchpotch of conflicting philosophies, Christian, revolutionary, materialistic, and humanist. The inconclusive debates on topical problems, like divorce and mercy killing, give clear evidence of this. For this reason it is wise to approach the question of morals with the fundamental question: What is man for? or in other words, what are the perfection and destiny of man, and what are his purposes?

This is the question asked by the Greeks and other leading thinkers. They propounded it in the form, What is the good of man? The line they took was to treat man as any other living thing and to inquire into its nature and end. The value of this method seemed to be plain, for, as they argued: unless we know what a thing is for, any business or dealing with it may damage both it and ourselves. A savage, on finding a steel razor and not knowing its purposes, may easily cut himself, and if on the strength of its sharpness he uses it to cut wood, he will then destroy the razor. Parents and school-teachers know only too well what damage children may do to themselves and some precious object by not knowing what are the purposes of that object. We have a fair idea in many cases of the nature and value of things around us—what, for instance, a prize flower or a first-class bullock should look like, and because of this knowledge we are able to superintend their growth, providing what is good and keeping away what is bad. The words 'good' and 'bad' come naturally to our lips in these contexts. In other words, good is what the plant or animal should be, and good can be used for all that helps to make it what it should be, and bad is used for failures and for what does harm. Again, we do not usually hesitate to apply the words 'good' and 'bad' to human beings, whether we are dealing with the body or the mind or a human being as such. Certain new drugs are with-

held from circulation because medical experts are not yet sure that their immediate benefit is not counteracted by long-range bad effects. We argue about corporal punishment of the young because there are two opinions on its ultimate effect on the development of character. We are quite sure that using little children in factories was wrong, that experimenting with prisoners in concentration camps, as if they were guinea-pigs, was an insult to human nature, and few can read of the sorry confessions in totalitarian law courts, by men who seem to have been debased into performing animals, without disgust.

In all these cases our judgments are founded on a conviction that we know to some extent what is good for plant, animal, or man. Moreover we can see the shift in the use of the words 'good' and 'bad' from a non-moral use to a moral connotation. Man, like everything else, has a good, and it is when this word is applied to man's conduct that it picks up completely a moral meaning. One partially satisfactory explanation of this is that man possesses a mind and will of his own and is responsible for his actions and is a person. But at the same time, while most of us may agree that certain actions are degrading and evil and that, for example, acts of kindness and heroic bravery are worthy and good, we are far from agreement about what constitutes his ideal and what his ultimate good is. Questionnaires in the newspapers and at universities reveal startling differences. English governments and educational authorities have generally shirked this question and contented themselves with planning for liberty and knowledge. This may be partly because religion might be expected to fill in the picture, as it had done for centuries, and partly because of a reluctance to dictate what persons should be and do. Nevertheless, a philosopher ought to be able to formulate some kind of an ideal for man, by examining his nature. He is able through experience to learn some acts which are harmful to him, and some actions which are beneficial. Furthermore, he can by inspection of man's nature see in which direction happiness and perfection must lie. The body must be kept in good health or at any rate in good condition for what his spirit requires of it. The spirit in man is plainly the superior, and it is wrong that the spirit should be enslaved to the bodily appetites. All feel that this is uncivilised and 'beastly.' We assert our true selves when we act with reason and wisdom and are able to exercise our will freely so as to be able to carry out what our mind sees to be true and right. We may go even further and conclude that mind and body should interact harmoniously, though great discipline may be needed before the body can be turned into a ready accomplice. The eyes and hand of the painter, the limbs of the dancer, the ear of the musician require a long education before the coming of the arts announces the victory of culture over savagery and before beauty can be loved for itself. Power has to

be harnessed to peaceful ends, and knowledge sought for its own sake. Eternal vigilance, also, is needed to make the passions obedient to reason; anger has to be controlled, fear overcome, savagery converted into self-respect and spendthrift rakishness into self-sacrifice. In all these cases, as Aristotle observed, virtue consists in a balance, in keeping the feelings and passions appropriate to the end in view. Some of the most powerful emotions are attached to specific functions of the body, to eating and drinking, and to sex. These functions have their legitimate expression; by them men live and endure, and the race continues. But so great is their enjoyment that the pleasure belonging to them is always tending to become anarchic and find satisfaction outside the function. The proper enjoyment of food is replaced by gluttony and animal over-indulgence, and sexual joy passes into licentiousness. Man has a complex constitution and the departments within it must serve the whole, and the legislative and ruling part lies in the mind and will. This presidency of mind and will distinguishes man from the animal, and they introduce the absolute. The object of the mind is truth and the object of the will is the good—not a relative or utilitarian good but something as fixed and unbending as truth itself. We cannot twist justice, for instance, to our own convenience; we cannot make an end, however good, justify an evil means. And this is why morals are said to be based on the Natural Law. The rules which define what is right and wrong for a nature endowed with mind partake of the absolute. Like truth they are unchangeable, and the most obvious of these laws can be recognised immediately in experience. Our conscience is the appointed recorder of these rules. But it should be made plain that conscience, in the correct use of the word, does not primarily designate a feeling; it is an enlightened judgment. As, however, feeling does colour the judgment and give it advance information, and as feeling is very fallible and all too easily conditioned, the conscience must be schooled by knowledge and love of what is the highest. Otherwise we may be betrayed, in the name of conscience, into approving what may be wrong and into shirking what is coldly right.

Philosophy and Natural Law

I have said that conscience must be schooled by knowledge and love of what is the highest. The question remains so far unanswered, What is the ideal and destiny of man? By the philosophic approach so far used we ought to be able to answer this, but, surprisingly, philosophers on this all-important point have spoken with an uncertain voice. They examine the nature of man and succeed to some extent in showing what man is for by emphasising the prerogatives of mind and will, their general aim, the unity of mind and body, and the necessity of co-ordination of all the activities in our complex unity to a fully human ideal. This

gives us some knowledge of the proper aims of man, and certainly is invaluable for his education. Furthermore, by continuing this philosophic kind of diagnosis we can add to the chart other features, such as, for example, that he is responsible for himself and therefore free and has inalienable rights and duties. The ideal, nevertheless, remains strangely obscure, and difficulties multiply the more we consider this ideal. Is man a creature of time or preparing for a life after death? If temporal existence be all, then his joys are very chequered and so entangled with corresponding losses that losses and gains almost balance one another. Perfection of mind and body rarely go together; the scholar has to sacrifice the quick eye and ear of the naturalist and pioneer and the radiant health of the athlete; reason and imagination are at loggerheads; practical men rely on experience and are impatient of book learning, while the learned are wise in theory and children in practice. Prosperity, to judge from the past, is usually the prelude to decline and fall, as peace brings passivity and indulgence. A cultured nation seems to lose virility and go down before the young barbarian. These and many other disturbing symptoms of man's estate confuse our attempts to define temporal happiness. I need not delay on still more obvious examples, such as the boredom and corruption of power and riches and the way in which ideals pursued, like an *ignis fatuus*, elude us or when attained defraud us by pointing beyond themselves. Philosophy in the name of reason can show that the spirit of man could not find satisfaction in this temporal life, and it can prove both the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul. But as such philosophic arguments leave so much unsaid, we can bypass them and turn to religion, and in particular to the Catholic faith.

What remains abstract and obscure in the philosophic approach is made concrete and clear in the Catholic teaching. Philosophy tends to treat man as a nature and on a level with other 'things', whereas religion regards man as a person in relation with his Maker. As Kierkegaard said: "The fact that God could create free beings *vis-à-vis* of Himself is the cross which philosophy could not carry. . . ." Above all, in the Christian religion God, in Pascal's words, is the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, and not of the philosophers and savants. Instead of an Absolute or Infinite Essence or Whole we have a living God who creates man in the image and likeness of Himself. Conscience can now be called without undue exaggeration the voice of God reflected in our own mind, and its admonitions, what Newman has finely called, "the aboriginal vicar of Christ in us." The Natural Law, also, so far described was only like a shape seen in the dark. In the light of religion it is "the expression of the creative and redemptive purpose of God, and representative of the divine Wisdom." As the Psalmist declares: "Thy justice is justice for ever; and thy law is

truth. Thy testimonies are justice for ever; give me understanding and I shall live." What is true of the Natural Law holds also of Positive Law which rests on it, and that is why a poet permeated with Catholic ideas, like Dante, could make Justinian say:

> Caesar I was and am Justinian,
> Who, by the will of the Primal Love I feel,
> Cleared the encumbered laws from vain excess.

The words "Primal Love" epitomise the religious approach to morals. Morals fall inevitably into rules and codes, but the ultimate law is the law of charity, and the principle governing all is love. Man is not a thing but a person, and between God who is personal and man, the relation should be of an I-Thou and not of an I-It. The ultimate end of man should fulfil all his longings and it should also be in terms of a personal relationship of love. Now God is that ocean of infinite good in whom all desires will be satiated, and He is the personification of love who gives a joy, greater than friendship, with Himself.

Life, therefore, in the Catholic interpretation of it, is not to be understood in terms of mere duty or self-realisation or pleasure or material or intellectual satisfaction. Some of these have their place, but they are incidental in so far as they do not fit the language of love as between persons. The ultimate end of man is union with God, and the final stage is after death. Life on earth is first and foremost a trial of love, a truth which is hinted at in so many legends and fairy-tales, the archetypal stories of mankind. As men are persons they have to give freely and show their worthiness before they receive the crown of love. Every individual starts life with one or five or ten talents, with something which he can multiply and give. He has his Sparta and he has to adorn it, and it is his duty as well as his privilege to make the most of himself in the circumstances of his time and place and powers. Each individual, too, is unique and a miniature cosmos; he carries the world on his shoulders, as if he alone were representative of the mind of God with regard to the universe. He is responsible for his neighbour, and the past is taken on by him as a dying flame is relit by the torch of the newcomer. Each person, therefore, should be free and sacrosanct, faced with his own lonely and individual destiny, which consists in working out his own salvation in love, and true education consists in preparing him for this drama. In a world where there are still so many who have little opportunity for a full life, where many characters remain infantile or savage or abnormal and others are conditioned into accepting false values, it may seem fantastic to make this high claim for every individual. But when conditions were far rougher a mediaeval poet could say of a serf: "Thy place is bigged (built) above the sterres clear; None other palace built in such stately wyse"; and there is plenty of evidence

that individuals can raise themselves to an ideal no matter how oppressive their state. Moreover, ideals, no matter how impractical they may seem, have an all-important function in directing what must and can be done at the moment.

The Catholic Doctrine

In the Catholic teaching on morals the doctrine of grace and the supernatural has an all-important and decisive role. It is not possible, however, to do more than glance at it. Man who was made in the image of God has by the free gift of grace been raised into a state of special friendship with God. Those who are in grace share in the sonship and privileges of Christ, the unique and natural Son of God. They are, as it were, the race of a new Adam. This doctrine is expressed in the Fourth Gospel in the words: "That they all may be one, as thou, Father, in me, and I in thee. And the glory which thou hast given me, I have given to them, that they may be one as we also are one." The same doctrine is scattered throughout the Pauline Epistles in various images, such as that of sonship, incorporation with Christ, being members and co-heirs. In consequence of such teaching a Christian thinks of himself as bound up in love with his fellow-Christians in a union closer than that of any family, and he has to strive to see in his neighbour Christ Himself. Clearly this must affect all human relations and give a new meaning to charity. What you do to your neighbour you do to Christ—or those words which can give a jolt to many besides bourgeois: "If you do not love your neighbour whom you see, how can you love God whom you do not see?" And if it may be said that this high-pitched teaching has not, in fact, made much difference in conduct or in the morals of Christians, the answer is that we have assimilated some of that teaching in past centuries and forgotten where credit is due. The conquest of slavery, the spread of hospitals, the high status of women, civility to the stranger, charitable organisations and many of the traits of democracy are the outcome of the Christian conscience.

One doctrine, however, deserves a slightly longer explanation. It is that of Original Sin. Our view of morals and education must be to some extent determined by what we think about Original Sin, and this is borne out by the history of morals. Those who dismiss the doctrine as folk-lore or legend tend to emphasise the innocence of human nature and to attribute human wrongdoing to the accidents of time which can be corrected. Amongst those who believe in the doctrine there are various schools, which for the sake of convenience we can simplify into two. The one was held by the majority of the Protestants at the time of the Reformation; the other is held by the Catholic Church. According to the first the effect of Original Sin was to corrupt human nature. Everyone is

born into the world so depraved that he cannot do what is right and good and pleasing to God. We live in a world of concupiscence, and all need God's grace to cover what is necessarily evil. In some respects this view is not unlike that of certain ancient and popular forms of Gnosticism. One of the tenets of this religious philosophy was anti-material. Matter was evil and true life consisted in the escape from all that was contaminated by matter, even marriage. This attitude is to be found even to-day, and as even Platonism looked on matter as half-unreal, this unease seems to be endemic and to lend support to the dogma. In the Catholic view the sin is not primarily concerned with concupiscence; it consists in the loss of grace and the supernatural life, the life of special friendship with God already described. This loss, however, brought with it a trauma or split in the human frame. Instead of the harmony of mind and body and the subordination of the emotions and passions to reason, we have a divided self. "I see and approve of the better, but I follow the worse." I am now tempted by "the concupiscence of the eyes and the concupiscence of the flesh and the pride of life." It should be noticed that in this quotation sins of the spirit are mentioned equally with sins of the flesh; moreover, we are inclined to these sins but not necessarily in thrall to them. The Church teaches that our will is weakened but not perverted, and that matter and all things such as our body, our sense, and our mind, are good; but care is needed in our use and enjoyment of them owing to the weakened state of our human nature. On one point the old Protestant view goes further even than the Gnostic, in that it entails a repudiation even of reason in its universal condemnation of human nature; and such a distinguished thinker as Karl Barth in many places in his writings accepts this. The Catholic, on the other hand, is unwilling to throw away any of the life-lines of human nature.

Both Catholic and Protestant rest the truth of their doctrine on Scripture, and therefore neither argues from experience. Nevertheless I can understand the Protestant in very dark moments of history, when, as it is said, the world seems to be returning to savagery, feeling that his severe view of human nature is justified by facts. The Catholic is less pessimistic and claims that the truth of his view is exemplified throughout human history. His view, too, is worked out into a very deliberate and precise teaching about morals, education, and social life. As material things and the body, not to say the mind and imagination, are good, the proper use of them and enjoyment are morally justified—with, however, some qualifications and safeguards. By the proper use is meant 'in accordance with their function' and to the betterment of man as such. It is legitimate, for instance, to take a minor risk in sport or in climbing, and we have old codes of Christian origin which lay down what is foolish and wrong in the risking of one's life.

We can submit to surgical operations when there is a proper proportion between the end in view and the means, but we are not allowed to mutilate ourselves arbitrarily. For similar reasons no one, not even the state itself, can mutilate or do harm to an innocent man, though he again can offer his body for grave reasons. One of these reasons would clearly be his duty to his neighbour or the community, and this explains the providing of blood for hospitals, or vaccination by the state (where the consent of the citizens is reasonably presupposed). When, again, the very life of the community is threatened, the state, as representing the general will to survive, can impose duties which are requisite for safety. Such regulations, however, can never make what is intrinsically wrong into right, no matter what the urgency. No state could order the murder of children or old people in order to save the life of the majority. Good functions, therefore, like eating and drinking and sex and speech, must be used for their proper purposes. That is the first qualification. The second is that we do not now possess an angelic and fully integrated nature, what is theoretically good may not be good for an individual at a particular time. A delicate stomach is made ill by a rich food; the young have not the stamina or experience to endure or enjoy what may be innocuous to the mature. But even the mature seem seldom to have recourse to reason, so that we have a spectacle of a world in which countless millions differ on countless subjects, and most of the opinions for which they fight would look to a Socrates or Thomas More to be compounded mainly of nonsense and prejudice. Moreover, if the findings of modern psychology be right, we have to allow for a constant infiltration of unconscious motives into our judgments; and, if Freud is to be trusted, concupiscence has far more sway than free thought supposes. Concupiscence is not the only weakness according to Catholic teaching, and experience and psychology do coincide with its view of nature as having a bias towards the dark and demonic elements in human nature. Thirdly, the ideal of man discloses itself only through effort and positive achievement, and even when presented in intelligible terms by religious prophet or official teacher, it is like the bait of knowledge offered to a schoolboy, a remote and unappetising prize. We are tempted to reduce it to our own measure and passing pleasures; and so the ideal is lowered and caricatured, and a nation or civilisation droops and dies. One form this fever takes is the nibbling away of moral principle or proved tradition. Exceptions are granted in the name of mercy or sentiment; general licence then spreads, and the whole moral structure is endangered.

These three qualifications are sorely needed if we are to use and enjoy the good things of life advantageously. They explain, too, the Catholic instruction and training in morals. The Puritan condemns even innocent pleasures because the soul of man is

depraved by sin. The Libertarian of the Rousseau school does not believe in sin and regards interference with freedom and laws of restraint as chains imposed on innocent man. Liberty, therefore, is the keyword in this philosophy and explains the form capitalism took in the first half of the nineteenth century as well as much else. So grave was the indictment against the fruits of this libertarian doctrine that moralists have leant over backward to the belief in its opposite and advocated the withdrawal from the individual of all power of doing harm. Individual enterprise is to be abolished and all power is to pass into the hands of the state. In between these two extremes lies the Catholic moral doctrine of social man. Liberty is to be extended as far as possible, and for each individual, but for this to work out to the good of the community each individual must be trained with the utmost care in habit of thought and will; by self-discipline and observance of God's commandments, and by knowledge and appreciation of God's purposes in his regard. Thus he will grow to the proper dignity of a man and be capable of exercising that control over himself and that respect for others which full liberty requires. Many think that all will be well if checks are put upon material possessions and thought left unchecked. On the contrary, says the Catholic: train the mind and will so that they govern wisely and then youth can be left free more and more to manage his own life and his own affairs. The aim of education should be to produce a race of men who can do this for the most part without injustice and without intemperance. Freedom by negotiation, and freedom in common association are in the nature of things higher than an enforced union or an imposed policy. But this kind of freedom cannot be won without sweat and tears.

The Church and Natural Societies

It is now, perhaps, easier to understand the approach of the Catholic Church to morals. The perspective is that of the Catholic faith with its doctrine of immortality and union with God. Human beings are created by a living God, with whom they have to enter into personal relations. The Church is that society in which by the Revelation of God the Catholic has the means to live that life of supernatural friendship and love with Christ and merit His gift of unending bliss. This present life consists, therefore, in entering into friendship with God and our neighbour and in 'making good' in this world, living up to our best, and fulfilling the will of God in our individual regard. Mortal life is not, however, a waiting on the next. Here and now good is to be done, and what we do has value, even an absolute value. The reason for saying an 'absolute' value is that the mind and will are of their nature immaterial, and therefore the object of mind is absolute truth and the object of the will is absolute good. For the

same reason the Catholic maintains that a human person, as endowed with mind and soul, has an intrinsic and absolute value, and therefore he cannot be treated as a means. No other human being can interfere with his soul, and, except for grave social wrongdoing, no human authority can deprive him of his rights. Even those rights of which he is deprived concern directly his life as a member of society and not as a private and incommunicable person. The chief duty of the state and of the family is to co-operate in making individuals fully human and able to prosecute their end. The family protects and looks to the welfare of the young, schools carry on this work, and the state must see to it that justice flourishes between its citizens, that they have the means to live unimpededly a human life, and that their liberty, that is the power to choose for themselves as persons, is enhanced and not decreased. The state, too, should have a not too inadequate idea of the moral and spiritual end of man, though unfortunately this idea has become very obscured in modern political theory. The family and the state are called 'natural' units or societies; that is to say, they are essential to the life and well-being of all men and women. We cannot live without a father or a mother and we cannot become fully human except in a community. For this reason the Church teaches that both these have a moral authority and in their legitimate functions have a right to acceptance and obedience. Teachers have not this same moral authority, and in so far as they exercise it do so by proxy for the family and the state.

There can be little doubt that the high sense of the dignity of man and woman, which has been the mark of our civilisation, is due in great part to the success of the Christian moral. This may be accounted a paradox, because the cardinal virtue of the Christian faith is humility. The explanation lies pithily in the lines: "O, lowly hope and high humility", in the combination of man, the likeness of God, and his tarnished state and his nothingness in the light of God's infinity. There is another paradox, the fact that life is under the Christian auspices a testing-time, a pilgrimage, and the fact that the West has witnessed the most remarkable improvement in human conditions of life and the love of things for themselves. I mean by the latter what is called the pursuit of pure knowledge and pure science, the passion for beauty and the arts and the study and reverence for nature. Once again the explanation lies in this, that the best insurance for the life of time is the belief in the divine, whose many-splendoured beauty is reflected in what is best in human life. More difficult to adjust and more delicate in their attempted harmony are the doctrine of the right use and enjoyment of the things of life and the spirit of unworldliness which is the profession of every true Christian. To make the most of this world and to be

a pilgrim of eternity look almost incompatible. That is not so, since in the Christian economy the visible is a symbol of the invisible, and we learn of God, His love and wisdom for instance, through the analogies of it in human affection and in the wonders of the universe. Nevertheless there is a friction, and of all is required some asceticism in order that they should be able to put what is first first and keep a true perspective. We have to stand away from ourselves in order to see ourselves and others truly, and that is why the saint is so often sought out for advice on moral issues and even on temporal affairs. He has a width of mind and a charity which illuminate the scene. This conflict, also, lies behind the tradition in Christendom of retirement from the world, of houses of contemplation and prayer, and the practice of celibacy.

On the chief moral subjects, as I have already suggested, the Church's approach on a first glance might seem common sense and in agreement with general informed opinion. The reason for this is that we still live on a set of inherited moral ideas sired by Christianity. The doctrine of Original Sin fits in very well with experience, and the insistence on special care and training of the young into good habits is the more likely to be applauded now that the effects of the Nazi and Soviet early teaching and the necessarily neglected home-life in England and America during the war years have become apparent. Dr. Moberley's book, also, on the need of a wholesome, if not Christian, atmosphere at the universities is in accord with Catholic teaching. Apart from its over-all conception of the end of man, the outstanding mark of the Catholic approach is its definiteness and logic or consistency. There are fundamental moral principles, whose validity is unchanging because the spiritual nature of man is fixed and in the likeness of God. An act which goes flat against the growth and end of that nature is intrinsically evil and what accords with that end and promotes it is good. Man, too, is made up of an organism with specific functions. In abusing these functions man does wrong to himself and to society, and only from a clear idea of man's ultimate good can we formulate a right judgment on the extent to which the body, for instance, can be sacrificed for the spirit or a minor function tampered with or replaced in the interests of the whole. As the major instinct, and the most disturbing, sex needs special vigilance and regulation, and purity is held up as an ideal in itself and as a catalyst in the highest pursuits of the self. How deeply rooted in this ideal has been the Christian conscience for centuries can be seen from the way Shakespeare shaped Isabella's moral problem in *Measure for Measure*! Besides purity the Catholic Church signals out what immemorially have been called the four cardinal virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. What is meant by these names has remained ever the same, but the words have changed their connotation. Prudence now has an un-

favourable sound and its ancient meaning is better conveyed by 'good judgment', that trained and unbiased sense of what is right and fitting in every moral situation. It is rightly called the queen of the virtues, and because of the passion and prejudice and conceit and ignorance which beset us it is hard to acquire, though our individual and the general welfare depend upon it. Fortitude is principally moral courage, the courage which makes us face and overcome our own defects and be sincere in the presence of others, especially in upholding unpalatable truths. Temperance means self-restraint and self-control despite passion and ambition and the lure of luxury and ease. Animated by justice and charity as well as by self-restraint, the Christian educated man should be ready for one of the greatest of evils, avarice. The Gospels are full of the danger of riches, and there are many religious orders of men and women in the Catholic Church whose members take a vow of poverty in order to free themselves from selfish preoccupation with material gain. On the proper use of money and material possessions there are for reference a series of Papal Encyclicals. These and other documents deal with the rights to possess, the obligations of possession and ownership, capitalism and communism, usury and the right to a living wage and the means of livelihood for worker and family, and other kindred subjects. The principle governing this instruction and advice is that ownership is a form of stewardship involving obligations, such as the care of family and employees, the poor and the community. In modern society, with its complicated systems of finance and industrial relations, there are, of course, a host of moral problems involved, share-holding, financial speculation, rehousing and redistribution of labour, the right to strike and compulsory membership of unions. The problems are very often intricate, but the Catholic Church believes that the correct way of answering them is in the light of principles and truths about the nature of man.

Conclusion

It remains to say a word on the relation of Catholic moral ideas to what are supposed by some to be inimical to them. It is quite true that Marxian materialism and the Catholic religion cannot meet and make terms; the one stands for material and economic processes as the sole determinant of morals and human life; the other admits the great influence of such forces, but claims that man, with his power of looking before and after and judging himself and such influences, can freely with the help of grace make himself godlike. With modern psychology and evolution there is, on the other hand, no foreordained quarrel. It all depends on what the protagonists of these studies claim. The extremist views that our thoughts and behaviour are entirely dependent on one or more unconscious instincts, or again that evolution has undermined

the stability of morals, go beyond the evidence and are self-destructive. Some human judgments must remain unalterable if we are to communicate intelligently with one another, find meaning in the past and have truth at all. Similarly, in morals there must be some privileged judgments which will serve us to think and act morally. Evolution has shown how slowly man grows to a wise and integrated knowledge of himself and others and to an adequate ideal; and again how swayed man is by fears and dreams and how easily twisted and perverted by passions and material needs. History shows how many mad and false beliefs have grown like weeds in systems of morality. But the conclusion from this history is not that all morals are relative. Quite the contrary—because we can see where men went wrong, sometimes out of fear, sometimes by the overstressing of some good, and this past falls into shape in the light of the permanent truths about man, his composite nature and his end. Modern psychology helps here by showing from a study of the background how it is that men and women so easily lose their common sense, become inconsistent, develop fixations, and can be stampeded like a herd into some frenzy. All moralists know of that no man's land neighbouring consciousness whose vapours confuse the mind and cause self-deception. The methods of the modern psychologists have helped us to understand better the interrelations of these two areas and to distinguish more accurately between normality and abnormality. As it is the aim of psychiatry to bring what is suppressed into full consciousness, and as our estimate of the value of these methods presupposes the validity of normal judgment, there can be no question of an attack on the old truth of man's moral responsibility. What we may have learnt is further insight into the Gospel saying: " Judge not and ye will not be judged."

Wherever men and women live together, belief is bound to play a principal role in deciding how they shall live and act. That is why belief, especially if it be revolutionary, can be so dangerous. The emotions and contents of a belief permeate our attitudes, and therefore it is all-important that that belief should favour cold reason and give it full scope. In the Catholic teaching reason brings us to a knowledge of human nature, sufficient to provide principles and lines of conduct. If, however, we are content to study human nature alone and apart, we shall have at best a torso. God is a living reality, and it is only in his relation to God, his Maker and his End that man and his nature come alive and become fully intelligible. Reason ought to acquaint us with this. But in fact the Catholic faith supplies this knowledge, and much else besides. It teaches that God in His loving providence has disposed for man a destiny far higher than he could conceive and invited him into a love and a union of quasi-equality with Himself. This is the language of friendship and of persons; it goes beyond

the dry statutes of reason and gives a new dynamism to ideas of duty and good. It dresses every activity to a "dexterous and starlight order"; it seasons the intercourse between man and man and between man and woman, introducing new delicacies and apperceptions and setting a new value on taste and tenderness and reverence. As the boughs to a tree, so are the etiquettes, the codes, the courtesies, our likes and dislikes in eating and dressing and jesting, our traditions and way of life to the Christian belief. So intimate with this belief are they that torn from it they become like flowers unrooted and set in a glass. They look at first as alive and unchanged as before, but they fade fast. Morals can be considered by the philosopher in abstraction from other human activities, and as such they are confined to the subject of major right and wrong; but in experience morals overflow into every activity and are the warp and woof of a culture. The culture has a recognisable unity of sentiment, habit, and outlook, and is always dependent on some overriding belief. When the belief weakens, the moral system lit by it resembles a broken stained-glass window: the pieces are dark and do not fit together. In the last resort the Christian belief must rely on its truth to persevere. It does not use the violence and fanatical excitements of the rival political creeds. The Catholic accepts a moral code because his mind recognises its truth, and at the same time he is sure in his mind that morality depends on God and that God has favoured man in a special way by the gift of the supernatural life through Christ. He ought to prove his faith by example, by the perfect performance of his duties, and by his interest in all that promotes the common welfare. He has a new dynamic motive for so acting; he has as a vivid model for imitation God-made man, and he possesses that "happiness within the heart", of which Dante wrote, in his belief that God is the master of fate, that no good thought or deed passes into the vacuum of the past, and that justice and truth will be vindicated.

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CHAPTER TWO

EASTERN ORTHODOXY

Part I

Introductory Notes

Eastern Christianity, which calls itself ' Orthodoxy ', that is ' true faith ', developed historically in a different way from Christianity in the West. Usually this difference has been formulated as follows. The East is apparently more inclined to contemplative religious life, whereas the West is more 'realistic ', devoting itself rather to outward activity. The East would appear to be more mystical, whereas the West is engrossed with the problems of actual life. Despite the element of truth it contains, this distinction is exaggerated and one-sided. Should we seek to discover the real difference between these two branches of Christianity it will be found to consist essentially in a profound and serious divergence in their conception of man and of the world. Of course, we are concerned here only with Christian conceptions in the West and in the East, not with whole systems of culture. In the West we observe in the Christian conception of man and of the world the great and, in many ways fatal, influence of St. Augustine, which still persists at the present time. The most vigorous effects of this influence have been manifested in Protestantism—as for instance in Barth, and in cognate tendencies. But in Catholicism, too, though it has long been modified by other teachings, the same influence still persists.

It is from St. Augustine's teaching that there springs lack of belief in human nature, or, to be more accurate, a distrust of it. The idea of St. Augustine that the basic incentive in man is lust (*concupiscentia*), that man's very ' essence ' is radically spoiled, continues to weaken inwardly in the West the revelation of man given in the New Testament. However paradoxical and unfortunate it may sound, it is often in that Western teaching which has departed from Christianity that we find a truer understanding of man from the New Testament point of view.

In Eastern Orthodoxy we find quite a different approach to man. Here we discover not only trust in man's ' essence ', but also faith in the undying strength of the good in man, and, generally speaking, a serene outlook on man and on the course of his development.

It is precisely in Eastern Orthodoxy that there has been developed and retained to this day the doctrine of the transfiguration of man's essence without jettisoning or destroying the natural impulses in man. This is the ideal of '*deification*' (theosis) expressed with great force by the holy fathers of the East.[1] It is in the light of this ideal in Orthodoxy that we must view the problem of moral education.

However, faith in man in Orthodoxy has nothing in common with the denial of the participation of God in the life of man which is typical of secular culture. Here is no superficial optimism such as lies at the foundation of the theory of 'progress' or social utopias. Faith in man is connected, in Orthodoxy, with a very precise assertion of the reality of 'original sin' as the 'dark centre' in man and the source of evil and destructive impulses in the soul. But in our souls there is also an abiding source of good—that is, the image of God, which is the conveyor of light and goodness. This is why in every soul, however cold and hard or even completely poisoned, there never ceases to take place a restless and profound struggle between good and evil.

This struggle can remain latent, or it can take the most unexpected forms. It can also fill our consciousness and acquire a sharp and painful character. The moral theme is not simply imposed superficially upon man; it is the central factor of his spiritual life, of his falls and his tragedies, as well as of his enlightenment and purification. But precisely for this reason the most valuable and important thing for the Church is "the hidden man of the heart", as the apostle Peter calls it (1 Peter iii. 4), not a man's conduct or his habits or even his 'principles.'

How, then, does Orthodoxy understand the problem of moral education? To answer this we must begin with certain more remote considerations.

The Meaning of Education in general

The general problem of education, as an active entering of adults into the life of children, is usually treated as that of preparing them for life. Adults, in accordance with their experience of life and their moral principles, endeavour to create for children the most favourable conditions for the development of their powers and capacities and for the release of their individuality and creative impulses, but without the imposition of ideas foreign to their souls. Generally speaking, this idea of co-operating in the maturing of the child's individuality is conceived in terms of allowing the child freedom to grow within a specified framework of 'the good'—but of course 'the good' itself is understood by

[1] For a survey of the literature on this subject see the book by J. Gross, *La divinisation du Chrètien d'après les Péres Grecs* (Paris, 1938). Unfortunately, English works are not mentioned in it.

everyone in his own peculiar way. In spite of the extraordinary development of secularism, and in spite of the age-long tendency to relegate the religious sphere to the depths of the soul and to divert it from the creativeness of life, we still find preserved in modern culture a consciousness of the centrality of the moral theme and of the need to protect the free development of the child's soul from the power of evil, from the poisonous breath of the destructive and bad influences with which contemporary life teems.

Yet even if we encounter authentic moral idealism and a genuine attempt at education in the spirit of service to ' the good ', still all this is usually conceived only in terms of life on earth, as if after death nothing is left of man, or as if any life there may be after death has no connection with life on earth. At the best, education is understood as education in the good only so far as this life is concerned. In this way there is lost the fundamental connection in Christianity between our present life and that of the future.

For Orthodoxy this turning aside from the idea of salvation appears monstrous, because nothing in life can be correctly understood and valued if one does not connect it with eternity, with that part of the present life which will remain in the life to come. The general problem of education from an Eastern Orthodox standpoint must be visualised as an introduction to man's future life through the ordering of our present life: adults must help children to establish good habits, to deepen their moral consciousness, to learn to look at all problems of life from the standpoint of eternal truth.

The actual relation of our present life to eternal truth must be illuminated by the idea of salvation, and the whole difficult business of organising not only the moral consciousness, but also a general world-outlook, can be made precisely to open up to children the idea of salvation, and also to help them to grasp its meaning. The difficulty of understanding this, and at the same time the centrality of this theme in the setting out of the problems of moral education, are connected with the weakening and more often with the disappearance of the idea of sin. This is so important in relation to all that follows that we must speak of it separately.

Sin and Sinfulness in Man

In the consciousness of people to-day there is an awareness of non-fulfilment of the demands of the moral law, and a knowledge of what ' repentance ', ' remorse ', etc., mean; but the idea of sin is almost lost. This is understandable, for sin is a category of religious consciousness and of it alone. As the psalmist puts it, " against Thee only have I sinned " (Ps. li.); that is every sin is a sin before God, and only in the religious consciousness can there be the sense of sin. This consciousness of one's sin before God

makes Christian morality mystical, that is, founded on the feeling of relationship with God, or (as it is usually expressed in Orthodoxy) on a 'standing before God.'

In such an ordering of the spiritual life, every breach of the demands of morality, and every falsehood which is incompatible with 'standing before God' is regarded as sin. This does not mean that in the feeling of sin only unrighteousness in relation to God is prominent. Unrighteousness in relation to people is also experienced in the religious soul as sin, since all that happens in life, however insignificant, is inwardly linked with that light and truth which shine upon the world from God. There is nothing in life, whether it be light or dark, which is not essentially connected with eternity. It would indeed be more accurate to say that all occurrences in life inevitably lead to evil or to good, and therefore pass into the sphere of eternity.

Precisely because of this the theme of salvation concerns not only the future life, as is often thought, but enters into our everyday life too. The theme of salvation is the theme of the overthrow of the dark, evil impulses within the soul and the liberation of the soul from their oppression. In other words, the theme of salvation puts before us the question of the transfiguration of our soul. The ideal of deification puts the problem of overcoming in ourselves all that is shallow and empty, all that untruth which penetrates the soul from without but which evidently finds an echo in us. This, in fact, is the problem of the struggle with sin, the problem of the removal of evil before the face of God.

Of course it is quite possible to approach man's moral task simply from the point of view of truth and the ideal. Moral idealism can exist outside the religious sphere. But a painstaking analysis of the moral sphere convinces us that moral idealism, if it matures in man in the absence of religious life, is in reality nourished by the influence of the religious sphere which penetrates our life everywhere.

One may not be aware of these religious roots of moral idealism, but good receives its meaning only in God. According to the happy phrase of one Russian philosopher, only "inspiration by the good"[2] appears to provide living strength for the soul; but moral inspiration, like any other, cannot be understood entirely in psychological terms, that is, simply as a phenomenon of the soul. Only from the religious sphere can there spring the need to serve the good; and religion alone gives strength for this task.

In particular, it is precisely the Christian religion (with its teaching that God is love, that the Saviour gave His life for the

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[2] This felicitous expression, which gives a good idea of the dynamic moment in the movement of the soul towards the good, comes from Vladimir Solovyev (Russian philosopher, 1855–1900). See his book, *The Justification of the Good.*

salvation of men and told us to love all men as brothers) which appears to be an inexhaustible source of moral enthusiasm. Christianity not only summons us to the pursuit of the good, it inspires the soul, particularly with its teaching about God as a heavenly Father and about eternal life and resurrection.

We always stand before the face of God, and every untruth and lie, every evil and dark impulse of the soul, deprives us of the light which comes from God. But it is very important not only to be conscious of sin, to feel oneself always and in everything standing before God, but also to understand why and how sin is possible in man.

We may say, quite definitely, that man enters the world not only with a longing for good but also with an inclination to sin. The mistake of St. Augustine lay not in his assertion of the real strength of this inclination of man towards sin, but in his reduction of man's whole being to this and this alone. In man there is a constant centre of sinfulness, but there is also a constant centre of movement towards the good. In the depths of the soul there is a dark centre and there is also a light centre. The image of God brings light into the soul, and this light even the evil spirits cannot disperse; because the devils themselves believe and tremble, since they too feel God as the 'Sun of truth.' Man is alive, he remains alive, because through the image of God there penetrate into him the rays of this 'Sun of truth.' Just as the thief on the cross, because of his confession of his sins, was honoured with a promise that he should enter paradise, so every soul, if it follows the impulse towards good, if it believes in that which shines into the soul from God, can be transfigured.

But in man there is also a dark centre, and, in the conception of 'original sin', it is this which entered into human nature through the fall of man in paradise.[3] This conception of 'original sin' is almost forgotten in contemporary culture, but nevertheless it is very important if we are to understand the reality of man's sinfulness which has its origin outside his own individuality. In a word, man does not come into the world morally 'neutral', as is often asserted, he is not *tabula rasa*, but on the contrary, the struggle between good and evil is unfolded in his soul from the very beginning. Though the child's consciousness is very slow to grasp the conception of good and evil, yet the actual parting of the ways is there from the start in the soul, preceding, in fact, the formation of the moral consciousness. But to understand and duly appreciate this it is essential to realise that in the soul, as stated above, there are two centres, through one of which there

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[3] On the conception of 'original sin' see the book of Norman P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin* (London, 1927). See also articles of Russian writers in the book, *Kirche, Staat und Mensch. Russisch-orthodoxe Studie* (Genf, 1937).

shines into it the light of goodness (through the image of God), while through the other there penetrates that sinful resistance to the good called 'original sin.'

The Main Significance of Moral Education

The category of the 'primordial' or 'underived' belongs in the spiritual life not only to the moral sphere, for contemporary psychology tends more and more to the conclusion that in the domain of knowledge as well we are concerned with what is not derived, that is, with functions of the mind which are not developed from the sphere of sensations. The same must be said of the religious field, where the underived nature of the category of 'deity' is accepted by all who approach the study of the religious sphere.[4]

But in the spiritual life of man, which, generally speaking, is hierarchically superior to the whole of man's nature, the moral sphere occupies a special place—indeed a central place. First of all, moral insanity leads always to the loss of 'common sense' and separates man from other men, whereas the underdevelopment of the religious, aesthetic, or even intellectual life ('stupidity') does not make a man useless for social life. In the same way the moral pathology bears eloquent testimony to the special meaning of the moral sphere in the inner world of man.

From another point of view, freedom as the most important creative power in man belongs only to the moral sphere. Of course, man is free to develop or suppress in himself the religious, aesthetic, or intellectual life, but this means freedom as an act standing outside the spheres indicated. If man has entered on the path of religious or aesthetic or intellectual life, then within those spheres there is only that which the German philosophers call transcendental freedom, in which there is not an atom of freedom in the psychological sense of the word. Indeed, within these spheres man is not free in this sense; he cannot call beauty that which to him seems monstrosity, and in the same way he cannot expel from his religious life, if he has entered upon it, that which is determined by his experience or tradition.

But in the moral sphere the very essence of moral consciousness is that it leads to a free choice between good and evil. Nor does the choice of evil, for example, withdraw a man from the moral sphere. Evil is the negation of good, but both evil and good are chosen by man. But without embarking at present upon an analysis of the conception of 'moral freedom', let us recognise that the actual reality of freedom within the moral life is the cardinal fact of the spiritual life of man and the basis of his creativity. One can evade religious or aesthetic or even intellectual

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[4] See especially the book of R. Otto, *Das Heilage.*

life, but the moral theme is, so to speak, imposed upon us. Whether we want it or not we always remain within the moral sphere, even when we consciously do evil.

This means that in the spiritual life of man the moral theme is thrust upon us unavoidably and indissolubly. As the spiritual health of man firstly depends on the health of the moral sphere, so the destruction of the spiritual life depends in the first instance upon disorders in the moral sphere. It is precisely Christian teaching about man which makes this fact clear to our mind, since Christianity, as we saw just now, teaches the existence in man from the beginning of two centres and two types of activity—one in the direction of good, 'the image of God', and one in the direction of evil, 'original sin.'

We are now ready to approach nearer to that essential conception of Christian anthropology which will help us to attack the concrete problem of the moral education of man—to the conception of the cross.

Of the Conception of the Cross in the Life of Man

There existed already in the ancient world a special conception defining 'destiny' in the development of man. This was the idea of fate as of some irresistible power, which determines the life of man and over which man has no control. This idea of fate referred not only to all the irrational in man himself and in his life and destiny, but also to a power outside himself. Here is the key to the tragic understanding of the life of man in antiquity.

Christianity also recognises the reality of moments of tragedy in the life of man, but the source of such tragic conflicts Christianity sees not in a blind external power which overwhelms man but in the wrong ordering of the spiritual life. The conception of the 'Cross' does not coincide (as is often thought) with the conception of suffering—though usually and almost inevitably our cross leads to sufferings, or is followed by them. Why is this so? The explanation of this will bring us back to the already-mentioned doctrine of an inward relationship between the eternal and the transitory in the life of man, and will help us to approach the fundamental theme of assisting children and young people in their moral development.

The image of God in man is the source and pledge of man's originality, of his unique, sole character. In calling man to life God gives to each his 'talent', his task, an ideal, so to speak, or—as one remarkable contemporary psychiatrist-pedagogue has put it—"a guiding or leading image."[5] If we could imagine the 'normal development' of man, in which his 'guiding image' was

[5] '*Leitbild*'—the expression of Keïnkel (who belonged to the school of Adler). See, for instance, *Arbeit am Charakter*, and his other books.

able to disclose itself completely, we should have before us not merely a healthy but also a holy (or spiritually harmonious) man. But in the path of this 'sound' development (the law of which is the cross given to each person by God) stand many obstacles. First of all there is heredity, both physical and psychological (in so far as the latter can be considered beyond dispute). Then there are the conditions of life during childhood, and the general dependence upon environment, physical, national, or cultural.

But the greatest obstacle in the way of surrender directly and wholly to this ideal with which the soul of every man is endowed, is sinfulness—that is, 'original sin', which is independent of individuality, being common to all people. Refracted as it were through the prism of the above-mentioned influences, which define the conditions of the development of the individual, this centre of sinfulness is responsible for 'crookedness' in the development of man. This is excellently described in Jesus Ben-Sirach (iv. 17–18):

> For at the first she (Wisdom) will walk with him (who trusts her) in crooked ways, and will bring fear and dread upon him, and torment him with her discipline, until she may trust his soul, and try him with her judgments: Then will she return again the straight way unto him, and will gladden him, and reveal to him her secrets.

This remarkable observation applies with certainty only to those who entrust themselves to Wisdom, that is, who consciously seek the disclosure of the 'guiding power' of the image of God alive within them. Yet even for such souls 'crooked ways', trials, and temptations are inevitable. That is why our Lord having assumed man's flesh had to pass through these inevitable temptations. But if, even in the case of those who have entrusted themselves to Wisdom, temptations make crooked the paths of life, what can one say of those who, willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously, depart from Wisdom, from those calls of God which, through the activity of the image of God, penetrate to every soul?

Here there is no struggle between the paths of Wisdom and other inclinations—here the soul simply surrenders to such inclinations. And yet all this is only on the surface! No one can renounce the image of God which is alive within him, or can stifle the call of God and trample underfoot that vision of the ideal which is revealed to us in the depths of our being. A breach occurs between the depths of the soul and its empirical levels; and if this breach assumes an acute character there follows that psychological shock which leads to the loss of spiritual equilibrium. In our time child psychopathology and criminology have revealed quite convincingly that mental illness and anti-social movements of the soul are rooted in those *traumata*, or 'wounds', in the soul which occurred in the early or second period of childhood. Indeed, if our souls evade what is, as it were, written into them as God's task, as a 'guiding image', internal conflicts are bound to

occur. In this respect there is nothing more symptomatic than early cynicism, sceptical rejection of all enthusiasm, deliberate shamelessness, or provocative violation of the demands of morality. All this bears witness to inner conflicts and schisms.

Speaking generally, man is not harmonious but hierarchical in structure. This statement must be put forward in all seriousness as the basis for the study of the child's soul. That ideal of 'harmonious development' of all the powers and gifts of man, of which people often think and write even now, is a pure illusion. And this, not only because in man inward conflicts develop continually, but mainly because the actual structure itself of man is hierarchical. If one accepts the usual differentiation of man into the three spheres of body, soul, and spirit, then it must be recognised that they are not on one level but are related to one another hierarchically. 'Normally' our spirit ought to reign supreme, but in fact it continually falls into captivity to the lower spheres of our being. When such a 'displacement' (of the true hierarchical order) occurs, however gaily and lightheartedly it may be experienced, it always creates inward 'friction', difficulties, conflicts, and schisms.

The 'development' of man almost always aims at the discovery of the equilibrium of his various inherent powers, for the purpose of arranging spiritually his inner world, and learning to control his aspirations and inclinations and not be possessed by them. The absence of this equilibrium is the main source of our sufferings—and we certainly can, and in fact often do, escape from ourselves into the outer world in order to stifle the uneasiness within us. But one cannot really escape from oneself; and finally the law of inner growth towards maturity (the *logos* of the particular individuality, its cross) turns into inner torment. The Cross which we do not 'take up', to use the words of our Lord Who called everyone to take up his cross and to follow Him, becomes unbearably heavy. The opposite is true if, having suffered torment, we finally accept our cross. Then all suffering ceases.

This was already understood in certain ancient ethical systems, where we find in the pronouncement of the Stoic philosophers: "*volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt*" ("the willing are led by fate, the unwilling are pulled along"). In the language of Christian anthropology this means that if we do not follow the path which is given from above, the cross becomes unbearably heavy, and yet even so it drags us along; we still make our way through ourselves towards that ideal which is engraved upon our souls by God. The right ordering of man in general cannot rest upon the suppression or abolition of any natural impulses of the soul, but only on the restoration of that hierarchy and on the spiritual and psycho-corporeal impulses which are the fruit of divine operation in a given soul.

Now that we have dealt with the basic conceptions of Orthodox anthropology, in so far as they are necessary to the main theme of our present study, we are in a position to explain how questions of moral education should be approached from the point of view of Orthodoxy.

Part II

A General Analysis of the Moral Sphere in Man

Before we proceed to construct a system of moral education—viz. the entry of older people into the spiritual world of children and adolescents—we must put to ourselves the question, "What is it that motivates their moral life, and what are the natural driving forces in the moral sphere?" What is it precisely that distinguishes ethical activity from other manifestations of the soul and of the spirit akin to it? Very frequently we regard as ethical experiences acts of social and physical responsiveness, which, however, may not contain within themselves any trace of morality. We know, for instance, that there are people who cannot endure the sufferings of others when they witness them, yet in essence they are profoundly egoistical and even cruel people. They would give anything to avoid seeing animals or people tortured before their eyes so as to avoid having to suffer themselves. This 'social sensitiveness', like all forms of social compassion, may not contain in itself anything moral or lead to any ethical process. Such actions only happen to coincide with that which is required from us by the moral law.

All such movements of the soul which resemble true moral facts, or externally correspond to the demands of moral law, were described by Kant as legalistic, while moral value was recognised by him only when something was done in the name of the moral law. But here Kant was not quite right, for it is not a question of our being conscious of a moral law; the real question is whether at the basis of our activity there lies *the principle of good*, whether in our acts (even though it may be but dimly realised and felt) there is the idea of good. In that excellent book of E. Hartmann's, *Die Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewustseins*,[6] different moral impulses in which the idea of good is but vaguely expressed are very well described. But at the same time this idea of good grows out of them, it seems to "shine through them" according to a neat phrase of Professor Hessen.[7] One may add here that only those moral ideas which have grown out of our own experience, out of our own moral feelings, influence our life and conduct, and repre-

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[6] This contains the best description of the moral sphere which has yet been written.

[7] Hessen, *Pedagogics*.

sent true '*idées-forces*' according to Fouiellée's expression.[8] Whereas all ideas which have not grown out of our own experience remain completely abstract, possess no effective power and give birth to that ethical intellectualism which has no creative influence of any kind.

Following Hartmann, one can accept this picture of the evolution of the moral sphere. Primarily it is expressed in certain moral feelings, then it is transformed into some kind of ' rules ' (common-sense ethics, so clearly expressed, for instance, in different systems of utilitarianism), acquiring through the exercise of reason the status of 'rational' morality, in which moral ideas achieve a general, universal character. All this correctly expresses the fact that behind the activities of the moral sphere there always lies a moral idea, which from vaguely experienced directives of feeling (compassion, pity, love, feeling of duty) is transformed into rational generalisation (' rules of life '), to be still further changed (in those who are capable of it in their spiritual and mental structure) into clear moral ideas, which already possess a universal nature.

One can characterise the evolution of the moral sphere in another way by proceeding from that out of which the consciousness of moral law emerges. In the first place, with children there exists no such thing as an idea of ' law ', there is simply feeling, primary actions, behaviour demanded by the family or by the environment. This is the stage of *ἀνομία*, which, as we shall see later, is almost always repeated in the period of adolescence. Then there gradually emerges a period when the child accepts (or creates for himself) this or that set of 'rules.'[9] These rules always either originate from the grown-ups, or are produced by the general conditions of life; and they can be justly described as creating a ' heteronomous ' morality (here *νόμος*, the law, acquires its powers from 'others', *ἕτεροι* in Greek, i.e. from parents, comrades, or life in general).

Next comes the period of sexual development towards maturity, when a young person begins to renounce all authority, to resist any stranger's will, and often to reject all those rules which have been thrust on him by life and people, thus entering once again into ' anomy ' (*sic volo, sic jubeo!*). At times this is pure impressionability, sometimes it is moral anarchism; but normally in adolescence it is replaced by a vivid blossoming forth of moral idealism—of broad, purely abstract and utopian constructions, of naïve but fervently experienced infatuations. Actually this is a golden period of moral creativity, but alas! it frequently disappears without any trace, unless reason preserves it by embodying it in

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[8] Fouiellée, *Psychologie des idées forces.*

[9] Following in the footsteps of Piaget, *Le jugement moral chez l'enfant* (Paris, 1932), we may think that a great role is played in this process by the rules of the ' game.'

the shape of firm principles and convictions. The important thing is that at this stage youth stands confronted with the idea of a 'moral world order.' In the case of more profound natures this can pass over into a form of 'autonomous morality', as Kant puts it: but in actual experience this rarely happens. The essence of this transition when achieved lies in the fact that man finds in himself the 'categorical imperative', in other words a directive in regard to duty that needs no sanctions because it is a 'pure' demand of the moral consciousness,[10] free not only from pressure from 'below'—from various utilitarian motives, but also from pressure from 'above'—from any higher Will.

In our days a remarkable German thinker N. Hartmann [11] has constructed such a 'transcendental' ethic, which 'categorically' renounces, in the name of freedom, the possibility of taking into account anything which can be found 'above' man. In other words, freedom of the spirit here is only freedom if it is absolute, if it is independent of everything and of everyone.

One cannot deny the possibility of such a construction, for of course it corresponds to some kind of reality. But to what kind? Only to the kind which is secretly nurtured by the religious consciousness. It is sufficient to read Heidegger's book devoted to the analysis of the human being,[12] to agree that for a consciousness which excludes religion the inevitable conclusion is that the 'essence' of our life is confined to 'worries' and 'anguish' (*Sorge und Angst*). Of course, in this system of pure nihilism (since above man there exists 'nothing') there still shines forth the idea of freedom, which is nevertheless permeated by despair since man is lost in an empty, senseless, and blind world. Man is free to live, act, even create; but all this is drowned in the abyss which surrounds him, extinguished in the darkness which envelops him.[13] If there is any meaning in the free and categorical demands of the moral consciousness then it has been smuggled in from the religious sphere (if we define this latter purely psychologically as an 'encounter' with something 'unconditional', as the Primary Reality). In essence, if an 'autonomous' ethical life is not a myth but a reality, it must always be *theonomic*—it must be nourished by its link with the Primary Reality, with the Absolute. We can adopt Spencer's point of view and speak of the 'Inconceivable', with which all that is 'lofty', best, and holy in our soul is associated, and which imparts sense to all our creativity, to all

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[10] For Kant the source of the 'categorical imperative' can only be 'pure will', which he thinks of as a transcendental moment—that is, not linked up with any 'empirical' experiences.

[11] N. Hartmann, *Ethik*.

[12] Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*.

[13] A moment of concealed despair (according to the formula *morituri te libertatum salutant*) permeates the celebrated books of the French 'existentialist' Sartre (*Etre et néant—Existentialisme c'est l'humanisme*).

our life. Such a system of moral life bears a mystical character, for it is based on a feeling of our profound link with the Great Inconceivable.

How Christianity interprets the Moral Sphere in Man

The Christian interpretation of moral urges in the human soul accepts all this, but regards it as preliminary material for the explanation of moral activity. For Christianity the 'Great Inconceivable' is God, who possesses a personal being in the Holy Trinity. That which has been revealed to us by our Lord Jesus Christ tells us before all else that God is our heavenly Father. This idea that we are the sons of God is central for Christian anthropology. According to the words of St. John i. 12, God gave us "power to become the sons of God." We may forget about our heavenly Father, deny Him or withdraw from Him, but the personal relation to God is the basic fact of our whole spiritual life and occupies the first place in our moral life. According to the Bible "the fear of the Lord" (a "standing before God") "is the beginning of wisdom." From this it follows that Christian ethics is not simply mystical (theonomic, in the broad sense of the word), but is deeply personalistic,[14] intimately bound up with the feeling of a personal, indissoluble link with God.

"God sees everything", we teach children; only we are not always turned towards Him, and this last fact reveals to us the mystery of our freedom. In a certain sense all human seeking (even to the extent of atheism) is a search for one's own personal free way of moving towards God—a way not acquired from any outside source, nor simply the result of custom or nature. Alas! frequently man has to commit a great sin before being able to turn to God freely with feelings of repentance. James, in his well-known book on religious psychology,[15] regards such people as the 'twice-born', for if the spiritual birth takes place after an inner crisis, it is in fact a 'second' birth. In any case, a Christian understanding of the moral life rests entirely on a consciousness of one's personal relationship with God, and the whole subject of moral education for Orthodoxy resolves itself into the problem of how one can help children and adolescents to attain to such a consciousness and strengthen themselves in it.

But there is one element here, which is actually included in the religious basis of the moral sphere already referred to, which we must stress at this point in order to realise its significance to the full. If the moral sphere is illuminated from within by a realisation that we are already standing before God, if this mystical source of moral inspiration determines the power and the quickening action

[14] This is expressed very well and very vividly by the Russian philosopher C. Frank in his book *The Incomprehensible.*

[15] W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience.*

of the consciousness of good, then it can be said that what is moral in us is that which is inwardly bound up with the idea of the good, which contains it in itself in a conscious or unconscious form. It is precisely the presence of the idea of good (in either a clear or a veiled form) which transforms different expressions of social feelings (pity, duty, justice) into moral activity. Not a 'respect for the law of good' (as one might paraphrase a well-known expression of Kant), but a vital orientation towards the idea of good from within, creatively transforms this or that feeling into a moral experience. It is very important to understand this in order to assimilate properly the distinction we have pointed out between the moral sphere and 'legalistic' behaviour. Pity or kind sentiments towards people in themselves, in spite of all their social significance, may in actual fact have no relation to the moral sphere in man and may not fructify his moral quest. Even heroism (for instance, in the case of mothers who are prepared to make endless sacrifices out of devotion to their children) may not have even a grain of moral impulse in itself.

The Dynamics of the Moral Sphere

From all that has been said above, it should be clear on what the dynamic of the moral sphere depends and what are its motive forces. Superficially, then, motive forces always bear an emotional character, but this is only their formal characterisation. The emotional sphere in man generally possesses a certain hierarchical priority,[16] in other words health or sickness on the emotional plane are reflected in the entire life of a man's soul. In particular, any moral motivation—though it must have at its foundation the idea of good and must be nurtured by the religious consciousness—is in actual fact concretely determined by the richness or poverty of the corresponding emotional experiences. To put it more accurately, moral activity is in the first place tied up dynamically with those feelings which become the conductors of moral principles. If our moral consciousness does not kindle our feelings, if it awakens no emotional response, it remains in such a case ineffectual. The principle of Fouiellée, which asserts that images as such possess a dynamic moment ('*idée-force*'), is correct only from a superficial point of view. One may fail to notice that the dynamic influence of images is mediated by the feelings which lie ready to hand, but the dynamic stress falls precisely on them. The newest theories, which limit the power of the will over the motions of the soul,[17] and quite justly emphasise the tremendous significance of the imagination, forget that imagination itself must be

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[16] See my sketch, *Concerning the Hierarchical Structure of the Soul* (works of the Russian Scientific Institute in Prague).

[17] We are thinking here of the theories of Coué, Baudouin, Vysheslavtsev.

recognised, if not directly as a function of the emotional sphere, at least as something which is ancillary to it as a first priority.[18]

It is very important to understand, therefore, that the dynamics of the moral sphere must not be interpreted either on the lines of intellectualism or on those of voluntarism. As regards the former it is sufficiently well known that neither reprimands nor lectures of any kind to children will in any wise make them morally sensitive. Pedagogical intellectualism[19] directs the attention of educators to the intellect of children, and strives through the inculcation of the idea of the good and of order to create a moral approach in children. But authority, based on logical conviction in argument which is addressed to the rational sphere in the child, possesses no key to the inner dynamic of the soul. In this lies the explanation of the fruitlessness, and sometimes the undoubted harm, of any kind of corrective reprimands.

There is more truth, of course, in pedagogical voluntarism. Authority is not infrequently determined by the fact that the will of the educator is stronger than the will of the children. His will can subject their wills or lead them. One cannot deny a certain amount of limited dynamism in such a situation, but the pedagogical ambiguity of all voluntarism cannot be doubted. The method of voluntarism does not open up any prospects for the freedom of the child, for his own activity. Meanwhile, freedom is a key to all spiritual life, and moral life in particular. In pedagogical intellectualism there exists, after all, an appeal to the child's freedom through 'convincing argument'; the drawback here is that the significance of the rational functions in the dynamism of the human spirit is exaggerated. At the same time the whole problem of pedagogical influence in general and of morality in particular is bound up with the fact that it has to be based on the freedom of the child so as to evoke from him his own movement in the direction which we desire. The soul of the child must feel an interest, must be carried away, must get to love, and to be kindled by, the aim, which we would like to see as his way of activity. Putting it in another way, the purpose of education can be here formulated as to help the hearts of the young to achieve a love for the good, for truth, the Church, God.

We must at once underline here that alongside all this we do not wish to eliminate the need for organising moral consciousness

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[18] This *new* theory of imagination (see works of Ribot, *L'Imagination Creatrice*, *La Logique des Passions*; Mayer, *Ueber des emotionale Denken*, and others) is tied up historically with Schleiermacher's emotionalism, with some currents of philosophical romanticism in Germany. See the teaching of Th. Gomperz (*Weltanschaungslehre*), about a 'total *impression*.' For details about the new theory of imagination see my book *The Psychology of Childhood.*

[19] See my article on "Pedagogical Intellectualism" in the periodical *Russian School* (published under the editorship of Professor Hessen).

and moral activity in children, or the aim of 'moralising' their intellectual life and their wills. Our Lord Himself said: "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also"; and the heart, both in the Old and in the New Testament, is regarded as the basis and the focus of concentration of the spiritual life. The words of our Saviour point to the primary importance of the aim of directing the child's heart towards the Good; in trying to organise the life of the heart in this direction lies the main concern of educators. But the hierarchical primacy of this aim in no way puts to one side efforts to organise moral consciousness and moral activity. This is the fundamental pedagogical idea in Orthodoxy—to proceed from the inner to the outer, but not in the reverse direction!

We shall proceed to elaborate this statement, but at the moment we are simply emphasising that the dynamics of spiritual life are determined in the first instance by the action of those feelings by which our soul is kindled. If one can accept this assumption which underlines the hierarchical primacy of the emotional spheres, then there should be no difficulty in accepting the methods of moral education as they are understood in Orthodoxy.

Part III

The 'Outward' and the 'Inward' in Moral Education

The concentration of our attention on the emotional sphere of the child or adolescent does not imply, of course, that we lose sight of all the rest. The hierarchical structure of the soul, by stressing in the first instance the significance of the emotional sphere, does not imply a depreciation of the other spheres of the soul into insignificance or into complete subordination to the central sphere. Moral consciousness, as a capacity for moral evaluation and thought about moral questions, as well as a moralisation of our activity, has a tremendous significance in the life of personality; although, hierarchically, both the work of the intellect in the ethical motions of the soul and the complex processes of activity 'depend' on the health and purity of moral feelings. Special significance attaches here to habits, about which W. James justly said once that "good habits are our friends, and bad habits our enemies." Generally, all that can be described as 'conduct', especially all that relates to social relations in which the moral principle in man is expressed with the greatest fullness, has a primary significance in man's life. Not only do we judge a man firstly according to how he 'behaves' and expresses himself, but all our external life as well, everything that we do, has its active reflection in our inner world. Our actions fetter our inner world and as it were predetermine those forms into which the activity of the soul continues to pour itself. How frequently we find our-

selves the slaves of something which we have done before! The correlation of this 'external' sphere (our conduct, our actions) with our inner world is such that very frequently and in very many things the external sphere determines the inner world, and not conversely. On this fact the whole system of education in general and moral education in particular is usually based; the meaning of education is reduced to the organising of conduct, to the working out and reinforcing of 'good' habits. One cannot, of course, deny the practical value of this approach to educational problems—firstly because for society the 'behaviour' of every individual is of primary importance, and secondly because the 'organisation of behaviour' so frequently creates an inner world corresponding to it.

Our Orthodox approach, although it does not deny the significance of the external sphere in man, does take as its centre of gravity the evaluation of personality, and most of all the organisation of a person's inner world. It proceeds not from the periphery of man towards his soul but in the reverse direction. This is the central point for the understanding of questions of moral education, and we must pause a little to make this clearer in a concrete way.

From the Inward to the Outward

I will take two concrete examples. The first example refers to the question of the education of children and adolescents in the habit of doing good, the second to the question of education in the feeling of honour.

Very frequently in educating children and adolescents (especially in youth organisations), the habit of performing various 'good deeds' is inculcated (service, attentiveness towards one's elders and the sick, helping the needy with money, etc.). It would be strange to deny the significance of education in such habits which in truth are our friends: nor can it be denied also that the acquiring of such habits can give birth to a true desire for the good in the hearts of children and adolescents. This gravitation towards the good may further develop and become a deep seeking after the good, which is an expression of the fact that the process of moral maturation 'has borne fruit.' But though such cases seem to witness to the fact that education can proceed from the organisation of external activity attaining through this to an inner growth of the moral consciousness, there are also many quite different cases. In the latter a habit of doing certain external works may not give birth to anything at all in the inner structure of the youthful soul. None who have had any dealings with children and adolescents can deny that this latter type of case is sufficiently frequent to show that there is no question here of malformation in the inner life, or of any 'dryness' of the heart (inherited or otherwise), or of reserve and self-absorption. On the contrary, we

should state frankly that in those cases when the practice of 'good works' really leads to the development of the moral structure of the soul, we are dealing not with what is natural or normal but with a morally gifted soul, which requires but few stimuli to manifest itself. Whether this capacity is 'inborn', or whether some premature wounding of the child's soul gives birth first to compassion for suffering, and then to a thirst for good in general, one cannot say without knowing the concrete biography of every particular child or adolescent. Nevertheless, the fact remains that we have in such cases a certain 'predisposition' to good, a certain 'moral giftedness', about which there can be no argument. But it also means that here actually we have no 'moral education', for the soul is already on 'the threshold' of the moral sphere. The moral education is concerned really with the other children, already mentioned above; those in whom the development and strengthening of 'good' habits organise only conduct, only the motives and habits of social activity, without bringing to the surface any activity in the moral sphere. Such indeed is the average child, and this should be understood very clearly, for only in relation to a child of this sort can we raise the question of moral education.

Let us take another question which is even more important to contemporary culture—the question of developing a sense of 'honour.' In itself the cult of 'honour' represents a sort of *pseudo-morphosis* of the purely Christian idea of the incomparable and irreplaceable 'absolute' value of the personality. This pseudo-morphosis developed historically not only in Christian culture but also in other cultures (for instance, in the Japanese and Islamic); but it always represents an outward safeguarding of the worth of personality, an outward sensitiveness to anything which encroaches on personality, which debases it or undervalues it. In modern personalism, this safeguard of honour occupies a very essential place [20]; only in the latest class-morality (which is also a pseudo-morphosis of morality) is the feeling of honour cast aside as a "remnant of feudal and bourgeois culture."

It is easy to criticise morality based on a sense of honour, but at the moment another aspect is more important for us, since here we see an example of the success of moral influence. It appears that it is not so difficult to develop a sense of honour, but the genesis of this feeling is always associated with the pressure exerted by the 'outward sphere' on the 'inner world.' If in the first example we analysed one can speak of the failure of moral education (viz. of the difficulty in life of evoking moral activity in the soul by organising 'good' habits), then in our second example,

[20] An exception is provided by that variety of personalism which has made a great stir all over the world under the name of existentialism (I have in mind its nihilistic form, which is especially vividly expressed by Sartre. See for example his sketch *L'existentialisme c'est l'humanisme*).

of success in the educating of the feeling of honour, we have an instance of what might be called bad success! We regard it as 'bad success' because, at the very best, when there seems to originate as it were a true 'ethic of honour', by no means everything which is illuminated and regulated from within by a feeling of honour possesses in itself any relation to good. Honesty which springs from the ethics of honour maintains itself only because a loss of honesty leads to dishonour—and only for that reason! The moral inadmissibility of dishonesty is not taken into account here in the slightest degree. It is for this reason that the ethics of honour so easily degenerate simply into preservation of external dignity without generating in the soul any exercise of the moral consciousness.

We have chosen two contrasting examples of substitutes for true moral education (substitutes which are unfortunately very widespread in modern culture), so as to demonstrate the falsehood of the general pedagogical principle of proceeding from the outward to the inward. In cases of this kind, when one does succeed it is only due either to the presence of moral giftedness or to pseudomorphosis of the moral principle. One can put the whole question of moral education—as it appears to the Orthodox consciousness—only in one way: all external activity acquires a moral meaning, moral significance, only as an expression and fulfilment of an inner movement towards the good. But how can we awaken this inner movement towards goodness—that which we have described as 'inspiration by the good'?

How can we arouse 'Inspiration by the Good'?

In the human soul there is a constant source of 'inspiration by the good' in the image of God through which we always abide in the light of God, always feel the truth, the beauty, and the joy of being with God. But the action of God's illumination is clear only in early childhood (with very rare exceptions) when it is not put aside or paralysed by other conflicting movements in the child's soul. According to the ancient saying, in early childhood there is always a 'reflection of paradise' upon children; the child's soul always absorbs into itself the rays of God's light and is even on the look-out for them.[21] But even in early childhood, and even more later on (after the break between 5½–7 years), this action of the image of God is thrust aside by the 'pressure' of the experience of life which the child and the adolescent undergo. In our everyday life there is so little room for the light of eternity, this

[21] The spiritual life of childhood was more frequently observed by artists than by psychologists, who usually do not go deeper than the *circumference* of the soul, when studying this or that set of functions in children. An attempt has been made to characterise the spiritual life of children at various periods in my work, *Problems of Education in the Light of Christian Anthropology* (T.I. Paris, Y.M.C.A. Press, 1934).

life is so completely and even pettily 'this-worldly', that perhaps only where the forces of destiny cut across it, overthrowing life and bringing upon it the breath of mortality, can this enchantment be broken or weakened. Nevertheless, the action of the image of God, as the medium through which the rays of Divine Light penetrate, never ceases, and it is precisely this which creates the basis for the possibility of awakening 'inspiration by the good.' The concrete forms assumed by both the lesser and the greater shocks which lead to this triumph of the idea of the good can be very varied—from the sufferings of a child (physical or moral, e.g. oppressive domination by his elders or the experiences of being an orphan early in life), to outbursts of compassion (towards animals or people who are being maltreated) or, again, emotions of tenderness evoked by truth and beauty. But the essence is always and everywhere the same: the child's soul consciously, half-consciously, or even unconsciously ceases to imitate that which takes place in life, to worship the accustomed forms of life, to be carried away by it, and begins to feel the reality of other ways of life and other foundations for it. Generally speaking 'inspiration by the good' cannot be artificially created; it cannot be planted in the soul from outside. One can only make an opening for it by thrusting aside everything which hinders and darkens it. And this can be easily understood; for 'inspiration by the good', like any enthusiasm, can manifest itself only in conditions of freedom of soul. It is the product of spiritual spontaneity.

In the youth movements of Italian Fascism (the *Ballila*), of National Socialism (the *Hitlerjugend*), of Communism (the *Komsomol*), we can observe the conditions for the birth of enthusiasm in the souls of the young. Enthusiasm is extremely catching, especially when it is made more fervent by 'heroic effort'; but in our theme of inspiration by the good, of pure moral enthusiasm, everything is complicated by the fact that our cold, unrighteous, unbrotherly life not only fails to provide any material for moral enthusiasm but damps it down at every step.

But as if this were not already enough, in European culture ever since the middle of the eighteenth century moral movements are replaced or squeezed out by aesthetic movements. If in Schiller we find a *rapprochement* between them (suffice it to remember his ideal, '*schöne Seele*'), in other writers and thinkers (mostly in Germany, though analogous manifestations under other forms took place both in England and in France) a psychology was created which based itself entirely on the aesthetic life in man. The type of the aesthetic man [22] was created. In the pedagogical

[22] A brilliant survey of this important movement in cultural psychology (in the eighteenth century), so far as Germany is concerned, is to be found in the book of Obernauer, *Die Problematik d'aestetischen Menschen in deutschen Litteratur* (1923).

inquiries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this movement was very deeply reflected in the lofty (and in a certain sense amply justified) evaluation of the aesthetic basis in its connection with the dynamics of spiritual life. In particular, in the psychology of youthful enthusiasm on which youth organisations so frequently desire to base themselves, the purely aesthetic element undoubtedly occupies a very prominent place. Already in the eighteenth century an attempt was made to base the whole of ethics on this, and we have previously referred to Schiller.[23] Nor need we here do more than recall the fact that Nietzsche and Ruskin were after the same thing. The most vivid expression of ethics based on the efficacy of the beautiful image in the moral life of man is to be found in the book of Vysheslavtsev, *The Ethics of the Transfigured Eros.*[24]

This whole movement is of paramount importance for the question of moral education (as we interpret it), in order to clarify the conditions in which enthusiasm can develop. The whole problem, however, as it arises here, rests on whether the 'efficacy of the beautiful image' always has an ennobling character. In other words, does it always move the moral sphere? There is only one image, which is both 'beautiful' and a constant source of nourishment for the moral sphere, and that is the image of Christ the Saviour. In relation to this image we can accept the indivisibility of the aesthetic and moral spheres—but only in relation to Him! Only in the image of the Saviour, His inexpressible beauty and His immeasurable love and service to mankind can inspire us with an equal devotion. In this sense the drawing near of the soul of the child to the image of the Saviour represents the best method of kindling in the child's soul a thirst to follow Him and a true inspiration by the good. But the image of the Saviour itself must not be separated from all the holiness of the Church. In Orthodoxy we have in the veneration of our Lady and in the lives of the saints an additional source of moral inspiration. It is precisely all the fullness and all the illumination from these images which are irreplaceable in the sense of arousing spiritual thirst, a desire to serve the good.

In the light of this it becomes clear that the powerful action of aesthetic impulse in the youthful soul can be directly transformed into moral elation only within the framework of religious experience, whereas outside this we have cases of the development of real amoralism on a foundation of aesthetic experiences. The ambiguity (in the moral sense) of aesthetic experiences is beyond any doubt. For this reason the system of Vysheslavtsev, like all

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[23] His *Letters about Aesthetic Education* will undoubtedly maintain its significance for our time.

[24] Vysheslavtsev, *The Ethics of the Transfigured Eros* (Paris, Y.M.C.A. Press, 1932).

other efforts to replace moral dynamics in the aesthetic sphere, cannot be accepted. Only the images of the Saviour, of our Lady and the saints, can actually communicate to our soul a true turning to the good.

According to the felicitous expression of Solovyev a true turning towards the good can be born only from a living encounter with the good. Who, for example, does not know of the extraordinary influence of Pestallozzi on homeless children? Who does not know lively instances of how a young soul turns once for all towards the good because it has had near to it a living example of goodness? The whole problem of the dynamics of moral activity is linked up, as has been said already, with inspiration by the good. It is not good feelings in themselves (compassion, shame, sense of duty) which link the soul with the good, but precisely this 'conversion' to the good. This is the point from which we proceed, and the principal efficient cause of moral activity in our souls.

Limits and Deviations in the Movement of the Soul towards the Good

Together with other Christian faiths, Orthodoxy faces a difficult problem, which sometimes appears insoluble, namely, that of leading the young soul through all the injustices of the contemporary world towards the source of light which gives man the power to stand up for himself spiritually and to affirm himself. Orthodoxy sees this source of light in the image of God, but it knows that the radiation of the light, which pours into the soul from above, is gradually darkened, thrust aside, and impoverished by the motions of evil which has its source in original sin. The path of education is lit up by the ideal of holiness, but the actual content of the life of a child or an adolescent is not completely filled with that which leads him to holiness. A Christian teacher is inevitably faced with the question of how he can lead the youthful soul to Christ if it is entirely possessed by earthly activity. Christianity, however, does not bring into the soul of the child something foreign to it; the trouble is only that the light of God which exists in every soul does not fill it completely, that the soul contains too much of the 'other' which obstructs that light. The actual development of the youthful soul almost always inevitably gives a picture of an inner (almost always unconscious) dualism: but the aim of education does not in the least consist of trying to remove this dualism by external means, but of trying to help the youthful soul to overcome it from within and to triumph over everything which draws the soul away from God, so that the desire for good should not be extinguished in the soul. To carry through life such an orientation towards the good is not easy even for mature people. It is even more difficult for the youthful soul, because for it the inward

divergence between the good and that which is 'of the world' is not sufficiently clear. If St. John laid upon the mature members of the Christian community the caution "believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God" (I John iv. 1), warning them against deception and temptations which originate in the spiritual sphere, how many times more difficult is it for the youthful soul to pass through all this! It seems that it is not enough to have only the idea of good and the love of the good, for even while possessing them we can also go astray. The Russian writer Gogol wrote sadly that now so often one does not see any good in goodness. This is true, but it is also true that one often sees good where there is in fact no good. It is for this reason that in Orthodox ascetic literature a high value is set on 'the gift of reasonableness', the capacity for incorrectly estimating the manifestations of life.

But in addition to all that is required for the development of moral consciousness in the progress of the soul towards the good there are two moments which are very important and are emphasised by the Church—they are repentance and the receiving from God of forgiveness for the sins committed. If it is not given to anyone to avoid sin it is important that sins should not burden the soul with fresh weights, that they should not entice it generally into the path of sin. Everyone is well acquainted with the usual psychology of sin: having once done some evil thing, a man then feels that he has lost his former purity, feels himself besmirched, and hence it seems to him that nothing else is left but to pursue further the path of sin. The first theft, the first breaking of the seventh commandment, the first murder—all this so often urges man to continue along the path of sin. Meanwhile our Lord gave to His disciples, and consequently to the Church, the right to forgive sins. Even the thief on the cross, who undoubtedly had many sins on his conscience, was forgiven by our Lord. But our Lord forgave him—in the same way as forgiveness is bestowed on everyone—because the thief repented, admitting that he had actually done much evil and deserved his punishment. Repentance, if it ends with forgiveness in the sacrament of confession, does not merely purify the soul, but, what is even more important, frees the soul from the power of the sins committed, and opens up the way to a joyful and inspired movement forward.

In the question of the moral education of the youthful soul all this has immeasurable value, for it is extremely important to preserve the youthful soul from the thought that after doing a bad deed there is no longer any return to the path of goodness. It is important to confirm and strengthen faith in the fact that we always stand before the face of God as "children of God", and that in the same way that the father receives the prodigal son back into his embrace when the son returns, so God also, in forgiving

our sins, accepts us with love if we ' return ' to Him, that is, return to the good.

This is the thread of Ariadne which will help the youthful soul to get out of any ' labyrinth ' of evil deeds and fallings from virtue. The basic aim of moral education is not to allow the youthful soul to lose this thread, and to see that it always strives to emerge into the light of God, even when it may have done many bad things.

Summary

It is time to summarise and make clear how Orthodoxy understands the problem of moral education. If we accept the basic assumption of Orthodox consciousness that a correct ordering of earthly life must serve as an introduction to the life to come, then the whole of moral education, both in its general postulates and in its practical forms, should be illuminated by this attitude. Practically this means that the participation of older people in the moral maturing of children must awaken and strengthen in their consciousness the feeling of our Godmanhood, of our eternal link with God and the necessity of " standing before God "—not in order to rule out all that is ' natural ' which arises in the child's soul, but for the sublimation and transfiguration of it. But a kindly attitude to all that is ' natural ' must be combined with a consciousness of the fact that in all, even the most sincere movements (" proceeding from the heart " itself) the possibility of sin is ever present. Moral growth cannot be anything else but a constant struggle for good, for light in the soul against temptations which come from without, but which also spring from within. In this struggle, the meaning of which can only gradually be realised by the youthful soul, it is important to arouse and strengthen a ' taste for the good ', that attraction for the good which has its own roots in the soul but which is so easily smothered and recedes into the background. This ' inspiration by the good ' cannot be implanted either by developing the intellect, or on the basis of the practice of good works—it is a free movement of the soul and it can be sustained properly only by love towards the Saviour. Only in the image of Christ can the youthful soul, if it draws near to Him, be inspired with a thirst for purity and goodness. No other ' good ' feelings, whether compassion, love, shame, or sense of duty, are in themselves (apart from a turning of the soul to the Saviour) capable of kindling in the soul such a thirst for truth and goodness as can stand up to the torrent of everyday worries and interests. That which makes man a moral entity is associated neither with being sensible (however valuable this may be), nor with the feeling of honour, nor simply with good habits. It is determined by the consciousness that goodness is the only eternal value for the sake of which and because of which we exist. This mystical foundation, this religious nourishment of the moral consciousness, in itself

opens up the field for creative movements of the soul, for work on oneself, and for a struggle with one's own inner darkness.

An extremely important position is occupied here by a repentance, as a purification of the soul from sins committed. But by itself repentance can never renew the soul unless it carries with it a forgiveness of sins. In other words, however valuable our realisation of our falsehood and our purification from it in repentance, only in the sacrament of confession where forgiveness of sins is bestowed is our soul truly renewed and kindled with a true thirst for becoming better. It is very important indeed for the youthful soul to be faced with the idea of the transfiguration of our being, so that it can learn to find in this idea the guiding strength for a struggle for itself. If the soul touches 'Wisdom' it will never be able to come out at once into a broad, straight, and clear path. It will not be able to avoid its path being strewn with torments and difficulties. But if we accept these difficulties as a cross for a given personality, if we can learn to understand that the cross is in essence that 'talent' which God has given to us, that it is turned into sufferings (i.e. 'moves by crooked paths') because we have followed false ways which are really not our own but alien to us; if we realise that a struggle with sin is precisely a struggle for our own selves, for the best that is in us—then it becomes easier to 'accept' our cross, to return to that 'guiding image' which forms the foundation of every personality.

But how can a youthful soul understand and grasp this? Of course, in our de-churchified, de-Christianised life, with its deification of technical achievements and worldly comfort, all this might sound a little abstract for the child's soul, while it is not manifest in life itself. Religious education, which is the basis of moral education, is possible for this reason only in a religious medium, and not in a religiously devastated environment.

All external methods of education will be useful and valuable if this inner feeding of the soul is actually taking place, if the soul, even unconsciously, is finding itself within the rays of God's truth. The mystery of moral education is therefore linked in the ultimate depths with the mystery of the Church on earth, with the mystery of the conversion of souls to Christ the Saviour. Only from a heart turned to the Saviour do all the external methods of education acquire their power; and then, like seed which falls on good soil, they will bear fruit a hundredfold. But to proceed from the circumference towards the heart means a failure to understand human nature and the mysteries of our destinies, all, that is, which binds our earthly life to life eternal.

V. V. ZENKOVSKY.

CHAPTER THREE

ANGLICANISM

THE ethical teaching of the Anglican Communion is ultimately based on the Book of Common Prayer. This claims to rest on the Scriptures of the Old Testament and the New Testament and on the general tradition of the Catholic (i.e. the traditional) Church before the great rift between East and West in the eleventh century.

We must, therefore, begin by examining the ethical teaching of the Prayer Book. This is mainly found in the Church Catechism and the Marriage Service. To begin with the former, what the Catechism does is to take over the Ten Commandments and reinterpret them in a Christian sense. But we shall be able to appreciate this reinterpretation only if we have a clear understanding of the ethical standpoint of the Decalogue itself.

First and foremost the Decalogue is a *theological* ethic. That is to say, it cuts out at once all ethical schemes of a naturalistic type, such as the various hedonistic and eudaemonistic schemes, or evolutionary systems of ethics. In other words, it regards morality as primarily a matter of duty and what is *due* to God and to our neighbour, and as not in any sense a matter of expediency. There is, indeed, a great gulf fixed between the standpoint of the person who says, " You must be honest because that is the law of the Creator ", and the man who says, " Honesty is the best policy ", or, again, between the man who says, " If you obey the laws of God, that will ultimately bring you to eternal happiness " and the person who says " If this course of action is going to make (as far as I can see) the majority of persons happier than any other course, it is the moral law for me." For the latter reduces law to the level of expediency: the former bases law upon an eternal and immutable standard of justice. As the Anglican theologian, Richard Hooker, says, the moral law " is laid up in the bosom of God."

It must be remembered that the Ten Commandments were part of a covenant relationship between God and the Hebrews. On their side the Hebrews undertook to keep these Commandments. But we must notice that on God's side there are no conditions. They were " the people of His pasture and the sheep of His hand " and, therefore, they were under an obligation to obey Him. But

on God's side there were no obligations. We may put the matter clearly by saying that on God's side there were rights but no duties, and on man's side duties but no rights—that is to say, no rights in relation to God. As St. Paul, the Hebrew of the Hebrews, forcibly expressed the matter, " Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why didst thou make me thus? Or hath not the potter a right over the clay?" (Romans ix. 20–21). And he saw—far more clearly than many modern writers—that if he had any rights *vis-à-vis* his neighbour, it could be only because God had bestowed them upon him. Apart from that he held (rightly, as I think) that to talk of the rights of man is moonshine.

This covenant relationship, then, included in itself the Ten Commandments of the *Torah*. We are accustomed to render this latter word into English as ' law ', but that is not an exact equivalent. *Torah* for the Hebrew meant practical instruction, the word being derived from a root meaning to ' shoot ' or to ' direct.' God's law, therefore (or, as we might say, the moral law) consists of the practical directions for living given by God to His people. Thus morality was never for the Hebrews, as it became for the Greeks, a matter of debate. " This is the way, walk ye in it." Such was the Hebrew conception of morality. And that was why religion and ethics never fell completely apart in Israel as they did in Greece, and in other ancient traditions.

This, then, was the ethical tradition and creed on which Christianity was based. Christ took it over. He did not seek to abolish it, but to ' complete ' or ' fulfil ' it, to use His own expression. He did this in two ways. First He tried to show how the Jews had, by their tradition, made the law of none effect. Sometimes they had done this by ' getting round ' the Law. Sometimes they had done so by keeping to the letter of the Law in such a way as to lose the spirit, as, for example, in their minute regulations about Sabbath observance. The second way in which Christ ' fulfilled ' the Law was by carrying out to its utmost limit the principle of the last of the Ten Commandments—" Thou shalt not covet." To pass from the ninth to the tenth Commandment is to cross a gulf. The first nine are concerned solely with actions. The tenth passes to the realm of thoughts. The vital difference between Jewish and Christian ethics lies here. The former is concerned primarily with actions; the Christian ethic is concerned even more with thoughts. This does not mean, as some have supposed, that Christianity is concerned solely with the spirit and not with the letter of the law. That is too common a misconception. Our Lord is quite explicit here: " These ought ye to have done and not to leave the other undone." The point is that the Christian ethic has grasped, as no other ethic before it had done equally, the psychological fact that " as a man thinketh in his heart so is he." This is a truth which, of course, had been noticed

by moralists long before Christ. But none of them perceived, as He did, the full significance of the truth.

We are now in a position to examine the Catechism and to observe exactly how it reinterprets the Ten Commandments of the Decalogue. In the first place, it divides them into two groups: (*a*) consisting of the first four, which prescribe man's duty to God; (*b*) comprising the last six, which set forth man's duty to his neighbour, i.e. as Christ taught, to any fellow human being in so far as he is brought into relationship with him.

Turning to the first group, we find the following reinterpretation. The first Commandment which enjoins loyalty to Jehovah as the only God becomes "My duty towards God is to believe in Him, to fear Him, and to love Him with all my heart, and with all my soul, and with all my strength." We have here a command to love God. This appears on the face of it strange, for it would seem to be impossible to love to order. Unfortunately, however, the word used in the New Testament *agapaō* and the substantive *agapē*, are not at all well rendered 'love.' For in English there is only one word to do duty for three Greek words denoting respectively 'sexual love', 'liking', and 'Christian love.' It would be an exaggeration to say that 'Christian love', or *agapē*, wonderfully described in 1 Corinthians, chapter xiii, has no connection with the other two, but certainly it is not to be identified with them. 'Christian love' is that attitude or 'set' of mind which characterised the Incarnate Christ. It is the duty of Christians to follow His steps. And as He Himself said, the first and greatest of all the Commandments is to have *agapē* towards God. He thus endorsed a truth which the wonderful insight of the author of the book of Deuteronomy had possessed five hundred years before Christ.

The second Commandment, which in its Mosaic form forbids the making of images, is interpreted as a command "to worship Him, to give Him thanks, to put my whole trust in Him, to call upon Him." It is thus taken to be a general command to worship God. The Anglican Christian is not taught—and generally speaking does not suppose, as some Christians do—that it is wrong for a Christian to make and use images—e.g. a crucifix—or to have pictures or stained-glass windows in churches. He believes that since Christ is, in St. Paul's phrase, "the image of the Invisible God", it is now safe for men to make use of religious art; and indeed it is sheer historical fact that the Christian religion has inspired some of the greatest achievements in painting and in sculpture. The Anglican Christian believes that, for modern man, a false mental image of God is far more likely to be a source of danger than a metal image, to quote an epigram from William Temple.

The third Commandment, forbidding the taking of God's name

in vain, becomes, " to honour His holy name and His word." The difference between the two ways of stating the Commandment is not negligible. By adding " His word " it is suggested that what the Commandment forbids is not merely a careless use of God's name, but the state of mind from which such a use must spring, viz. a disregard of the teaching which God has given to man about himself.

The fourth Commandment enjoins total abstinence from work on the Sabbath Day, i.e. Saturday in each week. The Anglican reinterpretation of this is noteworthy: " and to serve Him truly all the days of my life." In the early days of the human race God taught man the sacredness of time by setting aside one day in seven as His special day. This was of particular value to the Jews when they had no Temple worship to keep them together in the Babylonian exile; the two ordinances of the Sabbath and Circumcision came into prominence. The Christian—at any rate the Anglican Christian—is not taught that he must keep the Sabbath Day as the Jews did. All days alike are holy to him, but he has one special day—Sunday the first day of the week, not Saturday the seventh—which he is taught to observe as a day of worship, whereon he commemorates the Resurrection of Christ from the dead on the first day of the week. For the Anglican Christian, therefore, as for his Roman Catholic brother, the Christian Sunday is not to be identified with the Jewish Sabbath. True it is that men need rest one day in seven, but this rest, for the Christian, consists not in a mere abstention from labour but also in the refreshment of the mind and soul in Christian worship. The Catechism knows nothing of ' Sabbatarianism.'

We pass now to the second group of Commandments, which deal with man's duty to his neighbour. The detailed interpretation of these Commandments is prefaced by the short summary of them known as the Golden Rule: " Do to all men as you would that they should do unto you." This is the most concise way of expressing what is meant by having ' Christian love ', or *agapē,* to your neighbour. It means, in fact, the capacity to put yourself in his place and to act accordingly. It must be pointed out that this Rule—supremely important as it is—is not the whole sum and substance of the Christian ethic. It is subordinate to an even greater Commandment, viz. the Commandment to love God. That, as Christ said, " is the first and great Commandment." It is curious, and unfortunate, that it is so commonly ignored by those who suppose themselves to be living according to Christian standards. Those who are nurtured on the Catechism do not make this mistake.

After this brief summary and introduction to the second group of Commandments, they are reinterpreted one by one in the same manner as the first four. The fifth Commandment, to honour one's

parents, becomes "To love, honour, and succour my father and mother: To honour and obey the King and all that are put in authority under him: To submit myself to all my governors, teachers, spiritual pastors, and masters: To order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters." Thus many generations of children have been brought up in England, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of this teaching upon the formation of the English tradition and character. To some modern ears, this will sound rather like an obsolete relic of a bygone age. It cannot be doubted, nevertheless, that it is truly Christian. The Christian is not taught to think in terms of "I'm as good as he is", but in these terms: "Each esteeming others as better than himself." And it is worth while to point out that the words which conclude the whole passage, which reinterprets our duty to our neighbour, do not say (as they are so often misquoted as saying), "To do my duty in that state in which it has pleased God to call me", as if the Catechism inculcated the doctrine of the everlasting maintenance of the *status quo*—"the rich man in his castle, and the poor man at his gate." It says something very different: "To do my duty in that state of life unto which it *shall* please God to call me."

The sixth Commandment, which (it is worth pointing out) is not, "Thou shalt not kill", but "Thou shall do no murder", becomes in the Catechism: "To hurt nobody by word or deed; to bear no malice or hatred in my heart." The Anglican Christian, therefore, is taught to regard the sixth Commandment in a wider and a more inward sense than was the Jew. It is not sufficient, as Christ taught, to refrain from murderous deeds. The Christian is bidden to abstain from the harbouring of thoughts of hatred.

The seventh Commandment, against adultery, becomes "to keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity." Once more, the reference is wider, but no explicit mention is made of evil sexual thoughts. There is perhaps a hidden wisdom here. The Christian doubtless is taught that adultery begins with the harbouring of adulterous thoughts; but this does not mean, as some have supposed, that to have in the mind a single thought of this kind is as bad as to commit an act of adultery. Such teaching is plain nonsense. But if there had been any *explicit* reference here to impure thoughts, it might have lent itself too easily to a false interpretation and so have engendered that fatal malady of the soul—scrupulosity.

The eighth Commandment, against stealing, becomes: "To keep my hands from picking and stealing", and this requires no comment. Nor does the reinterpretation of the following Commandment, which forbids the bearing of false witness. This becomes "And (to keep) my tongue from evil speaking, lying, and slandering." The cardinal significance of the tenth Commandment has already been indicated. It becomes in the Catechism, "Not to

covet nor desire other men's goods; but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living, and to do my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me."

Such is the Anglican reinterpretation of the Ten Commandments. It is the compendium of moral instruction which is given to all children brought up in the Church of England, and in some of the sister Churches in the Anglican Communion. It sets forward the Christian standard in no unworthy manner. Moreover, the Catechism proceeds to point out what is far too often forgotten, viz. that nobody can expect to come anywhere near this standard apart from the grace, i.e. the supernatural assistance, of God. It is a big, though not an uncommon, mistake to suppose that when Christ reinterpreted the Jewish Law, he made it easier to keep. On the contrary, he made it harder. It was indeed possible for a Jew to keep the Law 'blameless' for—apart from the tenth Commandment—it was concerned only with *acts* and not at all with thoughts. But to be 'blameless' in thought is beyond the power of weak and sinful man. So the Anglican Christian is taught the necessity for the grace of God. The independent self-reliance of the Englishman has never found this truth easy to assimilate. The average English person's attitude to moral questions is well illustrated by the story of the little girl, who was asked whether she would rather be pretty or good. She replied, "I would rather be pretty because I cannot make myself pretty, but I can be good whenever I want to." Yet it is entirely false. "It is not in man that walketh to direct his steps aright."

Thus far the Catechism. We must now briefly consider the teachings of the Church of England on marriage. Here the most authoritative document is unquestionably the Prayer Book, and this makes it perfectly clear that marriage cannot be dissolved "until death us do part." But the Prayer Book teaches more than this, although its teaching is widely misunderstood even by those who might have been expected to know it. It lays down in its Preface to the Marriage Service that the marriage of Christians is "a remedy against sin", which was a technical term in the scholastic philosophy to denote a sacrament. The marriage of Christians—i.e. those who have acquired the Christian status by holy baptism—is a sacrament, and of course those who have not been baptised are not eligible for marriage in church. In the same Preface to the Marriage Service we are told that marriage is a holy estate "instituted by God in the time of man's innocency." It is hard at first sight to understand how it can be both this and also "a remedy against sin", until we realise that the former description relates to the natural institution of marriage as such, and the latter to the marriage of Christians, whose union is a sacrament because they are given the special grace of God to enable them to make a Christian marriage. In the proposed Prayer Book of 1928 which

was (fortunately, as many Churchmen think) rejected by Parliament, this preface was altered, but the rejected book has no canonical authority, although parts of it are frequently used.

Thus we see that there is a sharp contradiction between the marriage law of the Church of England which knows nothing of divorce *a vinculo*, i.e. the dissolution of a validly contracted marriage, and the law of the state, which allows numerous grounds for divorce. No divorcee can be 'married again' in church while his or her partner is still living. There are some members of the Church of England who would like to see this altered, but they form a not very influential minority. The general mind of the Church of England is dead against this; for marriage in church is only for Christians, and for them there can be no divorce. But there are some who would argue that for non-Christians the law of the indissolubility of marriage does not hold. This, however, is contrary to the general Christian tradition, which has always maintained that marriage is indissoluble in all circumstances, once it is validly contracted, for this is the teaching of Christ in St. Mark, the earliest of the gospels: or in technical terms, marriage is indissoluble in natural law. Some Anglicans would not accept this, but they cannot point to an authoritative ground for allowing more than one reason for divorce, namely adultery, which is allowed in St. Matthew, though explicitly disallowed in St. Mark and St. Luke. Those, however, who rest on the Matthaean exception are faced by the difficulty that no distinction is drawn there between the case of Christians and that of non-Christians. If it is allowable for the latter, therefore, to seek divorce for adultery, it should be allowable for the former. But the Prayer Book, as we have seen, forbids this. Those Anglicans, therefore, who are anxious to recognise the legitimacy of divorce for adultery are really in conflict with the teaching of the Prayer Book, which still remains the only authoritative ground for members of the Church of England.

Thus far we have been considering the general Anglican pattern of ethics as it is set forward in the English Prayer Book. We have now to consider the Anglican method of applying these general principles to individual cases—in other words, the Anglican view of casuistry. The word has a rather unpleasant sound in the ears of the average Englishman, who tends to think of it in terms of the cynical epigram as "a set of rules for the breaking of rules." That it has been abused to such an extent as almost to become that cannot be denied; but it is equally not to be denied by anybody who has given serious thought to the subject that the dictum that "circumstances alter cases" is true, and this means that problems of conscience inevitably arise.

One of the most far-reaching of all the effects of the rise of Christianity has been the appreciation of the dignity and rights of

the individual conscience. To the modern Englishman brought up in a tradition of liberty, this seems to be almost self-evident. In fact, it is nothing of the kind, as modern forms of totalitarianism in Germany and elsewhere should have forcibly reminded him. Indeed, the rights of the individual conscience are entirely the creation of Christian teaching, with its immense emphasis on the dignity and importance of the individual soul. In the pre-Christian world, this was almost entirely unrecognised. The individual, as such, hardly counted. It was the community alone which mattered. This fact is well brought out in such a work as the *Antigone* of Sophocles, where the conscience of the individual stands in opposition to that of the community. In order to achieve any dramatic effect, however, the poet has to put the individual in the most favourable, and the community in the most unfavourable, light.

There is no more fundamental principle in Christian moral teaching than the irrefragable rights of the individual conscience which must always be obeyed. Even an erring conscience must be obeyed. Nevertheless, it is plainly necessary to guide men's consciences so that they may not err through lack of sufficient knowledge and insight. It is here, on the question of the direction of men's consciences, that the Anglican tradition diverges somewhat from the scholastic tradition of the Church of Rome. In the latter, the whole question was, and is, governed by the practice of the Confessional, to which all the faithful are bound. They are, therefore, subject to direction of conscience in a different way from members of the Church of England who are *urged* to private confession only when their consciences are troubled. (See the first exhortation in the Holy Communion Service.)

It is true, of course, that from the first moment of the separation from Rome there have always been English churchmen who have resorted regularly to private confession; and their number has steadily increased. Nevertheless, the attitude towards questions of conscience which characterises a part of the Church which allows confession to be voluntary is bound to be different from that of a part of the Church which makes it compulsory.

We can see clearly how this matter stands if we examine the teaching of the great Elizabethan and Caroline English divines. Their aim is as far as possible to enable each man to be his own casuist. They speak of casuistry as 'Practical Divinity', and thus they enlarge its field so that it is the concern not only of the confessional, but also of the pulpit. At the same time they are in no doubt that there are bound to be many circumstances in which the individual conscience will be perplexed, and, furthermore, that it is the essential business of the parson to be able to advise and guide such doubting consciences. The following quotation from George Herbert's *Priest to the Temple* will make this clear.

He [*sc.* the parson] greatly esteems also cases of conscience, wherein he is much versed. And, indeed, herein is the greatest ability of a parson, to lead his people exactly in the way of truth, so that they neither decline to the right hand nor to the left. Neither let any think this a slight thing. For every one hath not digested when it is a sin to take something for money lent, or when not; when it is a fault to discover another's fault, or when not; when the affections of the soul in desiring or procuring increase of means or honour be a sin of covetousness or ambition, and when not; when the appetites of the body in eating, drinking, sleep, and the pleasure that comes with sleep, be sins of gluttony, drunkenness, sloth, lust, and when not; and so in many circumstances of actions. Now, if a shepherd know not which grass will bane and which will not, how is he fit to be a shepherd? Wherefore the parson hath thoroughly canvassed all the particulars of human actions, at least all those which he observeth are most incident to his parish.

The Elizabethan and Caroline divines, however, diverged from the traditional approach to moral problems in another way. In the Roman Catholic Church immense weight was given to the traditional teachings of the Schoolmen and in particular of Thomas Aquinas. The Church of England, in accordance with its fundamental basis, tended to go behind these authorities to the authority of Holy Scripture. Its whole endeavour was to move away from the legalism of the moral theologians of the Middle Ages to a field less clearly marked out. For them Law was regarded as 'the law of liberty' rather than a merely external code. Thus they tended to throw the ultimate responsibility upon the individual. And this attitude has characterised Anglican moral thought and practice ever since. To appreciate this is the key to the understanding of the Anglican view of the moral life.

In recent times, there has been a great revival in the Church of England of the study of moral theology. In this revival Anglican theologians have been greatly indebted not only to modern Roman Catholic moralists, but also to the great mediaeval writers, especially St. Thomas Aquinas. At the same time, there has been no disposition to follow them slavishly. The Anglican tradition leads a moral theologian in the English Church to pay more regard to the New Testament than to the Angelic Doctor. Indeed, it is truly surprising how comparatively few references the latter makes to the New Testament as he builds up the majestic edifice of Christian morals in his *Summa Theologica.* The Anglican moralist does not feel altogether at home in such an atmosphere. For him the New Testament must be the decisive ethical standard and criterion by which the Christian conscience must be guided. This is not to say that no judgment is valid which cannot find chapter and verse support in the New Testament. The Anglican does not ignore the value of the Christian tradition or forget the continuing guidance given to the Church down the centuries by the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, moral teaching which lacks any support in the principles enunciated in the New Testament, and,

still more, any teaching which appears to conflict directly with those principles, would be held to be gravely suspect by him. In matters of ethics, as in matters of essential doctrine, the authority of the Scriptures must, for an Anglican, be supreme.

Unfortunately, when we are concerned with practical questions of morals, the applicability of New Testament teaching is not always easy to see. The modern world, in many ways, is very different from the world in which Jesus of Nazareth lived. It is here that difficulties are apt to arise, and in meeting them the Anglican moralist will always give due heed to the general tradition of the Church as a guide to the interpretation of Holy Scripture. It is this deference which is the chief cause of the difference of his moral outlook from that of the ethical teachers of the Free Churches, who, as a rule, are far more individualistic in their approach to questions of moral conduct. The Anglican moralist seeks to hold a more even balance between authority and freedom.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CALVINISM

Introduction

FOUR main questions arise when we consider the philosophical basis of moral education: what *mores* are to be taught? on what authority is the selection to be made? what methods are to be used? who is to control the teaching? Each of these questions leads, sooner or later, to the fundamental problem of man's nature and his place in the cosmos. What kind of being is man, for whom this education is to be planned?

In discussing the Calvinistic approach to moral education it will be convenient to begin with this last question. There is a Christian answer to the question which might be so stated as to command assent from all Christian communions. The Christian understanding of man contrasts sharply with most non-Christian and with all secular anthropologies, and involves a characteristic Christian approach to the problems of moral education. But there are certain insights and emphases within Christian anthropology which are typically Calvinistic. It is those aspects of the Christian doctrine of man upon which our attention must be concentrated. Logically, they yield distinctive answers to the four questions which are before us.

Human life is not governed by logic, however, and educational practice seldom expresses a consistent educational philosophy. Calvinism has left a deep mark on the religious and social life of certain Swiss cantons (Geneva, Vaud, and Neuchâtel), of Holland and of Scotland; but even in these countries other important influences have been at work. Some of these are of local importance but others have wider significance. Modern Biblical scholarship has raised problems which did not exist for Calvin: Christian thinking about revelation has changed in ways which are deeply significant for religious education: modern psychology has thrown new light on the problems of human character. Inevitably the Calvinistic emphasis in moral education has been modified by those developments. It will be necessary, therefore, to draw attention to the influence of such developments at appropriate points and to consider the extent to which Calvin's influence can still be traced in educational practice.

During the past twenty or thirty years Protestant theology has

been profoundly influenced by a revival of Calvinism. Under the leadership of Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and others, many neglected aspects of Calvin's teaching have again become central issues of theological controversy. During the same period Biblical scholarship, having absorbed the main results of literary and historical criticism, has been re-emphasising the theological teaching of the Bible. Many Christian thinkers have been compelled by bitter personal and national experience to think deeply and realistically about the elemental facts of human life, and to put the central affirmations of Christianity to searching test in thought and action. We have entered a new creative phase in Christian theology. Calvinism is by no means dead, and some of its characteristic notes may find fuller expression in Christian theory and practice of moral and religious education during the next decade or so. Meanwhile a restatement of its main tenets and an assessment of their influence may be timely.

Calvin's Doctrine of Man

There are passages in Calvin's writings which exalt man to sublime heights. He is the crowning glory of creation for whom all things are made.

> Heaven and earth being thus most richly adorned, and copiously supplied with all things, like a large and splendid mansion gorgeously constructed and exquisitely furnished, at length man was made—man, by the beauty of his person and his many noble endowments, the most glorious specimen of the works of God (*Institutes of the Christian Religion*: I, xiv. 20).

Though belonging to the natural order, he transcends it in his possession of an immortal soul.

> In fine, while the many noble faculties with which the human mind is endued proclaim that something divine is engraven on it, they are so many evidences of an immortal essence. For such sense as the lower animals possess goes not beyond the body, or at least not beyond the objects actually presented to it. But the swiftness with which the human mind glances from heaven to earth, scans the secrets of nature, and, after it has embraced all ages, with intellect and memory digests each in its proper order, and reads the future in the past, clearly demonstrates that there lurks in man a something separated from the body (*ibid.*, I. xv. 2).

Other passages, however, proclaim equally clearly man's creaturely dependence on the sovereign grace of God. The glory of man is a reflected glory and man's immortal life is entirely the gift of God. Created from the dust he would return to the dust if the divine grace and mercy did not preserve his soul in life. "Were God to withdraw His grace, the soul would be nothing more than

a puff or a blast, even as the body is dust" *(Comm. on Ps. ciii. 15 f.:* quoted Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man,* page 27).

Man, as first created, was a being capable of communion with God. God made Himself known to man from the beginning and man had, in the beginning, the capacity of responding to that Word of divine revelation. The appropriate response of man to that Word is grateful trust and obedience. By that response man would have found his true life. The image of God would have been mirrored in the life of men. Through obedience to the divine Word men would have lived in fellowship with God and with one another. The true centre of man's nature is in God and the true law of his being is the law of childlike dependence, grateful trust, and willing obedience.

But man has broken the law of his being. He has refused to accept his creaturely dependence. In his desire to be 'as God' and to control his own destiny he has rejected the divine Word and has followed the impulses of his own heart. By so doing man has become alienated from God and also from his fellow-men. The restless unhappiness of individual character and the tragic conflicts of social life and history have their source in man's refusal to accept his creaturehood. Destined for fellowship with God, man has become a restless, burdened being imprisoned within the torture-chamber of self-centred existence.

Calvin's analysis of human nature, as it now is, lacks nothing in stark realism and frank pessimism. His doctrine of total depravity is one of the most familiar and characteristic notes in his teaching: "such is the depravity of his nature that he cannot move and act except in the direction of evil" *(Institutes:* II. iii. 5). All that belongs to the spiritual life of man is utterly dead. The image of God is, indeed, not totally destroyed, inasmuch as those gifts of reason and will remain which distinguish man from the animals, but even those natural gifts have become grievously perverted so that nothing remains of man's original excellence but "a ruin, confused, mutilated and tainted with impurity" *(ibid.,* I. xv. 4).

Man's condition is such that he is totally incapable, in himself, of conquering the evil which has enslaved him. Human goodness is the fruit of divine grace: grateful response to that grace is the ground and condition of man's true life. When man turns from God in arrogant rebellion, therefore, he destroys the very possibility of knowing God truly and serving Him rightly. He is incapable of thought or action which is free from the taint of self, and only a new creative act of divine grace can restore that motive of gratitude and that response of obedience towards God which are the conditions of spiritual health and social harmony. Nor is there anything remaining in fallen humanity to which the Word of God can appeal. "We ought therefore to acknowledge that we

come short in every respect so that the heavenly doctrine proves to be useful and efficacious to us only so far as the Spirit both *forms our minds to understand it and our hearts to submit to its yoke" (Comm. on Luke xxiv. 45:* quoted Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*).

When we turn from Calvin's description of fallen humanity to his account of God's purpose of redemption through Christ we meet a second characteristic and familiar Calvinistic doctrine: the doctrine of predestination, which teaches that God, from all eternity, has predestined some to salvation and some to destruction. Two fundamental elements in Calvin's theology come into conflict here: his doctrine of divine sovereignty and his doctrine of divine grace. The grace of God in Christ implies a purpose of universal salvation: it cannot be reconciled logically with the predestination of any human soul to destruction. On the other hand, Calvin found it necessary to believe that the issues of salvation or damnation were determined by God's sovereign will and not by any act of man. Without that certainty there could be no escape from the claims of the Roman Church and no assurance of salvation to the troubled believer. His doctrine of divine sovereignty thus takes logical priority, in the end, over his doctrine of grace, and his teaching about predestination savours more of the Old Testament than of the New Testament.

The distinction between Calvin and Luther comes out very clearly at this point. Both were faced with the same historic necessity of winning freedom from papal claims and securing assurance of salvation to the Christian believer. Luther found that freedom and that certainty in the grace of God, while Calvin found it in God's sovereign will. "Absolute predestination in virtue of God's sovereign will occupies the fundamental place in his thought, whereas the 'gracious God' whom Luther had long sought and at last found in 'the gospel of Christ' stands at the centre of his" (Mackinnon, *Calvin and the Reformation,* page 216).

Calvin's logic is at once his weakness and his strength. Divine sovereignty is logically incompatible with human freedom, the all-sufficiency of divine grace with moral responsibility in man. Calvin remains a prisoner to his own logic and virtually sacrifices freedom and moral responsibility, but Biblical teaching defies logic and rests ultimately in a paradox which is insoluble to man's finite mind. "We cannot do more than assert both the absolute dependence of all things on the will of God and also His unfaltering determination to create free persons" (Leonard Hodgson, *The Grace of God in Faith and Philosophy,* page xvi.).

If this unrelenting logic is a weakness in Calvin's theology, it proved a great strength to him as a Reformation leader. His doctrine of predestination may be open to serious criticism, but it

provided a secure refuge from Roman claims for the mind and conscience of the Reformed Church. " From this point of view ", says Professor Mackinnon (*ibid.*, page 251), " we might almost say that predestination was a necessity for the Reformation in its struggle with a system that could command all the prestige of a long history and all the force of the civil power." The assurance of all-sufficient grace and the certainty of salvation gave Calvinism moral energy and triumphant confidence, while the profound sense of the majesty of God and the awful solemnity of life gave it deep seriousness of purpose and a strong emphasis on moral discipline. In the infinite grace of God man was created for eternal fellowship with Him. In arrogant rebellion man has rejected his birthright. Through Christ's death all men may enter into their lost heritage. Human history is thus a stage on which the solemn and irrevocable choice is made between eternal life and eternal death.

The Aim and Content of Moral Education

From the Christian standpoint *all* true education is religious. Man belongs to the natural order and is subject to all the influences of physical heredity and social environment. Educators must therefore take account of heredity and plan selective control of environment. But man transcends the natural order in his awareness of, and responsiveness to, spiritual realities. This transcendent aspect of human personality cannot be ignored in any system of education. From the Christian standpoint it is the essential aspect and must govern all educational planning. Man can only reach full stature as an individual and as a member of society through that knowledge of God for which he was made.

John Milton, in his tractate *Of Education,* stated the aim of education in terms which were typically Calvinistic: " to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love Him, to imitate Him, to be like Him, as we may the nearest by possessing our souls of true virtue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection." One characteristic note is missing in this quotation. The service of God for which children were to be equipped by education was a service within the temporal community in which their lives were set. The Reformation leaders all rejected the mediaeval distinction between the religious and the secular vocation, with its corollary that the monk was the ideal Christian. Calvin taught that God was to be served *per vocatione*: the daily duties of men were to be, not only the setting within which, but the means by which, they might serve God. Calvinism did not seek to withdraw men from the world nor to promote a personal and individual piety. Its educational aim was social and it fostered a fine Christian tradition of public service in Church and state.

The school established by Calvin himself at Geneva was, as Foster Watson says (*The English Grammar Schools to 1660,* page 362): "intended to prepare for citizenship if ever school could claim such an aim", and the Scottish Reformers' *Book of Discipline,* urged Parliament to promote an ambitious scheme of popular education "for the profit of the Commonwealth."

Calvin himself tells us that "the first step in true knowledge is taken, when we reverently embrace the testimony which God has been pleased therein [i.e. in Holy Scriptures] to give of Himself" (*Institutes,* I. vi. 2); and in the same context he says that the law of God as contained in the Bible is "the proper school for training the children of God" (*ibid.,* I. vi. 4). The same truth is expressed succinctly in the *Shorter Catechism* of the Westminster divines. Having defined the chief end of man's existence in answer to its opening question, it declares in answer to the second question: "The word of God, which is contained in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy Him."

The Bible and an appropriate Catechism were therefore basic in the educational schemes of all the reformers. The Bible was the norm for all reformation doctrine and, in an age of theological controversy, the Catechism became a characteristic compendium of sound doctrine and a convenient medium of doctrinal instruction. There was thus a strongly intellectual emphasis in moral education at this period, in all educational systems influenced by the Reformation. It is significant, however, that that influence persisted longer and the emphasis remained stronger in those countries most deeply influenced by Calvin's teaching. It is perhaps equally significant that Pietism, with its influence on 'heart religion' and its neglect of doctrine, made its important contribution to religious education within the *Lutheran* tradition.

Foster Watson, in *The English Grammar Schools to 1660* (pages 56–68 and 336–46), gives an interesting and detailed account of religious instruction in English schools at a period when the Calvinistic influence was dominant. An extract from the statutes of Hertford Grammar School (A.D. 1616) illustrates the place given to Scripture and Catechism and shows the spirit which inspired the teaching:

> Likewise the Master and Usher shall interpret orderly and grammatically the allowed Catechism for Schools to the Scholars under their charge every Saturday and Feast Even and cause them that are able to construe a chapter in the Testament, Greek or Latin, and in all these things (that there be no noise, talking or whispering one to another) the eye and ear of the Master shall keep continued watch over them, that they may be habituated in the ways of piety, and that God may bless their studies in learning grounded upon his fear, which is the beginning of wisdom.

The scholarly standard of Scripture knowledge is impressive:

> In the Statutes of St. Saviour's Grammar School, Southwark, for instance, the boys are at a certain stage to read the New Testament in Greek. In 1627 Orders at Charterhouse School required the Upper Forms to be furnished with Greek Testaments for their use in the Chapel. In many schools they read the New Testament in Latin. In the schools where Hebrew was learned some chapters of the Old Testament were read in Hebrew. The application of the learned languages to Biblical studies was to be found even in country schools (*ibid.*, page 62).

It is equally typical of the Calvinist influence that a high tradition of scholarly learning has been largely maintained in the ministry of Calvinistic Churches to the present day.

Obedience to the divine will is the beginning of all true knowledge of God, according to Calvin (cf. I. vi. 2), and emphasis on discipline of the will has also played a prominent part in moral education in the Calvinist tradition. In Geneva and in Scotland, especially, Church discipline was used to control and to direct the moral conduct of the community. The system produced eventually a rank crop of repression and hypocrisy, but it also nourished that moral earnestness, that sensitive conscience, and that strength and sincerity of moral conviction which characterised Puritanism at its best. This moral earnestness and deep sense of responsibility influenced education wherever Calvinism spread and was one of the major contributions of Calvinism to moral education.

Modern developments in psychology, critical study of the Scriptures, and the unsettling influences of scientific thought have all played a part, as we shall see more fully later, in undermining the traditional Calvinistic emphasis on the intellectual content of moral education. Biblical teaching has lost the strong theological emphasis of earlier days and the catechism has largely disappeared. But there are signs of a change. The Calvinist revival in theology has again focused attention on the importance of sound knowledge, and a generation which has watched the collapse of Christian belief and, subsequently, of the Christian moral tradition, on the Continent of Europe, is more deeply aware that ethics and metaphysics are ultimately inseparable.

The Source of Authority in Moral Education

Calvin categorically rejected the authority of the Church as the interpreter of Holy Scripture. He recognised, of course, that it was appropriate for Church leaders to take counsel together on matters of doctrine and morals for the better guidance of their members, but he denied emphatically that any decisions so reached were necessarily true or binding on Christian people. "I deny, however, that every interpretation of Scripture is true and certain which has received the votes of a council" (*ibid.*, IV. ix. 13). The

Church in itself has no infallible authority but is simply the guardian and teacher of the divine Word committed to her in Holy Scripture. "Let this then be a sure axiom—that there is no word of God to which place should be given in the Church save that which is contained, first, in the Law and the Prophets; and, secondly, in the writings of the Apostles, and that the only due method of teaching in the Church is according to the prescription and rule of his word" (*ibid.*, IV. viii. 8).

In thus rejecting the infallible authority of the Church in interpreting Scripture, Calvin was, in fact, rejecting the possibility of an infallible and mechanical authority in matters of doctrine and morals, whose declarations would be plain and unmistakable to all. There is, however, a deep human craving for just that kind of authority, and the Reformers bequeathed to their successors a problem which has been the source of much confusion and difficulty.

Calvin's own position was quite clear. The truth of Scripture, he holds, is self-authenticating, and its authority rests in God who is its source. "As to the question, How shall we be persuaded that it came from God without recurring to a decree of the Church? it is just the same as if it were asked, How shall we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter? Scripture bears upon the face of it as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black do of their colour, sweet and bitter of their taste" (*ibid.*, I. vii. 2). This certainty of the divine authority of Scripture is "sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit" (*ibid.*, I. vii. 4). Jesus Christ is the full and perfect revelation of divine truth and He Himself has promised that the Holy Spirit will guide His Church into all truth, not revealing new truth to them but bringing "to remembrance what his own lips had previously taught" (*ibid.*, IV. viii. 8); cf. John xiv. 26).

Calvin's essential teaching on the nature of authority in religious belief is brought out very clearly in the opening chapter of the *Westminster Confession of Faith.* Two clear principles must govern all controversy over interpretation. They are stated in the last two articles of the chapter:

> IX.—The infallible rule of interpretation of scripture is the scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture (which is not manifold, but one) it must be clearly searched and known by other places that speak more clearly.
> X.—The supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the scripture.

Calvin and the Westminster divines alike regarded the Bible as the repository of revealed truth divinely dictated. The Scriptures might not speak plainly at every point. There might be contro-

versy on matters of interpretation. Christians might find themselves opposed on issues of doctrine or morals, while each sincerely believed himself guided of the Holy Spirit. But at least they had an objective and infallible authority and they could hope to draw closer together as each in sincerity and obedience submitted himself to the teaching of the Scriptures under the guidance of the Spirit of God.

Nineteenth-century developments in scientific knowledge, however, challenged the infallibility of the Scriptures and Biblical criticism seemed to undermine their authority. Science denied that the world had been made in six days and Biblical criticism showed that there were, in fact, two accounts of creation which differed in important respects. Was it necessary to choose between the Bible and modern science? Could the Bible be trusted if it contradicted itself? How could the Bible be trusted as "the only rule of faith and obedience" if the Ten Commandments were not really written down by Moses at divine dictation and if the recorded words of Jesus Himself could not always be accepted as accurate and original?

The nature of Biblical authority and the meaning of revelation had to be re-examined, and a period of confusion followed which had unfortunate results for Christian education. While theologians restated the Church's attitude to the Bible, perplexed teachers in school and Church neglected the theological content of Scripture and took refuge in traditional moral teaching. The period of confusion has passed, however, and the leading theologians of the larger Reformed Churches have reached substantial agreement on a view of Scripture which conserves the essential truth in Calvin's own position.

It is recognised now that revelation did not come by the dictation of divinely guaranteed truths, but by the self-disclosure of a Person to persons. God spoke "to the fathers by the prophets" (Heb. i. 1), and His Word was at last "made flesh" in the Person of His Son. The Bible is a human record of that divine revelation and it bears the marks of human fallibility and ignorance. Authority and infallibility do not reside in the words of Scripture but only in that Word which spoke by the prophets and was made flesh in Christ. As Christians read the Bible in every age that Word still speaks to their hearts and minds and "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts" (*Westminster Confession*, I, v).

The Calvinist position, restated in the light of Biblical criticism, thus still provides us with an objective and infallible authority for moral education. It is even more obvious than it was in the days of Calvin himself, however, that the declarations of that authority

are not always obvious and unmistakable. It may even seem as if the door were open to individual interpretation. But that is not so. Sincere believers may still expect to be led closer to one another as they seek together, under the guidance of the Spirit, to know the mind of Christ as it is revealed in the Scriptures. Calvin himself had a doctrine of the Church which safeguarded his position from individualism: "our weakness does not permit us to leave the school [i.e. of the Church] until we have spent our whole lives as scholars" (*ibid.*, IV. i. 4). But the ultimate authority for the Calvinist cannot rest in any declaration of the Church as such but only in the Word of God as it is authenticated by the witness of the Holy Spirit. This Calvinistic position could not be better summarised than it has been in the recent book of an Anglican writer:

> The conclusion which we have reached is none other than the classical Christian view since the days of the apostles, namely, that the authority of the Bible is in the last resort the authority of the Holy Spirit in the Church. But, as Calvin so clearly saw, the individual does not and cannot truly recognise the divine authority of the Bible as the vehicle of God's word or message for himself or for the Church, until the words of the Bible are "sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit" in his own heart and he comes to know that in his reading of the Bible or in the Church's Ministry of the Word God is addressing him personally (Richardson, *Christian Apologetics*, pages 219 f.).

Methods of Moral Education

The *Colloquies* of Maturin Cordier give a vivid picture of the moral and religious training in the famous school established by him at Geneva in 1536 on Calvin's invitation. Cordier was exiled from Geneva two years later, but continued his educational activities at Neuchâtel and Lausanne. He returned to Geneva and resumed his association with Calvin's school when it was reorganised under Theodore Beza in 1559, and it was in Geneva that he published his *Colloquia* in 1564 at the advanced age of 85 years. Sebastien Castellion followed Cordier as headmaster of the school in Geneva, but resigned in 1545 owing to a theological dispute with Calvin, having published his *Dialogues sacrés* two years earlier.

Cordier and Castellion were the educational leaders of Calvinism in the early days and the measure of their educational influence may be gauged by the fact that fifteen English editions of Castellion's *Dialogues* (Latin text) were published between 1573 and 1722, while Cordier's *Colloquies* appeared in several English translations which ran to over twenty editions and were still being published in the nineteenth century. Foster Watson, indeed, quotes evidence showing that Cordier's *Colloquies* were in continuous use in English schools from the early seventeenth century until at least the third decade of the nineteenth century.

The *Colloquies* show clearly that instruction of the intellect in sound doctrine and training of the will in moral obedience were the characteristic methods of moral education in the school at Geneva. We have already noted this Calvinistic emphasis in discussing the aim and content of moral education, and have recognised that it arises naturally from Calvin's teaching. It is worthy of remark, however, that Cordier and Castellion were both free from that intolerant spirit which was so evident in Calvin himself. Calvinism has sometimes been rigid and dogmatic in its orthodoxy, and its educational influence has sometimes limited the freedom of individual development. Calvin's own theological teaching on the nature of authority, however, may be quoted in defence of a larger freedom, and it is interesting to notice that these pioneers of Calvinistic education were themselves men of liberal outlook.

The intellectual emphasis in moral education persisted within the Calvinist tradition until the twentieth century. At the turn of the century in Scotland, for instance, the Shorter Catechism and large portions of the Bible were commonly committed to memory. An extract from the syllabus of religious instruction used in the schools of Govan Parish School Board (Glasgow) will illustrate the substance and the spirit of teaching:

> 6. Passages from Holy Scripture are required to be committed to memory, with portions of the metrical Psalms and Paraphrases. The passages selected have reference to the fundamental facts and doctrines of the Christian Salvation, the comfortable promises of the Gospel, the Institution of the Sacraments and other Ordinances, and the rules of Holy Living. Such passages are intended to form the subject of special explanatory lessons from time to time, so as to make the memory work as profitable as possible.
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> 7. The children are required to learn the Shorter Catechism consecutively, beginning with the III Class.
>
> 8. Occasional lessons are intended to be introduced, at the discretion of the Teacher, on special subjects, such as Reverence, Obedience, Purity, Honesty, Temperance, Truth, Contentment, Courtesy, and the like duties. These subjects can be taught in connection with the *Ten Commandments,* which ought, like the *Creed* and the *Lord's Prayer,* to be often repeated by all the children.

The influence of Herbartianism at this same period strengthened the intellectual emphasis in moral education, but other influences were already at work. Herbart had taught that the formation of character depended on knowledge, but new developments in functional psychology, associated with the name of William McDougall and others, began to focus attention on the significance of instinct and emotion in human life, while Freud and his associates revealed the importance of 'the unconscious' in human character and conduct. Cyril Burt and others applied the resources of this new knowledge in scientific studies of the causes of delinquency and placed the problem of moral education in an entirely new perspective.

Two results may be noted which bear on our subject. In the first place, the importance of social tradition in moral education was given a new basis in theory and fresh emphasis in practice. The term 'religious education' began to be used in place of 'religious instruction', for it was recognised that morality and religion could not be taught within a period set apart for that purpose. The change in outlook and emphasis may be illustrated in a striking contrast between the extract from an old syllabus quoted above and the following comments on the place of examinations in religious education in the *Scottish Syllabus of Religious Education for Use in Primary Schools* (1945):

> If the imparting of scriptural knowledge were the end and aim of religious education, examinations would be as justifiable in this subject as in any other, and the method of teaching would differ little from that adopted in other subjects. Such factual teaching need have little influence upon the mind and character of the pupils. If, however, as we believe, religious teaching should have as its one aim the influencing of mind and character, using the Bible as the supreme instrument, the method adopted will lay little stress upon the accumulation of merely factual knowledge.

There are signs, however, that any tendencies towards over-emphasis in this direction are being corrected by the reassertion of more typically Scottish and Calvinistic viewpoints in the reports of the *Scottish Advisory Council on Education.* The *Report on Primary Education* (1946) speaks of the young child's need for some simple philosophy which will "satisfy his mind and provide a basis for conduct." The *Report on Secondary Education* (1947) deliberately uses the term religious *instruction* and reminds us that "Christian influence cannot in the end survive without knowledge, and there is real need to ensure for this generation some understanding of the great affirmations of the Christian faith and of the Bible as their basis."

Modern psychological developments have had a second important result. It has become obvious that faults in moral character and conduct are intimately connected with emotional factors in the social environment of the child, which lie below the level of consciousness, as well as with those obvious moral and religious influences which operate both consciously and unconsciously in the child's development. In particular the whole nexus of parent-child relationships has come under thorough scrutiny. Child-guidance clinics have provided abundant evidence of the effect of broken homes and defective family relationships on the growth of character. They have shown how tragically the disordered, ill-adjusted personality may reproduce itself through the intimate emotional relationships of family life "unto the third and fourth generation." The bearing of this on moral and religious education is too large a subject to be developed here, but it should at least be noted that

modern psychology is bringing us back to a view of human nature in sickness and in health which has much in common with Christian teaching about sin and salvation. The terminology is different, but some of the essential features of Calvin's doctrine of man are finding support in unexpected quarters.

The Control of Moral Education

Calvin's political position is theocratic. Although he distinguishes between the civil and the spiritual spheres he insists on the moral and religious responsibilities of civil governors. Their duty is not simply "to enable men to breathe, eat, drink, and be warmed" (IV. xx. 3). But Calvin adds the significant comment: "I no more than formerly allow men at pleasure to enact laws concerning religion and the worship of God, when I approve of civil order which is directed to this end" (*ibid.*). Civil governors are invested with divine authority and must govern in accordance with divine law. Obedience is thus due to them except in so far as it may conflict with obedience to God Himself. "We are subject to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord" (IV. xx. 32).

The precise relations of Church and state in such a matter as education are not clearly defined by Calvin. It is clear that the administration of education would normally be a responsibility of the state, but it is equally clear that the interests of the Church are deeply involved. In theory no difficulty need arise since civil governors and Church leaders alike acknowledge the law of God. In practice, however, there is obvious danger of disagreement between the respective authorities of Church and state. There was no difficulty in Geneva once Calvin's position was firmly established, for Calvin virtually became the supreme interpreter of the divine will. It is noteworthy, however, that Calvin's educational ideals were not realised until his influence and authority were firmly established. The Academy, as reorganised under Beza in 1559, was, thus, completely dominated by ecclesiastical interests.

The development of Church and state relationships in lands influenced by Calvinism has varied according to national circumstances. In Holland education was controlled by the Dutch Reformed Church until the end of the eighteenth century, when the state assumed control and abolished Church schools. A struggle for Church influence in education began and continued throughout the nineteenth century. By common action the Catholics and Calvinists succeeded, first, in establishing their right to found Church schools and, finally, in 1917, in obtaining full financial support for these schools.

Switzerland, too, was exposed to the radical influences of the late eighteenth century, but also passed through a period of bitter religious controversy during the nineteenth century. Article 27 of

the Swiss Constitution of 1874 places responsibility for primary education on the individual Cantons but stipulates that such education must be directed exclusively by the civil authorities and be open to all children irrespective of their religious belief, and that no children must suffer on grounds of creed or conscience. In Protestant Switzerland three cantonal Churches have been disestablished during the twentieth century (Geneva, Basle, and Neuchâtel). In these the Protestant Church provides teaching in the public schools through its pastors, though attendance is optional. In the remaining Protestant cantons Christian teaching is part of the regular school curriculum. It is taught by the regular school staff and, in most cases, supervised by the Church authorities. Parents may withdraw their children from the religious lesson and teachers may refuse to teach it on grounds of conscience.

The position in Scotland has some features of special interest which are dealt with more fully on pages 329–348. The influence of the Church on education was much stronger and lasted longer in Scotland than in any other country influenced by Calvin. The ambitious scheme of education outlined in the *First Book of Discipline* (1560) was only partially carried into effect, but it had an important influence on later developments. When a system of parish schools was established by Parliament in the two Acts of 1646 and 1696 the Church was given paramount control. The responsibility for providing the school and paying the salary of the schoolmaster was laid upon local heritors, but the Church controlled his appointment. Subsequent legislation placed the superintendence of the parish school in the hands of the parish minister and, until the Act of 1872, every schoolmaster had to give a solemn undertaking to conform to the doctrines of the Church as laid down in the Shorter Catechism, in all his teaching.

Under the changed circumstances of modern times the traditions of Calvin and John Knox are happily perpetuated in a system which provides for friendly co-operation between Church and state, and the Calvinistic emphasis on sound knowledge of the Scriptures and of Christian doctrine is beginning to receive fresh attention.

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CHAPTER FIVE

LUTHERANISM

MARTIN LUTHER (1483–1546) did not want to create a new Christian Church. But his sharp criticism of the Roman Church of his time caused the Pope to ban him and his followers. Lutheran Churches were organised separated from Rome but usually closely connected with secular authorities. Lutheranism spread mainly in Germany and in Scandinavia. From there emigrants brought Lutheranism to America, and missionaries have planted Lutheran Churches all over the world. The strongholds of the Lutheran World Federation, organised in 1947, are, however, Germany, Scandinavia, and the United States of America. There are at present no official statistics available, but it is thought that there are some 80 or 90 million Lutherans in the world to-day. Some emphatically Lutheran Churches are not in the World Federation. Among these strongly orthodox, non-co-operating bodies the most notable example is the Missouri Synod in the U.S.A., with about 2 million members. Lutherans often prefer being called Evangelical instead of Lutheran. Luther himself did not want his followers to be called with his name, but pointed to the Biblical Gospel as the one and only authority. But in many countries, e.g. in modern Germany, Evangelical is the name of Churches and organisations uniting Lutherans and Calvinists.

Historical Survey of Lutheran Education

The criticism of Luther was directed not least against the educational system of the Roman Church of his time. In one of his most important writings, *To the Christian Knighthood* (1520), he attacks the Aristotelian scholastic philosophy taught in the universities. He wants to have the Bible, not scholastic philosophy, in the centre of any education. The schools of monasteries and convents had good intentions from the beginning, but now, he says, they have nothing but "prayer and singing", nothing of the Bible. "Where the Word of God does not rule, I advise no man to place his child", Luther writes, a dictum that has been used even in situations where the alternative has not been Roman Catholic schools, but schools of secular humanistic or other kind. Luther encourages the princes as secular authorities to start better schools than the Roman ones.

In *To the Mayors and Aldermen of all the cities of Germany that they should establish and keep Christian schools* (1524), Luther still more strongly urges the secular authorities of his time to organise schools. He is concerned about the fact that his criticism of the Roman institutions has caused people to withdraw their children completely from schools instead of giving them better education. With various arguments he stresses the need of education. He quotes the Bible, and he writes: "Why do we old people live but for helping the young ones, teach them and educate them?" Without educated citizens no society can be healthy and strong, and parents have neither time nor competence to take the whole responsibility. Even girls should have schools. Aristotelian philosophy should have no place in the curriculum. The Bible should be taught, and also languages, music, mathematics, history, and so forth.

In a third educational writing, *Sermon on the duty of sending children to school* (1530), Luther argues for compulsory education. To fight for education is to fight against the devil, against barbarism and disorder. Luther stresses the importance of education, on one hand for the creation of a Christian ministry, on the other hand for the instruction of governmental and other secular offices. Both kinds of vocations have the same spiritual value. Both the spiritual realm and the secular realm are under God, to fulfil His will. But in the secular realm one has mainly to rely on one's own thinking (*Vernunft*). God has not sent His Holy Spirit to tell us directly how to organise society, but how to save our souls.

Of still greater importance for Lutheran education than these writings are Luther's translation of the Bible into German, and his Catechisms, one larger, directed to ministers, and one smaller, condensed for general education. The importance of the Small Catechism (1529) for ethical education in Lutheranism cannot be exaggerated. It starts with the ten Mosaic commandments, and these with the explanations of Luther have been taught among Lutherans through centuries as the foundation of all education. The Apostolic Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Biblical foundations of Baptism and Holy Communion, all with explanations, are the other parts of the Catechism, finally some prayers and exhortations.

The secular authorities were slow in carrying out the educational aims of Luther. His friend Melanchthon became the main organiser of education, and he gave to the Lutheran school a broad curriculum. But owing to his interest in Latin, the Lutheran school became a Latin school until the nineteenth century. Melanchthon also brought back Aristotelian scholasticism into Lutheran theology and education.

Lutheran *orthodoxy* did not, as Luther, place the Bible in the centre of education. On the primary levels it was replaced by Catechism, in higher education by theological systems, and the

Bible was used casuistically to prove the dogma. Christianity was interpreted legalistically and intellectually: the main thing was to be able to repeat the Catechism. This legalistic Lutheranism, however, was of great importance for the moral education of the peoples. The orthodox ministers were true teachers of the people, and society was built on Christian law. In a way, the Lutheran Churches of the orthodox period were primarily educational institutions. They taught the people to read the Catechism, they decided what everybody should think and how he should live. In the cruel seventeenth century, the orthodox clergy with the Catechism as its tool fought for sobriety and for a chaste, monogamic life.

Pietism of the eighteenth century protested against the orthodox tendency of over-estimating knowledge of Christian fundamentals at the cost of a true Christian life. As orthodoxy brought back into Lutheranism something of the Aristotelian scholasticism that Luther despised, so pietism brought back ascetic and monastic ideals which Luther had likewise rejected. In his famous schools at Halle, Francke (1663–1727) kept the children from all worldly influences. Even childish plays were prohibited as symptoms of the sinful nature of man. As the schools of Francke were especially intended for orphans, it was comparatively easy to apply his method of character education: exclusion from the world outside the school. When punished with flogging, the pupil had to thank the teacher for the punishment and promise improvement, a demand that encouraged hypocrisy.

The *enlightenment* reacted against the hypocrisy of pietism and against its negative attitude to the natural inclinations of the child. Though Locke, Rousseau, and Pestalozzi were no Lutherans, the ideas of rationalism gradually penetrated into the Lutheran world. Kant and Schleiermacher became dominant in the Lutheran thinking of the nineteenth century, but orthodox and pietistic ideas did not disappear.

One of the most remarkable Lutheran pioneers of education in the nineteenth century was N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783–1872). A famous scholar and poet, this Danish pastor attacked violently the traditional school for its Latin language and for its many examinations. His key-word was freedom. His ideas did not penetrate into the general education of his age, but they took shape in voluntary 'people's colleges.' Social education is here in the centre. As a rule, Christianity is not taught directly, but where the spirit of Grundtvig still reigns, it is a profoundly Christian spirit. For a voluntary character-education of young people in the twenties, these schools have meant and still mean very much, especially in Scandinavia.

The enormous broadening of general education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is completely in accordance with

Luther. Contrary to Lutheran thought, however, is the modern belief in the natural goodness of man and in the capacity of the human mind to build a natural theology at the side of or instead of the revealed Biblical truth.

In the twentieth century, Lutheranism has experienced a revival of theological research. The ideas of Luther himself have been contrasted to those of orthodoxy, pietism, and enlightenment. Notably in Sweden, theologians have tried to direct the attention to the 'proper' Luther. The present president of the Lutheran World Federation, A. Nygren, is a representative of this Luther research, the late Archbishop Söderblom was another. Other famous Swedish Lutheran theologists of the twentieth century are E. Billing and G. Aulén.

This Lutheran revival has not penetrated much into education, however. Lutheran theology of to-day has not given much interest to educational philosophy, or catechetics, as the field is traditionally called. Thus, in the Lutheran world of to-day one finds in education all the trends mentioned above: the proper ideas of Luther, pietism, orthodoxy, rationalism.

Religion and Morals

The foundation of all morals is the law of God. The Ten Commandments, inherited from the Hebrews (Exod. xx), run in Luther's Catechism as follows:

> (1) Thou shalt have no other gods before Me. (2) Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh His Name in vain. (3) Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy. (4) Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. (5) Thou shalt not kill. (6) Thou shalt not commit adultery. (7) Thou shalt not steal. (8) Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. (9) Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house. (10) Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbour's.

In the New Testament Jesus summarises the law with a positive formulation: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets" (Mt. xxii. 37–9). In the Sermon on the Mount we find the words that have been called the Golden Rule: "So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets" (Mt. vii. 12).

In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus further interprets the moral law as to comprise not only the deeds but even the intentions behind the deed. Sometimes this has been interpreted to mean

that only the intention, the good will, is of importance for morals, but Jesus rather seems to stress the insoluble connections between intention and deed, opposing ethics that emphasised only the deed. Anyway, when he says that anger and wrath are condemnable just as murder, that a lustful look at another man's wife is condemnable just as adultery, he sharpens the law as to make it practically impossible to fulfil.

What should be the use of the Sermon on the Mount in ethical education? Opinions vary considerably. Luther objected against the Roman view which regards the radical commandments of Jesus only as good advice for certain people, not for everybody. The ascetic idealism of Tolstoy and others, taking literally such commandments as "Do not resist one who is evil, but if one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also" (Mt. v. 39), has seldom been accepted by Lutherans. By some theologians of modern times the Sermon has been interpreted as valid only for the time when it was preached, a time that was expected to be short in the expectation of the end of the world. Among modern educationists the solution of the liberal theology has been more commonly accepted. The commandments of Jesus are shining stars, but only so much has to be applied in human lives as is consistent with common sense and the natural claims of social life. The ethical quality of an act depends upon the intention, the good or evil will.

Representative Lutheran theology does not, like many educationists in Lutheran countries, regard the Sermon on the Mount as an easy tool for ethical education. Just as the commandment of loving one's neighbour cannot be treated apart from the commandment of loving God, the Sermon on the Mount cannot be treated apart from other parts of the Gospel, from the Cross and the Redemption. As a moral law the Sermon on the Mount is impossible to fulfil. Common sense cannot be permitted to take away its sharpness. If taken seriously, it condemns man, forces him to acknowledge himself as a sinner. He has to find his way to the Cross, where forgiveness of sins is given. If the Sermon on the Mount were the essence of Christianity, the Christian message, if taken seriously, would end in a crude, relentless law. But fortunately, the Cross and the Resurrection are the centre, and Christianity is primarily good news, the forgiveness of sins.

The true ethical life has its source not in the law, neither in the Ten Commandments, nor in the Sermon on the Mount, but in the Gospel, the message of the crucified and risen Christ. Psychologically, Christian education may have to start with the law, so that man finds out that he is a sinner in need of forgiveness. Luther has the Ten Commandments in the beginning of his Catechism. But once man has found his way to the Cross, the law is no longer his master. He loves his neighbour, because

God has loved him, forgiving his sins. This love is unmotivated, spontaneous. God loves man though a sinner, man has to love his neighbour regardless of his behaviour. "The love of Christ controls us", says St. Paul in 2 Cor. v. 14. And in the parable of the unforgiving servant (Mt. xviii), Jesus shows how the love of God to us must be continued in our love of our neighbours.

Lutheran theology traditionally speaks of two functions of the law. The function demonstrated above is called the second one. The law convinces of sin, shows man to the Cross. "The law was our custodian until Christ came", St. Paul writes in Gal. iii. 24. But the first function of the law remains to be "a *dynamis* unto the establishment of human fellowship" (Aulén). The law shows the foundations of social life to every man, as well to him who has not yet found his way to the Cross as to him who believes in redemption through Christ. The Sermon on the Mount may well be regarded as a witness of the intentions of God for human fellowship and may serve as inspiration and guiding star. But practical life causes one compromise after another between the commandments of Jesus and the demands of everyday life. Entanglements in this world mean an unavoidable condemnation. But the Christian always lives in a state of simultaneous condemnation and salvation: *simul justus et peccator.* The Sermon on the Mount is not primarily a law but a Gospel for those accepting the forgiveness of their sin. The character of good news is stressed already in its beginning: "Blessed are the poor in spirit . ." (Mt. v. 3). Lutheran theology emphatically stresses that it is not the law that establishes the relations between God and man; they are built on forgiveness and faith.

Before God every human act is stained by sin. But in human society there is great distinction between good and evil acts. There is no difference between the redeemed and the unredeemed as to the obligation and the ability to perform such relatively good acts. Thus Lutheranism is open to recognise and to co-operate with those who perform acts of the law even without confessing Christ as their Saviour. "Whatever is true, whatever is honourable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things" (Phil. iv. 8).

This recognition of the fact that the will of God can be done also by non-Christians (cf. Rom. ii. 14: "When Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires") implies that Lutheranism sees ethical values not only in religious education. Already Luther himself gave evidence of his interest in the teaching of languages, history, mathematics, and so forth. The teaching of such subjects is appreciated just as what it is, without any dependence on relations with the teaching of religion. The idea of a specifically Christian teaching of history, biology, mathematics,

distinguishable from a non-Christian teaching, is not common among Lutherans. Just as a Christian appreciates shoes made by a competent shoemaker irrespective of his religion, he prefers to have mathematics taught by a competent non-Christian to having it taught by a less competent Christian. On the other hand, it is not denied that the personality of the teacher is of great importance in every kind of teaching, and schools may be coloured by spirits contrary to the commandments of God. Because of this, many Lutherans have Church schools and Church colleges (especially in America), where a homogeneously Christian atmosphere can be guaranteed. Other Lutherans take the risk of sending their children to secular teachers, seeing a danger in the isolation.

Indoctrination and Experience

Lutheran theology has hardly discussed the problems concerning indoctrination and experience, raised by modern educational philosophies. Generally speaking, Lutheranism of to-day in its ethical education keeps to traditional indoctrination. In theology, liberalism has been so decidedly rejected that strong presuppositions prevent an acceptance of the educational philosophy that has grown up in connection with liberal theology.

There can be no question of the fundamental authority of the revelation. The source of all ethical and religious education must be the Bible. The Ten Commandments are taught as the foundation of morals, comprising both belief in the supremacy of God and the practice of justice among men.

There are in Lutheranism those who regard the whole Bible as a kind of lawbook, verbally inspired in all respects, and those who accept an historical interpretation of the Bible, meaning that Christ, as we meet him in the Bible, rather than the words of the Bible, is the authority. The former have inherited their legalistic view from orthodoxy and are more authoritarian than the latter. They find in the Bible a complete system, into which education has to lead the pupils.

They who have the more evangelical view of Christianity do not ask the children to accept as their own the Biblical system in all its details, only its central message of the supremacy of God and the redemption of Christ. This central message may enter into modern views of the world, built on modern science. Consequently, there are no ready-made answers to every theoretical and moral question. Human reason and experience are free to make discoveries of new theoretical and moral truths. The truth is in Christ who said: " I am the way, and the truth, and the life " (Jn. xiv. 6), but the revelation of God is still going on, and we shall discover it in our search for truth.

Indoctrination is inseparable from Lutheran education, in as much as the revelation, the Biblical message of Christ, is the

starting-point for the interpretation of reality and for an ethical life. Lutheran Christianity can never accept the treatment of the words of Christ as on the same level as the moral and religious teachings of other prophets and teachers, or the use of them in the same degree as advice for our moral and religious life. The authority of God in Christ is absolute and exclusive. But we have to acknowledge that the revelation is interpreted in somewhat various ways, even inside Lutheranism itself. And further, revelation is going on, making us open to new adventures and discoveries. Progressive education is right when stressing the validity of such new experiences, wrong when negating the absolute authority of God in Christ.

Educating Agencies

(*a*) *The Family.*—The primary responsibility for the education of children rests with the parents. Luther's Small Catechism was intended to be a help especially for house-fathers. It presupposes a patriarchal arrangement of the family, with the house-father as the religious and moral authority for wife, children, and servants.

Through the history of Lutheranism the religious and moral education given in the family has certainly meant more than any other education. Family prayers have been common, and only in this century has this custom broken down perhaps in the majority of homes, but by no means in all. Grace at table is still widely used. The evening prayers of children are often observed, even when all other forms of family devotions have disappeared.

The Catechism is not nowadays used in the family life as much as earlier. A Lutheran hymnbook has played and is often still playing a more important role in family life than the Bible. But all Lutheran homes have at least one Bible, and for the children specially arranged Biblical stories with fascinating illustrations are often the never-forgotten foundation of their education.

(*b*) *The State.*—I have demonstrated above how Luther turned to the state, represented by princes, mayors, and others, of his time, urging them to feel responsible for the education of children. Parents lacked time and competence to do the whole job, the schools of the Roman Church were unsatisfactory, and the new Lutheran Churches did not have the resources to start schools. Even though the secular authorities of the sixteenth century were slow in creating the educational institutions desired by Luther, by and by schools came into being, and in countries where Lutheranism has been a dominating power, the state has never ceased to consider its educational task, with the Church as a constant prompter. Unions between state and Lutheran Church have been common in Germany, and still exist in Scandinavia. This means, among other things, that the state accepts its responsibility for an ethical education in a Lutheran spirit. This ethical education takes

place mainly in compulsory religious education in the public schools below university, but also the ethical values in the teaching of secular subjects should be in harmony with Lutheran views.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, ideas of religious liberty have made the ethical and religious engagement of the state in the above-mentioned way somewhat doubtful. In Scandinavia the system still prevails, however, because of the relative homogeneity of the population. There are certain possibilities for non-Lutherans to be excused from the religious education of the public schools, but those taking advantage of this liberty—mainly Roman Catholics and Jews—are not numerous.

There is a good deal of opposition, however, against the union of the state with a certain religious system, and the ties between the state and Lutheranism have gradually become looser. A common view is that the state should support the ethics taught by the Church but not support the dogmatic teaching. But the Lutheran Church, though recognising that non-Christians can perform acts of the law, cannot separate dogma and ethics, religion and morals. The Church tries to make the state see that even if the state is naturally more interested in ethics than in religion, more in how men behave towards one another than in their relations to God, the former depends on the latter, like the fruit on the tree.

(*c*) *The Church*.—In many countries, notably the U.S.A., Lutheran Churches have no legal connection with the state, and even where there is such a connection, as in Scandinavia, the Church must assume great responsibility for moral and religious education. Nowhere do family and state make the educational task of the Church superfluous.

If the Church needs to give a reason for its educational task, it points primarily to the words of Christ: "Go and make disciples of all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you" (Mt. xxviii. 19–20). This dictum makes clear the intimate relations between baptism and the teaching of God's commandments. On the mission-fields, as in the early Church, the religious and moral instruction precedes baptism, but in the older Lutheran Churches the rule is to baptise children in accordance with the words of Christ: "Let the children come to me, do not hinder them" (Mk. x. 14). The unavoidable consequence of child baptism is that when the child grows up he must be taught what his baptism means. The traditional Lutheran form of this education is confirmation, which at the same time is a preparation for partaking in the Holy Communion. The length of this instruction may vary from some weeks to a couple of years, dependent on the effectiveness of other kinds of religious education. It usually ends at the age of 14–15. Its content centres around the Catechism.

After confirmation the moral and religious education of the Church takes place mainly in the sermons that are a regular part of the Sunday service, in special Catechism sermons, in personal pastoral care, and so forth. Earlier the pastor often had regular Catechism examinations in the families of the parish. In some places they are still practised.

If some older forms of the education of the Church are disappearing, new forms are entering. The Sunday school is in rapid advance in Lutheran Churches as it is in other Churches. Youth fellowships, study-circles for young people and adults are increasingly important parts of the programme of Lutheran Churches. The secularism of the twentieth century is everywhere felt as a challenge to increased educational emphasis.

More and more, Bible study has come to replace Catechism as the centre of the education of the Church. The Catechism is often regarded as too dogmatic, and the language of Luther's explanations is strange to our generation. To study the Bible directly rather than Luther's catechetical explanations seems to be fully in accordance with the intentions of Luther himself. But as the Catechism has filled a most important task as a summary of the Biblical message, it should not disappear. While some Lutheran Churches keep to it conservatively, others try to keep its content but to give it a modernised form with a language more congenial with our time.

The aim of the education of the Church is primarily religious. But as morals are an integrating part of Lutheran Christianity, as has been demonstrated above, the Church education directly and indirectly is also ethical education.

This ethical education is often in harmony with the interests of the state. A positive appreciation of the state may be built on the words of St. Paul: " Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God " (Rom. xiii. 1). But sometimes, not least in this century, the ethics taught in the Church conflict with the will of the state. Such words as " We must obey God rather than men " (Acts v. 29), and the contents of the Book of Revelation, give strength to fight the totalitarian state.

STEN RODHE.

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CHAPTER SIX

JUDAISM

mente sola unumque numen (Tac. *Hist.* V, 5)

JUDAISM is known to the Western world almost entirely through the ' Old ' Testament, as studied either in itself or as reflected in the ' New.' But it is more than an ancient creed. It is a way of life which has been lived continuously by an historical people; and its vicissitudes may be traced, both in written records and in traditions of living, for well over three thousand years. Again, as the parent of the great monotheistic religions it has much in common with its offspring, and it is part of the common front against the revived materialism which threatens to engulf the world, non-Jewish and Jewish alike. Further, there are those who have seen in the very survival of the Jewish people an empirical argument against the final value of mere force, and there is no doubt that in this survival Judaism has been a determining, if not the decisive, factor. We must remember, therefore, throughout the discussion that we are studying not an abstract system of inert ideas but a living tissue the understanding of which is of importance to the interpretation of human experience as a whole.

I

It is a commonplace that the genius of the Hebrew Bible lies in its moralising tendency. Its God is "exalted" in "righteousness"; its people "chosen" to "do justice"; its land "holy" because it "vomited out" evildoers. It demands "mercy and not sacrifice"; it takes account of the "desire of the heart" no less than the "work of the hands"; "thou shalt not covet" as well as "thou shalt not steal." It actually equates the "knowledge of God" with "judging the cause of the poor and needy" (Jer. xxii. 16). And the same holds in the widest sphere. Its world is a world of history in which there is a purpose and a judgment and all the acts of men are weighed. Empires are a "rod of God's anger"; kings are brought to eat grass; whole dynasties are dismissed with the curt refrain that like Jeroboam the son of Nebat they made Israel to sin. Public legislation is similarly directed to moral ends—the relief of the poor; the proper settling of disputes; the maintaining of just weights; the humanising of slavery (even the freeing of slaves); the regulation (even the remission) of debt.

I have spoken of 'tendency' advisedly. The picture is one of striving, and of progress hardly won. From the point of view of education this characteristic is all-important. We are not presented with a finished order. We are shown the lower as well as the higher, and we are left in no doubt as to which of the two is the lower. The Hebrew Bible is not only a moralising book. It is a book of moral instruction.

I take an obvious example, the episode of Uriah the Hittite. David says to Uriah: "Art thou not come from a journey? Wherefore dost thou not go down into thine house?"

"And Uriah said unto David:

> The Ark and Israel and Judah abide in booths; and my lord Joab and the servants of my lord are encamped in the open fields; shall I then go into mine house to eat and to drink and to be with my wife? as thou liveth and as thy soul liveth, I will not do this thing."

As we read that, we say: that man is noble, he shows character; and as the story continues, we feel ashamed, ashamed morally, for the king; the kingliness is on the side of Uriah. And that of course is the point of the story, as it is the point of the other story of King Ahab and Queen Jezebel and Naboth. But if our moral feelings are dulled and we do not feel ashamed of our own motion, we are *taught* to be ashamed: "But the thing that David had done displeased the Lord, and the Lord *sent Nathan to David.*"

We all know the superscription of the 51st Psalm ("A Psalm of David: when Nathan the prophet came unto him, after he had gone in to Bathsheba"). This psalm is almost the classic prayer, and as such is one of the great documents of religion. It is not to our purpose to inquire whether its ascription to David the king, and to David the king in connection with the Bathsheba episode specifically, is authentic or not—that is to say, whether these were the actual words of the historical David on that actual historical occasion. The important point is not the historical point at all: David may or may not have said this or that on this or that occasion. The important thing is that the written tradition ascribes just this psalm to just this person on just this occasion. We are not referred (for example) to David in his dealing with the Moabites (2 Sam. viii. 2). For such methods of treating a beaten enemy we may perhaps find excuses, parallels, extenuating circumstances. But David the decimator is not the David held up to us by the Bible. Our David is the David of the repentant spirit who gave expression to the moral intuition that "a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." The point is put plainly in the later record (1 Chron. xxii. 8) which sees David as a man of blood and as such not fit to build God's temple. This statement is an explicit moral valuation. It is a condemnation of what, as a result of this and other Biblical judgments, we have learned to recognise as barbarism.

It is thus one of the essential characters of the Hebrew Bible that the lower levels are not obliterated: we are shown both the higher and the lower. And we are taught to recognise them and to choose between them. There are set before us " life and good " and " death and evil ", " the blessing " and " the curse "; and while we are advised to follow the blessing, we are free to choose the curse. But the curse and its ways are exposed to our view from the very first story of Cain, the primitive murderer. Here is no divine predestination or acquiescence in remorseless fate but a guiding of, and a call to, moral choice.

2

The passages quoted are, as I have said, explicit. The lower is specifically condemned. I turn to an instance where the higher value is seen as struggling to emerge.

> And the Lord said: " shall I hide from Abraham that which I do? . . . For I have known him to the end that he may command his children and his household after him that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment . . " And the Lord said, " Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous; I will go down and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it which is come unto me . ."
>
> And Abraham drew near and said, " Wilt thou consume the righteous with the wicked? "

We need not go into the details of this famous scene. God is prepared to destroy every single person in Sodom, and his action is a punishment for sin: surely (it would seem) a moral idea. And indeed it is, when compared with the barbaric conception that there is no such thing as action which is morally wrong, but that whatever is supported by the strength of one's own arm is right. But there is a further stage in moral reflection and our story proceeds to reveal it. In the person of Abraham—a man—it asks of the standard of morality—God—whether indiscriminate punishment *is* moral.

The protest is sharp: " Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"; and the Judge of all the earth is put on the defensive. His defeat, left tacit in the present passage, is proclaimed to the world at large by later writers: each man shall die for his own sin. But the struggle between the levels of moral valuation could not be put more pointedly than in this dramatic conflict.

We may follow the idea further in a Talmudic passage (Sanhed. 111). According to Numbers xiv (following the ' evil report ' of the spies) God wishes to wipe Israel out and Moses pleads for them on various grounds, appealing at last to God's compassion and His own proclamation (Ex. xxxiv. 6) that He is " slow to anger." On which there is a Rabbinic comment (based evidently on the dual form of part of the Hebrew phrase [erech *apayim*]

translated "slow to anger" which they interpret as signifying "slow to anger" *both* to the righteous *and* to the wicked):

> When Moses ascended to Heaven he found the Holy One, blessed be He, writing the words: God is slow to anger. Said Moses: "to the righteous." Said God: "to the wicked too." Said Moses: "Let the wicked be destroyed." Said God: "By thy life, thou shalt stand in need of this." When the Israelites sinned on the occasions of the golden calf and the spies and Moses appealed to God as "slow to anger", then said to him the Holy One, blessed be He: "Didst thou not say to me: 'to the righteous only'?" Said Moses: "And didst thou not say to me: 'to the wicked too'?"

My point in recalling this story is simply that by now the higher level has finally won. God has (as it were) learned the lesson; and He turns the lesson against man just as before man taught the lesson to God: the lesson which (the Biblical) Abraham taught to God, God now teaches to (the Talmudic) Moses. He seems indeed to be teaching something even higher. Abraham taught the "Judge of all the earth"—how magnificent (and significant) the phrase—what justice involves: it is not compatible with the summary sweeping away of a whole community; there is wheat as well as chaff in every heap, and the proper function of the judge is to discriminate. But the later passage gives expression to yet another thought: there is no man on earth who is utterly righteous; we all at some time need compassion, and the compassion we need we should give.

I am reminded of a remark of Bacon quoted by John Morley: "The nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath"; and I should add that 'soul' here may be understood as including God as well as man:

> The Lord is gracious and full of compassion, slow to anger and of great mercy. The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works. . . . The Lord upholdeth all that fall, and raiseth up all those that be bowed down. The eyes of all wait upon thee; and thou givest them their food in due season. Thou openest thy hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing. The Lord is righteous in all his ways and gracious in all his works. The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him, to all that call upon him in truth. . . . Let all flesh bless his holy name.

Those who see the God of Israel as a tribal deity would do well to count the number of times the word 'all' is used in this Psalm (cxlv). But we should note it not only as a fact of the *written* record. We should remember (a fact of the 'tradition of living') that just this psalm is a favourite of the Jewish prayer book and is a part of the set service, public or private, every morning (in which it appears twice) and afternoon.

Thus the vision broadens, and the very broadening of the vision is noted as its moralisation:

> Listen, O isles, unto me: and hearken, ye peoples, from far: the Lord hath called me from the womb; from the bowels of my mother hath he made mention of my name: and he hath made my mouth like a sharp sword, in the shadow of his hand hath he hid me; and he hath made me a polished shaft, in his quiver hath he kept me close; and he said unto me, Thou art my servant; Israel, in whom I will be glorified. But I said, I have laboured in vain, I have spent my strength for nought and vanity: yet surely my judgment is with the Lord, and my recompense with my God. And now saith the Lord that formed me from the womb to be his servant, to bring Jacob again to him: (for I am honourable in the eyes of the Lord, and my God is become my strength:) yea, he saith, it is too light a thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth.

Attention should be directed to the two levels mentioned in this passage, the tribal and the universal. The universal, be it noted, is not opposed to the tribal but includes and, as it were, justifies and illumines the tribal, and the levels themselves are not only distinguished specifically but are judged as such: " It is *too light* a thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob. I will *also* give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation *unto the end of the earth.*" The one God imposes one standard on " all flesh." Morality, to be morality, is universal.

3

We may now note a second characteristic of Judaism which also springs from the nature of morality itself. After all, what *is* a moral act? It is not just a physical happening. It is a certain *quality* in the happening; or it is a happening of a very special kind. A well-known Talmudic passage declares the very same action to be in the one case 'good' and in the other 'bad'— " *they* rise from their slumbers and *I* rise; *they* work and *I* work; *they* walk and *I* walk ", and so on: the actions are the same, but their *direction* is different, and in the direction lies the morality. For morality is just this: a shaping, a turning, the imposition of form or rule. And its root is differentiation, the exercise of choice between alternatives. To be moral is to discriminate.

And here the Jewish outlook is peculiarly illuminating. In a sense the whole of Judaism is discrimination. The physical world (and with it the world of actions considered as just physical happenings) is, as it were, neutral; Judaism cuts it up into significant parts. " Why does one day excel another when all the light of every day in the year is of the sun?" asks Ecclesiasticus (xxxiii. 7 ff.); and answers: " By the knowledge of the Lord were they distinguished and he varied seasons and feasts." For nature any one day is like any other. For Judaism the seventh day is unique. For nature all meats are alike. For Judaism some are proper and some are not. For nature all acts are the same. They are

happenings, and no one of them is more or less so than any other. But in the thunders of Sinai came the proclamation: "thou shalt *not*." There are acts, however natural, which are wrong.

The later literature revels in this great theme. It relates that creation was imperfect till the Torah (the 'Law') was given; that man was imperfect till the commandments were given; that if the Torah had not been accepted natural order would have been chaos and the world could not have survived. The root idea is clear: morality is not mere nature but a shaping and taming of nature; and this lesson is a cardinal point both of ethics as such and of the moral tradition of Judaism.

The well-known phrase 'ethical monotheism' would thus seem to be justified. I do not say that Judaism is *only* that. But it is *at least* that. And this fact stares out at us from all the record, whether written or living. I need not argue to the centrality in Judaism of the principle of the Divine Unity. But it is more important to realise that the unity is not arithmetical. It is primarily, and more importantly, moral. It implies what in the human world is known as integrity: singleness of character and purposive direction.

4

As one studies the Hebrew Bible and in particular the Pentateuch (and for Judaism the Pentateuch is primary), one finds at first sight four types of consideration urged for the observance of the prescriptions of morality. There is the utilitarian ("when thou buildest a house, then shalt thou make a fence round it lest one fall"); the historical ("for in booths did I cause the children of Israel to live when I brought them forth from Egypt"); the moral ("for thou knowest the heart of the stranger"; "thou canst not turn thine eye away"; "lest thy brother break down before thine eyes"); and the religious ("be ye holy for I your God am holy"). Further study, however, reveals that none of the sections is watertight. The prudential, the historical, and the moral all disappear under scrutiny and reduce themselves finally to the religious. However we start—with advice or with reminiscence or with moral feeling—we come finally to God and His acts and His requirements from man.

And God and His acts and His requirements are finally seen themselves to depend on the idea of distinction, of separation, that is, of holiness; and the holiness is, as it were, typified in the historic act of the deliverance from Egypt. It is that concrete act of separation and distinction which is the mainspring of Pentateuchal ethics and religion: "After the ways of the land of Egypt wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do"; "I have brought you unto myself." And it is the source of ritual practice as well: "Defile not yourselves with any manner of creeping thing. For I am

the Lord that brought you up out of the land of Egypt to be your God: ye shall therefore be holy for I am holy."

This conception links itself immediately with the righteousness which in particular is associated with Israel's God. The holy God, in Isaiah's great words, is exalted in judgment and hallowed in righteousness. Unity, integrity, holiness, righteousness—this is the great sequence of Jewish moral theology. And already the Sifra (a basic Rabbinical commentary to Leviticus ascribed to the third century) knows its significance:

> " Ye shall be holy for I am holy "—that is to say, if you hallow yourselves, I account it unto you as if you hallowed me. Or does it mean that if you hallow me I am hallowed, and if you do not, then I am not? Nay, for it says: " *for I am holy* "—I remain in my holiness whether ye hallow me or not.

Here is the definite assertion of the fixed value from which the moral universe depends. Jewish ethics is neither utilitarian nor sociological. It is a direct derivative from the monotheistic principle. It is rooted in the oneness of God.

5

This oneness or integrity comes to its fullest expression for humanity in the idea of law. God is not wilful. He displays His holiness in right action. And so with man: the life of holiness is a life which is regulated by rule. It is a commonplace that one of the words for God in the Hebrew Bible is traditionally interchangeable with one of those for judges, and we have seen already that the theological début of Abraham lay in the moralising of Deity, as if God too, in order to be God, had to submit to the reign of law. But it is often forgotten that according to the same passage the future people of Abraham were made the bearers of that law even before the birth of Isaac and the establishment of the Abrahamic succession: " for I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment." Here we have the classic conception of the Hebrew Bible on the election of Israel and the chosen people (the chosen *people*, be it noted, not the, or a, chosen *person*: it is always a community which is thought of, and the R.V. margin rightly refers to Amos iii. 2), a people appointed to " keep the way of the Lord, *that is*, to do justice and judgment ", and so to bring the idea of law and the impersonal regulation of conduct into the concrete structure of human society.

It is worth while listening to the spirited remarks of Josephus [1]

[1] Trans. H. St. J. Thackeray, Loeb Edition. The excerpts are from Book II, chapters 15–18, 38–9.

on this theme (he is replying to the attacks of the Alexandrian Greek Apion):

Now, I maintain that our legislator is the most ancient of all legislators in the records of the whole world. Compared with him, your Lycurguses and Solons, and Zaleucus, who gave the Locrians their laws, and all who are held in such high esteem by the Greeks, appear to have been born but yesterday. Why, the very word 'law' was unknown in ancient Greece. Witness Homer, who nowhere employs it in his poems. In fact, there was no such thing in his day; the masses were governed by maxims not clearly defined and by the orders of royalty, and continued long afterwards the use of unwritten customs, many of which were from time to time altered to suit particular circumstances. On the other hand, our legislator proved himself the people's best guide and counsellor; and after framing a code to embrace the whole conduct of their life, induced them to accept it and secured, on the firmest footing, its observance for all time. . .

All schemes of education and moral training fall into two categories; instruction is imparted in the one case by precept, in the other by practical exercising of the character. All other legislators, differing in their opinions, selected the particular method which each preferred, and neglected the other. Thus the Lacedaemonians and Cretans employed practical, not verbal, training; whereas the Athenians and nearly all the rest of the Greeks made laws enjoining what actions might or might not be performed, but neglected to familiarise the people with them by putting them into practice.

Our legislator, on the other hand, took great care to combine both systems. He did not leave practical training in morals inarticulate; nor did he permit the letter of the law to remain inoperative. Starting from the very beginning with the food of which we partake from infancy and the private life of the home, he left nothing, however insignificant, to the discretion and caprice of the individual. What meats a man should abstain from, and what he may enjoy; with what persons he should associate; what period should be devoted respectively to strenuous labour and to rest—for all this our leader made the Law the standard and rule, that we might live under it as under a father and master, and be guilty of no sin through wilfulness or ignorance.

For ignorance he left no pretext. He appointed the Law to be the most excellent and necessary form of instruction, ordaining, not that it should be heard once for all, or twice, or on several occasions, but that every week men should desert their other occupations and assemble to listen to the Law and to obtain a thorough and accurate knowledge of it, a practice which all other legislators seem to have neglected.

Indeed, most men so far from living in accordance with their own laws, hardly know what they are. Only when they have done wrong do they learn from others that they have transgressed the law. Even those of them who hold the highest and most important offices admit their ignorance; for they employ professional legal experts and assessors and leave them in charge of the administration of affairs. But should anyone of our nation be questioned about the laws, he would repeat them all more readily than his own name. The result, then, of our thorough grounding in the laws from the first dawn of intelligence is that we have them, as it were, engraved in our souls. A transgressor is a rarity; evasion of punishment by excuses an impossibility. .

Nowadays, indeed, violation of the laws has with most nations become a fine art. Not so with us. Robbed though we be of wealth, of cities, of all good things, our Law at least remains immortal; and there is not a Jew so distant from his country, so much in awe of a cruel despot, but has more fear of the Law than of him.

> An infinity of time has passed since Moses, if one compares the age in which he lived with those of other legislators; yet it will be found that throughout the whole of that period not merely have our laws stood the test of our own use, but they have to an ever increasing extent excited the emulation of the world at large. . . There is not one city, Greek or barbarian, nor a single nation, to which our custom of abstaining from work on the seventh day has not spread. . . The greatest miracle of all is that our Law holds out no seductive bait of sensual pleasure, but has exercised this influence through its own inherent merits; and, as God permeates the universe, so the Law has found its way among mankind.

6

In this vivid passage we have the fundamental idea of law as informing the whole of life, law not as priestly secret or philosophical mystery but as a system of personal and social life, fully understood and consciously adopted, inculcated in the people both by regular instruction and by the habit of living until it becomes second nature. It is the ideal of a " kingdom of priests and a holy nation " translated into the concrete terms of a living and instructed discipline.

Criticism agrees, but insists that there is too much law, too much regulation, too much instruction. Charity, it says, should be left to the giver: we ought not to be *told* to leave the corners of the field and the gleanings of the harvest. Times of rest should be left to individual discretion: we have no need for the fourth *commandment.* The release of debtors should not be laid down as an *injunction,* nor should the returning of a pledged garment before nightfall, nor the refraining from bearing a grudge, nor the loving of a stranger, nor the bringing back of our brothers' sheep when they go astray. Need we be *instructed* (we are asked) when we " rejoice before the Lord our God ", to rejoice " with our sons and our daughters and our manservants and maidservants and the Levite which is within our gates and the stranger and fatherless and the widow "? Need the " voice of the living God " Himself " speaking out of the midst of the fire " have troubled to enumerate for participation in the weekly day of rest not only the members of our family and household but even " our ox and our ass and our cattle ", and then even repeat " that thy manservant and thy maidservant may rest "? On such questions different opinions may be held, although the observation may be permitted that even the minutest regulation would be not only supportable but desirable if by it we could attain the real social sense implied in these and other provisions of the Pentateuchal legislation. We are concerned here only to establish the fact as characteristic of Jewish society as depicted in its oldest literature, that conduct is to be regulated by law. The precision is sometimes mathematical. In that society the maximum number of stripes to be given an offender by the judge is forty, and the amount set aside for the poor is one-tenth.

True, the prophets often say otherwise and their sayings are hard. But their criticism is a criticism of society and presupposes the existence of society. It is *our* Sabbaths and New Moons which are an "iniquity", not the Sabbath and new moon as such. If Zion can be "redeemed with judgment", it is because she had "judges and counsellors" "*at first and at the beginning.*" No wonder that "wisdom" by which "kings reign and princes decree justice and all the judges of the earth rule" is declared (Prov. viii. 15–16, 23) to be "from everlasting, or ever the earth was." Torah (law, or 'the' Law), as the Rabbis said, summing up the whole outlook in a phrase, was created before the world; and characteristically enough they give the exact number of generations by which the one antedated the other.

The point I wish to make is that although we may find it irksome, definite regulation is as necessary a condition of the very existence of society as is habit of individual life. In our own societies, too, when we pay income-tax, we pay indeed more than a tenth, but we pay according to a fixed scale; and when we inflict punishment, we inflict it within circumscribed limits expressed in precise figures. And with regard to moral duty, is it really superfluous, even now, to be reminded that when we take a holiday, we should remember that those dependent on us need a holiday too; and since memories are short and mere reminders are apt to be neglected, is it really wrong, is it not rather a social obligation, to lay it down as a part of a definite ordinance and even to repeat it if by repetition the desired end can be achieved? The prophets may have stood for an 'open' (if we may adopt the phraseology made familiar by Bergson) as opposed to a 'closed' morality, and an 'open' morality may be held to imply an 'open' society. But an 'open' society is by way of being a contradiction in terms; society, however free, must be regulated. There must not be "divers weights", and neither the rich *nor the poor* (Ex. xxiii. 3; Lev. xix. 15) can be "favoured in his cause." And men must be taught. "Citizens are made, not born." The great contribution of Judaism to the art of life is its insistence that living means living in a society, and that living in a society means living in accordance with public rule.

7

Akin to the maintenance of set forms in society which is law is the maintenance of set forms in worship which is ritual, and much has been written about the 'institutionalism' of Biblical and later Judaism, not least by the long line of Jewish moralists themselves. The *de*-moralising influence of the over-insistence on 'works' is the recurring subject of the cries of the prophets; but the prophets are parts of the tradition of Judaism and their message is a Jewish message. And the voice is never silent. The Rabbis of the Talmud

laid down the general principle that "the all-merciful desires the heart", and it may come as a surprise to the non-Jewish reader that "all-merciful" is a standard Talmudic phrase both for God and for the Law, i.e. Scripture as the word of God. The great ethical classic of mediaeval Jewry is entitled the Duties of the *Heart*; and throughout the whole course of Jewish history there have been 'revivalist' movements (the latest was the 'Hassidic' movement which swept over large sections of world Jewry from the seventeenth century on), movements which all centred on the demand to revive the spirit in the ritual.

But it is a demand for the revival of the spirit *in* the ritual, not a rejection of the ritual. It is an affectionate drawing out of, and a lingering on, the intention behind the ritual act. From this there is no budging throughout the whole tradition. The Sabbath is never a day of gloom, but is illumined by a thousand activities each one of which has a spiritual significance of its own; and the "bride" (as the Sabbath is called in the Talmud) is welcomed with songs and dancing and bright clothes as well as with the traditional wine. The Lord is "served with gladness." Asceticism is condemned as a wrongful rejection of the gifts of God. The Nazirite, by a somewhat arbitrary rendering of Numbers vi. 11, is declared traditionally to be a *sinner*. To the "beauty of holiness" (Ps. xxix) is added, in Heine's phrase, the holiness of beauty. The spiritual movement is always from the outer to the inner, and from the inner back to the outer again. Ritual is envisaged as the detail. The principle is that of joy in worship. Rule is supreme, but it is rule that has become a precious personal possession. The Law is ever (Ps. cxix. 92) a "delight."

8

Thus in ritual as in law the rule in no wise excludes consideration of the person. It is rather (as we shall see again later, and in a fuller connection) based upon the person and aimed towards him. It is worth turning again to our random examples from Pentateuchal legislation: the day of rest (i), the being kind to a stranger (ii), the returning of a pledge (iii), the leaving of the corners of the field (iv), the forty stripes of punishment for the ill-doer (v)—and we shall see that for each of these regulations a reason is given which is based on consideration of the person.

(i) "The seventh day is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God . that thy manservant and thy maidservant may rest *as well as thou.*" [The Hebrew word translated "as well as thou", which gives the reason, is the same as that used in the 'Great Commandment' (Lev. xix. 18): "thou shalt love thy neighbour as *thyself*."] (ii) "And a stranger shalt thou not oppress; *for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt*" (Ex. xxiii. 9; so also xxii. 21; Deut. x. 19, xxiv. 17–8); and the same

reason is given for not going over the vines and olive-trees again (" it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow; *and thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt: therefore I command thee to do this thing* "—Deut. xxiv. 21–2). (iii) " If thou at all take thy neighbour's garment to pledge, thou shalt restore it unto him by that the sun goeth down; *for that is his only covering, it is his garment for his skin: wherein shall he sleep?*" (Ex. xxii. 26–7). In certain cases a pledge should not be taken at all (" no man shall take the mill or upper millstone to pledge: *for he taketh a man's life to pledge* "—Deut. xxiv. 6); but if a pledge be taken, " thou shalt not go into his house to fetch his pledge; *thou shall stand without* " (Deut. xxiv. 10–11), surely in order to spare his feelings. And then lastly (v), of the malefactor, " if the wicked man be worthy to be beaten, the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face, according to his wickedness, by number; forty stripes he may give, he shall not exceed: *lest, if he should exceed*, and beat him above these with many stripes, *then thy brother should seem vile unto thee* " (Deut. xxv. 2–3). A more literal translation of the last phrase would be " lest thy brother become contemptible before thine eyes ", and the meaning is: lest he break down before thine eyes and thus shame himself as a human being before other human beings, i.e. shame humanity as such; an idea well caught by the Rabbis when they remarked: " though he ' seem vile ', remember he is still ' thy brother '." A similar sense of moral fitness is shown in the case of the " beautiful woman " taken in war (Deut. xxi. 10–14): " thou shalt not sell her at all for money, thou shalt not deal with her as a chattel, *because thou hast humbled her* "; and the same phrase is used (Deut. xxii. 29) of the Jewish girl forcibly wedded: " and shall be his wife, *because he hath humbled her.*" Thus captive or malefactor, bond or free, stranger or native Israelite, they are yet human beings, and as human beings (and as such " but little lower than the angels ") are entitled to consideration.

9

Thus the basis of law and the regulation of society lies in consideration for the person, and the person is to be considered because he is a person, that is, in Biblical language, because he is created " in the image of God " who is " the God of the spirits of all flesh." We shall have occasion later to note the further significance of this. Meanwhile one may remark two shattering conclusions in the sphere of economic and social relations deriving from the idea of God. If God is really the " God of the whole earth ", then the earth and the fullness thereof is the Lord's and not ours; if God is really the God " of the spirits of all flesh ", then all men are equal not only in His sight but in practical life. " And the land shall not be sold in perpetuity; for the land is

mine; for ye are strangers and sojourners with me" (Lev. xxv. 23). "Over your brethren the children of Israel ye shall not rule, one over another, with rigour. . . For they are my servants, which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as bondsmen. Thou shalt not rule over them with rigour; but shalt fear thy God" (Lev. xxv. 46, 42–3). True, in this latter case, that of the inadmissibility of the very idea of slavery, the regulation is limited to the children of Israel who had been "brought forth out of the land of Egypt." But the supplementary voice was not lacking in the very earliest, as in the very latest, of the recorded prophets, and their cry still calls for its fulfilment: "Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto me, O children of Israel? saith the Lord; have not I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir?" (Amos ix. 7); "Have we not all one father? hath not our God created us? why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother?" (Malachi ii. 10).

10

Let us now turn to less familiar fields and discuss the broadening of Biblical prescriptions in later Judaism. Before I give examples I revert to a point touched on earlier.

It is customary to treat Judaism as synonymous with the 'theology' and 'morals' of the 'Old Testament'; and indeed it is obvious that its root ideas are there. But since Judaism is a living growth, the selection and development of these root ideas lie with the tradition; and as I have endeavoured to show earlier, the selection itself has introduced modifications and shifts in stress which amount to actual change. This process becomes more apparent in the later literature. The *lex talionis,* for example, is specifically abrogated in Rabbinic law: the phrase "an eye for an eye" is understood to mean a fine. But the imposition of fines is already a part of Pentateuchal law itself. So the Rabbinic modification of the law in question is only an extension of an existing principle. This practice of 'reading back' newer ideas into ancient texts is of course frequent in all development (one remembers the 'fictions' of law in general). We need not be surprised, therefore, at the method adopted, and should remember only what is achieved.

We may offer a couple of examples.

(α)

A not too clear verse in Deuteronomy (xx. 19) says: "When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by wielding an axe against them; for thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut

them down; for is the tree of the field man, that it should be besieged of thee?" It then adds: "Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for food, thou shalt destroy and cut them down."

As I said, the first verse is not too clear, but we can say definitely that the prohibition against destruction is limited: "If thou mayest eat of them, thou shalt not cut them down." And the utilitarian point is emphasised in the verse following: "Those that be *not* trees for food, thou *shalt* (i.e. canst) destroy." The prohibition is thus against cutting down fruit trees in time of war.

The Rabbis proceeded to expand the prohibition. First of all, why only the *tree*? Surely the *fruit*, too, should not be destroyed (Sifra); and a Rabbi (B.B. 26) states (somewhat surprisingly) that his own son forfeited his life because he plucked a fig before its time! But it is not a question only of trees and fruit. Every act of wilful destruction is a sin; and we come to the general Talmudic prohibition against destruction as such (*'Bal tashchith'*) which has bitten so deep into the Jewish consciousness and which has passed into a common Hebrew, and—even more significantly—a common Yiddish, phrase. The Ghetto mother, with upraised finger (and perhaps with even more than that), has impressed this moral value on the passing generations so that it has become an abiding principle in Jewish life: Do not destroy!

(β)

Akin to this principle is the far-reaching one of the sanctity of life as such. We open our Bibles—and here I apologise at once to the scholars who will smile at my opening my Bible at *Genesis*; but it is surely significant that in the very first chapters of the Bible as arranged by the tradition we find the bleak and utter condemnation of the taking of life. No one can as it were touch the Bible without observing that the giving of life to man by God, the taking of life from man by man, and the immediate and utter repudiation of that act, follow in one rapid and conclusive sequence.

We may consider the terms of the repudiation:

> The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground. And now cursed art thou from the ground which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand; when thou tillest the ground it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength: a fugitive and wanderer shalt thou be in the earth!

We may well note the recurring reference to the *ground*. Could the character of the act condemned be more strongly emphasised? It is *un*-natural. The very ground rebels. It opened its mouth to try to swallow the blood but (as it were) could not; and it, the very ground, refuses in punishment to accept the ill-doer's efforts

in the time to come. For this crime, and to this criminal, nature itself is adamant.

Anthropologists, occupied with problems of *origin*, will murmur 'blood taboos.' Our interest, however, is in *validity*; and we note that the later tradition fastens on the plural form of the Hebrew word 'blood' in the phrase "the voice of thy brother's *blood*", and comments: "i.e. not only *his* blood, but also the blood of his descendants to the end of all the generations." The spilling of blood (the wisdom of the tradition seems to instruct us) is one of those acts the consequences of which go on and on to the day of the last judgment; and the point is emphasised in the story of Zechariah, the son of Jehoiada the priest, who, according to the Second Book of Chronicles (xxiv. 21) was killed in the Temple. "When he died, he said: the Lord look upon it and require it" (verse 22); and the Talmud recounts that the blood was actually 'required' by Nebuzaradan 'the butcher.' (According to the Talmudic story the blood refused to be quiet and rest but soaked through the Temple floor [Gittin 57; San. 96] until Nebuzaradan slaughtered countless victims in expiation.)

The vigour of the original text is well known:

> At the hand of man, even at the hand of every man's brother, will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man (Gen. ix. 5–6).

But the later tradition is, if possible, even more vigorous, using an exegetical artifice which is startling and unforgettable:

> How were the ten commandments given? [I quote the Mekilta, the ancient Rabbinical commentary to Exodus, Yithro 8.] Five on the one tablet and five on the other, on the one: "I am the Lord thy God", and corresponding to it on the other: "Thou shalt not murder." The text teaches us that everyone who sheds blood is accounted by Holy Writ as if he diminished the stature of the King. It is as if a king of flesh and blood came unto a country and set up statues and made of himself images, and they coined for him coins. After a while they threw down his statues and broke his images and annulled his coins and diminished the stature of the king. So everyone who sheds blood is accounted by Holy Writ as if he diminishes the stature of the King, as it is said: "he who sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made He man."

A few miscellaneous points from the Bible itself may bring home further the unique importance of the theme. A wilful murderer is to be taken to his death "from my altar": the prohibition is to override all considerations of institutional religion. And again: "Thou shalt not take blood money for the murderer . . the very earth is defiled by him" (again the Cain motive). If you take blood money you make the very land you live on impure, and "I dwell within it, for I, God, dwell within the children of

Israel": God and blood-shedding do not, as it were, go together; and Israel must in this follow Israel's God because they share one land together. Again, the very choosing of Israel to receive the word of God, so the Midrash relates, was due to the fact that alone of the nations it repudiated blood and so could accept a code containing the prohibition of murder. And again, and lastly: "Hast thou killed and taken possession?" The prohibition is universal. There are no exemptions or exceptions. Even reasons of state are not accepted or acceptable.

I am aware of the command to "blot out the remembrance of Amalek" and the story of Samuel and Saul; and much has been made of this and other familiar prescriptions and precedents. I can only say, as I said before of King David and his treatment of the Moabites, that it is not the barbaric side of the old stories which is significant. The legal principle (Exodus xxi. 12–14; xxii. 2) is quite clear. Murder is condemned; accidental homicide condoned; killing in self-defence permitted. Life itself remains sacred. Even judicial killing is in Talmudic law so hedged about as to make it almost impossible. As for Amalek, I am glad to be able to quote a modern Jewish gloss, although I am unable to affirm that all modern Jews would accept it: "translate *not* Thou shalt blot out the *remembrance* of Amalek *but* Thou shalt blot out the *remembering* of Amalek" (i.e. cease remembering past injuries; give up always thinking of revenge); adding the remark that the very existence of this gloss is a welcome indication that some spark of the prophetic spirit is still living in Jewry.

II

It is the fashion to-day to consider all human activity from the social angle; and we hear a great deal about religion as a collective phenomenon and Judaism as a social, rather than an individual, experience. Yet in few literatures is the loneliness of the human heart depicted with greater pathos than in the Psalms, its rebelliousness with greater force than in Job. True, God "goes up with the sound of a trumpet" and appears, with thunders and lightnings, to the people as a whole assembled at the foot of the mount; but He is also revealed in the "still, small voice" and in the "panting" and "thirst" of the soul. Nor is the Hebrew Bible blind to the existence of conflicts between society and the individual: witness the agonised nonconformity of Jeremiah. Yet its faith is in the possibility of reconciliation. The *ideal* society at any rate does not swallow up the individual. On the contrary, its whole structure is conceived as providing the conditions in which the emergence of the individual becomes possible. Nor in it is law abrogated or abolished. Law becomes supreme because it takes up its seat within the completed individual. "I will put my law *in their inward parts, and in their heart* will I write it; and

I will be their God, and they shall be my people: and they shall *teach* no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they *shall all know me,* from the least of them unto the greatest of them" (Jeremiah xxxi. 33–4)—so the mediaeval thinker Maimonides, in a famous passage contained in an appendix to his commentary on Mishnah Sanhedrin X, gives his authority for his views on the state of man in the coming messianic age. And he adds a reference to Ezekiel (xxxvi. 26): "A new *heart* also will I give you, and a *new spirit* will I put within you" (the passage continuing: "And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes"). To both prophet and philosopher, divided though they are by seventeen centuries, the consummation of law lies in the refashioning of the individual. Right living thus becomes not an imposed command but a free discipline. It remains discipline ('law'); but it is yet a free activity, springing from the spontaneity of the 'heart.' The end of the whole story is the ideal of goodness 'for its own sake': "the reward of doing the right is the right, the punishment for doing the wrong, the wrong"—these and similar Talmudic phrases and sayings are repeated throughout the literature of the centuries. In the famous saying of Spinoza taken over from Maimonides: "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself."

12

Thus the Jewish doctrine of man may be best summed up in the old words "created in the image of God", and it is significant that "the one created in the image of God" is a common Rabbinic synonym for man. In this regard a saying of Rabbi Akiba may be noted: "Beloved is man, for he was created in the image of God; but it was by a special love that it was *made known to him* that he was created in the image of God." Man is not only created in the image of God but knows it; and the knowledge imposes an obligation: it gives him an ideal to live up to. However much the 'image' may be defiled, it may be 'washed' and 'made clean'; and the very consciousness of having defiled it (and that consciousness is the special quality of man as man) provides the spur to reform. The realisation of divine origin constitutes the moral sense which draws back the sinner to his Creator. Consciousness becomes conscience. "In all matters given over to the heart of man it is written (e.g. Lev. xix. 14; xxv. 17): 'thou shalt fear thy God'."

Thus man can recapture his own self ("return, ye erring children"; "let the wicked forsake his way"; "turn yourselves and live"), and he has a self to recapture; and we come back to the conception of personality and responsibility which is at the heart of practical morals.

13

This conception rests for Judaism on the idea of creation, and we may consider three passages, taken from three different epochs, which would seem to draw out the implications of this primary fact.

(α)

The spirit of God hath made me,
And the breath of the Almighty giveth me life.
If thou canst, answer thou me;
Set thy words in order before me, stand forth.
Behold, I am towards God even as thou art:
I also am formed out of the clay.
Behold, my terror shall not make thee afraid,
Neither shall my pressure be heavy upon thee. (Job. xxxiii. 4–7.)

All men are created by the one God and formed out of the one clay: they can therefore speak to one another without "terror" or "pressure." It was Carlyle, I believe, who quoted as the watchword of democracy the divine call to the prophet (Ezek. ii. 1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak with thee." The Rabbis put the point even more directly. "It is written" (Gen. v. 1), they say: "'This is the book of the generations of Adam' [in Hebrew, Adam = man]. Priest, Levite or Israelite is *not* mentioned here; only *man*."

(β)

My second passage is from the Mishnah (San. iv. 5):

And therefore was man created one, in order to teach us that he who destroys one human being is considered as if he had destroyed a whole world, and he who preserves one human being is considered as if he had preserved a whole world; and for the sake of the general peace, so that no one should say to his neighbour, my father was greater than thine; and in order that sceptics should not say there are many gods in heaven; and in order to declare the greatness of God: for a man impresses many impressions with one seal and they are all alike to one another, but God impressed every man with the seal of the first man yet not one of them is like another; and therefore each individual man should say: for me was the world created.

This passage lays down, in quaint and simple fashion, the fact of human diversity notwithstanding the equality of all. Men, *because they are the creation of God,* are individuals. They are not parts of man-made machines, interchangeable with one another or completely definable in terms of a manufacturer's catalogue. We are, each one of us, different from each other, and in the difference lies the sign-manual of divine (as opposed to mere human) creativity. In this sense individuality is the end. For it was the "world created."

(γ)

But thirdly and lastly, this individuality is not individualism. On the contrary, it means social responsibility. And for this I call to witness a Talmudic idea embodied in Maimonides' code:

> Every single man has merits and sins. If his merits outweigh his sins, he is righteous; if his sins his merits, he is wicked. If they balance, he is between the two. And so it is with a community. If the merits of all its inhabitants are more than their sins, it is righteous; if their sins are more, it is wicked. And so too is it with the whole world.
>
> Therefore should each man see himself as half-righteous and half-sinful. If he sins one sin, he inclines himself and the whole world to the bad and brings it to destruction; if he performs one meritorious deed, he inclines himself and the whole world to the good and thus brings himself and them to deliverance and salvation.

This passage comes from the Regulations concerning Repentance (cap. iii) laid down at the end of the first book of the code, and one may ask, as before, whether such matters as repentance can be regulated, and what place they can hold in a legal code. The arithmetical approach also is again worthy of note and may perhaps arouse a smile: our actions are in a precise balance, and one good or bad deed can incline the scale.

But is not the thought a striking, nay, even a salutary, one, and is it not strikingly, even unforgettably, expressed? Each man is responsible for his own actions; but each one of his actions affects the fate of the community of which he is a part, eventually indeed the fate of the whole of humanity. The great Hebraising, but non-Jewish, poet spoke of one's every deed done as in "the great taskmaster's eye." Here we have no taskmaster, but rather a father ("like as a father pitieth his children"; "as one whom his mother comforteth"); or better still, perhaps, in the fundamental Rabbinic term which fills the Jewish prayer book, "*our* Father"; or, better even still, in the complete and truly significant phrase, "our Father *and King*", king of our society and father of its citizens.

And He is King and Father because He is Creator; and, because Creator, He is not tied down to our fumbling regulations and tentative laws, but is the author and promulgator of the immutable Law to be "written" one day "in the heart" of men and "put in their inward parts."

14

I seem to be raising the theological spectre of the issue between "transcendence" and "immanence"; but Judaism was never rigidly consistent on its theoretical side and was always inclined to override this and other apparent contradictions. There is a simplicity in its approach which at times borders on the naïve but

which none the less strikes deep. Its God is both beyond and within; both " at hand " and " afar off " (Jer. xxiii. 23).

This is brought home in a remarkable Talmudic passage (Meg. 31), read every Saturday evening at the end of the service for the conclusion of the Sabbath (*Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, trans. Singer, pp. 214–15), and with it we may bring these brief notes to an end:

> Rabbi Jochanan said, In every passage where thou findest the greatness of God mentioned, there thou findest also his humility. This is written in the Law, repeated in the Prophets, and a third time stated in the Writings.
>
> It is written in the Law, For the Lord your God, he is God of gods, and Lord of lords, the great, mighty and revered God, who regardeth not persons, nor taketh a bribe. And it is written afterwards, He doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and loveth the stranger, in giving him food and raiment.
>
> It is repeated in the Prophets, as it is written, For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, and whose name is holy, I dwell in the high and holy place; with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones.
>
> It is a third time stated in the Writings, Sing unto God, sing praises unto his name: extol ye him that rideth upon the heavens by his name Jah, and rejoice before him. And it is written afterwards, A father of the fatherless, and a judge of the widows, is God in his holy habitation.

In passages such as these (and how well Rabbi Jochanan understood the art of selection!) religion and morals come together. There is here no attempt at proof or scientific demonstration; nor is there any question of competition between Judaism and other creeds—some of the phases used are said indeed by the learned to derive from the ancient Babylonian. But there would seem to be enshrined in them the very essence of the religious outlook upon the relationship between God and man and the relationship obtaining between them.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

ISLAM[1]

The Teaching of the Koran

In order to have a clear conception of moral education in Islam, it is essential to make a presentation of the basis of moral philosophy in this religion.

Islam is the name of the religion revealed to the Arabian Prophet, Muhammad, at the age of forty, more than six centuries after the birth of Christ. It is a professed belief by the Muslims that the mission of Muhammad is divine, revealed to him by Allah, the Arabic name for God, in order to disseminate it among his people in Arabia, and among any other communities he might contact abroad. Hence Islam is considered to be the religion suitable for all communities, and at all ages. It recognises both Judaism and Christianity as equally divine, and assumes towards them a reformatory character; the character of a religion appearing at a moment when deviation from the right path of God, and social and moral corruptions, were prevalent. It is thus declared to consist of a combination of faith and conduct: the faith in Allah, the only God, and Muhammad his apostle, and the conduct of the individual towards Allah and towards his fellow-beings. From the outset, it was clear that Islam aimed at regulating the relations between man and God on one hand, and man and his fellows on the other. This was expressly laid down in the Holy Book, the Koran. It should be clearly borne in mind that the Koran is the basis of all Muslim thoughts, religious and political institutions, civil and commercial codes, as well as social and moral principles. Since the Koran is both the inspiration and word of God, it follows that what it contains of moral precepts is imperative, final, and absolute. The moral philosophy of Islam, thus, originates in the Koran. It is, therefore, incumbent on every believer to conform in his daily behaviour to the moral injunctions, positive or negative, set for him in his Holy Book. One can qualify the moral precepts of Islam as religio-moral; for it is difficult to dissociate their religious nature from the moral one. An act is judged as being right or wrong not merely on moral grounds, but also, and above

[1] The writer of this article, though Muslim by creed, endeavours to present to the reader a disinterested exposition of the subject, dealing with it from an historical and philosophical angle.

all, on those of religion. We take as an example a wine-drinker. Since wine-drinking is prohibited in Islam, a wine-drinker is considered to be a sinner whose act displeases God. At the same time he is looked upon by the Muslim community as having committed something morally wrong, and indecent. There are, on the other hand, cases which can be judged only on their religious merit or demerit. For instance, it is prohibited to eat certain foods, according to the Koranic verse, "Forbidden to you is that which dies of itself, and blood, and flesh of swine. . . ." Should a Muslim eat any of these forbidden foods he would be religiously, but not morally, wrong. The criterion, then, seems to be that an act will be judged religiously, but not morally, right or wrong when it is '*intransitive*', i.e. its effect is confined to the doer. But it will be judged both religiously and morally right or wrong when it is '*transitive*', i.e. it has an effect on other people besides the doer.

The Koran declares certain acts as being strictly prohibited, whereas others it actually enjoins. The former category includes theft, hypocrisy, murder, intoxication, usury, gambling, and adultery. Of the latter we have truthfulness, justice, patience, tolerance, forgiveness, and honesty. It may be fitting to quote here some verses from the Koran which bear some moral significance.

And do not commit fornication, surely it is an indecency, and evil is the way. And do not kill anyone whom Allah has forbidden. And do not handle the property of the orphan except in a goodly way till he attains his maturity. And fulfil your promises, for surely everybody shall be questioned about his promises. And give full measure when you measure out, and weigh with a true balance, this is fair and better in the end (*Verses 32–5, Chapter 17*).

O you believers! intoxication and gambling and sacrificing to stones set up, and dividing by arrows are only uncleanness, and devil's work; shun them so that you may be successful (*Verse 90, Chapter 5*).

Allah has promised the hypocritical men and hypocritical women and the unbelievers the fire of hell to abide therein, and Allah has cursed them . . . (*Verse 68, Chapter 9*).

And Allah has allowed trading and forbidden usury. Allah does not bless usury, and He causes charitable deeds to prosper, and Allah does not love any ungrateful sinner (*Verse 276, Chapter 2*).

Do not conceal testimony, and whoever conceals it, his heart is surely sinful (*Verse 283, Chapter 2*).

Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to those who have right over them, and that when you judge between people you judge with justice (*Verse 58, Chapter 4*).

And be good to the parents, and to the near of kin, and the orphans and the needy and the neighbour of your kin and the alien neighbour and the companion in a journey and the wayfarer and your slaves; surely Allah does not love him who is proud and boastful (*Verse 36, Chapter 4*).

And when you are greeted greet back in a better way or return the same greeting; surely Allah takes account of all things (*Verse 86, Chapter 4*).

O you believers! Stand fast to justice when you bear witness before God, though it be against yourselves, or your parents or your kindred, whether the party be rich or poor, God is more responsible to them both. Therefore follow not passion, lest you swerve from truth (*Verse 135, Chapter 4*).

O you believers! Do not enter houses other than your own until you have asked permission and saluted their inmates; this is better for you, that you may be mindful. But if you do not find anyone therein, then do not enter until permission is given, and if it is said: go back, then go back . . . (*Verses 27–8, Chapter 24*).

The preceding verses and many others are to be found scattered in the chapters of the Koran; in them is laid the foundations of Islamic morals. In the same work it is also stated that every individual is responsible for his deeds in accordance with his abilities. Should he be forced to act contrary to the moral teachings he is forgiven. "Every soul shall bear the good and the evil for which it has laboured, and God will burden none beyond his power." [2]

Islam, like both Judaism and Christianity, emphasises the resurrection of the dead. After resurrection, comes the Day of Judgment, and the Muslim will be judged, then rewarded or punished according to the nature of his behaviour in this mortal world. "And he who has done an atom's weight of good shall see it. And he who has done an atom's weight of evil shall see it.[3]

Two factors control the behaviour of the Muslim: one is his religio-moral conscience and the other is the reward or punishment he will receive in the eternal life after resurrection. This conception of moral consequences on the part of the Muslim accounts for his scrupulous behaviour. There are, it is true, cases of wrong deeds which are punishable in this world by religious authority, such as stealing and committing adultery. "As for the man who steals and the woman who steals, cut off their hands as a punishment for what they have earned." "As for the fornicatress and the fornicator, flog each of them, giving a hundred stripes and let not pity for them detain you in the matter of obedience to Allah." The Koran has prescribed certain punishments, which are considered the right of God, for disregarding certain moral precepts. These punishments are:

1. Stoning or scourging for illicit intercourse.
2. Scourging for falsely accusing a married woman of adultery.
3. The same punishment for the drinking of wine and other intoxicating liquors.
4. Cutting off the hands for theft.
5. Various other punishments for robbery, which differ according to circumstances.

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[2] Verses 18–20, Chapter 92.
[3] Verses 7–8, Chapter 99.

We shall see later how the execution of these punishments was carried out. The rest of the moral breaches were left without any specific punishment in this world.

During the reign of the four Orthodox Caliphs—Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali—the application of these punishments was observed with due precision and accuracy. Caliph Omar Ibn Al Khattab, for instance, is reported to have scourged his son for committing adultery. The son, however, died during the procedure, but the father did not stop. He continued, saying: this punishment is God's right and I must fully discharge it. Gradually the practice of punishing the sinners, in the way prescribed in the Koran, slackened, petered out, and finally ceased to be. With the exception of Arabia, no Muslim country, at the present time, cuts off the hands of the thief. There are naturally reasons for the disappearance of these religious punishments, to which reasons we shall refer later.

We have already mentioned that the moral precepts of Islam have their religious sanction. It is pertinent in this connection to say that, even the ritual practices which could be looked upon as purely devotional, such as prayers and fasting, have been considered by moral rationalists as having certain moral significance attached to them. In prayers, for instance, the Muslim stands or prostrates himself submissively before God, asking His forgiveness for whatever sins or immoral deeds he has done. During prayers, the worshipper meditates and keeps his thoughts from wandering into the regions of the material; thus lifting up his soul and purifying his character. These are moments of repentance and reflection, when the worshipper feels the insignificance of the worldly material which is the cause of all troubles. The Koran has also set forth the moral value of prayers, saying: "Prayer prevents from committing crimes and doing what is blameable, and the remembering of God is surely a most sacred duty." [4] This, of course, applies to the true prayer which comes direct from the heart; for according to the saying of the Prophet, "God accepts only those prayers offered with understanding and true devotional spirit." The same can be said also of fasting. It is through fasting that the believer realises the pangs of hunger and the sufferings of the poor. As a consequence of fasting, the Muslim will give generously to the poor and needy.

Moral Application

Enough for the fundamental moral principles mentioned in the Koran. The Muslims look upon the character of the Prophet as an ideal example to be followed, for Allah has addressed him, saying: "And most surely you have sublime character." The

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[4] Verse 45, Chapter 29.

Muslims, on the other hand, are enjoined to imitate the behaviour of their teacher, the Prophet. " Verily you have in the Messenger of God a good model." In the opinion of the Muslims, Muhammad's sayings, the Traditions, come next to the Koran in authority and reverence. After his death, every endeavour was made to preserve the Traditions through learning them by heart, and transmitting them from one reliable person to another, and finally writing them down. The Traditions supplement the Koran, and partly explain its ideas and laws. They contain a wealth of moral teachings, and the Muslims derive a great portion of their ethical code from them as well as from the practice of the Prophet. It is related that he said of himself, " I have been sent to bring good morals to perfection." This saying indicates clearly that a part of Muhammad's mission is the uplifting of morality. Thus we have in the Traditions another source of Islamic morals. It was not long before the collectors of these Traditions began to classify them according to their authenticity and contents. One would find in the collection of a traditionist like Al-Bukhary (died A.D. 870) several chapters dealing with social and ethical behaviour. It may be fitting to quote here examples of these sayings.

> The most perfect of the believers in faith is the best of them in moral excellence, and the best of you are the kindest of you to their wives.
>
> You will see the faithful in their having mercy for one another and in their love for one another and in their kindness towards one another like the body; when one member of it ails, the entire body ails, one part calling out the other with sleeplessness and fever.
>
> Do not hate one another, and do not be jealous of one another, and do not boycott one another, and be servants of God, brethren; and it is not lawful for a Muslim that he should sever his relations with his Muslim brother for more than three days.
>
> Your slaves are your brethren, God has placed them under your control; so whoever has his brother under his control should feed him from what he eats and should give him clothes to wear from what he wears, and do not impose on them a task which should overpower them, and if you impose on them such a task then help them in doing it.
>
> God has no mercy on him who is not merciful to men.
>
> The younger one should start saluting the older one, and the one who is going along the one who is sitting, and the smaller group the larger group.

It is clear from studying the Traditions that they contain not only moral teaching in the narrow sense of morals, but embrace also courtesy and good manners. One can conclude, however, that the life of the Muslim and his daily behaviour find ample guidance in both the Koran and the Traditions.

The Muslim community of the first century of Islam, at least, drew its social and moral principles entirely from the Holy Book, the Traditions, and the conduct of the Prophet and his companions.

The teachers and scholars of that period constantly referred to these sources whenever they were confronted with a social or moral question. In fact, the whole life of the Muslim was controlled by his religion, whose ethics might be summed up in the formula "Believe and do right."

Another source, worth mentioning, which contains ethical maxims and aphorisms, is the Arabic literature; poetry, proverbs, fables, and orations. The Arabs are, by nature, attached to, and proud of, their literature and can easily be moved by its contents. Although pre-Islamic ethical maxims, expressed in literature, were not explicitly sanctioned by religion, they—as well as the post-Islamic—were accepted and considered practically valid. It is not uncommon, even to-day, to hear a Muslim approve or disapprove of an action by quoting a poetic verse or a proverb.

Education and Moral Training

From the early years of Islam right up to the present day the mosque has played an important role in the life of the people. It was not the place of worship and devotion only; it was also the educational centre for all believers, and to it the people went for devotion and learning. The Friday ceremony, which every adult had to attend, usually depicted the faulty conduct of the Muslims, criticised it, and indicated the righteous way, which they should follow. It was, in fact, a theological and moral ceremony; a means of ethical education. There was also the actual teaching in the mosque. The Koran and Traditions were the first and foremost subjects of learning; for in them the Muslims found what concerned them in the way of belief and conduct. They would sit in a circle round the teacher, who recited from the Koran or Traditions and explained his text. Both students and teachers learned the Holy Book and Traditions by heart; and the recitation of the former was considered both devotional and disciplinary. Reading the Koran in a solemn way, as it has always been the practice, would arouse in the reader noble feelings towards his fellow-beings, awakening his inner consciousness and his moral sense. It was not the mere automatic utterance of the text that mattered, nay, it was what Al-Ghazali—the great philosopher and theologian—said, "that in reading the sacred book heart and intelligence must work together; the lips only utter the words, but intelligence helps in the due appreciation of their meaning, the heart in paying obedience to the dictation of duty." Moral education was then received in the mosque, the centre of learning, along with the acquisition of knowledge. The teacher himself set his pupils a good example, for he was more of a spiritual leader than a lecturer. He would perform the prayers with them, then sit down and instruct them in the subjects of faith and conduct. As early as the year 17 of the Muslim era, Omar the Caliph sent teachers of the Koran in all

directions and ordered the people to attend their lessons. From the very beginning, education involved admonition and training in the right way of living. In interpreting the Koran, the scholars inculcated the habit of ethical behaviour. Their advice and guidance, in fact, continued the moral instruction given to the people earlier by the Prophet and his companions. With the coming of the second century of Islam, mosques all over the Muslim world were performing their educational function, while people thronged to them from all over. In Mecca, Medina, Damascus, Basra, Kufa, Baghdad, Balkh, Herat, Fustat, Tunis, and Granada, the mosques were actively teaching and preaching religious and secular subjects.

Apart from the mosque there existed small junior schools (called *Katatib*, i.e. *Kuttab*), to which children used to go in order to be initiated in reading, writing, and other subjects. Famous men like Al-Haggag ibn Yousuf, Al-Kumeit, and Addahak ibn Mizrah are said to have been schoolmasters. Of the main subjects taught in these junior schools (*Katatib*), '*Adab*' is one. The term '*Adab*' means the noble and humane tendency of the character and its manifestation in the conduct of life and social intercourse. It is the art of refined behaviour befitting differing circumstances. It embraces more than ethics. At that time no science of human psychology was known to the teachers, and they naturally relied in training their pupils' character on didactic methods and admonition. Since the main function of these junior schools was to teach refinement they were called 'the assemblies of refinement', or in Arabic '*Majalis Al-Adab*.' The well-to-do parents did not send their children to school; they invited private teachers for them. These teachers were more concerned with the formation of their pupils' character than with mere intellectual teaching. They were tutors whose main interest was to cultivate and foster in their pupils ethical habits and moral sense.

Modifications of Original Islam

After the great conquests of Islam in the East and West, the Muslim world covered an enormous area, extending from India to the Pyrenees. Islam found in the newly conquered countries, Persia, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain, not only legal and political institutions, but also systems of morals, and long-established standards of ethics, as well as a wealth of culture and literature. This is the beginning of a new phase in the history and philosophy of moral conception in Islam. Although they might have been genuine as far as faith was concerned, the newly converted Muslims found it difficult to shape their conduct and make it fit into the new frame of Muslim morality. On the other hand, a new and intellectual movement started and found encouragement in the reign of Al-Mansour (A.D. 754–75). The object of this

movement was to translate into Arabic, from the languages of the conquered peoples, important works in science, literature, and philosophy. The pioneers of this movement were Muslim Arabs and numbers of Christian and Jewish scholars who became converts. They began by translating into Arabic, from Greek, Syriac, and Persian, scientific and philosophic works of great scholars. This movement attained its climax under Al-Mamun (813–33). Of the Greek philosophy, we are told, treatises on moral philosophy were translated such as the Nicomachean *Ethics*, the *Magna Moralia*, and other works by Eudemus. The result of introducing through translations foreign philosophical and moral ideas appeared in the liberal attitude adopted by some Muslim scholars in discussing theological and ethical matters. Already a group of liberal thinkers had formed a school: I mean the Dissenters or Mutazilah—the Rationalists of Islam. The first half of the second century witnessed the rise of this school. The idea that everything, not even excepting evil and sin, is preordained and brought to pass by God dominated the popular mind at that time. The Mutazilah rejected the idea, and argued that if all human acts were the product of the divine decree, it was paradoxical that man should be punished for his wrong deeds. They further affirmed that man was a free agent and there was no eternal law as regards human actions, and that divine ordinances which regulated the conduct of men were the results of growth and development, and were subject to the same process of change to which the Creator subjected the universe at large. They found in the Koran verses in support of their argument, such as " God will not burden any soul beyond its power. It shall enjoy the good which it has acquired, and it shall bear the evil for the acquirement of which it laboured." Although they did not depart from the established moral principles of Islam, the Mutazilah loosened the illiberal formalism to which the jurists had clung, and emancipated the human intellect from the shackles which traditional scholars were beginning to place upon it. From the point of view of moral conception, however, the Mutazilah introduced the element of rationalism in Islamic morality. We must remember that Islamic morals belong to the category designated 'theological', that is, having their ground in the will of God, and not in the nature of the consequences involved in regarding or disregarding them. These morals are looked upon as being for the good of man, but they are for his good because they are divine. Another category is designated 'rational', a term which signifies that to be moral is not to seek to satisfy a desire for anything however good, or to comply with an outside rule, but to obey a dictate of reason determined by nothing outside its own rationality. The school of the Mutazilah adopted an attitude halfway between the two categories, and assumed that what was rationally good for the human being became, through the agency of God, a divine law.

Thus the moral principles of Islam are not only divine but also rational. The doctrine of free will thus becomes a rational determinism. An action is good when reason finds it good or beautiful, and action is evil when reason finds it evil or repulsive; in short, moral distinctions do not depend upon the will of God. Furthermore, they found in the Caliph Mamun an ardent patron, who not only adopted their doctrines but caused most of the judges and doctors of Baghdad, either from conviction or from policy, to accept their views.

Brothers of Purity

Another small body of thinkers is worthy of mention on account of their philosophical views with regard to Islamic morals and the teaching thereof. They called themselves the ' Brothers of Purity.' This ' Brotherhood ' was established in Basra towards the end of the tenth century. None but men of unsullied character and of the purest morals were admitted to its membership. They discussed philosophical and ethical subjects with a catholicity of spirit and breadth of view which would be creditable even in modern times. They issued their ideas and ideals in small treatises known as the ' *Tracts of the Brothers of Purity and Friends of Sincerity* ', which cover a wide range of knowledge including science, arts, philosophy, logic, astronomy, and many other subjects. It is with their moral ideals and the method of attaining them that we are more concerned. They are revealed in their self-study and in the purification of human thought from all impurity. Moral endowments, they maintain, are to be prized above intellectual gifts, and the strength of soul founded upon patient self-discipline and self-control should be regarded as the highest of virtues. Faith without work, knowing without doing, are vain. Patience and forbearance, mildness and loving gentleness, justice, mercy, and truth, the sublimity of virtue, the sacrifice of self for others are taught in every line of their treatises. Hypocrisy and deceit, envy and boasting, tyranny and falsehood are reprobated on every page. The whole bulk of their ethical writings is pervaded by a purity of sentiment, a fervent love of humanity, an earnest faith in the progress of man, and a universal charity embracing even the brute creation in its fold.

The psychology underlying the theory of their morals is that man's conduct is determined by the following four agencies:

(1) *The bodily construction.*—The body, they assume, is composed of four elements, and a person whose body contains much earth will be harsh and greedy, while another with a large proportion of water will be gentle, and so on. This physiological conception of theirs reminds us of the older Greek theory of the four humours prevalent also in the Middle Ages.

(2) *The climate.*—Those who live in a northern climate have more courage than those in southern lands.

(3) *Education.*—It has an effect in modifying man's disposition with regard to his conduct.

(4) *The stars.*—They are indeed the most powerful of all agencies, since the other three are dependent upon them. Even education, which influences the natural constitution, is affected by the heavenly bodies and their relative positions.

All this holds good as far as the first stage of natural morality, in which conduct is instinctively good or bad. But the soul can raise itself above nature, and reach the second or psychical stage where man has freedom of choice; his deeds are praised or blamed according to their quality. Should a man reach the third stage and that of rational deliberation, he acts either wisely or foolishly, nobly or basely. Finally, the fourth stage or highest stage is that of the divine cosmic order conformed to by godly prophets and holy agents, and a man is rewarded or punished according as he does or does not associate himself with them in the endeavour to become, as far as in him lies, like God.

This theory had a strong appeal to the members of the Brethren of Purity, although it had little or no publicity outside them, since their activities were rather secret.

'Sufism'

Apart from these two schools, which are marked out by their philosophical and moral conceptions, there emerged and grew up a system of asceticism and mysticism known in Islam as 'Sufism.' It made its appearance about the second half of the eighth century, and marked a reaction against the materialistic and worldly trends to which the Muslims of that time were inclined. The Sufi mystic seeks to realise the actual union of the soul with God, and expects to reach this stage by complete abstraction through methodical training in practice of ecstatic Sufism. Having reached the stage of union with God the mystic (Sufi) considers himself exempted from the practice of external religious duties. He sees in them only allegories and transient means in themselves. The external legal rites, says the Sufi, must yield place to the spiritual practices of mysticism, to spontaneous and not 'mercenary' works of the legal religion, as he designates them. Since there is no need to maintain the external rites once the end is attained, he holds that the intention is more important than the act, and that obedience is better than observance. The moral charge against Sufism is that it takes refuge in what is called spiritual meditation and divine union to the sacrifice of the recognised practical ethics. It so happened that the system of Sufism eventually attracted to it masses of ignorant people all over the Muslim world. One could find fraternal orders penetrating even into the very heart of heathen territories. The balance of early Islamic morals was tilted in favour of Sufism, which gradually degenerated and departed from the fine

ideals of its predecessors. This one can see from reading the literature of Sufism in the period fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, when many of the adherents of the system were false [5] and mere charlatans. It seems as though the morals of that time suffered from the practice of so many ignorant and sham Sufis who claimed to be leaders of fraternal paths, and who took over the initiation of their spiritual disciples. They thought that in the state of ecstasy and spiritual union they would be beyond blame, and whatever wrong they committed would be pardonable. No doubt there have always been the good and pious mystics whose mission is not only self-perfection, but also the teaching and guiding of others into the right path. On the other hand, we find those who abuse the institution by deliberate lying, by pretending to know the future, and to heal the sick, by cheating, sexual licence, stealing, vulgar and blasphemous utterances, physical and mental indolence, and by hypocrisy. In the absence of any positive moral criterion any kind of behaviour is possible.

The three preceding schools and many others show that inside Islam there existed different trends of theological, philosophical, and moral thought; each trend has its followers. With the rapid spreading of schools and other educational centres in the Muslim world from the beginning of the second century A.H. (of the Muslim era), the spreading of knowledge and moral education went on side by side. Each sect, system, or school of thought enjoined its own philosophy of morality, and preached its ideals. In spite of their diverse attitudes these different schools never abandoned the ethical principles set forth in the Koran and Traditions.

We have no records of the methods parents used in the moral education of their children. According to the Muslim tradition, however, parents are responsible for bringing up their children, by example and teaching, in the right way of living. They should see that they acquire and practise the common virtues, and should approve and encourage them in this direction. They should also see that their children avoid improper conduct and do not associate with bad companions, by discouraging or punishing them for it.

Besides the actual admonition and teaching of morals in the mosques, schools, and other educational centres, and the moral supervision of the parents over their children, many books on ethics (*Akhlaq*) have been written or translated and widely read. Some of these books are treatises dealing with particular categories of individuals, such as those dealing with the conduct of princely personages, the rules of prudent behaviour at court, the morals of pious men, the wise treatment of merchants, or the polite intercourse among friends. Collections of biographies of leading characters in Islam, with emphasis on the moral side of their lives,

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[5] Tabaqat El Sharany.

as well as books of ethical aphorisms and testaments, are also popular.

The prevalence of the mystic system in its corrupted form, which introduced superstitions and illegal practices into Islam, alarmed many of the orthodox Muslim scholars and jurists. It was felt that a reaction was necessary in order to arrest this downhill movement. In the eighteenth and following centuries there arose in Arabia, Egypt, and India some religious reformers calling for the return to the early theology and morals of Islam. Their endeavours, along with the influx of material civilisation, and the gradual spread of education, have succeeded in reducing the influence of Sufism and in making the people conscious of its superficiality: "From the modern secular literature of Egypt it would be easy to make a large collection of passages in which the trickery and the deplorable moral influence of the popular sheikhs (Sufis) are pilloried."

European Influence

Moreover, European civilisation has already been finding suitable ground for its seeds in the Muslim lands which were ruled by Western powers. Almost every Muslim country has been subjected to one form or another of European domination, with the result that non-Muslim ideas and practices have found their way into the life of the people. The banking system, for instance, brought with it the taking of interest, which is regarded by strict jurists as a kind of usury. Wine-shops have been opened and officially licensed. Night clubs for gambling, drinking, and every kind of illicit indulgence have found recognition.

But the picture is not all as black as that; it has its brighter side. European education, with its modern subjects and scientific methods, has been favourably accepted by the Muslim countries. In most of these there exist to-day two systems of education: one secular or European and the other religious or indigenous. European education has been found more practical, and more suitable for modern life; thus has been more attractive. Even in religious schools and colleges, the students have been crying out for the modernisation of their educational system, in order to meet the demands of the new civilisation. As far as moral education is concerned, in the schools of both systems formal religious and ethical teaching is given, though more extensively in the indigenous than in the secular. Student teachers receive, in the training colleges and institutes of education, instruction in the psychology and pedagogy of character training and formation. This they apply diligently in teaching the traditional Islamic morality. But the poor pupil is faced with a puzzling situation in that he is living in two different worlds: the world inside the school and the world outside, the world of theory and the world of reality.

In the outside world he sees licensed bars opened to the public

at regular hours approved by the state. He sees professional prostitutes practise their trade habitually and openly. He sees foreign films displaying quite shamelessly sexual passion and lust in all their nakedness. He sees vices thriving and immorality flourishing.

Standing at the cross-roads of morality, the pupil sees all this, puzzled and helpless, and looks inside and outside the school, but knows not which road to follow.

ABDEL AZIZ ABDEL MEGUID.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

HINDUISM

For a long time it has been generally the practice on the part of both Oriental and European authors to associate the Western and Indian forms of civilisation and thought respectively with an active and affirmative philosophy of life on the one hand, and a pessimistic and "other-worldly" one on the other. Frequently, too, Western positivism, naturalism, secularism, and materialism are confronted with the inborn spirituality, metaphysical idealism, mysticism, and intuitionalism of the East.

It is obvious that no such hard-and-fast distinctions between East and West can be made. They are a matter of emphasis rather than fact. Nowhere can the manifold expressions of human thought be imprisoned in watertight compartments. The history of human ideas evolves by contrasts. Although it is true that within the common frame of reference of a particular civilisation new philosophies grow on the basis of the old, they are mostly created in critical opposition to prevailing ideas. There is no doubt that to a large extent modern Western civilisation is dynamic, positivistic, and scientific. Its deeper and essential impulses, however, are derived from a basic philosophical idealism—both Christian and humanistic—which in a perpetual struggle with rigid traditionalism has created the modes of free thought essential to human progress.

It is unquestionable, on the other hand, that from the early days of its known history the essence of higher Indian culture was based on an unbroken spiritual tradition, which in various ways determined all the forms of its variegated life as well as the behaviour patterns of the people. In subsequent ages this tradition gave rise to many systems of philosophical thought, which were either the elaboration of the lofty, though not always consistent, ideas and ideals given in the commonly accepted divine revelation, or evolved in opposition to that revelation. It has been observed that the history of these philosophical systems was the history of its conflicts, which in itself is indicative of freedom of thought. Yet India is a land of paradox. Time and again the ideals of spiritual liberty broke through the trammels of tradition. Time and again, also, the new expressions of the ancient values were subsequently incorporated in and transmitted through the channels of that selfsame tradition embodied in a rigid social system. India's problem

was never or hardly ever the problem of freedom of thought as such. Hinduism in its totality covers virtually every conceivable type of creed, religious and philosophical. Its basic problem was the right application of spiritual freedom to its rigid social structure, ensnared in a complex of magic-religious fixations which has kept a considerable part of its population in a state of utter abjection. Only to-day more favourable conditions have been created to bring about this application in a modern democratic spirit. India's new constitution is certainly a wonderful document, embodying some of the best human aspirations of both East and West and containing a section on " Fundamental Rights ". Undoubtedly the basic ideals of the recent national struggle have greatly influenced the character of this constitution. More important is the fact that there are many departures from the old-established traditions of the country, and many revolutionary elements. One section reads: " The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, or sex; there shall be equality of opportunity to all citizens in matters of employment under the State; the practice of untouchability in any form is forbidden."

The new India strives to be a modern democratic nation on an equal level with the modern nations of the West, and with a definite role in world affairs. Its position and prestige in the United Nations as well as in the British Commonwealth testify to that fact. Furthermore, at the Asian Relations Conference of New Delhi (1947) Prime Minister Nehru called India both geographically and culturally " the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia ". In the preamble to the Constitution it is said that the task of government and people is to secure to all citizens social, economic, and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote, among them all, fraternity which will assure the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. It is hardly relevant to ask here whether these ideals are occidental or oriental in character. They certainly form part of the political and ethical doctrines of the advanced democracies of the West. This tends to indicate that East and West, representing different types of culture and attitudes of life, can no longer be viewed merely in terms of geography. A common frame of moral responsibility is in its formative stages, in spite of all conflicts and deep-seated resentments emanating from the past. It is therefore more important to ask whether these conceptions have a real basis in the age-old customs and patterns of culture of the people, and an emotional appeal to their transmitted ways of thinking. To the degree that they will be translated from words into acts, bringing about an essential improvement in the living conditions of the masses, there is no doubt as to their ultimate acceptance. How-

ever, a full realisation of these principles will entail a basic change in the Hindu institutional structure, which is ingrained in the minds of the people. This structure has survived, more or less integrally, all the upheavals and vicissitudes of its long history. It is a well-known fact that certain fundamental democratic ideas cannot be introduced merely by legislation. Rather, we are concerned here with a process of slow and far-reaching education. On the one hand, a hundred and fifty years of British rule have been responsible for excellent achievements in the fields of administration, of jurisprudence, of technology, and political science. Yet no " new form of civilisation " materialised. On the other hand, the underlying principles of the caste system provided ample means for creating a strong sense of democracy based on the rule of law.

Nevertheless, here too this democratic inclination was entirely unable to purify this system from its own abuses. The spread of modern democracy among the peoples of Asia proceeds concurrently with the evolution of new ways of life. The impact of the new ideals on the traditional values sets in motion a process of acculturation with all the attendant dangers of unsettling the stability of the social organisation. It makes undoubtedly a fundamental psychological difference whether such innovations are brought about by their own national leading groups or by some enlightened form of colonial administration which nowhere has been able to realise fully this desired result. Still, the problems inherent in all acculturational processes remain to a large extent the same. This is certainly true with regard to Hinduism, which by all too simple definition may be called the Indian (non-Muslim) way of life, determining all the inner contradictions of its social and spiritual existence.

The question of what Hinduism really is is extremely difficult to answer. If one consults even a fraction of the overwhelming mass of scholarly and popular literature on the subject one will meet with a great variety of opinion, ranging from the highest admiration for the speculative, imaginative, and aesthetic genius of the people to a total rejection of its " superstitions and idolatry " and the " non-moral or unethical " character of its philosophy. Many authors extol the spiritual unity of Hindu thought, and others regard both the religious and social life of India as the confused total of local traditions, the history of which, far from being written, is hardly possible to write. In the opinion of the well-known scholar, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, a faithful account of Hinduism might well be given in the form of a categorical denial of most of the statements that have been made about it. In his book *The Discovery of India,* Jawaharlal Nehru observes that Hinduism, as a faith, is vague, amorphous, many-sided, all things to all men. According to him it is hardly possible to define it, as

indeed to say definitely whether it is a religion or not in the usual sense of the word. Its essential spirit seems to be to live and to let live. According to Professor S. Radhakṛishṇan, Hinduism is comprehensive and synthetic, seeking unity not in a common creed but in a common quest for truth. It is more a way of life than a form of thought. It insists not on religious conformity but on a spiritual and ethical outlook on life. It is a fellowship of all who accept the law of right and earnestly seek for truth. Similarly, Mahatma Gandhi defined Hinduism as a search after truth through non-violent means. " A man may not believe in God and still call himself a Hindu. Hinduism is the religion of truth. Truth is God. Denial of God we have known. Denial of Truth we have not known." Such statements could be increased indefinitely. Contradictory as they are they all contain a measure of truth. The fact is that Hinduism—as an anthropological process—is a loose integration of the successive stages of its own past, reaching back to the dawn of antiquity. It is the result of the interaction of distinct currents of civilisation—presumably Munda, Dravidian, and Aryan—time and again traversed by foreign cultural cross-currents. In spite of this interaction, a complete interfusion was never realised. Consequently, Hinduism has a strongly dual character, ranging from primitive to highly developed. Juxtaposed, it comprises all the constituents of a great civilisation and all the elements of primitive society as embodied in the primitive tribes. India is studded with local cults of heterogeneous and very ancient origin—still very badly known—in which the primitive and the " higher " elements converge. They form a rich field for the study of the process of absorption, assimilation, acculturation, sublimation, and decadence, which is an outstanding feature of Hinduism through the ages. This process is rooted in certain paradoxical aspects of Indian philosophy, which is at once highly flexible and highly rigid. The Hindu social system, being the basic element of Indian (non-Muslim) life, must be understood in terms of this socio-philosophical process, owing to which it has tended to perpetuate the dual—i.e. developed and integrated, primitive and pluriform—character of Hindu society.

India, during its periods of greatness, created a marvellous literature and a wonderful art. In addition to the overwhelming mass of folk-tales, fables, and didactic narratives which excel by their lively descriptions of current situations and ideas, the epic and lyric poetry, the dramatic art of such inspired authors as Ashvaghosha, Bhartṛhari, Jayadeva, Bhāsa, Bhavabhuti, Bāna, and above all, Kalidasa, have become famous all over the world. Similar statements can be made with regard to the aesthetic qualities of its religious and symbolic art, its architecture, sculpture, and painting. Moreover, it produced remarkable results in the fields of grammar and phonetics, as well as early science, notably mathematics,

astronomy, and medicine, and in the field of "applied science", such as metallurgy, and in a wide range of arts and crafts. But the most important achievements of Indian culture were law, polity, and philosophy. The latter must be understood in terms of cultural diffusion. Philosophic ideas everywhere are related to the respective cultural situations which give them their meaning. Notwithstanding its concern with universal ideas, the ultimate problems of life, the nature of cosmos and man, the foundations of the moral order, logic, and epistemology, appealing to thinkers everywhere, this philosophy evolved on the basis of and in a perpetual struggle with the particulars, the concrete situations and data of Indian society, from which it derived its inner tension and strength. Yet in spite of this philosophic unity there is a wide cultural gap between the two aspects of Indian life. Perhaps no other country in the world but India shows such a wide discrepancy between the religious forms, the group customs, behaviour patterns, and ways of thinking of the higher, cultured, and thoughtful classes on the one hand, and the lower, ignorant masses on the other. It has been said that the masses do indeed accept some of the fundamental principles of the higher Hinduism, such as the ideas of Karma, transmigration, and caste. They pay lip-service to the official gods—Viṣṇu, 'Siva, Kali, and others—they honour the priests, the Brahmans, and acknowledge the merit of orthodox observances. Yet, at the same time, they adhere to practices and primitive beliefs centring around local deities, demons, and sanctuaries which are foreign to Brahmanical doctrine and thought. The origin and cause of this situation must be sought in the hereditary structure of that unique social phenomenon, the caste system, which is the organic unifying link as well as the dividing factor of Indian society. Regardless of its real historical beginnings, it is the worldly or social expression of the divine order with its hierarchy of values. From its divine character it derives its prestige. Its real origin, however, is complex. It is magic and ritualism rather than religion which has determined some of the essential modes of behaviour and taboos inherent in the system, especially non-commensality and ideas of pollution, ablution, purification, and ceremonial purity with associations of ritual sacrifice. The history of caste is perhaps older than the history of Indian philosophy, which in its totality embodies India's eternal struggle between magic and ritualism on the one hand and religious, spiritual, and free thought on the other. Both are indicative of the recurrent struggle between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The most important event in Indian history was the successive waves of Indo-European or Aryan immigration which took place throughout the second millennium B.C. It was the most important event, not because it is certain that it brought an entirely new and higher civilisation but rather because it created the pattern of Indian

cultural evolution for all time to come. For a long time it was generally assumed that the Hindu religion originated in the higher civilisation of these fair-skinned Aryan invaders who imposed their religion and social institutions on the dark-skinned barbarians inhabiting India at that time. This view can no longer be accepted. The archaeological, linguistic, and anthropological research of the last three decades has proved that prior to the Aryan invasion there existed in India various types of civilisation and culture, originating in different racial strands. Just as to-day, these cultures ranged from primitive to highly developed, as the discoveries at Mohenjo-daro, Harappa, and Chanhu-daro in the Indus valley have revealed. Some of the basic ideas and modes of worship recurring in modified form in later Hinduism may be traced to these periods. They include animistic and totemistic ideas; magic; beliefs in taboo and mana; ritualistic purity; tree worship; snake and fertility cults; phallic rites; belief in a Mother Goddess and in a god who may have been the prototype of 'Siva; *pūjā*—i.e. worship of the gods; metempsychosis, and a discipline which may be called the forerunner of the later Yoga. Moreover, certain astrological-philosophical conceptions related to the prevailing ideas of the contemporary civilised world, notably the early Mesopotamian and Egyptian cultures. Even elements of the caste system have been ascribed to this period. In view of the then already prevailing racial differentiation, the complex occupational structure and different levels of culture, such hypothesis has a certain measure of probability. Modern scholars have called this sphere of ideas the pre-Vedic or proto-Hinduism of India. If it is true that the Aryans, during a development of a thousand years, imposed their religious and social views on this sphere of life, it is equally true that the latter grafted many of its traditions, customs, and primordial religious attitudes on those forms of Vedic civilisation for which scholars of a past generation have coined the term "Brahmanism". This proto-Hinduism is the collective subconscious of the people from which they drew their symbolic forms and much of their mythology. Transformed and sublimated by Aryan philosophical ideas it lives on in the Pūrānas, Tantras, and Agamas, the literature which became a source of inspiration for the great theistic religions of India.

According to the orthodox point of view, the essentials of the Hindu religion (or religions) are based on the Vedas, the ancient body of literature which—it is asserted—is not the production of man but the voice of God Himself and co-eternal with him. More important even than the scriptural contents of this sacred literature is the position it takes as the divine source of revelation ('Sruti), "seen" in mystic vision by the Vedic sages, the Rishis.

The Vedic literature in its entirety represents a long period of religious development and social stabilisation. It includes the

ancient liturgical collections of the hymns to the gods, the Rig Veda, the sacrificial chants, the Sāma Veda, and the sacrificial formula of the Yajur Veda. These three are collectively known as the "trayī", the threefold holy scripture, and are as such the pivot of all orthodox tradition. A fourth collection is the extremely important Atharva Veda, a book containing magical and exorcistic formulae, as well as the beginnings of philosophical thought. It is undoubtedly earliest in inspiration, although it was written down last of all the Vedas. Of these four the Rig Veda and the Atharva Veda form the two poles of thought corresponding to the gradual integration and amalgamation of the pre-Vedic (Dravidian, etc.) and Indo-Aryan strata of life. In the Atharva Veda the animistic and more primitive ideas prevalent among both the Dravidians and the Aryans found their recognition and canonisation, which was a significant fact with regard to the development of the later Hinduism. The Rig Veda is of a different order. Many of its hymns are indicative of wonderful intuitions of the Divine. They reveal a process of spiritual growth, ranging from a form of deified or numinous nature worship to monotheistic, monistic, and pantheistic speculations. Some of the major themes which have ever since determined the course of Indian thought can be found in them. These hymns obtained a functional ritualistic purpose in a developing social order. Its central conception was the idea of "ṛita", cosmic order to which the gods were subordinate. From this conception evolved the later idea of dharma, the cosmic norm and duty of man. The idea of propitiating the different gods by means of worship and prayer gave a sacramental character to the Vedas and Aryan society. The sacrifice, the "yajña", became of paramount importance. The sacrificial act was called "karman". By these acts, as well as by the rigidly correct pronunciation and recitation of the sacred formula, the mantras—in connection with the importance of sound as a cosmic force—the priest, the Brahman, was supposed to be able to constrain the gods, i.e. to bend the forces of nature to the realisation of his purposes. The sacrifice was regarded as the worldly expression of the cosmic and creative order (ṛita). As such it became identical with the Unique Reality, at once Creator and Creation. In view of this development, the sacrifice became the regulating power of the various levels of the social order, the three higher Aryan castes, Brahman, Kṣatriya, and Vai'sya—necessitating a strict adherence to the concomitant Vedic injunctions which became the standards of Indo-Aryan life. They determined the rules of caste as well as the Vedic sacraments arranging the life of the people from birth to death, and by dint of the prescribed oblations to the ancestors also the existence after death. At a successive stage, as described in the so-called Brāhmana, 'and other ritualistic literature, the sacrifice—being the reproduction and

maintenance of the cosmic order and the means to establish a union between man and the cosmos—became extremely complex. The elaborate ritual acts, the Karma of the great sacrifices, could be performed only by the priests, who as the "Gods on earth" became the controllers of the cosmic processes and consequently obtained an extreme sanctity and ineradicable social prestige which —at least in theory—has continued till the present time. Another feature of the Vedas is the phenomenon which was called by Max Müller "henotheism", a transition to monotheism, according to which the attributes and qualities of various gods were ascribed to the particular god worshipped at the time. This phenomenon, however, is not restricted to the Vedas, but continued to play a considerable role in the pantheon of the later Hinduism, notably with regard to the great sectarian gods, 'Siva and Viṣṇu. Dispersed through the Rig Veda, but especially in the later books (*vide* Book X), there is a search for the one spiritual principle behind the phenomena of cosmos and life, a quest which has remained the basic theme of later Indian speculation. The famous Puruṣa Sūkta, the hymn of the God-man, contains an embryo of the subsequent spiritualisation of the sacrifice which finds its full flowering in the latest stage of the Vedic development, the Upanishads, or Vedānta, the "end" of the Veda, concerned with the esoteric, supreme wisdom, or transcendent knowledge (jñāna) of the Absolute (Brahman). All along we meet with a growing resistance against the mechanical procedures of the sacrificial acts as a means to bring about the well-being of man. New ideals were in the making. A cardinal doctrine of the growing Brahmanism and later Hinduism was the acceptance of the graded order of life, which was probably a rationalisation of actual situations. It found its expression in the four original social classes (Varna) which provided a spiritual justification of the caste system as a whole. The moral duties prescribed for these classes at a latter stage were of a high calibre. We read of the control of anger, truthfulness of speech, readiness to share, forgiveness, marital fidelity, purity of conduct, avoidance of malice, sincerity, and maintenance of dependents (Mahābhārata, XII. 60.7). Such moral principles are extolled time and again in the ancient and later literature almost as a matter of course. Further divisions of the graded order were the four ends of human endeavour (puruṣārtha) and the four stages of life (ā'srama). The former consisted of Kāma, pleasure or happiness in all its aspects (sensual and mental), Artha, wealth and worldly power, Dharma, virtue and duty, and Mokṣa, salvation or spiritual emancipation. The latter comprised the stage of brahmacārin, the novice, who after being admitted to the community of the Āryan "twice born" (dvīja) by investment with the holy thred, joined a guru, a teacher, to be further initiated in the sacred scriptures and the dharma, in accord-

ance with the commands of the ancient law books (Manu, a.o.). The next stage was that of the Gṛhastha, the householder, who after having discharged his duties to his family—the begetting of sons—and the world, moved on to the third, that of the Vānaprastha, the anchorite or forest-dweller. Having renounced the worldly pleasures and activities (Kāma and Artha) these recluses devoted themselves to the contemplation of the mysteries of life, death, the soul, God, and the Absolute. Finally, at a given moment, some of them even left the relative safety of the wood, roaming the land as a spiritual mendicant to attain final deliverance (sannyāsa and mokṣa) i.e. the *Summum Bonum*, the Supreme Good. Especially the sannyāsin, although often in a highly perverted form, continues to be a basic element of Indian life. As indicated in the (Vedic) forest books, the Āraṇyakas, it is from the community of these solitary thinkers in the woods that the mystical ideas of the Upanishads arose and the revaluation of the sacrifice was elaborated. The Vedic injunctions had a strongly social character, which could have no hold over these anchorites. Consequently, they became less interested in the formalism and determinism of the ritual act (Karma). Their aim was spiritual emancipation, and this could be realised only through jñāna, transcendent knowledge. The Puruṣa, the "God-Man", had sacrificed himself to bring about life and world. In this idea, the fundamental identity of the individual soul (ātman) and the Absolute (Brahman)—the main theme of the Upanishads—was in essence already given.

The full realisation of this identity became the true "sacrifice" as much as man himself came to be regarded as the true microcosmos. "Brahman, truly, is this whole universe" and "The Soul is this whole world", it was said in the Chāndogya Upanishad (7.25). There are, however, many passages in which the "sacrifice" and all that it represents is accepted as the "lower" truth (Aparā Vidyā). Apart from its philosophical implications postulating the relative reality of the phenomenal world and the social order, we witness the Brahmanisation of an essentially freer and more spiritual plane of thought in this phenomenon.

The sphere of ideas of the Upanishads is mystic and primarily monistic. Based on the fundamental unity of life it had by its very nature all the potentialities of breaking the fetters and rigid exclusiveness of the caste system. This, however, did not happen. In its quality of Vedānta, the culmination of the Veda, this philosophy both challenged and re-asserted the authority of the Brahmanical order. There are various reasons which account for this development. Although Veda and Vedānta represent two basically different levels of thought, they were traditionally accepted as the one eternal and infallible revelation of the Divine. Eventually they bifurcated into a lower and a higher knowledge. The lower knowledge—concentrated on the sacrificial act as a basis of the social

order—correspond to the stages of student and householder, to the two worldly pursuits (kāma and artha) and to the religious and social norm, dharma. In the graded order of life it came to be regarded as a preparatory stage for the higher knowledge, the Para- or Brahma-vidyā, which was originally the exclusive domain of the ascetic recluses whose ideal was mokṣa, perfection and spiritual deliverance. Consequently, the esoteric wisdom of the Upanishads was restricted to a small group of highly qualified aspirants—a spiritual *élite*. Aspirants desiring this wisdom—which could be obtained only from a proper preceptor, a guru—were subjected to a rigorous training. The exercises included various stages, viz. the formal study of the Vedas, philosophical reflection, and finally Dhyāna or upāsana, the inner mystic contemplation of the ultimate truth which transmuted it into a personal, direct (subjective) experience. Moral qualities such as generosity and compassion were prerequisite to the attainment of this highest knowledge. (See Bṛhad Ār. Up. 5.2.3). These mystic thinkers created a truly universal ideal. Yet owing to their very exclusiveness, it could do little (originally) to change the social structure, in spite of explicit statements (Bṛhad Ār. Up. 4.3.22) that in the world of the soul caste and out-castes (caṇḍāla) are non-existent. Moreover, the 'Sruti was inaccessible to the 'Sudras, the non-Aryan lower castes. The most important reason for the absence of social changes, however, is found in the metaphysical justification. The bifurcation into a lower and a higher knowledge was in harmony with the philosophic postulate of the double aspect of the Unique, unchanging Reality—transcendent and immanent—as the inscrutable basis of life.

During the sacrificial stage the term Brahman had many meanings, ranging from spell and prayer to cosmic expansion. With the spiritualisation of the sacrifice it became identified with the Vedic Puruṣa and expressive of the One Absolute Being, the essence of the universe and creative energy. It was described as the " One without a Second ". This led to speculations on the relation of the Monistic Absolute to the world and to the individual selves. Consequently, the Supreme Brahman, sole spiritual reality, self-existent and comprehending within itself Being (sat), Pure Consciousness (cit), and Bliss (ānanda), came to be viewed under two aspects: the one devoid of attributes and qualities (nirguṇa) and unconditioned, the other qualified and conditioned (saguṇa); the former unknowable to the finite mind, and beyond the categories of time, space, and causality; the latter limited and defined and working in the world of creation, preservation, and dissolution, i.e. the plane of cause and effect. The unfathomable Absolute—being limitless and transcending all empirical reality and discursive thought—could be expressed only negatively. It is " not this, not that " (neti, neti) we read. Yet it was the source of that supreme

knowledge "by knowing which all was known" and man became free. Though it is spaceless, timeless, and causeless, without it space, time, and the causal universe could not exist. The crux of this mystical philosophy and all later Vedāntic speculation was the true relationship between these two aspects, entailing the problem of the reality of life. How could it be, it was asked, that the super-causal Absolute manifested itself as the conditioned Brahman, the Omnipotent creator, God (I'svara), the plural universe, and the many selves. The answer was given in the concept of māyā, magic and transforming power in the Rig Veda, transcendent illusion, relative reality, creative energy, and wrong knowledge on the part of man in the Upanishads and later Vedānta.

The essential implication of the idea of māyā is that no answer can be given to the mystery of life. Ultimately, the two aspects, Nirguṇa and Saguṇa Brahman, are one. In wider connotation this means that Brahman and the world, or Brahman and māyā, are one. Hence, if Brahman is impredicable, the true nature of finite existence must be likewise inexpressible. Brahman is beyond causality and the only reality without a second. Consequently, the finite world of names and forms, which is ruled by causal laws, cannot have the same reality as Brahman; compared to Brahman it must be non-real, a mere appearance. The Supreme Brahman is all-enfolding, and nothing can exist outside it. So the non-real must be inherent in the One Reality, and this is the transcendent illusion, as there can be no unreality in reality. This illusion, this māyā, is therefore the mysterious, the inscrutable power by which the unconditioned Brahman appears as the conditioned Brahman and the manifold Universe. And as Brahman and Ātman are one the cosmic illusion is also working in man. Just as māyā is called a veil, it is avidyā, ignorance, which makes man forget his own essential nature. This causes him to be a slave of his passions and desires, keeping him in the turmoil of the samsāra, the eternal cycle of birth and re-birth. And just as avidyā is a transcendent force, it is only by jñāna, mystic vision, that man can re-establish the union with Brahman or God. The moral implication of this philosophy centres around the value of human action. Māyā, i.e. the empirical world, can be conceived either as a mere appearance of Brahman and therefore as false, illusory, or as an expression of the Divine, granting reality to the world and individuality to the soul. Correspondingly, Brahman can be viewed as static, dynamic, or creative (God = I'svara = Saguṇa Brahman). All these views (and their permutations) have had their many great champions in the long course of Indian philosophical and religious development. Especially the concept of Saguṇa Brahman, the personal, creative God, was of extreme importance with regard to the rise and form of the great theistic religions by his identification with 'Siva and Viṣṇu. In whichever of these ways the world is conceived—as

illusion or relative reality—it is ruled by inexorable causal laws. All action must yield fruit. Conversely, all effects are bound by or to causes. So, the course of man—the microcosmos—is determined by his own deeds. This is the doctrine of Karma which had its roots in the magic acts of the sacrifice. In the spiritualisation of the latter, Karma became a moral force. Man's soul is immortal. In so far as human beings remain engrossed in their desires, selfish pursuits, and wrong ideas, they must abide in the sphere of phenomenal existence, reaping (or suffering) the fruits of their deeds in the present or future birth. In this way man's deeds shape not only his personality but also his destiny. As he is so shall he be born. Consequently, the connection between Karma and caste, and its stranglehold on Hindu life, becomes obvious. Man is born in his particular caste because of his deeds committed in a previous birth. Yet Karma in its philosophic aspects is neither deterministic nor fatalistic. Man is responsible for his own deeds. In so far as he lives a truly moral life and realises his spiritual identity, he is able to transform his personality, to elevate it to a higher plane of existence and eventually to break the chain and to become free. However, in the mind of the unenlightened masses Karma did obtain a strongly fatalistic character which has certainly acted—through the ages—as a barrier to bring about fundamental changes in the social structure. There has been much speculation in Indian philosophy on the value of human work with regard to the irreality or relative nature of phenomenal life and the ultimate ideal of transcendent perfection. A solution was given in the idea of non-attachment, the fully detached performance—as a sacrifice to God—of one's duties. In Hindu society these duties became largely identical with the adherence to the rules and regulations of caste, family, sect, etc., including the extremely important marriage laws. In spirit the ancient Upanishads are fundamentally "heterodox". Yet they became the pillar of Brahmanical orthodoxy, the primary basis and authoritative source of inspiration of all subsequent Hindu religions and philosophical developments.

Their concern was reality and life, the destiny of the human soul, man's bondage and freedom, his relation to the Unfathomable Absolute, God, the Universe, and his fellow man. "He therefore that knows Brahman . . sees self in Self, sees all as Self", it is said in the Bṛhad Ār. 4 Up. (4.23). Throughout the centuries the prestige of the Upanishads has rightly remained unshakable. All Hindu renaissance movements took recourse to their fundamental doctrines. Similarly, the moral implications of the metaphysical ideas they taught gave an impetus to the rise and formation of the great heterodox religions, Jainism and Buddhism. However, they were not the only source of Indian philosophical thought. The history of Hinduism is essentially the history of Brahmanic organisation and the resistance against that organisation. Contemporary

with the ancient Upanishads (600 B.C.), traditions of free speculation can be traced which repudiated the Veda, the Brahmanical order, and caste. They included a number of religious sects as well as agnostics and realists (lokāyata). The latter were not interested in transcendental metaphysics but rather in empirical reality and "common sense". It is from these circles that the logical schools originated which forced the Brahman priests to revaluate their own world of ideas. Subsequently, the Brahmans incorporated the rationalistic methods of these schools which gave substance and system to Indian philosophy and a conceptual basis for all higher Indian religion. At a later stage six systems obtained an orthodox-canonical character. They comprised the fundamental, "Pūrva mīmāṃsa", the "Ancient Exegis", which was a rationalisation of the Vedic sacrifice, i.e. the Brahmanical social order; the essentially antagonistic spiritual and monistic Vedānta, which in its several forms became the predominant and most inspiring philosophy of India; the logical schools (Nyāya and Vai'seṣika) which created an epistemological basis, yoga, the spiritual discipline of human perfection aiming at the "Unio Mystica" which gave a practical basis, and sāṃkhya, the dualistic and evolutionistic system of soul or essence (puruṣa) and nature or substance (prakṛti), which developed the psychological basis of Indian philosophy. All these "Points of View" were made subservient to the one end, mokṣa, emancipation. However, Indian philosophy could not and did not satisfy the emotional needs of the people as a whole. The yajña, the Vedic sacrifice, was the prerogative of the priests, the philosophy of the Upanishads of the spiritual *élite*. Both the mystical and the logical philosophies were too subtle for the masses. Yet it was the outstanding quality of Indian philosophy that—in spite of its subtlety—it was able to act as a ferment by its power to sublimate popular conceptions. The religion of the masses was (and is) rooted in the pre-Vedic pūjā, the cult of the idol with its own ritualism, different from the Vedic ceremonial. With the spread of Brahmanism, the Vedic yajña superseded at first the non-Vedic pūjā, which provoked a reaction on the part of the predominantly non-Aryan masses. In the 'Svetā'svatara Upanishad, already the supreme Brahman, was identified with the (personal) god Rudra-'Siva. The urge was for a personal God whom the average man could love and comprehend, and not for an impersonal abstract absolute. In 'Siva and Viṣṇu, the alternative forms of the One Supreme God, a response was given to that urge. With the rise of theism yajña succumbed again to pūjā, though in a sublimated, spiritualised form, just as the two principal divine incarnations of Viṣṇu (i.e. God), the great saviours of mankind, Rāma (the hero of the Rāmāyana) and Krishna (the hero of the Bhagavad Gītā), had their roots in local cults. The higher form of pūjā was Bhakti, the loving devotion to God in which the religious longings of the

masses and the higher mystic speculation (Vedānta) converged. Through the centuries it remained a source of living emotion for the people and many of India's greatest thinkers. In Bhakti Indian spirituality became democratic. Salvation was offered to all. Its central doctrine was " prapatti ", self-abandonment to God. " For even those who are born of the womb of sin—women, Vai'syas and 'Sūdras too—if they resort to me, go on the highest way " and " surrendering all the laws, come for refuge to me alone. I will deliver thee from all sins; grieve not ", Krishna says to Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gītā. In this transformation of Hinduism ritualism deepened itself to the processes of life. Human life itself became a rite devoted to the quest for union with the Divine and to the detached fulfilment of work. It is from the Bhakti movement that most of the social reformers arose who tried to break the more abominable aspects of the caste system. It was its sad fate that this form of worship, too, became too philosophic for the people. To-day again the religion of the masses is predominantly pūjā, ceremonialism, rather than Bhakti, a spiritual love of God.

Hinduism in its higher form is one of the greatest religions of humanity. In its emphasis on the spiritual unity of life, in its capacity of syncretism, tolerance, and altruism, in its aptitude for philosophical reasoning and speculation, in its basic ethics as well as in its disciplines aiming at the mastery of mind over matter, it has all the qualities to remain the source of regeneration which it has been for the past hundred and fifty years, from Rammohan Roy up to the Tagores and Mahatma Gandhi, and of which the new India is in need more than ever. India's basic need is human unity as distinct from political unity. This longing was felt as strongly when the poet of the Rig Veda said: " Assemble, speak together, let your minds be all of one accord. United be the thoughts of all, that all may live happily, that ye may all happily reside " (X. 191, 2–4).

DAVID FRIEDMAN.

CHAPTER NINE

BUDDHISM

The Criteria

In describing a religion a twofold method may be employed: (1) to observe the people who confess it in their mental outlook and in their behaviour; (2) to study the collection of thoughts and rules of conduct, codified on the basis of a tradition handed on from many generations. This code or Sacred Book forms a standard or norm for the outlook of the people who adopt it and it is thus the ultimate source and authority for the study of religion since the behaviour of the people is governed by this Canon.

Modern research warrants the assumption that we can, with a high degree of probability, regard the Pali Canon as an authoritative document of the Buddha-word. The present sketch of Buddhism is accordingly based on this Pali Canon.

(*a*) If we look at a religion and try to understand it merely with an intellectual interest, our understanding cannot be complete. It is wrong to see in it a rational system of thought: religious truth is *more*, it transcends the reasoning plane and very often is not true in the sense of scientific truth. If viewed as such it often appears as pure fiction, not provable to the mind. But it *is* provable to the heart and appeals to the heart because it is a mirror of life and a symbol of life's secrets. Religion transcends the sphere of the Visible at every step; in it man tries to form a union between the things of the senses and the yearnings of the heart, its contents have a cosmic significance. The investigator who ignores this truth will find his investigation barren. A shell and a butterfly have little significance in the view of science when compared with the human brain: in the religious view, however, they are of equal value, as they all contain the Universe, and the brain of man cannot exist without the shell and the butterfly.

(*b*) Religion is the ocean of all that man thinks, hopes, and imagines. All these mental states are in constant interpenetration, so that there never is a clear and distinct separation of the one from the other. Religion is a network of ideas which shifts and intertwines haphazard, like the objects of a dream. They cannot be brought under a rational scheme; they are a true reflection of life as it actually is. Even the new ideas of a reformer are entangled with the net and cannot be singled out as his own revolutionary

innovations. Religion is world-wisdom in the widest and most significant application of this term.

(*c*) Religion is always conservative, since its object and contents are such as need to be conserved with the greatest care. This feature is well illustrated by Buddhism, which from the beginning has withstood all innovation and drastic reform and has handed on the original teaching and code of morality in a most remarkable solidarity. So much so that it presents many features of stagnation and in many respects has proved antagonistic to progress and the assimilation of new ideas. In that respect it has, like every religion, handed on a mass of superstition. Buddhism, as we meet it even at its historical beginnings, is a mixture of a most ingenious philosophy and a wonder-tale simplicity of belief.

(*d*) There is no uniform criterion within the same religion. Analysis and classification are insufficient, and the method of isolation used in the exact sciences cannot be applied here. One man's belief in *karma*, for example, is most probably quite different from the other man's belief in the same word '*karma*.' Experiment and proof cannot be applied in individual psychology.

(*e*) In judging a religion one is apt to apply a standard of measurement to some fundamental traits and to try to separate ideas which from the aspect of the mind appear mutually exclusive but which nevertheless are all expressions of that fullness of life which they describe. The question of inconsistence as weakness does not apply to religion at all, because it is not a system and needs neither justification nor proof. Its proof is the religious experience as transformation of being, and is self-justified. Of a large number of apparent inconsistencies in Buddhism I mention only the following few. (1) It is asserted that everybody must be his own saviour, and yet Buddhists believe in the Buddha as the Saviour of the World. (2) Ultimate cessation of life and of being reborn over and over again is perfectly compatible with the belief in a state after death in the realm of perfect peace and eternal bliss called heaven. (3) The assumption of and the belief in a soul lies as a powerful factor of conduct behind the logico-verbal muddle of self and non-self or soul and no-soul. The prevalence of one or the other factor of these inconsistencies depends on the temporary religious mood of the human being; neither the one nor the other is a wilful distortion of the truth. They are spontaneous primitive forms of faith, of which one is as legitimate as the other.

(*f*) One other point of orientation is frequently overlooked. The emphasis of every religion lies on the relation of man to the so-called next world. If in connection with this the emphasis shifts to this world and to this life, it does so by relating both worlds to each other, the decisive element always being the other world. This interdependence of both is very marked in all Indian religions, and Buddhism is no exception. Unless we understand what re-

birth and transmigration are, and are satisfied that those who declare their belief in its reality have spoken truth, we cannot understand what Buddhism is. This is particularly true with regard to the law of *karma,* which is the connecting link between any two reincarnations, viewed as an expiatory process in which the principle of retribution works itself out rigorously down to the minutest detail.

Buddhism and Hinduism; the Buddha's Enlightenment

Within the mental horizon and on the identical soil of Indian culture, Buddhist philosophy represents but one of the many different schools of thought, each with its own particular bias and tenets. Buddhist religious thought does not deviate from the old-inherited speculation and ideology which time-honoured tradition has impressed on the Indian mind. Here and there light and shade may vary, but the essentials of faith in a governing world-principle, of the belief in heaven and hell, of devotional practices of worship and prayer, are integral components of Buddhist and Hindu religions alike. The living garment of God is the same all over India because it is woven of the same threads, studded with the same jewels, and embroidered with the same pattern of bird and beast, of trees and stars.

The whole metaphysics of Buddhism is a gigantic web of truth and fiction. There are no drastic changes in the ancient sacred mythology, and what looks like a change is only the fact that certain aspects are emphasised more than others and more prominent than they had been before. That is the case with the concept of *Dharma.* This (in the Pali form *Dhamma*) is the eternally ordained, immutable, yet constantly changing order of things. It is not only the adjustment of the natural course of things in the sense of a procedure which avoids collisions and restores the balance if there should be a disturbance: it includes the principle of justice and of moral balance. It is the Cosmos as the visible emblem of an invisible Justice. In a special meaning the *Dhamma* is referred to as its exposition (the religion as preached) by the Buddha, and in this connection we find it described as " beautiful in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end."

Next in importance is *Brahmā,* the Creator and Upholder of the Universe, the heavenly stage-manager who watches over the career of the Buddha from first to last and who speaks the prologue as well as the epilogue to this humanly divine drama of Enlightenment. His name (in its composition form *brahma-*) permeates the whole ideology of the Pali Canon with dozens of expressions of something divine, holy, exalted, and pure. We hear, for example, of divine states of heart, of the godly life, of the road to God, and of the world of God.

No attempt was made to concentrate all the various and contra-

dictory forms of cosmic power in one central source: tradition was too strong for that. Nor has there ever been any real need for such an attempt because religion is not a rational system of the physical universe, and conflicting powers cannot be imagined and represented as uniform powers; Nature at work is always conflicting.

We now come to the all-surpassing great power: the *Wise,* the God-in-man as God-awakened and God-embodied. He is the *Buddha,* the Knower (knowledge in India has always been considered superior to being) in whom all gods take an interest. He, with his penetrating eye of wisdom, is the discoverer of the cause of the existence of this perplexing world of change, of life and death and suffering, and he has proclaimed that the only way out of this turmoil is to remain perfectly undisturbed. The steadfast man will bear all unhappiness with an unflinching eye, and only by withdrawing from the puppet-show, by never attaching himself to the world, can the wise gain his freedom, can he surpass even the gods and reach the sphere of the perfectly controlled, the sphere of the non-existence (of craving) called *Nibbāna* (*Nirvāna*). When in his contemplation man becomes one with the holy life and in action practises it, he is released and his natural status is peace and calmness. In the Buddhist hierarchy the figure of the Buddha outshines every other. He is the God of gods, the *Dhamma* is he and he is its embodiment: who sees him sees the *Dhamma,* and vice versa. In the Buddhist Credo, the formula of taking refuge in the three Gems (the Buddhist Trinity), the person of the Buddha occupies the first place. The process of Gotama's apotheosis began very soon after his passing.

Here too we are on the ground of ancient and sacred tradition. Both Gotama and Krishna become the royal sages, proclaim the ideal of *Brahmā* (brahma) and lead the homeless life. The God-protected man, the hero and victor in the fight against the evil powers, was greater than the gods, for he had visioned salvation, enlightenment, in his own experience. The newness in his statement of suffering lay in the formulation of the recipe of salvation in a fourfold setting. As the treatment of a sick patient needs the skill of the experienced physician, so the Buddha's analysis of the diseased condition of the world leads to recovery of health and happiness by application of the four noble truths, of which the first is that of unhappiness which is birth, old age, disease, and death, association with unpleasantness, separation from pleasantness, and non-attainment of one's wishes. The second truth turns round the cause of this undesirable state, this existence of misery: it is craving, thirst, clinging, which causes reincarnation. The removal of this thirst, root and all, is the third truth, and the fourth gives the remedy, which is the way leading to the eradication of suffering and restoring health, equal to salvation. This 'way' was in primitive Buddhism simply holy living, but it gradually assumed an elabora-

tion as eightfold, including a somewhat arbitrary specification of eight items necessary for the way of life of an 'Aryan', i.e. a Buddhist.

There is still another sinister, indefinable force lurking in the depths of Darkness: the manifestation of Evil, the arch-enemy of the gods, the *Tempter*, the most powerful Power, which can be conquered by superhuman (and superdivine) force only: *Māra*, Death.

Māra is not directly the destroyer of Life, for life exhausts itself through the law of *karma*, but a promoter of life in a further re-incarnation. His name originates in the popular fancy, where death is always regarded as the most terrible fate. That the wise welcome death as a redeemer does not alter the fact of its inexplicable dreadfulness and inexorability. *Māra* is the Demon who by means of innumerable cunning temptations stirs to a flame the passions and vices which bind man to life. He sets ablaze the glow which *Nirvāna* cools and extinguishes. He is the enemy of the Buddha because he is the interrupter of extinction.

He is often called King of Death, viz. cause of re-death, which is equal to constant rebirth. This is the fate of the foolish people and disbelievers. This idea has to be separated from the ideal of the wise and right believer, which consists in death as final cancellation of suffering more life in unhappiness.

When we ask: "Where did the Buddha get his wisdom from and from what source did he draw his superhuman strength?", we are asking the Unanswerable. This much, however, can be stated: enlightenment is awakening ('buddha' means awake), it dawns like the dawn of the morning. And the urge to communicate this wisdom is a divine urge, also prompted by *Brahmā*. At the same time it is the result of hard striving, deep concentration, and unceasing effort. It cannot be studied or learned, it is a fact of life based on the deepest life-experience, which can be only individual. But since all individuals are alike in essence, each and every one is capable of attaining enlightenment, of becoming 'Bodhisattvas.'

If enlightenment is said to consist in higher knowledge, this does not refer to exact knowledge of experimentally accessible facts: to the Indian mind it is exclusively a visionary or even dream-knowledge, which has its sphere of validity and 'scientific' verification in the production and exhibition of supernormal psychic faculties, and the *vidyā* of the Pali Canon is of a magic and almost uncanny character. It includes the extraordinary power of producing miracles and causing miraculous events. To the untrained 'ordinary' people, the Buddha is the master-magician, and much of Buddha worship lies in this direction. It was very early transferred to his relics, which are all through credited with a wonder-working power. There can be no doubt that Gotama the Buddha

was a Yogi who in the end realised and condemned the futility of extreme ascetic and yogic practices. This, however, did not make any difference to the Church.

Reincarnation and Karma

A frequently occurring equation deals in various settings with the eternal mystery of life in its appearance and disappearance, and the attitude of the human being towards it. It is: "as he has come so he is gone" (Pali: *yath'āgato tathā gato*). It is often applied in the case of somebody mourning for a dead relative, where it is meant to teach the futility of ostentatious lamentation. In other contexts it has a quasi-scientific application and may be said to comprise the quintessence of the doctrine of *karma.* For when the states of pre-life and after-life thus viewed become the object of speculation, the question (with its solution) arises: If coming here is caused by something which led to this coming, then the going hence must be conceived as a consequence of the time between the two events and must in itself and of itself form the cause of the next state of existence following upon this going hence. This relation, judged with reference to the action of man himself as one (perhaps the main) factor of this development, is, under the moral aspect, interpreted as being the outcome in both cause and consequence forming an inseparable union of man's own actions.

Reincarnation is envisaged as an unbroken, conditionally endless series of past and future existences of the identical being. Every new coming-into-being depends on *karma*: it is said in the Canon: "The creature goes where his *karma* is." Reincarnation is based on the entirely human and morally-coloured theory of retribution. As regards its so-called proof from observation, it is generally supported by the fact of seasonal and observable cyclic repetitions in the physical world, but it entirely ignores—and accordingly cannot be claimed to be a natural, evolutionary process—the unique and non-repeatable facts such as the very existence of the self, its passing through the cyclic changes of phenomena preserving its identity, and its life-experience which can never be repeated and does not lie in time.

The sequence of renewed existences is related to a cause, and the discovery of this hypothetical cause is supposed to lie within the range of human ingenuity, and in this way the causal interrelation of all phenomena becomes the first and fundamental principle of the constitution of the Universe. And the coming-into-being of individual life, formulated in the abstruse and obscure formula of the famous 'dependent origination' (alias 'chain of causation'), becomes the *magnum mysterium* of the Buddhist theory of evolution. The very enlightenment of the Buddha is said to have been the visioning of this intricate formula under the famous Bo tree.

The Phenomenal World

In the Buddhist view the world of appearance has three fundamental qualities, on the realisation and valuation of which depends man's happiness or unhappiness, wisdom or ignorance. These are:

(1) Unsubstantiality (*anattā* character), meaning that all we see in this world as forming a person's individual manifestation, both mentally and physically, is not his true self (*attā*), because he has no free disposal over it. It may therefore be called his non-self (*anattā*), and the manifested world has the nature of non-self, i.e. is a world of unsubstantiality and illusion.

This theory of non-self has in speculative philosophy gradually been twisted into a theory of no-soul (also called *an-attā*), i.e. it was denied that an individual had a permanent soul which might constitute his essential self.

(2) Impermanence (*anicca* character): all manifested individuality, both physical and mental, is impermanent.

(3) Frustration and suffering (*dukkha* character).

The first quality implies the recognition of something in the Universe against which man is powerless. It is not myself, it is other than myself. This means that there is no *self* in the world which could be grasped as we grasp a material object. But there *is* a world of real suffering which this invisible self has to go through and which is lived in the very matter and form by which the invisible self manifests itself. In this relation we face the insoluble intellectual puzzle: how to reconcile the real fact of being with the illusory fact of having. There are two ways of either solving or evading this contradiction: either by lulling oneself into the make-believe that one has produced a solution which reconciles the two statements " I am a self " and " I have a self ", or by observing a silence about it, which may be uncomfortable to the intellect but is the only possible way out because *now* the solution is transferred to the plane of ethics, away from the bewildering realm of yes and no of the sphere of logic and words. That was the way which the Buddha chose, and which every wise man chooses. What the wise man's position is, is not that he cannot solve the problem of existence and non-existence (which does not need an intellectual solution), but that he realises the impossibility of solving the difficulty by language and words.

Anattā is joined by the second quality which dawns upon the mind when it awakens to the reality or otherwise of the world and which is of an even greater, because practical, consequence, viz. impermanence. This is certainly as strong a motive to cause one's withdrawal from the world. It is, however, a characteristic of the phenomenal world only, the world of the egocentric self, the world of I and mine, the world of attachment. It does not reach into

the realm of that which is not myself, the sphere of the inapproachable, the sphere of the overruling Fate. The practical lesson of impermanence is drastic, but at the same time most suitable for the acquisition of wisdom, easier than the first quality. It leads to the discovery of the things which one cannot take with one when leaving this world, and to the finding of those which one *can* take, the things of the Imperishable and Everlasting which are the attributes of *Brahmā* as the embodiment of holiness and perfection.

Anicca has become one of the corner-stones of Buddhism, even more than the discovery of the (ultimate) cause. It is more fruitful than the search after a cause, inasmuch as the Impermanent must lead to the Permanent, for no sane person can believe in a negative ideal. Searching after a cause, on the other hand, brings permanent worry and discontent.

The third sign is undoubtedly the most deeply cutting and far-reaching one, *dukkha*, unhappiness. What the Buddha saw with penetrating eye and every Buddha after him will see, is the pathetic reality of suffering and tragedy where nobody can die for another, and where clinging to life as well as to death is madness, is like a thirsty deer running for an illusory oasis. Here the message of the truth comes like a hand of marble laid upon a feverish brow, saying: give up, see the things as they really are, see for yourself.

The Church

In the face of the tragedy of existence, coupled with the fact that things which come are sure to go, what else is left but renunciation? And when one has penetrated to its centre, has fulfilled it to the last shred, one may in isolated moments arrive at the conviction that it is all oneself who makes it and breaks it and is responsible for it. This coming face to face with *karma* is even more bewildering and more stupendous than the first enlightenment, and in thinking it to the end we feel as if we were losing all ground, and we are utterly helpless. Still we need help, we need someone better than ourselves, whom we can worship as our ideal self, a helper who assures us that the road is safe although it is frightening. This friend, who is our well-wishing companion, our spiritual friend, is called " beautiful friend " in Buddhism.

When there is more than one spiritual friend, they form the company of the 'Worthy', the elect and saintly people. They retire from the world because life in the world is a hindrance to the cultivation of spiritual ideals, they give up all possessions, they live for their soul's good and fit themselves for the state of *Nirvāna* when the sands of reincarnation have run out. That is the main idea. Its justification cannot be tested and proved because it lies in the unprovable sphere of religion. In any case it has established itself from early times of society when the man of the mind separated himself from the man of the hand, and it has

gradually and tenaciously become a justified state of society the moral basis of which has never been questioned with any success because it was beyond questioning. It implied advantages for both sides, for in their mutual relation a sort of partnership element, a class obligation, arose. If the men of the spirit are the dispensers of the higher good of salvation and blessing *after* this life, the man of the world provides them with the commodities of *this* life. This mutual relation between the spiritual élite represented by the *arahant* (*reverendus*) or *ariya*, the noble, saintly one, and a class of ordinary people who look upon the élite as their teachers, is often likened to a ploughman and the arable field. The former is the giver and the latter the recipient, and since the field produces good results when properly cultivated, so the field of merit benefits both the giver and the receiver of gifts. A further development takes place in the expansion of the field of merit by way of dedicatory or vicarious gifts for the sake of another person such as a deceased relative. This transference of merit is as effective as a direct gift or offering.

In general the relation between the aspirant and the aspired is one of seeking and granting shelter or protection and is an intimate personal relation, not based on an intellectual desire for knowledge, unless it is 'saving' knowledge. This is expressed by the same formula (the Refuge formula) both in Hinduism and in Buddhism ("I go to the Lord for protection").

The training of the Initiate may be summarised under the heading *Yoga.* There is no difference between the Buddhist yoga practices and those which are the common heritage of all other Indian religious groups. Their chief object is the development of self-control and mental-emotional equilibrium, with the object of setting an example, to the ordinary folk, of an unselfish life and a life of compassion for the good of all creatures. Yoga for the student is hard training. Numerous are the exercises for concentration and meditation, for mind-control and training of virtuous character. For the advanced student there is the higher training in the attainment of psychic powers. Yoga *is* the essence of Buddhism in practice. That a very great importance was attached to it is evidenced by the traditionally preserved 'last' words of the Buddha when he, just before passing out, addressed the confraternity with "achieve your blessings with diligence."

Space forbids the enumeration of even the best-known formulae for the cultivation of earnest application to mindfulness and character-building, but all agree on one-pointedness, complete physical and mental relaxation and full awareness as preconditions for any successful results. The foundation for the success of higher intuitional activity is complete composure (*samādhi*). It is not concentration in the way of mental tension accompanying ratiocination: there is nothing forced or wilful in it. It is serenity,

like the peace of an unruffled mountain lake basking in life-giving sunshine.

The Buddhist Outlook

On the whole, Buddhist psychology moves in the emotional sphere, especially in that of psychological ethics, and primitive Buddhism was a religion of sternness. The Buddhist attitude to Nature and natural feelings is throughout one of restraint. Natural background comes in only as either helpful or harmful to spiritual progress. Another feature worth mentioning is Gotama Buddha's aversion to idle speculation. His are many emphatic utterances condemning that kind of philosophy which shirks a direct and practical solution of the burning problem of life's unhappiness. In one of the suttas (*Mālunkyāputta*) he says: "As to the much-discussed topic of speculation whether the world is eternal and infinite or not, whether the soul is identical with the body, and in what condition a saint lives after death: I have to say that all these things are irrelevant to holy living, and neither can nor need be answered. The fact remains that there *is* life and death and discomfort, and that this is the only relevant thing, to which the answer is given in the four noble truths."

That the contemplation of eternal impermanence, of ever-renewed unpleasantness, and of the absence of an enduring centre of personality should lead to a superhuman, all-transcending condition of eternal happiness and life in a sphere whence there is no return to the tribulations of the mundane world: this is too complicated a philosophy to satisfy the innermost heart of man, who by nature is born to life and by nature desires happiness. Here the philosophy of negation yields to an altogether different mode of thought, and to a way of living which centres in the unsophisticated worship of a hero and saviour who leads the faithful and devoted through the wilderness of life's misery to a happy abode of perfect peace. Here we are on the ground of Buddhism as religion, and the most conspicuous form which it takes is a popular interpretation of the recognised means which serve the end of salvation. Here it is not the ethical postulate of the strenuous life which is the chief thing, but the use of the formulations of this very life as charms of protection against evil forces and the production of happiness by chanting propitiatory prayers.

A very extensive share in this sort of religious practice falls to relic worship. As no Buddhist organised church is without the communion of the Worthy, so no Buddhist worship is complete without relics of some sort which are enshrined in relic chambers of the temples. In fact, the temples are buildings covering and protecting the relics.

And what a wonderful fairy-land this religion of magic and charms is, of fortune-telling by signs and dreams, of the explana-

tion of unheard-of events with their bearing on good or ill of man, of raising and laying the ghosts! The most significant and wide-spread form which this sort of superstition has assumed is the protective spell, viz. chants or formulae of a deep and hidden meaning, applied for the purpose of exorcism. They are called *parittā*, protection, and consist in the recitation by members of the Order of about twenty-eight canonical texts in order to avert the evil spirits (*bhūtas*) and to invoke the help of the *devas*. Of these twenty-eight, a selection of nine forms the 'Common Prayer' of Buddhists, called *Pirit Pota* in Ceylon and *Mahāparitta* in Burma. They are a mixture of long and short pieces, one of the best-known being the *Ratana-sutta* or Jewel Charm. This is a hymn of praise on the three Gems chanted to the Bhūts, for which they are expected to return protection. A psychological analysis even of this one sutta would show the whole history of Pali Buddhism from its origins to the beginning of our era.

A very short chant among these twenty-eight is the Peacock charm, which may be given as an example of a pretty and instructive prayer for morning (and night).

> He rises, the all-seeing, only King, golden-coloured, illumining the earth. Thee I adore, and protected by Thee may we spend the day. Whatever Brahmins there are, perfected in the Vedas and in all things, these I adore, may these protect us. Adoration be to the Buddhas, adoration to the Bo tree, adoration to the Released Ones, adoration to the Release.

The "Book of books" of Buddhist ethics is the collection of world-wisdom or practical philosophy, called *Dhammapada*, 'words of righteousness.' This is an anthology from various books of the Canon, forming a vade-mecum for the aspirant after the highest Good and the Truth, known and practised by every Buddhist and learnt by heart by every Buddhist child. No better idea of the most valued virtues can be gained than by glancing through the main topics of these four hundred and twenty-three proverbs.

The key-note is the moral self (*attā*=*ātmā*) and its responsible action (*karma*). These two words are the most frequently occurring. Emphasis is laid on the practical religion of the *Dhamma* as embraced by the Noble ones (*ariyā*) and which has been from all time and shall be for all time. Some of the other topics are: the tragedy of suffering, the praise of steadfastness and equanimity, fearlessness, abstention from sin and being on guard against the Tempter, the beauty of wise friends, the help of teachers and of the gods who love the good, and the reward of heaven for those who follow the teaching of the Lord and purify their hearts.

It seems as if some sort of charm belongs to this famous collection which is not merely the charm of personality, but has

a kind of magic, sedative influence on the believer and his world. This must not surprise us, for are we not all guilty of the utilitarian belief that a good life and going to church are palliatives against illness and accidents?

In summing up we may mention some of the points on which the success of Buddhism rests, if we are allowed to apply such a utility valuation to a religion:

(1) Its appeal to primitive emotion: its motto " away from this and from the other world ", both in fanciful cosmology and formidable eschatology.

(2) Its still greater appeal to the truth-fiction sense of the ordinary person. The religious imagination is fed by wonder-tales grouped, openly or in disguise, around the figure of Buddha as the hero. This is the simplest and easiest way of introducing Buddhism to people of childlike thought and disposition. These tales are the *Jātakas*, stories of reincarnations of the Buddha (Bodhisat), a popular thesaurus of world-wisdom, all illustrating the moral that it is more profitable to be wise than to be foolish. The contrast between these two *moral* qualities goes through the whole collection of five hundred and forty-seven tales.

(3) The easy and pleasant way of acquiring after-death merit through holy works.

(4) The coherence and stability of the Church.

(5) The success of monastic education in relation to the state of society in which it obtains.

(6) The harmonious co-operation between the secular population and its ecclesiastic leaders.

We are at the end of our sketch, bewildering with its variety of conflicting ideas, which make up the Ocean of Buddhist thought, which has been fed and filled by tributaries from all times and all climes: Buddhism, the religion of renunciation, the philosophy of change, the school of discipline: all components of a great quest, but none offering the final solution of the riddle of Life.

W. Stede.

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CHAPTER TEN

CONFUCIANISM

A GOOD short definition of Confucianism would be "an ethical system which is also a tried moral code as well as a political philosophy." It is a system which has stood China in good stead for twenty-five centuries, and it has proved the most constant cohesive force in Far East civilisation.

It should not be necessary at this late date to insist once more that Confucianism is not a state religion in the modern sense of the term; nor is it a religion at all in the strictly Western sense of ritual worship and an organised hierarchy of priests and laymen. None the less, Confucianism does supply, for the great majority of the four hundred and fifty millions of Chinese, something of the same moral and ethical drive which religion and Church ritual provide for other nations.

From childhood to old age the process is continuous. In early days the Confucian Canon, later divided neatly into the Four Books and the Five Classics, was learned by heart—mainly by repetition on the part of the pupil and exposition of difficulties by the teacher. In the passing of time there grew up a vast literature of commentaries on the Canon. These were written by leading Confucianists in each successive dynasty with the idea of bequeathing to future generations some worthwhile help to the understanding of what had become generally considered 'a priceless treasure.' Yet these were, normally, beyond the reach of young students, in that they presupposed a knowledge which was not yet there.

Thus in the Sung dynasty, some fifteen hundred years after the death of Confucius, a certain scholar conceived the idea of writing a preparatory manual for children. This was not only a primer for Confucian studies; it was Aristotelian in its concept, if not in its nature; for in the compass of a poem of some three hundred couplets are found the basic facts of Confucian teaching, geography, history, arithmetic, and general moral observations on the rules which will lead to a full and happy life.

It is, in fact, the primary object of Confucian teaching that only the life which is full of effort and which can show some achievement is at all likely to be happy. The pursuit of happiness as an end in itself is nowhere suggested. The young students were in

fact shown their rightful place in the scheme of things from the very beginning of their studies. It was pointed out that they had received their bodies from their parents as a trust; it was their duty to do nothing which would impair the good state and efficiency of those bodies, for this would be an offence against the parents themselves, as well as a loss to the person so acting.

Some cynical people in modern times have interpreted this teaching as if it meant that no one should, in any circumstances, run any risk and still less make the supreme sacrifice. But such interpretation either ignores or betrays ignorance of the fact that in another part of the book in which this instruction is embodied, it is clearly enjoined that lack of bravery in battle is a breach of the doctrine of filial piety. In other words, the instruction in question is merely an injunction against the wanton neglect of one's health, physically or mentally.

In this way grew up one of the most telling of the ethical teachings of China—that of filial piety. This has been much misunderstood; it has even led to the most extravagant statements on the part of Westerners as to the part played by ancestor-worship in China. Yet the clue is quite simple. This practice, which is deep-rooted in custom, forms part of the Confucian faith. In every home there is an altar for the worship of ancestors who are represented, if near, by tablets with their names engraved on them and, if remote, by a general tablet engraved with the words 'Ancestors of All Generations', while in every village there are ancestral chapels for worship on certain days of the year. Ancestral worship is not due to superstition or meant to immortalise the ancestors but is, in its essence, to foster filial affection, whereby other virtues may be attained; for filial affection being itself a virtue, its cultivation cannot fail to breed other virtues. It is believed that if men are taught to have an affectionate regard even for the dead, they will understand more readily the duty of having an affectionate regard for the living.

Although Chinese children, in common with those of other nations, have children's books, these are different from the purely amusing 'comics' of the West, in that most of them show a distinct ethical influence somewhere. This is not always intentional; it merely derives from the fact that Confucian training and ethics have so deeply permeated Chinese life at every point that even subconsciously a writer embodies in his work the training he himself has received.

Very early in the development of Confucianism there came the phenomenon generally known as 'the Chinese family system.' This might be best regarded as a natural growth of the idea of filial piety. Just as the young owe a special duty to their elders (and their elders, in turn, towards them, of course), so each member of a family has his definite position with its attendant rights and

duties. There has always been an insistence on the equal regard paid to duties as well as rights, which is, in fact, the principle underlying the parental and school teaching of the doctrine of filial piety. One instance will suffice. A person unkind to his children is considered just as bad as one who is unfilial to his parents, because one's children are the grandchildren of one's parents.

The family system has often been called the 'cement' of the Chinese body politic. Certain it is that it is owing to the firm adherence to this system that China has survived so many perils and major cataclysms in the course of four thousand years of recorded history. But this must not be taken, as it has been erroneously by some who are unfamiliar with Chinese institutions, that the Chinese place loyalty to the family above loyalty to the state. This would not be true; for it has been well known for centuries and clearly stated in the Classics that when these loyalties conflict, loyalty to the state should prevail. The Chinese attach much importance to the family, because they consider it the place where the elementary virtues are taught. As I state in my book *China Moulded by Confucius* (published by Stevens & Sons, London), "the family is the channel through which nature breeds in men the sense of love, affection, duty, and responsibility."

In spite of the fact that some Westerners find the Confucian Canon more than difficult, Confucianism is essentially simple. It is an ethical system based on a close observance of human nature and an understanding of human needs. It is decidedly practical; indeed, the main charge that has been brought against it by Westerners of deep religious convictions is that it is too much concerned with this world and makes no provision or takes no account of any future life. This is true; for Confucius, when asked by one of his disciples what he thought about a future life, said: "As you know nothing yet about life, how can you know anything about death?" In other words, men should be concerned more in the duties pertaining to life than in what will happen after death; to do good and fulfil our duties to mankind is not a price we pay for our happiness after death, but a gift we willingly and gladly offer to our fellow-men.

Thus it is easy to see how Confucianism became the basis of national teaching for more than two thousand years. There were other teachers; one indeed, Mo Tzu, has received the title of 'the pre-Christian Apostle' from Western missionaries in China. But the system of ethics and morality which found the most ready acceptance in the Chinese mind was the one which most clearly applied to his own nature. There are no impossibly high ideals in Confucianism; it is difficult to live up to the full standards laid down by Confucius for himself and his followers, but there is no element of impossibility about it. There is no hierarchy of angels and archangels who have achieved superhuman merit to arrive

at their dizzy height. The true Confucian is the truly excellent man, and that is all. As Yen Yuen, Confucius's leading disciple, said: "What sort of man was Shun (one of the Sage Rulers of Chinese antiquity) and what sort of man am I? He who exerts himself worthily like him will likewise become one like him."

All this incidentally furnishes an additional explanation as to why the Chinese never thought of deifying Confucius. The fact of regarding him as one of us indeed conforms to his teachings, but it also elevates mankind; because his example shows what men can attain, being thus to them a source of inspiration. And the fact that he had men like Yen Yuen as his devoted disciples and men like Mencius as devoted expounders of his doctrine throws an additional light on his greatness.

The True Confucian

There are astonishingly few technical terms connected with the Confucian teaching. One of these is *Jiun-tze*, variously translated by Western writers as 'the princely man', 'the gentleman', and 'the superior man' (superior, that is, in the true sense of the word, not as the word is sometimes used, almost sneeringly). This person is the true Confucian. He is superior because in no way does he at all resemble the man at the opposite end of the scale—the *Siao-yun* or the mean man. Here again the word 'mean' has not its narrow connotation of to-day, where it often means nothing more than stingy. The Chinese is literally 'a small man', small in all that which goes to make up our daily life. He is unvirtuous and unwise; his outlook is restricted and small; his mind is centred on gains and material things, rather than on what is right or righteous.

The *Jiun-tze* is a man who, in looking outward, sees all others' good before his own; who, looking inward, sees his own faults clearly and blames himself for having achieved so little good. He is a man whose conduct, being a model, will naturally lead others —especially the young—to imitate him; as he is a *Jiun-tze* this will also naturally lead to the making of more and more *Jiun-tze* as his influence spreads.

Confucius spoke of a time in the past history of China when, under wise rulers, "things lost on the road were not picked up" and there was no need for prisons for there was none to put into them. This was the age of the sage rulers of antiquity—nearly two thousand years before Confucius. Examining into their times he found that they lived, ruler and ruled alike, in a state of great simplicity, free from such excessive ornamentation and indulgence as characterised the princes of his time. The dominant note of his teaching, therefore, was that simplicity was the keynote to true progress.

Thus there is no difference in standards of conduct as between different people. The *Jiun-tze* is the standard for all. Nor is there

any expectation that the more educated will *necessarily* the more readily achieve the ideal; only is it looked for that, such men having had greater advantages in education and general training, so much the greater is their responsibility. Any fall on their part from the standard of the *Jiun-tze* is thus more severely regarded, not merely by their peers and subordinates but even, to their credit be it said, by the transgressors themselves.

This is not the only form of ideal in Confucian teaching; there are passages and passages in the *Analects* which show that Confucius had the highest possible ethical standards constantly before him. Although he considered that his teaching was largely of this earth and dealt almost exclusively with the conduct of this life, although he discouraged among his followers discussion of possible future existence, he did believe in Heaven and the guidance of God. On one occasion he said, "He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray." But he did firmly believe that man's main preoccupation should be with his conduct here and now; that settled, he could face with confidence any possible hereafter. In other words, he accepts no excuse from one who does not love his neighbour but says he loves God.

Confucius in fact enunciated the Golden Rule. Some Western scholars have gone to great pains to declare that he did this only in the negative form. In fact he did, on one occasion, set it out in the positive form, in the following words:

"The man of perfect virtue, wishing to have himself established, endeavours also to have others established and, wishing to have himself enlightened or advanced, endeavours also to have others enlightened or advanced. To be able to judge of the wishes of others by one's own and then act to them as one would act to oneself, may be said to be the means of attaining perfect virtue." It was only on the occasion when a disciple asked him to formulate in a few words a rule by which one could abide for life, that he enunciated the rule in the negative form "Do not unto others what you do not wish to be done to yourself." He put the rule in the negative form, because the negative is more comprehensive than the positive, and because, when it is put in the negative, no one could say that he would not be able to be equal to it, inasmuch as no one could reasonably say that he would do to others what he would not wish to be done to himself.

Chinese Education Basically Philosophical

Thus, although there have been many changes in the course of the centuries, one factor has been constant in Chinese education. At all periods and under all forms of government, teaching of the Confucian philosophy has formed part of the education of all Chinese. After the founding of the Republic there was, for a time, a tendency to emphasise European studies at the expense of purely

Chinese training. There were even some who made it their boast that they knew nothing of the Confucian Canon, or indeed of any other Chinese writing, but that they knew the Russian or French writers almost by heart.

But this was a passing phase. It was not long before Chinese students abroad, learning how Confucius was regarded by the scholars of the West, turned to his writings themselves. They found, to their amazement, that even among the giants of Western literature there was none who could dwarf the mighty figure of their own countryman. The natural reaction soon came. Even those Chinese who had decided, for one reason or another, to specialise in Western studies first laid down a foundation of deep knowledge of the Confucian writings. They then found that, so far from hindering their further studies, such a basis was a help to their swift advancement. This phenomenon has also been remarked by several Western sinologues in their own personal experience.

It was not mere chance that dictated the curriculum of early Chinese schools. It had been found that the best men, whether for state service or for private employment, had been produced by the close study of the Confucian ethic and the attempt to embody in one's own person the qualities of the *Jiun-tze.* In consequence, even elementary schools taught the principles of the Confucian philosophy. At every stage of education some form of Confucian morality formed part of the syllabus, and those who showed most aptitude in the assimilation of the spirit of Confucianism were the most successful in their chosen walk of life.

The Chinese have always been apologists for the empirical method. Nothing is to be accepted until it is shown to work. This characteristic, coupled with the long devotion to Confucian instruction, has led Westerners to accuse the Chinese of ultra-conservatism. In spite of appearances, however, this is not a true picture. Chinese are slow to change only because they prefer to test thoroughly any new course before embarking on it. In other words, the general acceptance by successive generations of the Confucian philosophy, as an essential basis for the educational system of the country, was not imposed by authority and handed down as an irrevocable *ukase*; it was a natural result of the discovery that the system worked. The Confucian teaching, properly followed to its logical conclusion, produced the *Jiun-tze*; none of the competing systems could do this. Therefore Confucianism became the state cult, as some have called it.

It is no exaggeration to say that the whole trend of Chinese education is the production of a sound moral character. That in the process a man becomes a profound scholar with an incredibly wide range of reading and general knowledge is rather in the nature of a by-product. It could hardly be otherwise in a country where

the most revered teacher laid it down in the earliest stages of his teaching that in education only that method would succeed which did no violence to basic human nature. It is the emphasis placed upon human nature by Confucius in his teaching that has made his ethic of universal application. Some of the wisest Western students of things Chinese have become as enthusiastic as any Chinese over Confucian teaching.

No Chinese is esteemed for mere book-learning unless he has the character which, in Chinese opinion, should go with the well-read man. Thus the aim is not so much to produce the man with encyclopaedic knowledge on all topics as to show forth a man of high moral character who will command respect wherever he may go. The Chinese care less for outward show and decorations than most peoples; for them, inner worth is of first importance.

Consciousness of attainment, however small, on the way to becoming a *Jiun-tze* shows itself in the possession of a quiet, humble confidence. The accent is on ' humble ', for no great teacher anywhere in history was more humble than Confucius himself. He deprecated all praise from those near him; he claimed not to be learned but ' only to love learning ', to be ' unwearied in his pursuit of it.' Yet there was probably no man of his generation who had a wider acquaintance with human thought and knowledge; certainly no man before his time, or since, has displayed such profound understanding of human nature.

It is in the close association of ethical and moral teaching with the activities of everyday life, on whatever level it is lived, that the continued hold of Confucianism on the mind of man is to be found. There is idealism—but not an idealism so vague and other-worldly that it comes violently into conflict with human experience and daily effort. There is morality—but not a rigid and formal morality which is of the schools only, having no place in the ordinary practices of life. There is an ethical code; exacting enough to be sure, yet not so saintly that any man may well despair of attaining to its practice.

As the emphasis of Confucianism is laid on *Jiun-tze* as the embodiment in a living man of the principles of Confucian thought, it is in the universities that the fine flowering of the Confucian tradition can best be seen. There, not only is the constant precept in line with the Confucian thesis; the very example set in their own lives by the preceptors is constantly before the mind of the student. Thus at home, in the conduct of his father, elder and younger brothers, at school in the teaching of his instructors, in the world of business and exchange, and, finally, for the few lucky ones, in the wider field of university study, the student grows up in an atmosphere which is everywhere permeated by this constant influence.

The character-forming power of many of the Confucian maxims

which have become colloquial currency (they are even to be heard quite frequently from the lips of illiterates) may be judged to the full only by life among the people. Some of these sayings have found their way into Western literature (largely through French writers) so long ago that they now appear in books of quotations as if they were of Western origin.

The emphasis on wisdom and learning (though Confucius disclaimed both in his own case) is explained by the need for the informed man. This attitude is reminiscent of the Socratic view that no man willingly or knowingly chooses evil; that, therefore, ignorance and evil are well-nigh identical terms. Yet the importance attached to being aware is everywhere evident in the Confucian writings. " The *Jiun-tze* towards the world has no prejudice for or against anything. What is right he follows."

Learning merely in order to exert undue influence over others or that one might be puffed up with self-satisfaction was not true learning at all. For Confucius the object of all learning was to enable a man to develop the natural goodness inherent in him, so that he might lead a virtuous life. This life was to be a continuing example to others. The soil of China bears abundant evidence of men and women of all ages who, having lived noble and self-sacrificing lives, left a record that posterity might see and emulate them. The record was not their own, of course; their humility would not permit that. But a neighbourhood, proud of having nurtured such a one through a long and useful life, would see to it that a record of the facts should remain to stimulate future generations. Countless Chinese ' village Hampdens ' would gladden the spirit of Gray on his ghostly way through modern China.

So far as ruling the people is concerned, Confucius summarised the whole of his teaching in one sentence: " To govern a state (even) of a thousand chariots (i.e. a principality) demands devotion to duty, sincerity (deserving of the confidence of the people), economy in expenditure, love for (i.e. deep interest in the welfare of) the people, and employment of the people at the proper time (i.e. without interfering with their seasonal occupations)."

Confucius never taught any doctrine which would put the family above the state or the community, and still less any doctrine which would put the interests of the individual above those of the state or the community. In fact, he never mentioned anywhere in his teachings the words ' individual ' or ' family ' except in the one case where he says that improvement of the individual is the key of all virtues and achievements and, in the other case, that if you wish to improve the world you must first improve the state; if you wish to improve the state you must first improve the family; if you wish to improve the family you must first improve the individual. What Confucius taught in connection with the individual or the family is the doctrine of filial piety, which distinctly puts truth and the state

above the family. Thus the *Book of Filial Piety* says: "Filial Piety begins with love of parents, matures in service to the sovereign, and ends in establishing oneself according to truth and righteousness." From this it is clear that Confucius places the interests of the state or community above those of the family or individual and, what is more, truth and righteousness even above the state. In other words, he would not subscribe to the doctrine "My country, right or wrong." In short, throughout his life Confucius taught nothing but unselfishness, loving one's neighbour as oneself, fidelity to truth and righteousness, and universal brotherhood.

So all-embracing is the reach of Confucian thought that it has never been really shaken by the impact of other systems from widely different lands. To-day the power and hold of Confucianism on the minds of many peoples beyond the borders of China attest the vigour which it still has to enlighten the mind and stir the spirit. Even in such a matter as study (where, it might be assumed, few are likely to go astray), there is to be found a warning note: "Learning without thinking is empty; thinking without learning is dangerous."

In 1949 was celebrated the two thousand five hundredth anniversary of the birth of Confucius. It would have been natural enough if this had made a great stir in China and in one or two other countries of the Far East. Yet celebrations took place all over the world, and several countries of Europe, including Austria, made special commemoration of the event by radio and publication programmes. In spite of the antiquity of the teaching of Confucius, its application to the problems of to-day may thus be judged.

From the time of Voltaire intelligent people in Europe have not been content to remain in ignorance of the teaching of Confucius. He has long since been recognised as one of the world's truly great men, and the importance of his teaching has been brought still more into view as translation succeeded translation in an effort to bring over into Western languages the finer points and the nuances of the Chinese sentences. Each generation now seeks a new interpretation, either into the current idiom or because some one phase of previous versions leaves obscurities unresolved.

Although it still remains true that the full force of the teaching can be gained only from reading it in the original Chinese, it must be admitted that the Western student now has at his disposal a range of versions dependent on different schools or commentators or based on one or other of the varied modern methods of treating ancient texts, e.g. the historical method or the canonical method. Those who would are now able to explore *au fond* the writings and principles of one of the most penetrating minds of antiquity.

After the Second World War it became obvious to thinking people that efforts must be made to create out of the various nations ONE WORLD. The late Mr. Wendell Willkie, once high in the counsels of the U.S.A., wrote a book with that title. Much of what he said

and wrote was pure Confucianism, although Mr. Willkie may not have known it. For the first enunciation of the principle of ONE WORLD in which all people could and would live the good life is to be found in the LI CHI section of the Confucian Canon. There it is called *Ta T'ung* (frequently translated as the 'Great Confederation'). The text of that passage can fitly conclude this summary essay of Confucianism:

> When the *Great Principle* (the ideal social order that Confucius had in his mind) prevails, the world is like one home common to all; men of virtue and merit are to be elected to be rulers; sincerity and amity pervade all dealings between man and man; people shall love not only their own parents and own children, but also those of others; the aged, the young, the helpless widows and widowers, the orphans, the destitute, the incapacitated, and the sick shall be well provided for and well looked after, while the able-bodied shall exert themselves in their aid, men shall be appropriately employed and women suitably married; one detests that things are abandoned or wasted on earth, but, when gathered or stored up, they are not to be retained exclusively for oneself; one detests that exertion does not proceed from oneself, but its fruits are not to be regarded exclusively as one's own. Thus there will be no, and no cause for, conspiracy, robbery, theft, or rebellion, and no need to bolt one's outside door. This is a true Commonwealth.

F. T. CHENG.

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SECTION III

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD

Introduction

A CHARACTERISTIC feature of religious life in all English-speaking countries is a very great diversity of belief, of doctrine, of forms of Christian worship and ritual. One finds denominations of all kinds, from the Roman Catholic or Anglican to the Quaker or Unitarian, forming an all but continuous spectrum. One finds all sorts of methods of church government, which may be chiefly in the hands of a clerical hierarchy or of the laity. One comes across theologians who rest their theses upon St. Thomas, William of Ockham, Luther, Calvin, or even upon scientific discoveries—and sometimes upon all of them.

Strengthened by this diversity, perhaps arising from it, there is everywhere a very generous toleration of religious difference and of nonconformism—and this in social practice as well as law. A further result, deplored by some, is a fear, a suspicion, even a dislike of dogmatic assertion and of fervour—of 'enthusiasm', using that word in its seventeenth-century sense. The effect has now spread into other regions, even into the social and political, so that 'toleration' and 'freedom' have become almost synonymous words. All this has helped to create a social climate favourable to the growth of kindliness and amiability: in schools, teachers avoid harsh punishment and endeavour to adopt methods of maintaining free and easy discipline. The relation between all this and the formation of the moral personality presents an interesting subject for speculation and, even better, for observation and research.

In England, the Church of England has close connections with the state, and in Quebec as well as in the Irish Republic the Roman Catholic Church has a predominant influence in public affairs—though it is in no way the Church of the state. Elsewhere the separation between Church and state is complete—though all these English-speaking countries consider themselves Christian. Secularism has never attained the pitch of anti-clerical feeling which we notice in Latin-Catholic countries.

Moral training, whether imparted in independent, in subsidised denominational, or in public ('secular') schools, is, broadly speaking, based on Christian ethics, as revealed in the Gospels. There are, however, variations, and it is convenient to consider the

countries in this section under three headings: those where religious ceremonies form part of school life; those where all such instruction or ceremonies are strictly excluded from school life; and those, like Ireland and Quebec, where the Catholic religion is an integral part of the school curriculum.

The first group includes England, Wales, Scotland, Canada, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. Undenominational instruction of a non-dogmatic kind is provided in an attempt to maintain in full activity the beliefs common to all Christians. Since the Roman Catholic minorities have, on the whole, contracted out of this arrangement, by establishing separate systems, it is likely that the 'undenominational instruction' tends to be Protestant. It is in fact accepted both by the Dissenting Churches and by Anglicans, though disliked by some Anglo-Catholics. Since both secular and religious authorities agree on the Christian basis of ethics, it has not been thought necessary to provide courses of secular moral instruction.

The second group includes the U.S.A. and the Australian States. Here, the secularism of Federal and State legislation is uncompromising and prohibits religious instruction. If the Bible is used for reading, comment is, as a general rule, forbidden. Yet this attitude in no way implies any hostility to Christian traditions. Both the U.S.A. and Australia consider themselves Christian countries, and the majority of their citizens openly adhere to Christian Churches. Their secularism is of historical origin: it is the result of a struggle between denominations for the control of education and of a scramble for public funds. The conflict was solved, in accordance with the desire of the majority of the population, by building up a national educational system under forms of public control which maintained interdenominational neutrality. Neither country has introduced into schools courses in secular morality, founded on traditions other than the Christian.

In the two Catholic regions, the situation is simpler. The Catholic Church *de facto* controls education, and its religious-moral training is integrated into the school life. Both Quebec and the Irish Republic are predominantly agricultural regions, and the families are large. The problem of moral education is thus simpler than in the strongly industrialised and urbanised countries of this section. Paternal authority and family ties are stronger; attachment to the Church and its leadership is accepted as a matter of course; the moral codes, if old-fashioned in some respects, are followed without questioning. It appears, however, that these two Catholic areas, surrounded as they are on all sides by technically progressive industrial communities, strongly affected both by Protestant and by scientific influences, will find it increasingly difficult to preserve their relative cultural isolation and their traditional stability. Industrialisation and urbanisation cross

denominational frontiers, and Catholics too are involved in ongoing technological and economic change: the cultural attitudes will alter in consequence.

It should, perhaps, be stressed that in no English-speaking country is there any desire to reawaken the 'religious problems' of the past as regards control of schools. There is widespread satisfaction with the solutions now adopted—or at least they are generally accepted. After all, the solution of a social problem means discovering an arrangement to which no one objects violently and not working out the absolutely right answer! Nevertheless, there is evidence of a widespread anxiety concerning the moral behaviour both of adults and of the rising generation. A neutral and scientific detachment in this matter is felt to be insufficient and there is a growing demand for a more positive and active attitude towards religious and moral questions.

EDITORS.

CHAPTER ONE

UNDENOMINATIONAL CHRISTIANITY AND MORAL TRAINING IN THE ENGLISH SCHOOL SYSTEM

The Act of 1944

THE distinctive feature of the educational system of England and Wales is a paradox. Daily worship and the teaching of religion are compulsory in all schools maintained or aided by the state, yet every teacher and every child, if his parents so wish, is free to take no part in it. Within that general framework the system embraces both schools in which denominational teaching is their *raison d'être* and others in which no catechism or formulary distinctive of any particular religious denomination may be taught.

This is perhaps hard for the logical Frenchman with his principle of *laïcisme* to understand, as it is for the liberty-loving American jealous of any departure from the Federal Constitution, and for the totalitarian Russian frankly using the schools as a prime instrument for the inculcation of social and political doctrine. To those in some countries of Europe or Asia it may even seem to manifest a lack of both realism and sincerity, whether from the political point of view or the religious—another vagary of the incomprehensible English! Yet it is neither an easy-going confusion nor a futile compromise. Crystallised in the Education Act of 1944, it contains elements contributed by the adventures and conflicts of three centuries at least. Wrought into a Bill by a long process not only of drafting but also of friendly conference with Churches, teachers, local education authorities, and political parties, it became an Act of Parliament after a critical and constructive debate lasting over many days and ending in an overwhelming majority of convinced and discriminating votes cast in favour of it. Indeed, the Act was a practically unanimous decision of the people's representatives in Parliament.

Structurally the pattern is clear and relatively simple. Only nursery schools and independent schools receiving no grant from public funds and owning no responsibility to any but their own governing bodies fall outside of it. The primary and secondary schools financed and controlled in any degree by the Ministry of Education and the local educational authorities are either county

schools, entirely provided, maintained, and controlled by the local authority, or voluntary schools, all the educational costs of which are met by the local authority though the buildings have been provided by a religious body—Anglican, Roman Catholic, or in a few instances Methodist or Jewish. In the case of the voluntary schools, if the body concerned can find 50 per cent. of the cost of bringing the buildings up to the standard required by the Ministry, the religious teaching is in accordance with the trust deeds of the school (generally, therefore, denominational), though Agreed Syllabus teaching must be given to any children whose parents ask for it, and the managers, of whom four out of six are elected by the religious body, appoint the teachers, subject to objection by the local authority on the score of professional inadequacy: such schools are 'aided' schools. If the body concerned cannot raise the 50 per cent. the authority takes over the whole responsibility for the buildings, though these remain the property of the religious body and are at its disposal out of school hours: the authority appoints the teachers and four out of the six managers, but the religious instruction must be in accordance with an Agreed Syllabus, save that for those children whose parents ask for it denominational instruction must be given on two days a week by a teacher approved by the religious body: these are 'controlled' schools.

There are two other types of school—direct-grant secondary schools, which receive financial assistance from the Government but not from the L.E.A., and must comply with the Act in respect of worship and religious instruction; and special-agreement denominational secondary schools which, under the Education Act of 1936, received from public funds anything up to 75 per cent. of the cost of reconditioning or of new buildings, and whose managers and teachers are appointed on much the same basis as those of 'controlled' schools under the 1944 Act. Both direct-grant and special-agreement schools are relatively few and the number of each is strictly limited.

In county schools the religious teaching must be in accordance with a syllabus compiled for the authority or recommended to it by a statutory 'conference' consisting of representatives appointed by the local authority, the teachers, the Church of England, and other Churches in the area. Each of these groups has one vote and the decisions must be unanimous. The syllabus must be free of distinctively denominational teaching. No teacher in any school within the scope of the Act may be penalised for declining to take part in religious instruction or gain professional advantage from doing so. In the Education Act of 1870 the 'time-table' clause required that religious instruction should be given at the beginning or end of the morning or afternoon session to facilitate the withdrawal of children whose parents did not wish them to receive it.

This arrangement has proved to be no longer necessary, though the 1944 Act provides that withdrawal must be at such times that the work of the school and the education of the child will not be disturbed. Religious instruction can now be given in all schools at any time in the school day, as, since the Education Act of 1902, it always could be in secondary schools—a provision which enables the headmaster or headmistress to put it into the hands of willing teachers: no others need undertake it, and willingness is held to imply conviction and competence, or readiness on the teacher's part to do what he or she can to become competent. The teaching is inspected, like all other parts of the curriculum, by His Majesty's Inspectors—an innovation in so far as, from 1870 till 1944, it was "no part of the duty" of H.M.I.s to inspect religious instruction or even to be present when it was given: this was because during that period the whole responsibility for providing or not providing religious instruction in state schools lay with the School Board or, after 1902, the local authority, the limiting conditions being that any such instruction must not be sectarian and that the 'conscience clause' permitting parents to withdraw their children, with the 'time-table clause' above-mentioned, must be observed.

Ministers and clergy can therefore no longer be asked by L.E.A.s to visit county schools as unofficial 'inspectors' or advisers. They may, of course, take any part they wish in the worship and religious instruction in voluntary 'aided' schools, but they have no 'right of entry' to 'county' schools, nor can they at the same time hold a cure of souls and a paid post in a county school: if they wish to become regular teachers in county schools they must be professionally qualified as teachers. They may be invited on occasion by the headmaster or headmistress to conduct worship or take some special part in religious instruction, but this must not be sectarian.

Parents may withdraw their children from worship or from religious instruction or from both in either a county or a voluntary school, but must not keep them away from school for the periods involved unless to the satisfaction of the local authority religious instruction is provided for them elsewhere: otherwise the children are given instruction in the school in some 'secular' subject while worship and religious instruction are going on. In county secondary schools, if parents wish their children to receive denominational education which cannot conveniently be arranged outside the school, facilities must be given within the school, but the teachers must be provided and the cost borne by the parents or the denomination.

Such in brief outline is the scheme. Minor provisions and adjustments will be mentioned subsequently, for they have reference to such problems as any form of organisation is bound to bring with it. The main considerations here are that the system

is comprehensive, absorbing and at the same time reforming the 'dual system' which prevailed from 1870 until 1944: it is democratic, bringing into co-operation—or, to use a better word, partnership—all the interests involved, those of Church, state, parent, and teacher, submitting the whole to the unfettered decision of Parliament and making provision for minorities especially in matters of conscience; it is Christian, for the Churches have two of the four votes in the making or adoption of Agreed Syllabuses (though it would be untrue to suggest or seem to imply that this is the only reason, for authorities and teachers have their own grounds for wishing it to be so). 'Moral instruction' arises out of Christian teaching: it could not be otherwise, and there is neither necessity nor desire, if the Bible is taught, to develop any separate body of ethical teaching, nor does anyone suppose that it is possible to improve upon the ethics of Jesus. It is interesting to note that in providing for the withdrawal of children from religious instruction the Act does not even suggest that some form of moral instruction unrelated to religion might be given within the school to such children as an alternative.

Morality and Religion

All this, however, may seem to ignore previous questions of no small importance. Some people, for example, would at once ask: Is there any necessary relationship between morality and religion?

In the ancient world there was often little enough, even though men paid real respect to both. We recall the character of some of the gods in the Greek pantheon, and Plato's objection to the use of the poets in the education of children because so many of the stories of Homeric deities were flagrantly immoral. The Hindu *puranas* and some of the temple carvings have raised a similar issue. From other points of view many people since Plato's day, in the East and the West alike, have advanced lofty and even austere codes of ethics while repudiating as irrational or superfluous all forms of religious belief. As contemporary instances we may cite pragmatists and intellectual idealists of the John Dewey school, or scientific humanists who would agree philosophically with Julian Huxley, J. B. S. Haldane, or Bertrand Russell. More significant, perhaps, is the advancing tide of practical materialism among young people as well as older ones, who just do not see the relevance of religion in a world obsessed by the discoveries and explanations of modern physics, chemistry, and biology, though they are greatly concerned with the moral values and standards of 'Western civilisation', 'good citizenship', 'decent conduct', and the like.

The philosophical questions thus raised are considered elsewhere in this volume. Here we must be content to note that anthropological and psychological inquiry shows that some kind of morality

and some sort of religion (or substitute for religion) are found in all men of whatever time or race. To quote Professor B. Malinowski: "The substance of all religion is thus deeply rooted in human life; it grows out of the necessities of life. In other words, religion fulfils a definite cultural function in every human society."[1] One or two primitive tribes have been described as having no religion, but it would seem that they are 'exceptions which prove the rule', since they are dominated by an inversion of religion pervaded by fear, or are 'devil worshippers.' The point is that the *capacity* for religion and morality is native to all humankind, whatever shape belief and practice may in fact assume. Psychologically, therefore, to teach children religion and morals is not to impose upon them while they are defenceless and malleable the prejudices of their elders. It is to enable them to develop the inherent capacity to which we have referred. It is, in fact, to satisfy a universal need, for if they do not find a true religion they will embrace a false one, or a substitute.

For Christians there is no doubt, either philosophically or empirically, about the relation between religion and morals. Both the Old Testament and the New are clear and emphatic on that issue. One of the distinctive elements in Hebrew religion was precisely the challenging declaration of the prophets, notably Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, that the most enthusiastic devotion and elaborate forms of worship were a mockery if they did not issue in conduct acceptable to a God supreme above others in moral character and purpose. On Sinai, God had revealed Himself to Moses not only as personal but as moral, and the covenant relationship between Him and His people must needs rest upon a moral responsiveness on their part correctly represented in the Ten Commandments. Jesus Himself, who said that He came to fulfil the law and the prophets, made this demand the more searching when He turned it into the wholly positive terms of the parables, and pressed it back from action to motive. From James's blunt reminder that faith without works is dead to Paul's picture in 1 Corinthians xiii of what love means in practice we find the same emphasis.

The New Testament, moreover, takes us back to our question in what many would regard as its most practical form—can there be genuine and enduring morality without true religion? Paul, with his first-hand, intimate knowledge of life in the Graeco-Roman world of the first century A.D., the world of Seneca and the Stoic moralists as well as of Nero and a decadent aristocracy, portrays with unsparing frankness at the beginning of his letter to the Romans the rottenness of that civilisation at its roots: it was the creation of men whom he describes in writing to the Ephesians as

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[1] Riddell Memorial Lectures: *The Foundations of Faith and Morals* (O.U.P., 1936, p. 59).

" having no hope and without God in the world." He affirms that without the standard set by Jesus Christ, in life as in word, and without the dynamic of faith in God as Jesus made Him known to men, it is impossible to achieve the best in either character or morals. This had indeed been Paul's own experience as a devoted Jew, burning with zeal for a religion which impressed the ancient world so much by its ethical ideals but driven to despair by his own powerlessness or perversity—" For the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I practise." Here he depicts the human situation with psychological insight not surpassed by our modern analytical schools, and bears witness to the remedy, not in theological terms but in those of personal devotion—" I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord."

Undenominational Christianity

This prompts another query. Our title speaks of undenominational Christianity. But is undenominational Christianity real Christianity? Or is it only a reduced, even an *ersatz* affair? Does it envisage a full-blooded religion, or is it rather a desiccated and devitalised belief in a ' sort of a something ', with a commonplace moral teaching which cannot properly be called Christian at all? The answer will emerge later in this article, but it is well to take note of the question now.

These are not rhetorical questions idly asked in a mood of irresponsibility. In any serious review of the place of religion in English education they cannot be kept out. They always have affected, as they still do, all pioneering enterprises and experiments, legislation, administration, and school practice. The debates and controversies about education and the place of religion in education which have gone on for the last hundred and fifty years in this country have never been mere party-political or sectarian conflicts. They went back to first principles, and only as this was at last fully recognised did it become possible to achieve the constructive compromise of 1944.

For another reason we ought not to ignore these questions in our present survey. Satisfying answers to them cannot be found, and should not be sought, by speculation and argument alone. Scientific method requires observation, hypothesis, experiment, and verification. Religion, and in particular Christianity, points the same way to the ascertainment of truth, for faith is " action beyond (but not contrary to) the evidence ": it is self-committal to action in accordance with reasoned belief and experienced fact, but it leaps out beyond these in the expectation of further discovery. " If any man willeth to do the will of God, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God or not." History has its contribution to make to the development of any valid philosophy.

It is the more needful that we should keep all this in mind and

not take too much for granted, one way or another, because the educational system in England, unlike those in many other Christian countries, has never in fact been secular. Moral training within that system has therefore never been isolated from religious teaching. An effort was made in 1870, as we shall see, to separate the two, but it failed, and in 1944 secularism was decisively rejected by the bare fact that for the first time worship and religious instruction were made compulsory. The English system thus affords a contrast, as we have indicated above, with those of the United States and France, where, for different reasons, all but private schools are on a strictly secular basis, though the place of religion in personal and corporate life is in no way denied or disparaged as it must be in a state built upon the materialist conception of history which is fundamental to Marxism. George Washington, in his final address to the American people, declared that true morality was rooted in and inseparable from the Christian religion. In America, the schools and the earliest universities had been founded and controlled by the Churches. But the article in the United States Federal Constitution of 1787 which, in seeking to protect every citizen's prescriptive right to freedom of thought, speech, and action, declared that Church and state must be wholly separate, is held to preclude the teaching of religion in state schools. There have even been judicial decisions (much misunderstood) that the Bible itself is a sectarian book, and a decision in the High Court has lately reaffirmed the complete secularisation of the system by declaring illegal the growing practice of allowing pupils to receive during school hours (i.e. 'on released time'), whether off or on the school premises, religious instruction entirely provided by the Churches, even giving 'credits' for such courses, usually unsectarian in character. In France the increasing political power and claims of the Church led to the 'laïcisation' of the schools in 1886, whereby no priest, monk or nun was any longer permitted to be a teacher in a school within the state system, and religious instruction is regarded as exclusively the province of the home and the Church, and in no way that of the school. Jules Ferry, the great minister responsible for education in France at that time, enjoined upon teachers that it was indeed their duty to give moral training to their pupils but that in doing so they must be most careful to avoid any word or attitude that would wound the susceptibilities of a good man—which is to say that they must not in any way attack or slight religious conviction. Of course, both in the United States and in France there were many private schools maintained by the Churches: the most recent statistics[2] record that 900,000 elementary pupils in France and 308,000 secondary are in

[2] *Times Educational Supplement,* October 6th, 1950.

denominational schools. But in neither country is there a 'dual system' bringing state and Church schools within one framework and providing the entire cost of the Church schools, apart from the cost of the buildings, from public funds.

Now it cannot be said that in England we have merely avoided an issue which other countries have frankly faced and decisively settled. Certainly it is not true to say that worship and religious instruction have their present place in our schools simply as an outcome of tradition and convention. But neither was that place determined by unheralded crises and sudden radical decisions in 1870, 1902, and 1944. Since the times of the Venerable Bede, King Alfred, and Alcuin, education has been a factor in the social and cultural progress of England. Until the Reformation the Roman Catholic Church, as in other countries, was the great provider of it and controller of it. Our Protestant Tudor monarchs were vigorous promoters of it, and even though Henry VIII sought the dissolution of the monasteries he used money obtained thereby to found schools and colleges which were on a religious basis as a matter of course. The grammar school tradition was such that—

> even private grammar schools were not outside the scope of Ecclesiastical influence and it was not till Queen Victoria's reign that teaching[3] without a Bishop's licence was legalised. Religious observances were an important feature of the Grammar School life, and in school statutes there were often strict injunctions imposing Church duties upon the headmaster and requiring the pupils to participate in worship. . . The *Primer* of sequences and hymns was an essential pre-Reformation school service book;

it was revised at the Reformation and prescribed by Edward VI as the only one that might be used.[4] The Puritans, though this is often overlooked, were no less ardent with regard to education.

> The national duty of education was largely taken up by the Long Parliament in 1641, and though war caused them to abandon their design of a complete system, donations from confiscated Church lands were continually made for the maintenance of schools and schoolmasters. Treasury grants in aid of education were frequent in the period of Puritan rule.[5]

Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Nonconformist, then, have alike and always been concerned to provide and promote education not

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[3] I.e. in grammar schools: the restriction does not appear to have applied to others.

[4] W. O. Lester Smith, *To Whom do Schools Belong?*, p. 59.

[5] G. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, p. 317, quoted by Lester Smith *op. cit.*, p. 28. See also W. A. L. Vincent, *The State and School Education 1640–1660*, e.g. pp. 49–52, where it is stated that not only were Westminster, Rugby, King Edward VI Grammar School at Chelmsford, and Bingley rehabilitated but also "the Commissioners of Charitable Uses appropriated unattached charities and used them to found a school at Halesowen."

only as churchmen but as citizens, and as a means not only of inculcating their distinctive forms of Christian belief and worship but also of maintaining and developing those ethical principles and moral standards to which the common elements in their interpretations of Christianity commit them. This unity amid differences lies at the root of what some authoritative writers call the 'compromise' of 1870, and it is the constructive principle of the far more positive enactments of 1944. It is not a digression, therefore, to hark back to the seventeenth century or to pursue a little farther the course of events which, though it took three hundred years, has made our present position possible.

Historical Background

We have spoken of unity amid differences. It was in the religio-political conflicts between Royalist Churchman and Puritan Roundhead during the seventeenth century that something was won which without exaggeration may be said to be the very foundation of the religious 'settlement' in the Education Act of 1944. As Mr. Kitson Clark has demonstrated in his book on *The English Tradition,* that freedom of thought, speech, and action which we now regard as the mark of British democracy was not a secular conquest, nor is our fundamental loyalty to moral convictions a product of purely ethical evolution. These were indeed achieved in this country under the leadership of men like Cromwell and Milton, Sir Thomas More and Sir John Eliot. But the dynamic which drove them was religion, and religion not only as devotion to a creed but still more as a way of life. Helwys and John Robinson, Bunyan, Tyndale, and Robert Browne were among the creators of the English tradition, and when some of them were harried into exile for their faith they established fairly and squarely on the bedrock of religion and morality their new political and social communities in America. From the days of the Pilgrim Fathers to those of President Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms', the American tradition like the British has upheld a moral order rooted in the Christian faith. Even the secularisation of the United States educational system was no denial of that fact and, as in France, the state has ever since looked to the Church to preserve, by concurrent and independent educational activity, the religious springs of the nation's ethical vitality. The experience of America would even seem to show by contrast the soundness of the British determination to keep religion in the schools, and of the more empirically discovered conclusion that this cannot be done in schools provided and maintained entirely from rates and taxes on any basis but the non-sectarian teaching of religion, be this described as undenominational or as, in essence, interdenominational. For it has become evident in America that neither psychological behaviourism nor social and political idealism proves

in practice sufficient to supply a philosophy of education that will give unity and direction to the life and work of the schools. It is now clearer than ever before that from nursery school to university (and beyond), no education is adequate that fails to take account of the whole person in all his functions and potentialities: body, mind, and spirit form an indivisible unity which again lives and grows only in relationships, to the world invisible as well as that of space and time. And so Americans have sought to develop external co-operation between Church and school on terms that will not abrogate the Federal Constitution. Unfortunately, the makers of that great instrument of democratic government in effect, however unintentionally, carried out the judgment of Solomon, and in the effort to ensure freedom dismembered the living child.[6]

The eighteenth century brought the Evangelical Revival. Shaftesbury, Zachary Macaulay, Wilberforce, Elizabeth Fry, and other notable Christian philanthropists and reformers owed their inspiration to their warm and living religious experience, as everybody knew. But too little recognition has been given to the effect of the Revival upon the development of popular education. George Whitefield and John Wesley had more than a philanthropic interest in dispelling the illiteracy and improving the morals of poor children, or indoctrinating them with theological formulae. They founded both day and boarding schools which Wesley, at any rate, treated as thorough-going educational experiments and intended to be models for his own followers and other Christian people to emulate in all parts of the country. He was much influenced by what he saw at Jena and Herrnhutt. He was a student of the educational theories of such pioneers as Locke and Comenius, and he read, though very critically, the writings of Rousseau. For his schools he wrote grammars and other text-books. In 1739 he laid the foundation-stone of his first meeting-house at Bristol, and a month later began the building of the Kingswood School, of which Whitefield had laid the foundation. Similarly, that same year, when he established at the old Foundery what became the historic City Road Chapel he at once opened a school there. He laid upon his societies, and especially upon parents who were members of them, the paramount duty of Christian education. It was not for nearly a generation that the Methodist Conference took up the enterprise seriously, but the relevance of Wesley's work to our present theme is twofold. From it sprang one of the most notable and enduring Free Church contributions to elementary and secondary education in England and Wales but, strong as the Methodist denominational consciousness

[6] Cf. *Religion in the Post-war World*, Vol. IV, *Religion and Education*, Edited by Willard L. Sperry.

has always been, a special Education Committee in 1890, while agreeing to maintain specifically Methodist day schools where possible, "pressed for the establishment of School Boards everywhere and the placing of a school with unsectarian Christian teaching within reasonable distance of every family, especially in rural districts." [7] This later became the official policy of the Methodist Church and the characteristic position of the Free Churches in general.

Whether Robert Raikes, an evangelical Anglican, was greatly moved by the Revival is perhaps uncertain. However that may be, the Sunday School movement which he led by example and precept in the latter half of the eighteenth century kindled a public interest which spread rapidly through the country. Raikes provided schools in Gloucester on Sunday for the boys and girls in the city who reacted from drudgery and repression in the factories during six days of the week by running wild on the seventh. His newspaper, the *Gloucester Journal,* afforded him an opportunity of publicising his experiment and advocating the project widely, as he did also in the pages of *The Gentleman's Magazine.* Meantime Hannah More divided her time between carrying on Sunday Schools in the Mendips and making vigorous propaganda for progress in educational ideals and developments generally—and particularly, of course, in girls' schools—among the distinguished people she met in the salons of the West End of London, as well as through her voluminous writings. She organised week-evening schools of industry for the children who attended her Sunday Schools, being, no doubt, stimulated to do so by the Charity School movement and by the activity of Mrs. Trimmer in this early form of 'practical' education animated by a religious motive. Wesley urged his people to read Mrs. Trimmer's *Oeconomy of Charity,* though she was as strong a High Churchwoman as Hannah More was an Evangelical, and Wesley himself was becoming an unwilling outcast from the Church of England.

The ferment of enthusiasm for Sunday School work was in fact bringing together in a common effort people who were otherwise sharply divided in matters of theology or churchmanship. Locally it not seldom happened that a denominational Sunday School became interdenominational. The early Methodist Schools have been described as "Wesleyan in theory but undenominational in practice, welcoming children of any church or of no church at all." [8] Many schools, especially in Lancashire and Yorkshire, were undenominational from the start, an outstanding example being the great school at Stockport, with its three thousand

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[7] H. F. Mathews, *Methodism and the Education of the People, 1791–1851,* p. 199.

[8] H. F. Mathews, *op. cit.,* p. 60.

children. The General Sunday School Society affiliated schools of different denominations all over the country. Parliamentary returns reveal the fact that in 1818 there were nearly half a million Sunday School scholars in England and Wales, while in 1833 there were more than a million and a half. "It was through the Sunday School that the idea of universal education was first considered possible." [9]

The purpose of the men and women who gave themselves so wholeheartedly to the work of the Sunday Schools was in most cases not narrowly pietistic, and they taught 'secular' subjects without hesitation. "The Sunday School of that age was a more substantial institution than that which still perpetuates its name," says one writer.[10] At any rate it was impelled to cover a wider field because at the turn of the century the crying need of the children for even the barest elements of instruction would have remained unmet had Sunday Schools not taught them to read and write.

> Any examination of the evidence [writes a recent researcher] shows that the situation which called these schools into being was the ignorance of the working-class children, their potentialities for crime when left uninstructed in elementary reading and writing, and the concurrent lack of any practical measures to cope with the problem on the part of the State. The impression one gains from reading the early accounts of such schools is that their founders realised their religious possibilities *after* they had come to see what good could be done by teaching secular subjects.

In this connection he quotes a passage from an article in *The Methodist Magazine* written as late as 1824:

> Simply *to teach* became the great object; and whether that which was taught was a table of arithmetic or the Tables of the Law, the catechism or the imitation of the writing copy, the process of infallible improvement was thought to be going on, and that (*sic*) knowledge, morality and religion were to be the sure results.[11]

On the other hand, many schools which had been started as Sunday Schools pure and simple developed into day schools in which, of course, religion was taught but on unsectarian lines. Nevertheless, the primary aim of the Sunday School was not lost to view nor was its importance as a denominational recruiting-ground forgotten. Thus in 1837 the Methodist Conference "affirmed the necessity for a Sunday School to be associated with every chapel as a means of initiating the young into the characteristic tenets of the denominational faith." [12]

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[9] Frank Smith, *A History of English Elementary Education*, pp. 59 f.
[10] W. L. Mathieson, quoted by H. F. Mathews, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
[11] Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 50, 52.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

Religious Difficulty in the Nineteenth Century

It is idle to compare or contrast the contribution made by the various denominations to this form of Christian education in those pioneering times, but it may be said that the Free Churches did more than is sometimes recognised. "In Nottingham the statistics of Sunday-school instruction in 1802 show that nearly half the number of children attending such schools were in Methodist Schools (Anglican 400, General Baptist 275, Particular Baptist 138, Congregationalist 150, Methodist 900)."[13] The Report of the Manchester Statistical Society for 1834 credits the Church of England with 7,954 scholars in Manchester, the Congregationalists with 2,864, the Baptists with 1,039, the Roman Catholics with 3,136, the Unitarians with 182, and the Methodists with 8,308. In Salford the Anglicans had 1,900, the Congregationalists 1,138, the Roman Catholics 539, the Unitarians 128, and the Methodists 2,633. For York, however, the figures present a different picture—Church of England 1,263, Congregationalist 281, Unitarian 40, and Methodist 607. In 1839, according to Sir James Kay Shuttleworth, seven-eighths of the children receiving nothing more than Sunday School instruction were in dissenting schools. But this was no doubt partly due to the fact that the Free Churches, while at the time maintaining denominational day schools of their own, favoured the undenominational schools promoted by the British and Foreign School Society. Yet they did not regard the teaching of the Bible there given as a sufficient education in the Christian faith and they held, as the quotation above from *The Methodist Magazine* indicates, that the Churches should teach their own distinctive tenets themselves in their Sunday Schools. The Church of England, teaching its whole doctrine in its day schools, and moreover using the method of catechising children in church on Sundays, had less need to provide Sunday Schools. All this has a bearing upon the division between the Church of England and the Free Churches when the first state schools were established on an undenominational basis in 1870.

Kay Shuttleworth, the famous Secretary to that Committee of the Privy Council on Education which in the course of nearly a century evolved into the Ministry of Education, wrote in 1867 to the old scholars of the Bampton Independent Chapel Sunday School, where as a young man he was a teacher and later was superintendent of the boys' department:

> I would not have you, however, think that the Sunday School can do all that is needed in the instruction and training of youth. The Sunday School was the root from which sprang our system of day

[13] G. H. Harwood, *History of Wesleyan Methodism in Nottingham and its Vicinity,* p. 128, quoted by Mathews, *op. cit.,* p. 57.

> schools. The force which makes religious training the chief aim of the elementary day school was derived from this root. The congregational organisation of our school system has the same origin. Long before even enlightened statesmen and leaders of public opinion cared for the education of the people, the congregation had begun the work in the Sunday School. When the Government first attempted to organise national education, it not only found this machinery ready to its hand, but it also, after previous experiments in other directions, found that the Churches and congregations contained within themselves a zeal and purpose, as to public education, which existed in no civic body—not even in the Parliament itself.[14]

Kay Shuttleworth was not an ardent denominationalist; his plea was rather that the vital and active concern of the local 'congregation', be it Anglican or Free Church, for the welfare and Christian upbringing of the children in its own homes and neighbourhood was the surest guarantee that a school for which it was responsible would provide the best education for these boys and girls, and that therefore the connection between 'congregation' and school was too valuable to lose. That letter was written three years before Mr. Forster's Education Act of 1870, and up till that time the Government's part in 'organising' education had been simply, from 1833 onward, the provision of grants-in-aid to schools built and conducted by the Churches, the non-sectarian British and Foreign School Society, and some other voluntary bodies. The grants were administered by Kay Shuttleworth's Committee of the Privy Council, which appointed Inspectors, some of whom had to be Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Methodists, or Congregationalists in order that their supervision of denominational schools might be acceptable to the Churches concerned. Contemplating the plans for direct public provision and control of schools already, no doubt, under discussion, and the growing volume of opinion that such schools ought to be secular, or at most undenominational, Kay Shuttleworth continued:

> Even now, when great political changes have made the education of the people a necessity of the State, I cannot conceive that any purely civic body like a committee of rate-payers or a town council can, in the present state of information, opinion, and feeling, without mischief, supersede the congregation in the management of the school. On the other hand, the congregational school will have to become a public school, in which the civil rights of the minority, however small and humble, will have to be respected. On this basis the schools which have sprung from the root of the Sunday School, and retain both the aim of religious teaching and the congregational organisation, may well be included in a national system supported both by the general taxation and by local rates.

It took three-quarters of a century to work out a solution of the problem which should secure the inclusion of denominational and undenominational schools in one system without sacrificing, on the

[14] Frank Smith, *The Life of Sir James Kay Shuttleworth*, pp. 6 f.

one hand, public control of the expenditure of public money or, on the other, provision of Christian teaching in all the nation's schools, the right of parents to have their children taught in accordance with their own Christian convictions and denominational loyalties, and the teacher's freedom of conscience and professional prospects. Nevertheless we may see in what Kay Shuttleworth wrote something like a prophetic anticipation not only of the Dual System, the Cowper-Temple Clause, and the Conscience Clause of the Education Act passed in 1870, but also of the firmer and stronger structures which Mr. Balfour in 1902 and Mr. Butler in 1944 built upon these principles.

It is unnecessary to recount here the familiar story of the schools from 1798, when Joseph Lancaster opened his monitorial school in Southwark, to 1870. Lancaster's experiment kindled the public imagination with regard to day schools much as Raikes's had done in the case of Sunday Schools. In 1808 he and his friends formed a small society for promoting the education and welfare of children, and in 1810 this became the Royal Lancastrian Association, with a committee which included men of such public standing, and withal of such diverse outlook, as Brougham, Whitbread, Wilberforce, and James Mill. In 1814 it was renamed the British and Foreign School Society. The support of the politicians and social reformers was due to more than their disappointment at their own failure, and that of others as eminent as themselves, to get successive Education Bills through Parliament: for the philosophers and men of letters it was easier to come together in this particular movement because it was free of theological and ecclesiastical shibboleths. Lancaster was attracted by the simplicity of Quaker worship and teaching, and did in fact join the Society of Friends. In the schools which he himself founded and those which sprang up all over the country under the aegis of the British and Foreign School Society the reading of the Bible was basic to the curriculum, but no sectarian interpretation of it was permitted. This, however, and the extent to which the schools were supported by Nonconformists and otherwise unorthodox people, appeared to Mrs. Trimmer and other uncompromising Anglicans, whose sympathies she quickly aroused, likely both to undermine the position and influence of the Church of England and to plunge the country into atheism and sedition. She charged Lancaster, unjustifiably, with plagiarising from Dr. Bell, who had invented a monitorial system while working in Madras and had experimented with it on returning to England in 1798, Lancaster's only contribution being

> the nondescript religious views which she thought were no better than those of the "Jacobins, the Illuminati, the Philanthropinists, the sectarists and infidels." The cry was taken up: the *Anti-Jacobin*, the *Quarterly*, and the *British Review*, besides the army of pamphleteers,

> poured upon Lancaster every abusive epithet they could discover. He was nothing better than "a Socinian" or "a Deist."; his system would lead to "general infidelity" or "a kind of philosophical deism" . . In this way Lancaster was made the focus of Nonconformist and Whig efforts in education, while Bell was exalted as the saviour of Church Schools.[15]

In 1811 there was founded by the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church throughout England and Wales, which took over the charity schools sponsored for a century past by the S.P.C.K., and by 1830 had some 346,000 children in its schools.

> As a condition of receiving aid from the Society it was necessary to follow the monitorial system as laid down by Bell, to give the pupils instruction in the Liturgy and Catechism of the Church of England, and to take them to church regularly on Sundays. At the same time there was, in some schools at least, a conscience clause which allowed nonconformist children to be withdrawn from religious instruction.[16]

The importance of the Lancaster-Bell controversy from our present point of view is that the prime controversialists were not Lancaster and Bell themselves but the Churches, and that the controversy crystallised about these two societies not so much the polar opposition of the Church of England and the Free Churches as the bipolar problem of religious education with a state system, for after state grants began in 1833 and were administered mainly through these two societies a state system it was, as Kay Shuttleworth recognised, though all the schools were voluntary. The radical difference was whether public money should be spent upon sectarian teaching or only upon 'undenominational' religious teaching, or in other words that upon which all the Churches were agreed. There was no division at all on the question of whether there should be Christian instruction and worship in the schools. Brougham's Parish Schools Bill of 1820 was lost because it proposed that though the school buildings should be erected at the cost of the manufacturers and maintained out of local rates, parents paying school fees, the teachers should be appointed by the Vestry and must be communicants of the Established Church, and the parish clergymen could veto appointments or dismiss teachers and decide upon the curriculum: children were to attend church *or* chapel on Sundays, during the week simple Bible teaching only was to be given, and no form of worship except the saying of the Lord's Prayer was to be allowed. Both the clerical control and the undenominational teaching were inflammatory elements in Brougham's proposals, but they evoked no counter-proposal that schools should be secular. On the contrary, for example, "Official

[15] Frank Smith, *A History of English Elementary Education*, p. 78.
[16] H. C. Barnard, *History of English Education*, p. 67.

Methodism disliked the Chartist demand for secular education as much as it disliked its anti-clericalism. It was this which caused them to oppose the proposed Education Bill of 1839." [17] Methodists as a matter of policy established a considerable number of secondary schools, both boarding and day, as well as a great number of elementary schools, during this period, and it is noteworthy that "As far as higher education was concerned, the matter which chiefly worried Methodists was the lack of religious instruction in the existing (non-Methodist) schools to which the new Methodist middle classes were beginning to send their children." [18]

As early as 1837 the Central Society of Education had been formed to seek the improvement of education on a basis of complete religious neutrality. It was, however, the conflicts of the Churches which drove Chartists like Lovett and politicians like Cobden to advocate a 'secular solution.' Lovett declared that more genuine Christian charity was found in the school established in 1846 in connection with his National Hall in Holborn to provide a "sound, secular, useful and moral education" than in the denominational schools. Cobden said in that same year that he "took to the repeal of the Corn Laws as light amusement compared with the difficult task of inducing the priests of all denominations to agree to suffer the people to be educated." [19] On that account he favoured the 'Massachusetts system' of complete secularisation of the schools. At about the same time there was considerable support in Lancashire, which later spread to other parts of the country, for the idea of free, secular, education in schools maintained from the rates. W. J. Fox introduced in 1850 a Bill for supplementing the existing voluntary schools by local effort through education committees empowered to levy rates for the purpose, the schools to be free and secular, with provision for religious instruction if parents desired it, but this was heavily defeated in the House of Commons.

The Compromise of 1870

When, therefore, in 1870 Gladstone's Government determined that schools must be built and maintained at public expense, since with the utmost effort, and with financial assistance from the state, the National Society, the British and Foreign, the Methodists, Congregationalists, Roman Catholics, and other voluntary bodies, could not make even half the provision required if all the nation's children were to go to school, there was already a widespread inclination to demand that these schools should be secular. But, as had been the case with Cobden and Lovett, the motive was

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[17] F. C. Pritchard, *Methodist Secondary Education,* p. 129.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 146.
[19] John Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden,* ch. xvi.

to get rid of sectarian squabbles, not of religion. The Education League, founded in 1869, was led by such men as Joseph Chamberlain and Dr. R. W. Dale, the theologian minister of Carr's Lane Chapel, Birmingham. Calling for unsectarian, free, and compulsory education and opposing denominational schools, the League, which rapidly gained influence in the country, declared itself against all dogmatic and theological teaching, all creeds and catechisms, in the schools, but proposed that simple Bible teaching, without note or comment, should be a matter for the ratepayers to determine.

When Forster's Bill was before the House he resisted secularism no less than sectarianism as a basis for the new schools. "The English people," he said, "cling to the Bible, and no measure will be more unpopular than that which declares by Act of Parliament that the Bible shall be excluded from the school." The result was the famous compromise Act of 1870, by which school boards should be established to survey their areas and decide what additional schools were needed, to supply and control these, to determine whether religious instruction should be given in them or not, and if it were, what it should be, so long as no catechism or formulary distinctive of any religious denomination were taught and the teaching was given at the beginning or end of the morning or afternoon to facilitate withdrawal of pupils if parents so desired. Her Majesty's Inspectors ceased under the Act to visit elementary schools during any period of religious instruction.

Mr. Balfour's Act of 1902 empowered local education authorities, which now took the place of the school boards, to provide secondary as well as elementary education, but religious instruction must be within the terms of the Cowper-Temple Clause, though arrangements might be made in certain circumstances for denominational instruction to be given within the school at the request—and the expense—of parents who wished their children to receive it. More important was the fact that there was no restriction as to the time of day at which religious instruction could be given, and H.M.I. were not precluded from inspecting it if the school desired. The last two of these provisions were extended in 1944 to primary schools also. The part of the Balfour Act which caused embittered denominational controversy and the cry "Rome on the Rates!" was the requirement that denominational schools should receive aid from rates as well as taxes, all their costs apart from the erection and maintenance of buildings being thus met from public funds, though the managers continued to appoint the teachers and to apply religious tests, while the religious instruction continued to be denominational.

Forster proved to be right. Scarcely any of the hundreds of school boards between 1870 and 1902 or the 316 local education authorities after 1902 left religious instruction out of the school

time-table. The teaching, however, was far too often jejune and colourless. School boards and authorities often consulted local clergy and ministers in drawing up a syllabus such that if teachers kept within its limits they might feel safe from the charge of breaking the law and inducing religious controversy. But this inhibiting fear was due as much to misinterpretation of the Cowper-Temple Clause as to indifference or even disbelief. Cowper-Temple himself, when the question was asked in the Commons in 1876 whether it was an offence against the law to teach the Apostles' Creed, replied not only that the Ten Commandments and the Apostles' Creed were not to be regarded as 'distinctive' of any particular denomination but that the clause had a positive intention. It was meant to secure that the great truths of the Gospel, none of which is the property of any Church, should be taught to the nation's children.

Despite this authoritative ruling, however, 'undenominational' instruction continued to languish in the doldrums of suspicion and indifference. This was made worse by the fact that as a matter of practical convenience all the children in a school were taught 'Scripture' at nine in the morning, and since classes were large it was always inevitable that all teachers, whether sympathetic and well-equipped, or only one of the two, or neither, should share the teaching. The conscience clause in the Act of 1870, re-enacted in 1902, was for parents, not for teachers.

Agreed Syllabus

The tide turned in 1924, when the first Cambridgeshire Agreed Syllabus was published. One or two other local education authorities had already produced syllabuses on similar lines but on a smaller scale. The Cambridgeshire authority invited a little group of men and women eminent as Biblical and theological scholars, or in the teaching profession, to co-operate with representatives of its own education committee and teachers in working out a syllabus of which the contents would be acceptable to the Churches, and the selection and arrangement of material would be in conformity with modern psychological knowledge of the development of children and resultant methods of teaching. The task took two years to complete, but the book, with its brilliant introduction on the new approach to the Bible made possible by the results of scholarly inquiry, its section on worship, its wealth of passages selected as suitable for the successive stages in children's growth but welded together by a general plan for presenting the Bible as a whole in the course of a child's school life, and its abundant suggestions for the teacher's own reading, lifted the whole matter on to a new level. Other authorities followed with equally well-designed and illuminating syllabuses—Surrey, the West Riding of Yorkshire, and Lancashire, for example. Progress was stimulated by the fac-

tual inquiries and reports of the Council of Christian Education, a body representative of the Sunday School Departments of the Free Churches, the National Sunday School Union, and Westhill Training College, which set out to secure the use of a good modern Agreed Syllabus in every local authority area, so far as the undenominational or 'provided' schools were concerned. This was undertaken with the full knowledge and approval of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York (Dr. Lang and Dr. Temple), who further recommended that Anglican schools, which were free to teach whatever they wished so long as it was in accordance with their trust deeds, should teach from an Agreed Syllabus on three days a week, reserving only two for their specifically denominational instruction. In the course of a few years it came about that most authorities had either adopted a well-known syllabus (nearly half the 316 adopted the Cambridgeshire and many the West Riding or the Surrey), or compiled one of their own. The syllabuses were offered to teachers as a guide, never imposed upon them as a prescribed scheme which must be followed in detail. In most of the syllabuses teachers were repeatedly urged to use the syllabus in their own way but asked to preserve the general outline, so that as a child passed from class to class and school to school his knowledge of the Bible and the Christian faith might be steadily and systematically built up.

Some teachers criticised the syllabuses as too full, too difficult, too doctrinal, and so forth, but sometimes, at any rate, this was an indication of weakness in the teacher rather than of faults in the syllabus. Moreover, the very existence of the syllabus called forth varied and plentiful provision of help for the teachers in the way of lectures and classes, residential courses, handbooks, and so forth, and more attention was given to the matter in training colleges and university departments of education. It would surprise many people to know how much local education authorities and the teachers' own organisations, notably the County Associations of the National Union of Teachers, have done since 1924 to provide substantial courses for acting teachers, calling upon some of our finest Biblical scholars and theologians for help, which has been gladly and even enthusiastically given. After syllabuses had been in use long enough for reasoned judgments to be formed they were revised: the Cambridgeshire, for instance, was completely remade in 1939, by a freshly appointed committee, and again in 1949.

About 1935 a group of Anglicans and Free Churchmen came together to consider what could be done to improve the teaching of Scripture in schools and the training of prospective teachers for it under the terms of the existing Education Act. Before long this body was regularised as the Joint Conference of Anglicans and Free Churchmen, consisting of representatives appointed respectively by the Church of England and the Free Church Federal

Council. It published an influential and practical report in 1938, but even more useful was the way in which it developed a new relationship of mutual understanding, habitual consultation, and desire for joint action on points of agreement. Nor was it serviceable in this way amongst the Churches alone, for it frequently discussed problems with accredited representatives of the local authorities' organisations and the N.U.T. When the Education Act of 1944 was passed a committee authorised by the Joint Conference, the N.U.T. and the Association of Education Committees produced a "National Basic Outline of Religious Instruction" for the assistance of L.E.A. conferences charged with the compilation of Agreed Syllabuses. The Joint Conference also endorsed a brief "Statement of the Christian Faith" issued by the Christian Education Movement, so that teachers working under the Cowper-Temple Clause, and in accordance with Agreed Syllabuses, might know what are the fundamental truths which all the Churches proclaim. All this was valuable in steadily enlarging the areas of positive agreement which prepared the way for the passing of the Education Act in 1944. In 1946 the functions of the Joint Conference passed to the Education Committee of the British Council of Churches, which is simply the Churches of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland and the Free Churches working together with full authority to take counsel, and where desirable and possible to take action, on all matters of common concern. It is, of course, the British counterpart of the World Council of Churches which, planned before 1939 and fostered during the war, was constituted at Amsterdam as soon as the war was over. There is a sense, therefore, in which undenominational teaching in our county schools, as well as in the voluntary ones, is given against the background of the World Church. The 1949 Cambridgeshire Agreed Syllabus in its section giving an outline of Church History for secondary pupils (modern as well as grammar) brings the story up to Amsterdam 1948 as its climax.

One of the most impartial and objective historians of English education was the late Professor W. Adamson. In his marshalling of the facts it becomes evident again and again that religious controversy delayed educational progress. Nevertheless it is true that but for the denominational enterprise during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, and the insistence of the Churches that a true and complete education is impossible without worship and religious instruction, we should probably not have had religion taught, under the Cowper-Temple Clause, in the state schools at all: they would have been secularised. If again the Cowper-Temple Clause had not made it possible for the school boards and L.E.A.s to keep the teaching of religion alive in their schools from 1879 till 1944, Mr. Butler would hardly have found it possible to make it universal and compulsory under his Bill, or

to preserve the Dual System. Finally, had the Agreed Syllabus idea not been conceived and developed voluntarily by L.E.A.s during the twenty years before the Act of 1944, and the range and depth of teaching permissible within the terms of the Cowper-Temple Clause thereby revealed and established, Mr. Butler would not have had ready to his hand an instrument so widely understood and accepted as the Agreed Syllabus.

There was, indeed, criticism of the Agreed Syllabus in some quarters before 1944 on the score that local authorities selected individual enthusiasts as members of the committees which compiled the syllabuses, and that although the committees did include Church folk, teachers, and administrators, these excellent individuals often did not represent the views and experience of the majority in their respective committees, and had indeed no authority to speak for their Churches or for teachers as a whole. By requiring that the four groups which make up a conference charged with compiling the syllabus should be appointed by the bodies they represent the Act disposed of the difficulty, and by requiring further that each L.E.A. must appoint a conference to frame its own syllabus, or to adopt or adapt an existing one, the Act ensures that the content of the syllabus shall be determined by the people who live in the area where it is to be used. Some teachers wished for a national syllabus because, they said, a teacher moving from one area to another might find that teaching permitted by one syllabus was forbidden by another. The Churches resisted this because they believed that greater freedom and variety in the making of syllabuses would be healthier and more fruitful. As we shall see, there has proved to be a great family likeness among the new syllabuses, despite marked differences in approach and treatment, and some authorities which have not made one of their own have adopted two existing syllabuses in order that teachers might have the distinctive advantages of both, while some have compiled syllabuses consisting largely of material taken, by permission of course, direct from three or four others.

Conditions of Success of the New Act

Educationally, and even to some extent administratively also, the satisfactory working of the system created by the Act depends upon two factors—the quality and the practical teachability of the Agreed Syllabuses, and the number and competence of the teachers willing to teach in accordance with them. It was not to be expected that all the new freedoms and the higher standards of teaching made possible by the Act would be given full effect at once. As yet even the earliest of the new syllabuses has not been in use for a full generation of pupils, from nursery school to upper sixth form: experience will suggest many modifications and improvements, almost entirely on the side of the selection of material

for the various age-groups and types of pupil rather than on that of the subject-matter as a whole. The removal of the 'time-table' clause and the inclusion in the Act of a conscience clause for teachers must mean that more will be demanded of fewer teachers, both specialist and non-specialist, and this demand will be enhanced by the fuller content of the new syllabuses: students in training colleges and university departments of education and at the same time practising teachers will need more opportunities for equipping themselves. It would be foolish, therefore, to suggest that the Act has already brought about immense changes in the schools, though much progress has been made and the lines of development are becoming clear. We may, however, with advantage glance at the position now reached after the Act has been in operation for just over six years.

As experience between 1924 and 1944 would lead us to anticipate, a relatively small number of authorities have produced syllabuses of outstanding excellence, which are being adopted or adapted by many others. These syllabuses are quite large and often handsomely produced volumes of a couple of hundred pages, more or less, containing valuable and stimulating introductions, outlines of courses for the successive age-groups, a considerable section on school worship, and substantial appendices such as full and annotated lists of books for pupils and teachers, time-charts showing the place of significant people, events, and literature in world history from Abraham's time to our own, information about visual aids in teaching, and so forth. Each syllabus provides for the whole school life of the pupil. The suggested courses are in some syllabuses filled out with historical, Biblical, and theological notes for the teachers: in others they set out a selection of suitable passages from the Bible and the Old Testament Apocrypha, but have at the end of the book general essays on such subjects as the historical and literary study of the Bible and the main conclusions resulting from scholarly research, the great religions of the world, miracle in the Old and New Testaments, and so on. The London County Council Syllabus opens with an explanation by Dr. F. A. Cockin, now Bishop of Bristol, of the real meaning and value of 'Biblical criticism'; the Durham Syllabus begins with a very full treatment of the history of Christianity in the North of England from Saxon times till to-day; the Cambridgeshire 1949 has an arresting introduction on the background of current ideologies and interpretations of science and history against which the teacher of religion must do his work; the West Riding Syllabus deals at the outset with worship and offers detailed guidance and help in this regard, especially for those who have charge of younger children.

The core of the syllabuses, however, is the same. The courses are planned to help children to gain during the period of their

school life, taken as a whole, an understanding of the whole Bible in outline with, of course, a more detailed knowledge of the Gospels and of the life and teaching of Jesus: an understanding of those truths which all Christian Churches regard as the vital elements of the Christian faith proclaimed in the New Testament and affirmed in the historic Apostles' and Nicene Creeds: some knowledge of the Church, the Christian ministry, and the Sacraments as these are described in the New Testament, and the growth of the Church in the world from the first century to the twentieth: the application of Christian teaching to daily personal conduct and social relationships: and (for the sixth form) discussion of such questions as religion and science, Christianity and non-Christian religions, Christian ethics and social problems, and the like. Above all, the syllabuses provide help not only in the conduct of the daily act of worship required in all schools, but in the teaching of children at every stage in their development what worship means, and how they may practise it, personally and corporately.

Here we have the answer to the question raised earlier in this article—Is religion as taught in an 'undenominational' school and in accordance with an Agreed Syllabus anything more than an eviscerated, devitalised residuum of the real thing? Does observance of the Cowper-Temple Clause mean leaving out everything that makes Christianity a living faith and a real way of life? Nothing of the sort is required or intended. Indeed, the content of a typical Agreed Syllabus may appear overwhelming until it is remembered that a child's school life extends over at least ten years —from 5 to 15—and may begin at 3 and continue till 18. The task of the teacher is simply to deal with the particular age-group —nursery, infant, junior, secondary lower or middle form, sixth form—entrusted to him or to her. At each stage foundations are laid upon which building at the next stage can proceed. Every teacher has the greatest freedom in his own classroom but is expected to work as a member of a team and, just as in the teaching of English or mathematics, to fit in sufficiently with the 'over-all plan' to ensure that as the pupil moves up through the school or passes from one school to another he will receive a cogent, progressive, and in the end reasonably complete, education, while at every stage the material is so selected and treated that instruction accords with the pupil's 'age, aptitude, and abilities.' The choice of Biblical and other material from this last-named standpoint does in fact turn out to be much the same in all the syllabuses, so that if a pupil goes from an infant to a junior or from a junior to a secondary school where another Agreed Syllabus is used he should find himself neither leaping a gap nor travelling over too-familiar ground.

A very real problem of construction emerges at the secondary school stage. While differences of all-round intellectual capacity

are of course found among the children in every age-group, the actual disparities grow wider as the children grow older. Up to a point the skilled teacher knows how to treat the same material differently to suit a class of predominantly 'practical' bent or one of a more 'bookish' type. Beyond that point, however, it becomes necessary to work on a different syllabus even if, as in teaching religion, the same essential facts and truths are to be grasped by the pupils in the end. Some compilers of Agreed Syllabuses have recognised this and have provided a simpler outline alongside the fuller one. But it is doubtful whether this is sufficient, and the question has been raised quite seriously whether a special syllabus should be prepared for those children who need it, particularly in secondary modern schools. At the other end of the scale is the demand of the sixth form for advanced study and thorough-going discussion: many of the syllabuses have done something to meet this, but some have contented themselves with little more than a brief list of suggested topics.

When the Act was passed a certain type of secondary school master fulminated against the very idea of being required to teach in accordance with an Agreed Syllabus: he had never before been told what he must teach, he said, and he would not now accept an imposed syllabus, especially in the sphere of religion. Like many clerics who denounced "Agreed Syllabus religion" without ever having seen an actual syllabus, these teachers (who were after all in a minority) not only spoke, as a rule, in ignorance but also forgot their frequent and unnecessary subservience to School Certificate syllabuses in history, mathematics, and the rest. They overlooked also the pupil's need of order and progress in study if he is to attain any dependable knowledge and genuine understanding. Apart from the reiterated insistence in the syllabuses themselves that the whole purpose of providing them will be frustrated if teachers follow them slavishly, the Act provides that a local authority conference may recommend approval of an individual school's own syllabus if it is a good one and is not sectarian. Quite a number of secondary schools are availing themselves of this. What is no longer possible is that a state school should be without a syllabus of religious instruction altogether, leaving it to each master or mistress to teach what he or she happens to consider convenient and congenial, or to have a bad syllabus in the sense that it is educationally below standard.

Before leaving the subject of Agreed Syllabuses it may be noted that Scotland has one Agreed Syllabus for the whole country, but circumstances make the arrangement more suitable there than it would be in England. The population is not only smaller: it is also far more homogeneous in religious tradition and Church membership. In Wales a syllabus was prepared by the Welsh Society of the Institute of Education, a body of teachers and Biblical

scholars which has no denominational colouring or connection at all but does, in fact, include among its members people of all denominations. This syllabus so commended itself that it has been adopted by most of the Welsh L.E.A.s, so that in effect Wales has one Agreed Syllabus.

The Position of Teachers

Coming now to the teachers, while the Act obliges no individual teacher to give religious instruction there is no doubt that the majority of teachers wish to do so. There are, nevertheless, schools where the headmaster or headmistress is hard put to it to find even one or two willing to undertake it, and competent as well as willing. Equally there are schools where every member of the staff is ready and eager to teach religion, and some at least are well qualified academically. In some schools all the teaching is done by a specialist. Others have no specialist—or perhaps may be like the one whose head naïvely reported, "All my staff are specialists in religious knowledge: they all teach the subject!" Ideally every school should have at least one specialist in the sense of a master or mistress who has made as thorough a study of the Bible and the Christian faith as the other members of the staff have done of their respective subjects, but who does not monopolise the teaching of religion, or teach no subject but that: every teacher in such a school who desires to do so should find a place in the team headed by the specialist, and should receive all encouragement and help in seeking to widen and deepen his own knowledge and to improve his methods of teaching in this field. We cannot here describe the many ways in which students and teachers are being offered, or are providing for themselves, opportunities of qualifying themselves to play their part in this work, whatever that part may be. But those teachers of religion who are most devoted and efficient are the first to urge that these facilities must be greatly increased. It is difficult to get more into the two-year training college or the one-year university diploma course than is in many cases already provided, but certain colleges and universities are now offering a supplementary course in Divinity lasting for one year, and preferably taken by teachers of three or four years' experience. The need is that more teachers should be released, and their salaries and fees paid, to enable them to take such courses. As to local courses held in the evenings or short residential courses, the need is not only that these should be multiplied but that some of them should be linked in series, enabling teachers to follow a sustained course of study for, say, three years, with guidance in reading during the intervals between courses. This problem of equipping and training teachers is of cardinal importance, for unless it is adequately solved the Act cannot be carried into full effect however excellent the Agreed Syllabuses.

An important suggestion contained in the Act is that each local authority, after adopting an Agreed Syllabus, should set up an advisory council having, as one of its chief functions, the provision of help for teachers in the shape of lectures, books, and so forth. It may do much else to further religious education, but one of its most valuable features is that it provides a focus for that consultation and co-operation between L.E.A., teachers, and Churches which has already developed so happily and fruitfully in the compilation of the syllabuses. It is to be hoped that *all* local authorities will establish such councils, and that none will neglect or decline to do so merely because they do not wish to multiply committees, or even because they fear that a committee of this kind might possibly turn into a pressure group.

The primacy of worship is perhaps the most distinctive and impressive feature of the Act and of the syllabuses. It means that children are to be brought up in state no less than in denominational schools in a truly religious atmosphere. This is an important part of the answer to the question whether ' undenominational ' schools can or do teach religion in any real sense at all. The broadcast services for schools which form a regular part of the B.B.C. weekly programme, and to the preparation of which great care is given, are warmly appreciated and widely used. The Rev. J. G. Williams, who has contributed so much to the development of these, said recently that their whole purpose was to enable children to enter into an experience, and wherever school worship is conducted with sincerity and forethought this is true. Unquestionably, though there is sometimes empty formality or perfunctory routine in ' prayers ' or ' assembly ', it is far more often the case that God is worshipped, however simply, in spirit and in truth, while often, especially when the children themselves are given a little share in the planning and conduct of the service, the act of worship is one of the high points in the school day. Had it been otherwise it would have been a mockery and an offence to make daily worship obligatory. Not long ago a representative conference of teachers, training college lecturers, and inspectors on the teaching of religion in secondary modern schools spontaneously and repeatedly made the point that the teaching must spring out of the worship.

The Act, however, for practical reasons perhaps, does not prescribe even a minimum number of periods of religious instruction each week. It is of little use to provide for daily worship if the time devoted to teaching is too little to ensure that children shall acquire at least an elementary knowledge of what the Bible is and contains, what Christians believe about God and man, and what is meant by Christian conduct in daily life. In the primary schools the daily Scripture lesson is still common, and if the ground indicated by the syllabuses is to be reasonably well covered

nothing but a full lesson-period each day will suffice. To some extent the secondary modern schools follow the same practice, but there is a tendency among them to approximate to that of the grammar and high schools, which normally allow only two periods, and often only one, each week—at any rate in the upper forms, where the claims of 'examination subjects' squeeze out everything else. That is one reason for making religious *knowledge* (for, of course, no one can examine religious faith or experience, or wishes to do so) an examination subject. Faith, we are told on apostolic authority, should at least not be divorced from facts, for zeal without knowledge may have results to be deplored and Christianity is in any case an historical religion. There is no reason why religion should not be intellectually respectable but every reason why it should, though it is essentially something that involves the whole man and not his mind alone. The new General Certificate of Education regulations offer considerable encouragement to the study of religion throughout school life, and especially at the advanced and scholarship levels, where syllabuses and papers call not only for wide reading and exact knowledge but also for ethical, theological, and religious reflection and interpretation. It would immensely strengthen and enrich the resources of the schools for the teaching of religion if all sixth-form pupils who intend to become, or may become, teachers would take religious knowledge as one of their main subjects, required or optional, in the advanced and scholarship stages of the new Certificate Examination (the old Higher School Certificate). They would thus lay a solid foundation of knowledge and gain the beginnings of an insight which would prove invaluable to them in their later studies and the subsequent exercise of their vocation.

Conclusion

Religious and moral education has for generations, as we have seen, been a subject of vigorous debate and often of controversy. It has too seldom been a subject of inquiry. Truth usually lies between extremes, and there is justification for believing that the teaching of religion in the nation's schools is neither so good, save in exceptional instances, nor so bad, except in rare cases, as protagonists and antagonists prone to easy generalisation have so strongly affirmed. In the 'undenominational' schools there was a great volume of goodwill, and there was also a great deal of good work, before the Education Act of 1944. Mr. Butler would readily agree that the lead which he and Mr. Chuter Ede gave in the framing of the Bill was in large part a bringing together and an expression of what teachers and parents, as well as the Churches, had already clearly showed that they wanted the freedom and the resources to do. Much progress has undoubtedly been made since the Act was passed. Fuller factual knowledge, however, is essential

if permanent and substantial advance is to be made. What difficulties do teachers encounter? What help do they most desire? How best can the varied resources of the country be utilised in providing that help? These are the questions to which the Research Project of the Institute of Christian Education is meant to discover, in some measure at least, effectual answers. What number of periods is in fact available in the school? How many of the staff participate in teaching? How many are specially equipped by training and experience? What syllabus is in use? Is it well adapted to its purpose? Have the pupils enough Bibles, books to read, books for reference? Are there enough visual aids and other teaching apparatus? What do teachers feel they owe to their religious knowledge and method courses in college or university? What do boys and girls retain, two or three years after leaving school, of religious knowledge as compared, for example, with historical? What are the special needs of the nursery school, the secondary modern school, the sixth form in the grammar school? What forms and pattern of worship are used? What experiments in teaching or in the conduct of worship have been tried and with what success? Such are the inquiries now afoot, not made by an outside body, but by the teachers, of the teachers, for their own mutual benefit. The I.C.E. has some three thousand five hundred members at home and overseas, working in every sort of school and belonging in the main to the Church of England and the various Free Churches. The Research Project is only one side of its work, but this has been planned and is being carried out with the guidance and co-operation of the Ministry of Education, university institutes of education—which bring together in their respective areas the departments of education and the training colleges, the local authorities, and the teachers, and have research departments and research fellows and students who can and do help in the inquiries—and the two major professional bodies of teachers (N.U.T. and Joint Four). It is obviously an extensive and long-term task, including the presentation of a reliable general picture of the facts and intensive investigation of a number of specific problems. It is early yet to say in what form or forms it will be found best to make available the information and suggestions which result. The significance of it all, however, will not be the mere amassing of facts and figures, essential as these are to constructive effort, but the stimulus that is given, even while the inquiry proceeds, to thought and action, experiment, consultation, and co-operation. There is a process of fermentation going on and the outcome of it will be, let us hope, not mere froth but more bread.

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CHAPTER TWO

RELIGION AND MORALS IN ENGLAND

To estimate the state of religion and morals in England to-day is fraught with difficulties. There is no measure for the quality of a religion or of a system of morals. A quantitative statement of membership of religious communities is no criterion of its qualitative value. Attendance at church or chapel is no indication of the intensity of the devotion practised there. Nor is there any means of gauging the quality of the impact of beliefs on a community. A fervent minority may not only be vociferous but intensely stimulating, thus exercising an influence far outweighing the smallness of its numbers. Nor is it sufficient to state the number of those actively participating in religious organisations, for within these organisations there is a vast variety of moral codes on some of the most important social institutions, notably the family and the sanctity of the marriage bond. Nevertheless, the available facts and figures can give us a kind of scaffolding through which we can perceive the sort of social structure wherein the qualitative development of religion and morals takes place in England to-day. Let us look, then, at a few of these facts and figures before we attempt to sketch in the more solid structure they contain.

A recent survey of attendances at places of worship in England gives us the following information: approximately one-fifth of the population attend church, chapel, or synagogue regularly; two-fifths attend on special occasions such as the great festivals; two-fifths do not attend at all. Those regularly attending comprise all types of Christian denominations and Jews. Thus within the one-fifth who are actively attached to some form of religious organisation there will be an immense range of beliefs and codes of conduct. This factor must be kept in mind constantly when we further explore the state of religion in England to-day.

Outside the evidence of regularity of attendance at places of worship, there are some other points to be considered in estimating the interest in religious beliefs. The B.B.C., state-controlled yet very sensitive to the needs of the public, gives three short services a day on the air, and a much longer time on Sundays and religious holidays.

Moreover, several series of talks in the Third Programme are regularly given on problems of religion and morals. Many of these

have been published and sell well. Nor must we forget that the Bible remains a best-seller, and that in the last twenty-five years since its inception, the Bible Reading Fellowship has grown from a handful of members in 1922 to a circulation of 350,000 in 1947, touching all age-ranges through its four series of readings.

We can therefore conclude that in England to-day there is a small minority actively organised in very varying religious groupings, there is an unknown number of listeners and readers who are actively interested in religion and create the demand for the religious services on the air and for the sales of the Bible and other religious literature. Negatively, the neglect of attendance at places of worship as seen by partially empty churches and chapels, and such facts as a recent statement in the Press that one of the Nonconformist bodies has lost 100,000 members in the last twenty years out of a total of 300,000, all point to a definite decline in organised religion in the last quarter of a century or more. This is the quantitative state of affairs in religion as far as available facts can carry us.

Now let us look at some other factors of a non-religious kind through which standards and attitudes may be developed in a community. The cinema is obviously a potent influence in modern society. Though recent research has established that there is little direct connection between juvenile delinquency and the cinema, yet the weekly regular attendance of the children both at their Saturday clubs and during the week with their parents, amounting according to one estimate to 20 per cent. of the cinema-going public, must have some effect on the standards and values of the public. The contrast between the glamorous conditions on the screen and actual conditions in the home and neighbourhood must at its best give rise to discontent, and at its worst enhance any tendency to escape from reality into fantasy and so develop and encourage an irresponsible moral attitude. Moreover, the intense popularity of film-stars amongst adolescents leaves no room for doubt that the stars are the ideals set by the young generation for themselves. The cinema, therefore, by virtue of the numbers attending it weekly, is a strong rival to religion in the formation of attitudes and ideals in England to-day.

But there are yet other quantitative measures which give us a clearer picture of the values admired in our community in the middle of the twentieth century: £725 million is spent per annum in England on gambling. Racing and betting on every kind of sport to-day forms a weekly occupation for large portions of the community, as can be seen by the growth of pools and the eager sales of racing and sporting news in the daily Press. In a decade whose economy has been strained to breaking-point by the war and its resulting devastations, the Government has been compelled to import tobacco, and preserve some petrol for pleasure, by a

community that cannot discipline itself to the sacrifice of these two former luxuries.

Finally one other set of figures must be considered. Since the war the rate of divorce has increased greatly. So has the rate of juvenile delinquency. Robbery with violence, mainly by young people, has in the last five years caused widespread alarm. The high percentage of absenteeism in industry still draws attention to the problem of incentive in work. We can thus see from this short collection of selected facts and figures that English society in the mid-twentieth century is uneasy over its attitude to work, thoughtlessly expends its national income in pleasures such as the cinema, sport, gambling, smoking, and motoring, whilst bewailing the fact that it cannot get both ends to meet in its domestic budget, admires to the point of extravagance cinema and sporting stars, and finds to its growing bewilderment that young people have little or no respect for property and that an increasing number of people find it difficult to maintain the most fundamental of human bonds, that of the family. Violence to life and limb are causing public alarm; a diminishing number of the community select to remain within the orbit of organised religions with their attendant obligations.

Let us look now a little more closely at the quality of religion and morals set within this framework of facts. Religion and morals are imbibed by a community through varying channels, chief of which is the home. We must therefore examine home life in England in the mid-twentieth century as carefully as we can, for here is the clue to much that is both bewildering and alarming in the community to-day.

The increasing number of delinquents and divorces, both of which have risen rapidly since the war, indicates an increasing instability of home life. Recent reports on delinquency establish a definite correlation between broken homes and delinquent children. The child is forced, as Mr. Stott tells us, "to escape from unbearable situations." Parental tensions that are so great that their only solution is the divorce court are obviously such situations for the child. The rise in divorce rates threatens the sanctity of marriage; on the sanctity of marriage rests the stability of the home, for it is in the security of its parents' relationships that the child finds the point to which to tether itself in its exploration of the world and its own emotional stability. If, then, by increasing examples the sanctity of the marriage bond is undermined, not only will there be a positive increase in divorce figures, but those who are striving to maintain their marriages find their determination subtly undermined; whilst children themselves have been known to be alarmed by the number of divorced parents amongst their friends. Moreover, the organised religions do not offer a uniform doctrine of the sanctity of the marriage

bond as a bulwark against this disintegration of marriage, for amongst the 20 per cent. of the population who actively adhere to their religious organisations, there will be a multiplicity of attitudes to marriage, ranging from the Roman Catholic with its doctrine of marriage as a sacrament which cannot be dissolved to that of the devout non-Catholic or Jew who will recognise the necessity of divorce in certain circumstances. A recent survey by Mass Observation on attitudes to marriage reveals that for the majority who answered the questions marriage was not regarded as a religious ceremony. So for the mass of the community marriage rests on social, not religious, sanctions, and these social sanctions are being loosened by three factors—the social acceptability of divorcees in their increasing numbers; the recent changes in divorce laws which have allowed more reasons for grounds of divorce, and the reduced cost of divorce. So that by custom, by law, and by lack of uniformity amongst the religions, English society has gone a long way to enhancing the instability of the institution of marriage and consequently of the home. Nineteen hundred and fifty is a far cry from 1900, when it was extremely unusual for the highest in society to be socially acceptable after a divorce.

Several other factors have helped to undermine the home and disintegrate the family unit. The family as a social institution has suffered grievous harm in this century. The accumulated effect of changes in social life has dispersed the family both literally and in its main interests. Increased facilities in transport have resulted in separating the family in its work, each member being occupied at varying distances from his home; in its leisure, too, the members of a family tend to go their own way or get out of the way when the housing accommodation makes home life a restriction rather than a stimulus.

Recent social legislation, too, has made an accumulative attack on parental obligations of a more subtle nature as they take the forms of substitution of the parents' control of the home, despite the obvious physical and mental benefits gained by the children. Thus, family allowances and the extension of free education since 1945 reduce the economic responsibility of the father; at the same time it curtails that type of authority which was so effective two generations ago, particularly in the middle classes, where the father's control over his children, especially in adolescence, was so often derived from an explicit or implicit recognition that once he had spent so much on maintaining and educating his children, then the children owed him a returning duty. These economic sanctions underlying parental control most powerful in the middle classes are now, since the war, partially removed in England. The adolescent cannot be brought to heel morally by such a sense of obligation to his parents and their authority, since the economic obligation is greatly reduced. Nor

has a corresponding sense of obligation been instilled to the community which has provided the maintenance and the education. This lack of obligation in the young is now very apparent, because it has at last reached the middle classes who are articulate enough to comment on the change and are perturbed by it. But amongst the working classes, though this particular form of economic sanction was of no avail in families whose children began their independent economic life at the age of 14, yet another economic sanction existed which kept the family together but is now being loosened: the sanction of economic necessity. For the family unit was strengthened by the pressure of want and the need for the help of its members which was so clearly seen in the years of slump about 1930. But now, higher wages, longer school life, better health and social services for old and young, and, so far, continual employment, have relieved the urgency of needs, so that again there is a relaxation of the bonds of the family life and with this goes the sense of responsibility to parents and equals, a gap which has not yet been adequately filled by other social units. Thus, recent social legislation and economic factors have together undermined parental authority, and the decline of parental authority means the removal from the young of the means by which they obtained their moral and religious standards of value.

Two world wars within a span of forty years have also had incalculable effects on the stability of family life and the subsequent establishment of sound moral attitudes.

During the recent war, home life was disturbed most directly by two things: evacuation and the call-up, for the first time in history, of both parents. Hence the children under 14 in 1939 were directly subjected to rapid changes of social environment, of school, and of parental control. Parents appeared and disappeared with alarming irregularity on the child's horizon. It was a tragic game on a gigantic scale of 'peep-bo', in which the familiar face so often did not return. Other substitute parents would sometimes anchor the children's affections, only to be torn again from them by unknown real parents. But were they 'real' to the children? Several cases of unhappy and delinquent children suggest that to the child the real parent was the foster-parent, the unreal one the newcomer with legal rights. Then, at the return home, the demands of industry frequently withdrew mother as well as father from the child, who would return from school at mid-day to find homes locked or deserted. Could children in such circumstances (and we must not forget that the majority of children had some or all of these experiences between 1939 and 1945) develop stable moral attitudes, by which they could clearly discriminate between wrong and right action, when the adults on whom they depended behaved in ways totally at variance with the child's expectations and needs? It is not without significance that

the recent outbreak of robbery with violence and other acts of violence, which have considerably alarmed the public, are largely due to youths between 15 and 25, who in 1939 would cover the age-range of 4–14. Nor that the greatest bulge in the 1948 return of crimes with violence comes in the under-14's, who, again, if we select those of 10–14 from the group as the main offenders in 1948, would represent children who at the outbreak of war in 1939 were between 1 and 5, the age when emotional ties with the parents are strongest, when, too, moral social attitudes are inculcated. This correlation of disturbed homes and later immoral acts cannot be overlooked. War, whilst heightening the social virtues of adults, has, in its modern guise, most disturbing effects on the next generation. Moral standards are here corrupt at their roots: the new generation does not know what are social acts and what anti-social when its own childhood has been so disastrously outraged morally.

But the stability of the family has been shaken not only in the children of to-day, the parents in their attitudes bear the scars of the war of 1914–18, when they in their turn were children. The present adults between 41 and 51 are the parental group of those under 30 now. These 41–51-year-olds were between 5 and 15 at the outbreak of the 1914 war, and have suffered in their turn in their childhood from the impact of war conditions. Though in no way as tense and devastating as the 1939–45 war, yet the 1914–18 war was characterised by its appalling slaughter of men, so that many children were deprived of their fathers for ever during this important part of their upbringing. These children, now adults, have in their turn to-day to exercise an authority over their families, which in many instances they have never experienced themselves. Europe lost over ten million of its men during that war; of these, one million were Englishmen. Is it to be wondered at that both in Europe and in England, the men who are now beginning to exercise political power throughout the West seek consolation in the supreme authority of dictatorship or Welfare State, and thus escape from their individual responsibilities? The stability of moral standards and the veneration of values rooted in home life and parental authority have alike been attacked and undermined and, in a large number of cases, blasted out of existence for both children and parents in the homes of to-day.

A glance at familiar and popular catch-phrases amongst the young since the war is revealing. One of the most popular is "I couldn't care less"—indicating the hardening attitude of the young to experiences that have been too much for them and from which they have withdrawn into a cloak of indifference. Similarly, the desire for approval has been intensified; the desire to go with the stream, to belong somewhere in this medley of choices, has given us the popular phrase: "I couldn't agree more", whilst the

bewilderment of the generation is expressed by " I haven't a clue." Nor is it insignificant that the young to-day express their highest approval of ecstasy by the adjective 'smashing', whilst their parents during the 1914–18 war used 'ripping', and their grand-parents reared in the halcyon days of the Edwardian or Victorian period dubbed life as 'jolly.' The young in all three generations have been clear in their vision and in their wisdom have epitomised their epochs in their catch-phrases.

The three generations who have summarised life as predominantly 'jolly', or 'ripping', or 'smashing', now live together in England, and endeavour to establish some common code of morals, some common patterns of behaviour. Of these three the dominant group in home and community is the middle one, which has in its youth experienced the 'ripping' experience of deep psychological insecurity, and again in middle life has had to relive a 'smashing' experience as all that they have erected from the chaos of the first disaster has fallen about their ears. No wonder that the maintenance of stable moral values in England to-day is felt to be beyond the capacity of men. Some transcendent power must help. Communism and Christianity vie with each other to give that faith from which alone moral attitudes can derive and be sustained.

If the Englishman's home has been so shaken by benevolent and malevolent experiences in the last half-century and intensively in the last decade, what other channels are open to the community for the acquirement of standards of moral conduct and of religious beliefs? Can the religious bodies, despite the smallness of their numbers, help to maintain the ideals of the whole community? It is pertinent here, before we attempt an estimate of the quality of the religious life in England, to state a difficulty in the way of the acceptance of religious faith in present-day England which is linked to the decline of parental authority in the home, and may, indeed, be an unperceived outcome of it.

This difficulty has been admirably discussed by Jaques Maritain in a recent broadcast talk of his, printed in the *Listener*. In this examination of " The Meaning of Contemporary Atheism ", M. Maritain has a remarkable passage; he says:

> I believe that an absolute atheism begins with a fundamental act of moral choice, with a free and crucial determination. Suppose for yourselves a man who, at the moment when he is taking stock of himself and weighing up the entire direction of his life, confuses the transition from youth to manhood with the refusal not only of the subordinations of the nursery, but of any subordination whatever. He comes to regard the rejection of any transcendent law as an act of moral maturity and emancipation. He decides to approach the problem of good and evil in a totally and absolutely free experience in which any ultimate end and law from above have been brushed aside imperiously and for ever. Such a man making such a free and moral choice, which concerns, after all, the primary values of existence, will

in fact be rejecting God entirely from the universe of his personal life and thought. That is the point, to my mind, at which an absolute atheism begins, deep down within the spiritual activity of man. But what is this I have just been describing but a sort of act of faith —an act of faith in the reverse gear? Not an adhesion to the transcendent God, but a declaration of war against Him.

Here the crucial point is that this momentous decision is made at the transition from youth to manhood, when the parental authority is rightly rejected. If a positive atheism is established in the depths of human nature by a confusion of parental with divine authority, so that both are rejected, what hope is there for our people when two successive generations suffered profound disturbances of the parent-child relationship throughout the whole formative periods of childhood and youth? Since all homes in the community have been affected by the wars, in all homes there will be this tendency to reject obedience to God. To the majority of the population religious sanctions and beliefs will necessarily appear as impossible fairy-tales, 'pie in the sky', and similar in character (because so profoundly linked psychologically) to the insecurity of the parental presence experienced during the years of war. Are we in England faced with a generation who are almost psychologically conditioned by their experiences against a divine authority and religious values, or will the very deprivation of such authority in childhood and youth force the issue in the contrary direction, so that youth to-day, left unguided in their immaturity, seek passionately in the most rigid authoritarianism for that security of which they were so tragically deprived by the war and by their parents' initial incapacity to exercise authority? Certain evidence points to the latter as a possible solution of the moral crisis of youth. But let us first look at the condition of religious activity in England amongst the 20 per cent. practising members of religious bodies. Do these offer us stable codes of conduct or some unity of belief to meet the urgent need for guidance by the whole community?

Diversity of religious practices is the pride of democratic England. This results in an immense variety of standards of conduct and beliefs within the practising religious group itself. This 20 per cent. of the population comprise Christians of all denominations and Jews. First there is the cleavage between Jew and Christian, and then within the Christian group the range of beliefs extends from Unitarianism to the most rigid Trinitarianism of Roman Catholicism as the two extremes, within which is an immense variation in beliefs. Whilst the nature of God is described in such various terms by this group, their standards for social conduct, for relations between men and men, are greatly varied. We have already seen how wide is the divergence over the binding nature of the marriage bond. Similarly, there are as great

differences over other fundamental questions of social conduct. The degree of obedience to religious injunctions and the extent of the authority of the priesthood, the relative importance of devotional practices to social activities, the degree of tolerance of one faith with another—all these practices and customs differ one from another as between Christian and Jew, and Christian and Christian; so that those who look to the professedly religious for set standards, for an authoritative statement as a guide for faith, find to their disappointment or subconscious relief that the professed believers in supernatural agencies in life in twentieth-century England are themselves, in many instances, contradicting each other flatly. Religious toleration results in diversity of religious practice, and such diversity places the burden of choice between the various claims of the differing religions upon a people so shattered morally and religiously that they are almost incapable of making such profound choices. Variety has almost led to chaos, and has certainly to some extent diminished the influence of religious sanctions as a social force in England.

But there are three developments taking place within the religious communities in England which we must now consider if we are to draw a true picture of the sources of religious life and morals in our community to-day. These will make us pause for thought.

Whilst the over-all figure for attendance at places of worship shows a positive decline in the last twenty years, within those professedly religious, there are significant changes. There is a notable increase of converts to Roman Catholicism; 1950 is the centenary of the establishment of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in England and is being celebrated with great pomp and ceremony. Within the Church of England there is an increasing number who follow the Anglo-Catholic form of ritual. Two points are to be noted here that are very pertinent to our inquiry. Both these forms of Christianity stress the authority of the priesthood, both designate their priests as 'Fathers.' Nor is it insignificant that Congregationalism is on the decline where, more than in any form of nonconformity, the final authority rests with small autonomous groups of worshippers.

The second movement within the religious bodies is their remarkable effort in the last twenty-five years to draw together into some form of union, articulating the expressed beliefs in transcendent values in life. This movement in England has taken a variety of forms. The religious bodies have drawn closer together where similarity in ritual and organisation has made it easier to take steps for closer union. Thus we see joint meetings of various kinds of Protestant organisations, ranging from the Free Churches to the 'Broad' Church party in the Church of England, whilst the High-Anglican or Anglo-Catholic branch of the Church of

England associates itself with the Church of Rome despite the latter's reluctance to compromise. Then Protestants meet Jews on various religious committees with a common programme for social reform. And here and there in small groups, like the one associated with the memory of Baron Von Hugel, Protestants and Jews, Quakers and Catholics meet together and find themselves strangely in harmony.

Whilst within the English setting unity of religion is appearing as a reality, two pressures from without the English scene are developing a wider vision of the Christian Church and its message to humanity. The one is the South India Scheme, where in the mission-field all types of Christian missionary, except the Catholic, have joined forces in the face of the great needs of the missionary expansion. The other is the Oecumenical movement of the Christian Churches in the world, which met in 1948 with representatives from all non-Catholic branches of the Christian Church, thus bringing together for the first time since the Reformation the whole body of Christendom save the Roman Catholic. But even the latter were represented by members attending as visitors by express command from Rome. So in the last twenty-five years, both within and without England, people with religious beliefs are drawing together in a unity which may augur a great return of religious strength.

What has given rise to this urge for unity? Two factors must be mentioned, one little noticed and the other quite obvious.

We have already seen that the radio in England gives a good proportion of time to religious questions. The remarkable element in the religious programmes which has not received the attention it deserves is the extraordinary degree of unity in faith and outlook which these very varied programmes display. The radio, it is hardly too exaggerated to say, is a strong force for the unity of religious beliefs. When it is remembered that one of the causes of religious disunity in the late sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century in this country was the ignorance of the several religious groups of each other's practices, then the service done to religious unity by the B.B.C. can be slightly appreciated, for the radio brings to all and sundry the whole range of religious services used in this country by the main Christian Churches and the Jews. It is significant that the Oecumenical movement for unity within the Christian Churches has gathered momentum in the last twenty-five years concurrently with the growth of radio, and that in England this movement has strong support. The many societies already mentioned which have sprung up in the last ten years reflect this eagerness for joint action and the discovery of a common basis of faith. There are, therefore, in England to-day definite manifestations within the religious bodies of a gathering strength, of an envisaged homogeneity, which is the counterpoint

to the decline of separate organised religions and to which the service rendered by the B.B.C. in its religious section is as yet incalculable and unobserved.

The second reason for the desire for unity is the growing realisation of the danger from Communism. Events in Czechoslovakia in 1949, and the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, have driven the thinking public in England more and more towards a consciousness of the values inherent in the democratic way of life, and have awakened amongst the religious minority a realisation that all religions need to stress the transcendental nature of their creeds in direct contradiction to the materialistic philosophy of the rival belief. For the danger from Communism is not merely on the materialistic level; it strikes at the root of spiritual loyalties. It is not without significance that the English Communists do not look to their small communal 'cells' for final authority, nor even to some specifically English leader, but turn and give whole-hearted support to Russia's version of Communism where all can accept without question, and are in fact compelled so to do, the final authority in all moral and political questions of the paternal head of the state, Stalin, 'the little father' of the U.S.S.R., its satellites, and its potential world dominion. For the psychological and moral ravages of two world wars have left the younger generations in England peculiarly susceptible to any creed offering absolute certainty (enhanced by a short cut to prosperity!) in spiritual and moral matters. In reaction to this powerful attraction from Communism, though it affects but a small minority in England at present, the Christian Churches are gathering themselves together and moving, albeit in some sections very reluctantly, towards a realisation of their basic unity of beliefs. It is notable that the conversions to Christianity in England are mainly in the Roman Catholic Church and in the Anglo-Catholic section of the Church of England, where in both instances the priesthood speaks with authority and is designated as 'father' by custom. Here, then, in our English setting, within the desolated and disrupted homes that were the Englishman's boast and his stronghold, we see enacted the crisis of Western civilisation, the dynamic struggle between the philosophy of dialectic materialism with all its certainties and the Christian faith held by few, but those few increasingly aware of their weakness in numbers and their potential strength in unity. So the moral and spiritual needs of the English peoples are driving their spiritual pastors and masters to a spiritual unity where, perhaps, they will build better than they know.

Though only a fifth of the English people go regularly to religious services, and as we have seen this fifth is disunited within itself, yet the religious communities have other methods than church-going by which they affect the standards of the community in which they function. There are in England a whole host of

organisations dealing with social welfare whose setting is largely religious. There are organisations like the Scouts and Guides, whose rules of life contain Christian codes of conduct in relation to one's neighbour. Thousands of children belong to these, and thousands of their parents have come in their youth under their influence. There are the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A., to quote only the best-known of the hostels based on Christian principles, which touch a far larger public than the mere church-goer. There are all the societies, such as the Mothers' Union, which provide within the Churches for the spiritual needs of parents and other adults. There are such organisations as the Industrial Christian Fellowship, which aims at taking Christianity direct by trained missionaries into the factories of England. This year, this has grown to such proportions that it has set up a training college for its missionaries. Then there are the regular or sporadic missions to cities or counties such as the Mission to London in 1949, when the Bishop of London sent forth trained preachers throughout London to preach the simple basis of the Christian faith. Such missions are regular practices of the Catholic Church and are now being adopted by the other Churches as the paganism of the four-fifths of the population who do not attend worship is becoming a stark factor in the moral climate of England.

Thus we see that in 1950, by increasing conversions, by the growing realisations of unity within the religious bodies, by wide-spread infiltration into the secular daily life, the small minority of those professedly religious in England are making an impact on the whole community and maintaining to some degree the morals based on their various faiths. But other standards exist for the majority of our people, and we must now examine as best we can their salient characteristics.

The radio and the cinema both have a potent influence on the formation of standards of taste and morals in the modern community. We have already seen that active work is done through the B.B.C. to stimulate and conserve religious life; but the B.B.C. does more than this. Its normal standard for its ordinary programmes reflects and interacts to the mood of the English in a subtle but important manner. Thus it is the recognised custom that no indecencies, no commercialisations, no blasphemies should emanate from English transmitters; and it is the public, to which the Corporation is highly sensitive, who insist on this standard. Religion and morals in England are maintained and sustained by the B.B.C. in a manner that is remarkable for its very unobtrusiveness.

Far otherwise is it with the cinema. The majority of the community attend the cinema once a week. No estimate has yet been made of the effects of such attendance on the adult population; but the growing concern of the public over the suspected effects

of the cinema on the moral standards of the young led to the setting up of a commission of inquiry in 1947 to explore the relationship, if any, between the cinema and child delinquency. That report has just been published. Its findings reject the direct connection between the cinema and delinquency. But they express deep concern at the type of films shown to the children, and at the behaviour of children at their clubs on Saturday mornings. One of their important suggestions is the presence of adults at these clubs. Their recommendations are an attempt to bring the unruly young into some relationship with the adult population. Here can be seen a tacit recognition by an experienced group of adults that the need of the young is for association with adults; it is there that the war deprived them most, it is there that morals and standards must be developed. But though the commission has found only a small number of cases where juvenile crimes have taken their models from an episode in a film, the recent publication of photographs of children at Saturday-morning film clubs can leave no doubt that the children are subjected to strains and tensions that must have a profound effect on their nervous stability. The films shown to the children, often in serial form, which prolongs the suspense, are unquestionably poor in quality, emphasising violence and bloodshed, shooting and gangster morals. Whether hero or villain triumphs is immaterial; throughout there is a stimulation of excitement and enjoyment of violence. Many girls of 12 or 13 in the modern secondary schools when talking confidentially admit that murder films are their favourites, however terrifying they may be; and this is the gentler sex whose admiration the boys seek in adolescence and youthful manhood. Regularly every Saturday morning in England 250,000 children sit down to imbibe this dose of moral training. On weekdays the doses are repeated in the company of adults, thus acquiring approval and sanction for the child as he shares and feels the enjoyment of the adult with whom he sits in the cinema.

A recent survey of some 80,000 young people's lives over the last three years at work and play in Birmingham has just been published. Here again the findings emphasise the aimlessness of the greater proportion of these young people's leisure activities, and the general sense of purposelessness in lives, which are " empty and barren, rather than anti-social and vicious." So that moral values seem conspicuous by their absence in the coming generation.

If the regular weekly attendances at cinemas by the majority of the population and their children and the annual income spent on gambling, drinking, and smoking reflect the values that hold priority in leisure occupations with the English in 1950, what of the moral attitude to work and property, two fundamentals in social living? In both we see self-interest as the chief motivation.

Since the slackening of tensions of war and the nationalisation of

several basic industries, such as coal and transport, the incentive to work has become a problem of the first order. The previous incentive of need by the maintenance of a large reserve of unemployed labour has been removed by the actions of a benevolent Welfare State for which the Labour Party stands. The incentive of service for others, joined to the incentive of responsibility for a concern that is one's own, has not yet emerged. The result is a moral conflict in industry whose outcome no one can surmise. On the one hand many people urge the return to unemployment as a threat to induce men to do their work well; on the other hand the trade unions maintain their function of security of tenure without a corresponding insistence on quality and regularity of work. Absenteeism still flourishes and irresponsible strikes are frequent, without regard to the welfare of the community or the immorality of broken contracts. The trade unions, now comprising nearly the whole of the working population in industry, are negative in their attitude, and unlike the mediaeval craft guilds maintain no moral standards towards work. They are there to bargain and to stick to a bargain which has as its only incentive an insistence that the workers should have a fair share of the profits. Meantime the Welfare State has so heavily taxed the profits of industry in its effort to redistribute wealth more fairly, that the profit motive for the owners of industry is a diminishing incentive, whilst in nationalised industries it is not present at all. Hence the very *raison d'être* of the trade unions is disappearing, and this may be one of the chief causes of the decline of the authority of the leaders of the unions over their men and one of the as yet unanalysed causes of the many 'unofficial' strikes. Here, then, we see at work at the core of our industrial life the effects of conflicting moral values in an important section of life. On the one hand is the traditional reliance on the profit motive both to the owners and to the trade unions as potential bargainers for part of the profit, on the other hand the growth of the Welfare State is removing profit from many industries. What incentive will take its place?

Service to others and a sense of social responsibility have alike been incentives for generations to a small group in the community, the professional classes. But are these motives, which reflect certain moral codes of behaviour, welcome to the majority of the population in 1950? Service to others, unless it flows from some religious belief that will keep it constantly purged, tends to lose its altruistic quality and to become one of the most subtle forms of social domination. As two-fifths of the population are unconcerned with religious observances, and two-fifths are only casually concerned, it is not surprising to find constant complaints of petty tyrannies in both industry and public services. It is very easy to start by exercising authority and to end by exercising dominion over others, for unless in exercising authority there is a clear

recognition that such power is limited by the terms of reference given by the 'author' of the power, there is a danger that the means is taken for the end and naked power is used unlimited by any recognition of ethical code binding upon its use. With the increasing need for people to work the Welfare State, where the profit motive is cut out by the nature of the case, more and more people are being absorbed into the bureaucracy to exercise authority, who are either unused to the responsibility attached to such office or, if accustomed to responsibility, see in it the opportunity to exercise a benevolent despotism over their fellow men. The Welfare State which has come to birth in England since the advent of the Labour Party, and more particularly since their return to office in 1945, poses the population of England through the problem of incentive to work with some of the most fundamental questions of moral and political philosophy. It is clear that on this great issue there is as yet no consensus of opinion, and only a faint awareness in thoughtful circles of the magnitude of the moral problem with which the nation is faced in 1950.

Finally, what of the attitude to property? Two instances throw light on the attitude of the working classes to this most vital of bonds in social living. The first was the extraordinary annoyance of the working classes when, during the war, the income tax was so lowered as to catch the majority of the wage-earners in its net. Many workers earning enough to bring their wages within the highest level of taxation at 10*s*. in the £ looked upon this as a levy designed to halve their legitimate earnings. They complained that it cut out the incentive to work, as they were paid at only half-rates for any sum above high-tax level. There was practically no recognition that higher incomes brought with them extra responsibilities, nor that the social services from which they themselves benefited greatly must be paid for. When compared with the acceptance of such taxation, despite grumblings, by the professional classes, who have for generations recognised responsibility towards the use of money, the difference in moral attitude is illuminating. The professional classes recognise that services must be paid for, even if in many instances, until very recent years, they did not appropriate such benefits to their own use. Traditions of service and responsibility have trained them to accept taxation as a necessary evil provided the money was not ill spent. But to the working-class man the exaction of a tax that almost halved his marginal earnings was regarded as monstrous and undermining to his incentive to extra work, despite the fact that the worker himself was largely the beneficiary of the services on which the tax was spent.

This spirit of 'take all and give nothing in return' is very apparent amongst the young people to-day, both as they leave school and in their attitude to property in school and their own

pocket-money in particular. The young 15-year-olds leaving school take their attitude to work no doubt largely from their parents and adult friends. It is constantly stated by these children, when asked what kind of work they would like or hope to get, that they want a job where they do little and get good money. Moreover, amongst school children in the state schools dishonesty is a constant source of worry to the teachers. Petty pilfering is frequent; lying is very prevalent. The children regard school property as something to be appropriated or destroyed, seldom as something to be cared for and for which they are responsible. The amount and methods of spending pocket-money amongst working-class children are also very revealing of the lack of discipline amongst the children and lack of training in responsibility at home. Many children, according to a recent private survey in the London schools, have a regular 5*s.* a week from their parents; in some few instances they have as much as 10*s.*; in one or two exceptional cases they get as much as £1 and a very few have nothing regular at all. Seldom is any charge laid on this pocket-money. In many instances the parents provide treats, such as going to the cinema, over and above the regular pocket-money. No training is given in the use of this money, and this extravagance amongst the children is frequently found in districts where the parents are earning weekly wages varying between £5 and £7 on average. The children spend their money on ices, fruit, going to the cinema, sometimes in saving up for presents or national savings, very occasionally on providing extras for dress, such as cosmetics or gloves, ties, etc. The corresponding age-range of children from professional homes have far less pocket-money or are expected to meet certain of their obligations from such weekly allowances. They are early trained to a certain measure of responsibility towards money.

It would appear, then, that in the working classes neither young nor old have as yet acquired a sense of responsibility towards property and its contingent pride of ownership, and so find it difficult to cultivate the corresponding virtues of honesty and integrity in work and speech, particularly as four-fifths of the population are virtually outside the religious denominations where a moral code, sanctioned by religion, declares these virtues as valuable and insists on them as the necessary foundations for good social living. If property is, as some psychologists maintain, an extension of personality, we see here one of the reasons for the lack of respect of personality which has broken out recently in the 'cosh' attacks on defenceless men and women.

What, then, is the over-all picture of religion and morals in England in the middle of the twentieth century? A young person growing up in England to-day may, and often does, meet a multiple standard of values offered him within the religious

organisations, amongst his friends, and from the contacts he makes within his work and leisure occupations. Good neighbourly action as laid down in the ancient Hebrew formulation of the essentials of man's duty to his neighbour vies with the allurements of the cinema heroes, with the get-rich-quick standards of a competitive economic society, with the excitement of the races and the tracks, or with the charm of a quiet position in the expanding bureaucracy where ambition will point the way to a veiled domination of one's fellows. It is from amongst these, often completely contradictory, values that the youth of England must choose and formulate and set up their own standards.

Morals and religion in England in 1950 are in transition. The general adherence to Christian or religious standards and faiths has disappeared. The codes of conduct which governed the middle classes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries still govern them, but do not gain allegiance from the majority of the working classes. The twentieth century has seen the emergence of the working class from political bondage to power: but the mass of this class is still groping for its own values, bewildered, truculent, and profoundly aimless. And every member of the whole society has suffered at the roots of his being such disturbances in childhood that the making of choices, which is the fundamental characteristic of the moral life, is in itself a spiritual agony. This is the gravest danger to the democratic foundations of English society, for democracy demands of its members the power to make continual choices. So the young of to-day greet apathetically any attempt to encourage them to make choices and so develop their powers of judgment. So would they rather drift with the tide and look for leadership either in the fantasy of the cinema star or in the political agitator who offers a materialistic millennium.

The roots of the moral life of a community are buried in the home; and the homes of to-day in England are well on the way to disintegration. Not only have the causes already discussed shaken the home to its foundations, but the state has benevolently set up nursery schools, maternity and child-welfare clinics, child-guidance clinics, juvenile courts, probation officers, and the like, all to help in the rearing of the young both physically and morally, but none as yet effective as parent-substitutes. The Englishman, by a strange series of events, has become a spiritual prodigal, and by a bitter irony of fate, is rapidly finding himself without a family to which to return and confess his spiritual bankruptcy. He is in a 'far country' where 'no man giveth him to eat', for there is little or no systematic moral training for the mass of the population. Nor does his loss end with the decay of spiritual life in its highest form; the roots of democracy in England dig deep into the family and the Christian ideal of family life for their sustenance. The brotherhood of man becomes a meaningless

phrase on the lips of a person whose only experience of a home is one divided against itself in the disruption that so often follows parental disagreement. Religion itself, as we have seen, suffers a back-handed blow from the same cause; and the Christian religion with its insistence on the value of personality is one of the corner-stones of English democratic traditions.

Thus in England to-day there is an obvious breakdown of society at certain joints in its armour, giving a clear indication that for both young and old it is no easy task to formulate, establish, and maintain standards of conduct and, where faith exists, to sustain religious beliefs. Yet it is in such struggles that moral fibre develops; and the emergence of a new class in society, whilst inevitably casting aside codes of behaviour associated with its previous subservience, must bring with it the formulation of new codes and new standards. The old codes are there albeit held by a minority; the old faiths are deeply rooted. There is an awareness of the growing danger from a mode of thought, that of totalitarianism, which is alien to the Englishman's most cherished beliefs in fair play and democracy. Will this sense of imminent danger weld together the various religions? Will it stimulate and quicken the nation to realise anew the values respected and adhered to by their grandfathers in more halcyon days? Perhaps the very boredom, which continual purposelessness engenders, may be the necessary prelude for a renewed search for an understanding of the meaning of life and setting up of standards of conduct which will receive homage and obedience from all classes.

PHYLLIS DOYLE.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE TRAINING OF CHARACTER IN SOME ENGLISH SCHOOLS

THE aim of this article is to discuss, from the standpoint of a social psychologist, a particular and limited aspect of the general question raised by the Editors of the 1951 YEAR BOOK: "the ways in which . . . the school contributes to the formation of moral character, sentiments, attitudes, ideals and ethical standards, codes", and of the special question: "Are different standards of conduct and different ideals prevalent in different sections or classes of the nation?"

The writer has selected as his subject-matter the training of character in the English public schools. About this subject a great deal has been and is being written; usually, however, from the standpoint of the educationalist or the politician. There have been few attempts to regard it as a subject for psychological consideration.

Few teachers would not claim that they helped to train their pupils' characters. In England, however, there are educational systems of which their praisers assert that the special, primary aim is to train character rather than intellect. Now as these terms, however employed, are psychological, it is reasonable for a psychologist to inquire how far and in what ways such a claim has been examined.

It is surprising that, though during the last four decades there has been extensive and intensive psychological investigation into character-training, it has hardly affected estimations of English public schools and their functions.

An explanatory note about the use of the words 'public' and 'preparatory' schools is necessary. The English public school is not public in the sense in which Americans use this term. It is privately owned; entry is restricted and expensive. Though it may (often it does not) receive grants from public authorities, it vigorously maintains its independence. In no sense, therefore, to-day, is it public.

The 'preparatory' (or 'prep') school is also privately owned and organised, and its function is to prepare boys for a public school.

Whether there are girls' public schools, and what is the basis of their claim to this title, will be left to others, e.g. lawyers and

modern historians. For the sake of relative simplicity, this article will not discuss the question.

The popular opinion is that the English public schools train 'character', and it is significant that the noun usually appears without any qualifying adjective. Yet all character-training need not be good. In Charles Dickens's *Oliver Twist*, Fagin's kitchen certainly trained the boys' characters, in ways of wickedness. There were some very nasty characters at Rugby when Arnold became Headmaster, and some writers assert that these boys could have easily been trained into Nazi thugs, if they had been given modern scientific weapons and equally scientific training.

Character and Personality

Let us examine the concept of character, i.e. see its relevance to our present question. Even now, the word bears different meanings, not only in different languages, but in different countries using the same language. For the sake of brevity, let us confine ourselves to the English-speaking nations on opposite sides of the Atlantic. Most people can distinguish between an attractive personality and an unstable, dishonest, or disloyal character. Fifty years ago, a servant who on leaving her situation asked her mistress for a 'character' would mean a written estimate of her loyalty, trustworthiness, sobriety, punctuality, etc.; not a catalogue of the visible or audible signs which might render her attractive or unattractive to others. Paraphrasing Professor William McDougall's, and borrowing from Sir Godfrey H. Thomson's definition, I have, elsewhere, for working purposes, defined Character in this way:

> The comparatively stable structure of the mind and body, wrought by the integration of habits, skills, attitudes and sentiments into a relative unity.[1]

The definition allows for two important facts: first, that in the complex social world of to-day it is impossible to exhibit an excellent character without possessing the skills necessary for one's trade or profession. A chauffeur who cannot drive safely, a journalist who cannot write efficiently, an administrator who cannot be trusted to handle people, might show strength of character elsewhere, say, in the home, but his professional reputation would be poor. Even in the family, during periods of economic depression, an out-of-work father is likely to find, if he tries to reprimand his fully employed children, that their idea of his 'character' depends in part upon his professional achievement.

It is not always appreciated that McDougall's concept expresses the idea that in any stable character, organisation of sentiments is

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[1] "Personality in its Cultural Context", *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, Vol. 30, 1946, and Manchester University Press.

all-important. Often his concept of a sentiment has been incompletely grasped. A sentiment is an organisation of emotional *dispositions* grouped about the idea of an object; not an organisation of emotions. According to him, sentiments are not actually experienced. We enjoy, directly, the light from an electrical installation, but not the organisation of wires, dynamos, and bulbs which makes it possible; the feeling of financial security, but not our bank balance or the system which lies behind it. Furthermore, the extension of sentiments from persons or concrete objects to general ideas is important in character-formation; the theme of the present article.

The Concept of Character-structure

Here we encounter the great difficulty already mentioned; the term 'character' may suggest different meanings, not only to general readers, but to psychologists in different countries. It would seem that in the U.S.A. 'character' is generally assumed to have a moral connotation; the adjectives 'good' and 'bad' are always, so to speak, wanting to link themselves with it. Psychologists there prefer the term 'personality.' Yet, as I have already hinted, in popular usage—and for once the voice of the people might be right—such qualities as charm and tactfulness or their antitheses—physical beauty or ugliness, attractive or repellent appearance or speech—might 'go with' either a good or a bad character. A film actress would lose her professional charm if a rival were to throw acid in her face, but subsequent events might show that she had a strong or weak character, quite apart from the moral aspect of her behaviour. For this reason, I have proposed as a working definition of Personality:

> The effect upon others of a living being's appearance, behaviour, etc., so far as they are interpreted as distinctive signs of that being. (A person may be aware or unaware of these signs.) [2]

Recent uses by Professor Ernest Beaglehole [3] and Dr. W. V. Dicks [4] of the term 'character-structure' make it clear that the concept can usually be separated, for working purposes, from that of personality, and that so far as integration, strength, or dependability are concerned, character need not be described in moral terms. Professor Ernest Beaglehole describes the Maori and Dr. W. V. Dicks the Nazi character-structure without implying moral judgment at every turn. Recent writings by non-psychologists about Mussolini and Rommel, and the different estimations by

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[2] "Personality in its Cultural Context", *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,* Vol. 30, 1946, and Manchester University Press.

[3] "Character Structure", *Psychiatry,* 1944, Vol. VII.

[4] Chapter IX in *Psychological Factors in Peace and War* (ed. T. H. Pear) (London: Hutchinsons and United Nations Association, 1950).

critics of the value of these biographies, often confuse integration of character with moral praiseworthiness.

The English Public School Character

When considering the 'English public school character' it is important to remember that much of the training which the boy receives at school is aimed at enhancing the attractiveness of his personality (in the above sense of the word), at least to people of the social stratum in which he was brought up and intends to live. The probability is very high that one type of public school training may produce in the average boy general good manners, while another might endow him only with manners admissible or recognised in certain restricted circles. Some discussions of character, between ex-public school boys, turn upon this point. Bearing this in mind, let us consider whether there is not some value in the idea, expressed so often by 'old boys' who return to distribute prizes, that while their school never claims to train (except indirectly) the intellect, it produces and sets great store by 'character.' The speech often refers implicitly to William of Wykeham's "Manners (mores) makyth man", though it is doubtful if 'manners' in the sense in which the speaker uses it to-day, means the same as 'mores.' Now, since it is unlikely that in every public school each lesson is focused chiefly upon the training of character, and since the susceptibility of individual pupils to any kind of training obviously differs, an important problem ought to arise, though usually it is ignored. This concerns the 'transfer of training'—what is transferred; how much, and in what conditions.

We can merely glance at the long story of investigations into this problem. The first stage was concerned with what has not unnaturally been called the 'debunking' of an ancient creed, still expressed in sermons, editorials, and conversation in school and university common-rooms. This is the belief in general or 'formal' training; it assumes that the mind resembles a muscle, in that its 'size' and 'strength' can be increased by many different forms of exercise, just as a biceps can be developed either in the smithy or in the boxing-ring. In particular, it was asserted that to study Latin develops the whole mind; later, mathematics was claimed as a 'vehicle' of general training. The utilitarian argument, that Latin was once indispensable for all scholars, and that mathematics becomes increasingly necessary to scientists, is seldom used; rather is it urged that to study these two subjects alleged to be 'focal' trains important 'faculties', particularly that of 'reasoning.'

Upon this hypothesis early experimenters directed their efforts. They found surprisingly little evidence of transfer, even between performances which on casual inspection had seemed to resemble each other. (The results are summarised in most textbooks of

educational psychology.) Consequently, for a time there was a general tendency to be sceptical concerning any claim of transfer-effects, and to advise anyone who wished to be highly proficient in one skill or one form of memory, to train that one and no other. Few great pianists have ever attained the highest pinnacle of skill by practising the organ; champion figure-skaters would find that ski-running interfered with the more important aspects of their polished skill, i.e. negative as well as positive transfer is possible.

This belief might be summarised, to quote Dr. P. B. Ballard in *The Changing School,* as " the amount of transfer from one mental function to another is usually proportional to the similarity of the material dealt with and of the mode of dealing with it."

While it is impossible to summarise briefly all the results of investigations into 'transfer', we may say that there seems to be general agreement along these lines:

(*a*) Knowledge of facts, when their relevance to the new situation is consciously noted, may transfer. It should be mentioned, however, that while there may be, and most probably is, unconscious transfer, it is the pupil who notes or fails to note that certain facts are relevant. Consequently, we read an increasing number of criticisms of such simple claims as that a first class in the Oxford 'Greats' (the name for the honours degree in philosophy) automatically enables its possessor, for the rest of his life, to handle successfully administrative problems of all kinds. His philosophical training may have shown him how to formulate and analyse them; to seek out and to recognise their resemblances and differences, and to attack them with the aid of his special knowledge of history, yet to-day many of these 'teasers' demand for their solution expert special knowledge and appreciation of new facts, e.g. in the physical sciences, economics, or social anthropology, and of the ways in which the minds of others, especially of his subordinates, work.

(*b*) Knowledge of methods and techniques, applicable to the 'new' situation, may transfer. Yet when these are inapplicable this transfer may be 'negative.' An historian, asked about the probable effect upon international relations of the Hiroshima bomb only a few weeks after it fell, began, perhaps automatically, with " History teaches us . . ."

(*c*) Within a limited range, habits may transfer, if by habits be meant specific adjustments to specific situations. What are called 'generalised habits' are better termed attitudes or sentiments. Their transfer may lead to virtues or vices, e.g. 'living by the clock' is a virtue in a radio-producer, but a vice in a worker who ought to complete his task before he plays. There is much evidence of negative transfer of habits; e.g. in athletics (excellence in one type of ball-game occasionally obstructs proficiency in another); and in musical skill. Yet a person who has become a

'creature of habit' may as a result develop a character which is strong, dependable, wilful, stubborn, obstinate—the choice of adjective depending upon the chooser; and such a person may be regarded by others as moral or immoral. A point often overlooked is that moral character and ethical standards are to a large degree related to social structure, and behaviour considered admirable at one level is sometimes considered reprehensible at another.[5]

(*d*) Training or education may result in a transfer not only of knowledge of subject-matter, but also of attitudes, sentiments, and ideals. In this way much of the transfer asserted to occur by the supporters of general education, and denied by extremists who believe that only specific training is possible, may in fact exercise great influence. A long experience of theoretical and practical economics, combined with great love for the drama, resulted in the unusual instance of a university don, the late Lord Keynes, being able to run a theatre at a profit. Sir Stafford Cripps, for long Chancellor of the Exchequer, did not follow the usual educational path of an English politician from Winchester to New College, Oxford, but went to University College, London, where he studied natural science. Who can measure the result of this upon our nation's present and future?

At this point, claims for character-training in schools may find their most secure foundation, for a boarding school in particular inevitably inculcates certain attitudes and sentiments, not only towards work and play in term-time, but to life in general, and by the time some pupils leave the school their characters may have been permanently altered.

'Transfer' and the Concept of 'Transference' in Psycho-analytic Theory

It is interesting that the concepts of 'transfer' in education and of 'transference' in psycho-analysis grew up side by side, but so far as the present writer knows, there has been little cross fertilisation between them, though a suggestion in this direction was made by T. H. Pear, J. N. Langdon, and Edna M. Yates in the *New Era.*[6]

The liking of a pupil for a particular school subject is often closely bound up with a trustful affection for its teacher. The converse, that he may dislike and distrust the teacher of another subject, seems possible. Perhaps, therefore, in some instances of transfer, the chief factor is the transference of the learner's affection from his parents, nurse, or early teacher, to the teacher of a new subject. In the great public schools, the number of pupils to each master is usually much smaller than in other schools, the

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[5] Cf. Alex Comfort, *Power and Delinquency* (Kegan Paul, 1950).
[6] "Transfer of Training and Transference", 1928.

masters have been hand-picked for personality, character, and intellect, and the pupils for long periods are separated from home influence. Consequently both 'transfer' and 'transference' may happen, and their mechanisms interlock.

Now, whatever the terms in which they are expressed, many opinions in prize-day orations, in some sermons, and in speeches praising or blaming the results both of public school and of military training, imply that transfer of attitudes and sentiments occurs. Yet such transfer need not always be socially desirable. Army discipline, which toughens a boy, may also teach him skills and techniques which are now being used by deserters and others in burglaries and attacks upon civilians. The sentiment of loyalty to his immediately present group may cause an ex-Service man to assume that the Army, now he is out of it, is fair game for anyone who supplies him with an undeservedly laudatory testimonial. One often sees examples of devotion to duty, loyalty, good humour in civilian life attributed to army life, yet scrounging, 'passing the buck', time-wasting, evasion of responsibility are also learnt in the Forces and transferred outside them. Such problems are easier to comprehend if we can distinguish between transfer of skills, techniques, isolated items of knowledge, and of attitudes and sentiments.

Alleged Defects of the 'Public School Character'

In these democratic times, criticisms are made of arguments advanced with much opposition fifty years ago. Objections now range from a denial of some important assertions underlying them to variations upon the reasonable theme that the social frameworks of 1900 and 1950 are very different. There will be no attempt here to present extreme objections, but only those which to the present writer appear moderate.

The first complains of the explicit acceptance and assumption of England's social stratification when parents, more especially those who have not themselves attended such a school, send their boy to the public school "to give him a better start in the world", or because "he will mix with a better type of boy." These phrases may be ambiguous to the sceptic, but not to the parents, who may be making great financial sacrifices for the children. To them, therefore, it may seem obvious justice that their boy should have the best that money can buy. But acceptance of this attitude would make social 'pull' a commodity, and to-day, to a certain extent, it is. Some would object that in both the above assertions 'better' begs the question, and ask "Better for what?" To answer, we must inquire whether, assuming that the public schools once met the need for leaders, they are doing so at this day. Has the type of demand changed, and have the schools changed to meet it? Now that our foreign policy is more important than our

domestic policy [7]—a matter so delicate that it was hardly mentioned by either side in the General Election of February 1950—some critics urge that for the Foreign and Diplomatic Service the orthodox public school training, with the attitude that it engenders towards 'foreigners', especially if they are small-business men, needs much modification. 'Mixing with a better type', even if the postulate be granted, may make it difficult to mix with types deemed to be less good. When middle-class—especially 'lower-middle'—parents send their boy to a school far distant, both geographically and socially, from themselves, they ensure that in the holidays he will have few acquaintances of the social class he knows at school—these, too, he may not be able to entertain at his home—and may now find it hard to mix with the boys in his own street. Consequently at an early age he may come to regard the experience of 'not-mixing' or semi-isolation as normal. The experiences of the 'scholarship boy' at a school where most parents pay full fees is not as unpleasant as it was fifty years ago, though the facts are not fully documented. A recent radio play and film, *The Guinea-Pig* (the name applied to a poor boy, who was sent to this type of school, as the subject of an experiment in implementing the Fleming report), may have been written to please both stalls and gallery, and obviously does not take all the possible factors into account. Yet a scholarship boy from this type of home must often experience divided loyalties, especially if he knows that he has been sent to this school because of its reputation as a first-class employment agency. And mention of this function may infuriate not only egalitarians, but the many thousands of pupils from excellent schools not recognised as 'public' by the self-elected Head Masters' Conference.

Again, it is often asserted that public schools encourage intellectual immaturity, and—this is put more politely at some times than at others—after years of residence in such schools, some masters, when among mature 'outsiders', feel ill at ease, and this embarrassment may cause a strengthening of existing tendencies to put first in their lives loyalty to the school, especially to its games and routine.

Related to this is the charge that the public schools narrow their pupils' outlook. They might reply almost defiantly that it is necessary to produce men who are loyal to their country and the Empire. In this respect schools will differ considerably, yet before 1930, some discouraged the formation of branches of the League of Nations Union and were, to put it mildly, lukewarm towards the Scout Movement, while making membership of the Officers' Training Corps practically compulsory. Among legislators who find it hard to grasp the idea that unlimited national sovereignty cannot

[7] This sentence was written in August 1950.

exist if hydrogen bombs and bacteria are ever to be used as weapons, are many products of this type of training, by no means confined to the public schools or to England.

Attitudes towards Parents

To *The Character of England*, edited by Sir Ernest Barker, Lady Violet Bonham-Carter contributes a delightful chapter on the 'Nanny'—the devoted nurse of young children in English upper-class households, more especially before 1940. Anyone acquainted with psychology and social anthropology may regard it as significant that in this family framework, for some years after the first month of life, the boy is physiologically and psychologically disciplined, especially in feeding and toilet-training, by a woman not his mother. His own mother may see and play with him at certain times of the day, usually in circumstances pleasant for them both. Consequently, many 'do's' and 'don'ts', 'of courses' and taboos, are implanted by a mother-substitute, who later may fade out of the child's picture, though sometimes she lives with the family for many years. But if at the age of 8 the boy goes to a 'prep' (boarding) school to prepare him for his public school, he may become part-sharer in a second foster-mother—often very likeable if efficient. It therefore seems possible, in the light of what is known about the laming effect of serious mother-complexes, that this regime may be beneficial for a boy destined in early manhood to make difficult decisions in distant countries—for at least he may be free from any haunting doubt whether his mother would approve his action, and by that time he will probably regard 'Nanny' as incapable of judging the rightness of his conduct, even if she knew or could understand the issues involved, which he would consider unlikely. The day, therefore, on which such a little boy leaves home for the 'prep' school may not be as painful as to a boy who has grown up with one mother only. At the 'prep' school, he may find a second mother-substitute, and a father-substitute. Many boys are very happy at their 'prep' school, but may a note of criticism creep in? If the school is in or near a small town, the headmaster may impose rigorous isolation from dwellers in the town; the boys may walk two by two to reserved pews in the local church, or to the beach, where they swim as a supervised group. If they or their parents happen to have friends in the town, occasional visits may be allowed, though not encouraged because of the possible 'unsettling' effect. Yet home-sickness is feared less than the making of local acquaintances.

We are here concerned not with judging, but with pointing out, the special social pattern into which the child is fitted. Some critics, however, would add that occasionally the 'prep' school is permeated by a public school atmosphere of thirty or more years

ago, as this is remembered by the headmaster, so that the boys' mode of life may be dominated by some conventions already out of date by public school standards. This class-segregated, sex-segregated regime produces in some boys a tendency to regard women as falling into two classes, those who resemble his mother and sisters, and the others. In some social patterns, particularly in the outposts of Empire, such an attitude may have tended to efficiency, even if a ruthless kind. Under its influence, home-sickness will be less; rituals like that of dressing in special ways at special times, speaking either with authority or with conscious equality, easy, habitual, never quite unconscious alteration of manners towards people of different social classes, may seem more natural to the 'prep' and public school pupil than to the day school boy. Yet from the products of such training there have come criticisms. Geoffrey Gorer,[8] for example, describes in detail the 'shyness' produced in this type of Englishman, and asserts that it was an important factor in 'losing' India.

Let us return to the operative definitions of personality and character on pages 314 and 315. These may shade into each other, more or less; less in a theatrical impersonator, more in a country-town bank manager. It is obvious that some visible and audible signs of the public school boy's personality have been cultivated, especially if he has been to a 'prep' school, at some of which, even in the severest rationing period, parents were commanded to give up their personal coupons to provide school uniform and distinctive games-clothing.

Since judgments of personality and of character may reflect peculiarities of the judge as well as of the person judged, I will note some of my own, as neutrally as possible, while the reader decides to agree or disagree. Consider first, personality. The public school boy is taller and heavier than the average boy in this country. The question whether he is also 'better-looking' can be avoided by most scientists, as involving subjective standards, but a social psychologist must face it. Judged by English standards, the public school boy is definitely better-looking. This is often because his parents' financial advantages, their ability to travel, both physically and mentally, their wider range of acquaintances, their greater freedom from money-worries, have allowed them to mate for reasons of physical and mental attractiveness, and this kind of sexual selection may have continued for several generations. Such boys, to use the drill-instructor's expression, 'strip better.' Add to this, modifications made by barber, dentist, and tailor. Many of these are desirable for everyone—e.g. healthy, straight teeth, clothes cut to fulfil their proper functions in work and in play; made of good material, resisting rain and wind. Other modifications are

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[8] *Horizon,* Vol. X, 1949–50.

'class' symbols. Some styles of hair-dressing mark off the 'prep' and public school boy, who perpetuates them for several years when he leaves school. Not only do 'quiffs' and special kinds of moustache designate certain social classes, but upper- and lower-class haircuts are associated with some barbers who, if allowed, could show more versatility.

There is even a type of upper-class facial expression; relatively unchanging, called strong, firm, equine, or wooden according to taste. It may be 'loosened' to people in the wearer's class, or in one obviously several grades below his, but not when giving orders.

Such conscious restriction of overt signs of friendliness is sometimes defended on several grounds—the firmest one, perhaps, being that if a social hierarchy is assured and respected, as in a battleship, necessary duties get done without demur or argument. Compare, defenders may say, the demeanour of a taxi-driver on a station rank who, seeing only one passenger, gets on with the job cheerfully, with that of the same man in war-time, when he could 'oblige' three persons besides the original hirer, taking often incivilly four fares for one journey.[9] The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that acceptance of military rank-differences implies reciprocal obligation. The officer has to return any soldier's salute, and has definite duties towards 'his' men. Class-differentiated obligations are non-reciprocal. When most public school boys joined an Officers' Training Corps, awareness of this distinction was instilled early.

The above passages refer chiefly to signs of personality—i.e. to the ways in which a person appears, sounds (etc.) to others. Such behaviour-signs are different if directed towards people recognised as of his own class (even renegades or rebels) or towards other classes. Against such deliberate discrimination the ex-public school boy occasionally revolts, though, as Victor Gollancz points out in his introduction to the late George Orwell's *The Road to Wigan Pier*, the manner of the protest is apt to be conditioned by public school etiquette.

The extent to which, in any individual, personality and character are independent or integrated may offer important problems to the psychologist and psychiatrist, for a highly integrated character may co-exist with several different, integrated personalities—in a man who has many friends and acquaintances and adjusts himself to them. His average personality may be attractive to some people, neutral or repellent to others, and his integrated primary character may develop a secondary character-structure more or less closely bound up with it.

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[9] The use of 'incivil' instead of 'impolite' or 'rude' hints at an unwritten chapter of English social history; cf. Edmund Wilson, *Europe Without Bædeker.*

Maturity of Character

Much work remains to be done by psychologists before the different meanings which can legitimately be given to the term 'maturity' are distinguished. It seems certain that the 'permanent adolescence' to which some critics of the public schools object is a type of emotional immaturity. But it is frequently claimed as a virtue in the public school system that it develops a special kind of maturity of character, at an earlier age than any other system in our own culture-pattern does, at least nowadays.

To this important question, "What is Mental Maturity?", comparatively little attention seems to have been given, at least if educational and psychological publications are to be regarded as a criterion.[10] Dr. Overstreet's recent book is a striking exception, and it would be interesting to examine it in detail to determine how far the English public school character, as usually portrayed, measures up to his American demands. In the book and the Rylands lecture cited below, the present author has compared and considered the views of Professors Gordon W. Allport, D. W. Brogan, Sir Cyril Burt, Edward L. Thorndike, Doctors Charlotte Bühler, E. Glover, Marie Jahoda, Alan Maberly, Margaret Mead, May Smith, F. H. Spencer, and Mr. Cyril Connolly. As a result of such comparison one may well inquire "Mature for what?"

Let us sort out the more reasonable criticisms of 'the public school character', though this is a question-begging term. One alleged defect, which some urge is a virtue, is that it nurtures in small groups of boys the assumption that they are 'natural' leaders, and that there will always be a large pool of naturally leadable persons. This is often disputed. The Battle of Britain was not won on the playing-fields of Eton, but, as J. B. Priestley remarks in *Out of the People*, by secondary school boys. The heroism of the Merchant Navy, usually unsung, is shown by men very few of whom learned leadership in public schools, and the famous Dartmouth system produces leaders for the Navy by strictly vocational training. In India, the ex-public school boy type of leadership needed, and often did not obtain, considerable supplementation. It worked better half a century ago when the whole world was simpler.

A more impressive claim is, not that in World War II public school boys as a whole, when given responsibility, succeeded, but that, 'as to the manner born', they were specially apt to look for and to assume responsibility. This is easy to believe, since they often had respected parental and grandparental examples, a sense

[10] Cf. H. A. Overstreet, *The Mature Mind* (London, Gollancz, 1950); T. H. Pear, *The Maturing Mind* (London, Nelson, 1939); "The Concept of Mental Maturity", *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 1944, Vol. 28, and Manchester University Press.

of family prestige, an assumption, understood even in nursery days, that giving orders to certain people was natural. Moreover, at school they were used to the prefect system. A natural result would be an attitude (not a 'complex') of superiority. Yet as the Officer Cadet Training Units found, the inter-war diminution in size of classes in many non-public schools and their imitation of the 'house' and prefect system had increased the numbers of boys who 'naturally' looked for responsible jobs. Moreover, in World War II, though the basic officer-like qualities ('OLQ's' in Navy language) required in any fighting force might be similar, different intellectual and other demands were made upon, say, fighting air-pilots and cavalry officers, and the techniques of jungle and commando fighting, 'intelligence' and 'resistance' must often have developed ethical values which no school chapel is likely to have instilled. And, as the Services' vote in the 1945 General Election showed, many combatants, both men and women, distinguished sharply between the kind of leadership they desired in war and peace respectively.

Whether and to what extent the public school-trained leader will be useful will depend largely upon the type and degree of social stratification in the society which employs him, as a glance at the system in the U.S.S.R. would show. At the time of writing, our own Prime Minister is recognisably a public school and university product.

Closely connected with ability for leadership in a stratified society is the general advantage of good manners, including suitable ways of speaking. The public schools are expected to inculcate these, and usually do. Many other types of school do likewise, but to possess manners which will seem good to different strata of society generally requires wide social experience. Up to 1939, the public school boy had usually travelled more than the average boy. This state of affairs was then altered, though the foreign friends of most 'other ranks' were limited in variety.

Inevitably criticism, both positive and negative, turns upon the question of loyalties, especially patriotism. In the public schools a high degree of patriotism is taken for granted, yet did the country as a whole do so badly from 1939 to 1945? At the General Election of February, 1950, it could be inferred from the very few attempts to make foreign affairs an issue, that the two chief political parties correctly assumed the existence of loyalty to this country, even if sectional loyalty was so evenly divided. The public schools, however, have not led the country in trying to foster a supra-national loyalty.[11]

A difficult question arises in connection with the degree of

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[11] Cf. J. C. Flugel, Chapter VI in *Psychological Factors of Peace and War.*

obedience which any educational system should foster. It is sometimes claimed that the fagging tradition, which of course does not exist in a number of public schools, inculcates unquestioning obedience of the " theirs not to reason why " kind. Yet in World War II, in contrast to the Crimean War, many leaders, especially Field-Marshal Montgomery, ensured that, so far as possible, every soldier should know not only what he was going to do, but why. And one method of getting rid of an incompetent minor army leader in peace-time is for his subordinates to obey every order he gives, however fatuous.

An interesting result may arise from disciplining boys to regard their own wishes and reasoning as irrelevant to many situations they are called upon to meet, e.g. when a fag must 'hang about' in case a bigger boy may want him to do something, useful or useless. It has been suggested [12] that the inculcation of this general attitude of utter self-subordination may explain why the study of elementary Latin and Greek occasionally 'trained the will' of those who knew they were not going to use these subjects afterwards—so far as the study was unpleasant, but compulsory, it might as well have been shoe-cleaning—except that shining shoes may shed their lustre on the cleaner, while irregular verbs do not.

Perhaps the question of the moral value of fagging is not important to-day, though some would demur. It seems to have begun for reasons of utility, and moral justifications followed—a not uncommon sequence. Where, as in day schools such as St. Paul's and Merchant Taylors', servants were unnecessary, fagging was absent.[13] In 1830, the *Edinburgh Review* wrote that fagging does not diminish, but authorises and multiplies tyranny, describing it as the only regular institution of slave labour, enforced by brute violence, which now exists in these islands. In 1835 the *Westminster* was of the opinion that fagging makes the boy from a wealthy family " see life in terms of tyrants and slaves." Yet the Government Commission in 1864 had nothing but praise for the prefect system.

Dr. Arnold argued that the fag learns " quickness, handiness, thoughtfulness, and punctuality." Not surprisingly these alleged 'faculties', unhesitatingly invoked at that time, have been subjected to later analysis by educationalists and psychologists. Dr. Badger considers this claim tantamount to saying that if we wish to inculcate dexterity of mind and hand in a child, we should make him an errand boy-*cum*-domestic servant, and writes that to hang about idly for orders does not seem the best method of inculcating thoughtfulness and punctuality. He disapproves strongly of this

[12] By Mr. A. B. Royse in a personal communication to the writer.

[13] Cf. A. B. Badger, *The Public Schools and the Nation* (London, 1940); J. W. Adamson, *An Outline of English Education* (London, 1925).

specious form of propaganda on behalf of a system which serves only 3 per cent. of the children of this country, a section rendered almost alien to the majority by its curious system of taboos.

It would seem that Dr. Badger does not distinguish sufficiently between the prefect system and the fagging system, but most people will agree that "Jump to it!" may be an educationally desirable order if given by a trained superior, whether skipper or sergeant-major, captain or teacher, but to be at the mercy of an ignorant big schoolboy is often a very different matter. Bernard Darwin, an old Etonian, in *The English Public School* (London, 1929) strongly favours the prefect system: "It is good for the clever boy to have colleagues who will not let him turn into a prig." Yet in *Must England Lose India?* (London, 1930) Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Osburn condemns the system whereby a prefect, himself only a child and at the most neurotic, irritable, and exotic period of his life, is allowed to "flog and to discipline children smaller than himself." These sadistic gentlemen, exclaimed Colonel Osburn, afterwards became our Judges and Lieutenants, Governors and High Commissioners. Against this, in *Life and the Public Schools*, Dr. David finds that the administrators of the British Empire are the finest fruits of the prefect system: "their success in ruling men, which is beyond dispute, has some connection with their early practice in the handling of boys."

The above excerpts were selected by Dr. Badger, from whose book I am borrowing—Chapter VIII is devoted to *The Public School Training of Character.* Here he summarises many features of the public school system claimed to be good. These are the system of boy-discipline, the consciousness among many public school boys of belonging to privileged families of wealth and influence, setting them apart from the majority of boys in the British community, the *mores* (manners and morals) fostered and acquired, historically conditioned and fashioned by centuries of tradition. The French chivalric code of conduct has had a predominating influence on the public schools ever since Bishop Wykeham: "The body hardened and strengthened by much exercise in the open air, and by early rising"; "an early attempt at a 'Compliance and suppleness of children's wills' till Awe and Respect be grown familiar . . ." (John Locke). There is training in virtue, which "alone is true nobility" (Lord Chesterfield). Outward behaviour and appropriate conduct are very important, for "every man should perform everything in the most becoming manner" (Addison and Steele). "The playfellows . . of a boy of spirit may be the future friends of his head or his interest." "In a free intercourse with his equals, the habits of truth, fortitude, and prudence will inevitably be matured" (Edward Gibbon). To Thomas Hughes the main characteristic of Rugby boys was "their genial and hearty freshness and youthfulness of character." In the

public schools there is " the educating of the sense of independence, individualism, empiricism and a strong national consciousness " (L. Wiese). " The public school boy plays fair, and although not positively magnanimous, he tries to be just. He may often be narrow-minded, but he is not mean or petty " (Bernard Darwin). Finally, the public school boy is " free from any consciousness of social inferiority; his home influence is wider and more knowledgeable; he is more stable since he has spent a number of years away from his parents among boys ", and he is better " for a period of absence from unrestricted attention to the crooner, the dance-band, and the popular cinema; he is taught that spiritual values should come first "; and he has a conscious pride in his school, which can be very snobbish but " at its best is purified by a spirit of *noblesse oblige*, a sense of responsibility for those who are in some way or other inferior or less fortunate." [14]

It may puzzle some readers that this chapter deals only with the claim that English public schools train character. Little appears to have been written concerning the efforts made in non-public schools. The assumption perhaps is that in them character is trained indirectly. It would, however, refuse to face facts if we were to assume that the claims made for the public schools are not claims of superiority in this respect. A corresponding analysis therefore of the character-training in our secondary and elementary schools needs to be written.

T. H. PEAR.

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[14] J. H. Simpson, *The Future of the Public Schools* (George Over, Rugby).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SCOTTISH SOLUTION

By entitling this article 'The Scottish Solution', the Editors have in great measure determined its scope and emphasis. In the wide field of social and moral education, Scotland cannot claim either that her problems differ fundamentally from those of the Western peoples generally or that she has had signal success in dealing with them. Where she has perhaps made a distinctive contribution is in finding, if not a final solution to the problem of religious teaching and observance in her schools, at any rate a working arrangement which for a generation now has been productive of much good to the young and of singularly little trouble or bad feeling among their elders.

Accordingly, the first purpose of this article is to describe, with just the necessary reference to earlier conditions, the provisions made in the Education (Scotland) Act, 1918, for religious and moral teaching in Scottish schools; to trace the working out of these provisions; and to indicate the verdict of informed opinion on the present situation. This account will be followed by a rather less detailed consideration of certain formative influences in the moral and social nurture of Scottish youth in our time.

PART I

When the Education (Scotland) Act, 1872, carried a stage farther the secular control of Scottish education by transferring to the newly established school boards all the parish and burgh schools (thereafter to be known as 'public schools'), it left to the remaining three thousand-odd schools, of which about two-fifths were denominational, the following alternatives:

(*a*) to be transferred by their managers and become public schools, and

(*b*) to remain under voluntary management and receive Government grants but not, of course, rate-aid.

The provision of religious instruction was not dealt with in the Act itself, but the preamble stated that it had been customary in Scottish schools to give religious instruction to children whose parents did not object thereto, and that it was expedient that the managers of the public schools should be at liberty to continue this custom.

Of the 931 school boards set up under the Act almost all continued religious instruction in accordance with 'use and wont', and it is hardly surprising that in a country so predominantly Presbyterian the boards, with only two or three exceptions, saw fit to base their instruction on the Holy Scriptures and the Shorter Catechism. Indeed, in an oft-quoted Report for the year 1878, one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools wrote: "The public schools are to all intents and purposes denominational schools. Public and Presbyterian are practically interchangeable." This judgment must, however, be qualified by remembrance of the operation of the Conscience Clause, safeguarding the parent's rights, and of the relative freedom from religious tests enjoyed by the teachers in the public schools.

The Working of the Act of 1872

How the Act of 1872 worked out in the forty years separating it from the First World War is clearly indicated in the following table [1]:

Voluntary Schools Receiving Grant

	1880	*1890*	*1900*	*1910*
Church of Scotland	145	62	27	8
Free Church .	39	18	6	1
Episcopal Church .	73	74	68	57
Roman Catholic Church	126	166	188	220
Undenominational	235	146	71	61

The Presbyterian Churches might not be wholly satisfied with the provisions of the Act, but clearly they did not feel strongly enough to be willing to carry the immense burden imposed by a perpetuation of the voluntary system, whereas the Roman Catholic Church, and to a less degree the Scottish Episcopal Church, did in fact regard the conditions of transfer as being so fundamentally unsatisfactory that they felt constrained to keep control of their own schools. While the figures showing the increase in the number of Roman Catholic schools are striking, they do not fully reveal the remarkable educational effort made by that Church during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. For the Roman Catholic community, not in general possessed of great financial resources, the burden of building and modernising schools was additional to the payment of normal rates on the very large number of new public schools erected by the school boards. Moreover, as successive Acts abolished fees at the primary stage, extended the period of compulsory schooling, multiplied post-primary depart-

[1] *Memorandum with Regard to the Provision made for Religious Instruction in the Schools of Scotland,* Cmd. 6426, p. 5.

ments, and made increasing provision for the health and well-being of children, educational costs rose enormously. Hence the Roman Catholic schools, which in the years after 1872 had shown remarkable vitality and earned much commendation, fell under ever greater disadvantage; and, during the first decade of the new century, increasing concern was felt—not in Catholic quarters alone—that about a seventh of the country's children should, owing to financial straits, be educated in voluntary schools, gravely deficient in accommodation and equipment, in classes far too large, and by teachers poorly qualified and wretchedly underpaid. When, therefore, towards the close of the First World War, national sentiment called for a major advance in public education, and experience for drastic reform of its administration, the chance was taken to attempt a bold solution of the denominational problem in the Education (Scotland) Act, 1918.

Provision for Religious Education in the Act of 1918

Our present concern is solely with the provision made in the Act for (*a*) religion in the public schools, and (*b*) the transfer of the voluntary schools to the newly constituted education authorities.

In respect of (*a*), the Act simply repeated the preamble to the Act of 1872, thereby making explicit the right of the education authorities to continue the custom of giving instruction in religion, subject always to the provisions of the Conscience Clause.

(*b*) The issue in respect of the voluntary schools has never been better put than in the words of the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr. Robert Munro (now Lord Alness). Speaking in Edinburgh, while the Bill was before Parliament, he said:

> There I had three courses open to me. The first was to leave these schools alone—to leave them out of the Bill. That probably would have been the line of least resistance. But I think that solution would be educationally unsound. At present, one-seventh of the school population of Scotland are, owing to the inadequate resources of managers, being denied the opportunities open to children who attend our public schools. In other words, these children are being penalised because of the religious belief of their parents. I do not think that that is either expedient or just. The second course open to me was to propose that denominational schools should receive a State grant which would compensate them for what they lose in rate-aid. I am not prepared to take that course. I am satisfied that public opinion in Scotland would not endorse it. The remaining solution of the problem is to take over the denominational schools, and to place them under the same management as public schools—on terms. Those terms are that the teachers in the transferred schools should be approved by the former managers of the school or by their representatives both in respect of faith and character, and that religious instruction should continue to be given according to the use and wont of the former management of the school.[2]

[2] Reported in *The Educational News*, January 18th, 1918.

Mr. Munro, himself the son of a Scottish manse, appealed to all parties " to study these proposals on their merits, without prejudice, bigotry, or heat ", as affording " the true solution of a difficult problem." After a year's animated discussion by all interested, the Bill was passed with almost no opposition.

It is unnecessary to detail all the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, which dealt with the transfer of voluntary schools; the salient points are these. The schools affected in the first instance were day schools providing education for children between the ages of 5 and 14 or 15. The managers of such schools were empowered to transfer them to the education authorities by sale, lease, or otherwise at their own option, the authorities being bound to accept the transfer on agreed terms. In the event of disagreement on financial terms, decision rested with an arbiter to be appointed by the Scottish Education Department. Schools so transferred became in every sense public schools, the education authority having complete control of curriculum and also of the appointment and dismissal of teachers. Existing staff was to be taken over, and provision was made that teachers appointed after the date of transfer must be approved as regards religious belief and character by representatives of the Church or denominational body concerned. The time allowed for religious instruction was to be not less than before transference. Any school management committee having in its care a transferred school must include a representative of the Church or denominational body concerned. A voluntary school established after the passing of the Act might be transferred on the same terms as above. Two years after the passing of the Act, any school to which Section 18 applied ceased to be eligible for grant, unless it had been transferred to the education authority.

How the Provisions of the 1918 Act have Worked Out

Consideration of the manner in which the religious provisions of the 1918 Act have worked out may conveniently start with the transferred schools. Few would dispute the verdict of the Scottish Education Department that " the provisions of Section 18 have worked out on the whole with remarkable smoothness." [3] Speaking in Parliament twenty-five years after, the late James Maxton, who was a member of the first Glasgow Education Authority, recalled how smoothly even in that former storm-centre of religious controversy the transfer of the voluntary schools had been carried through, and added with characteristic humour: " The chairman of the authority at that time, who was very active in arranging the transfer, was one of the leading Orangemen in the West of Scotland and a powerful figure in the Conservative Party, with family connections with Ulster, and all the rest of it." [4]

[3] Cmd. 6426, Section 17.

[4] *Parliamentary Debates,* February 25th, 1944.

Any fears the Roman Catholic and Episcopal Churches may have felt that their schools could not be safely entrusted to education authorities on which their own voting strength was but fractional proved wholly groundless. Arrangements for the appointment of religious supervisors and satisfactory procedure for certifying to the education authority as appointing body that a teacher "is approved in respect of religious belief and character" have presented no serious difficulty. The Roman Catholic and Episcopal Churches have acquiesced in the closing of schools no longer needed, and have not pressed unreasonably a claim for the provision of separate schools, where the number of their children was insufficient to justify it. Similarly, where a fully qualified candidate of their own religious persuasion was not available, they have concurred in the appointment of an outsider. Above all, in a sphere where there seemed endless opportunity for litigation, it is remarkable that only two cases have occurred in twenty-five years. On the more important one, involving the obligation of the education authority to take over a school built by the Roman Catholic authorities with the approval of the Scottish Education Department, and settled in favour of the Church, the following comment by a Catholic writer is of interest: "In this case the Act was not at fault, but the agents attempting to work it did give evidence of human frailty on both sides. The wonder is not that such a case occurred, but that in twenty-five years it is the only one of its kind." [5]

Time and again Roman Catholics have acknowledged that the bargain has been well kept, the Act generously administered; and Monsignor W. F. Brown, who had a leading part in promoting the 1918 settlement, said of it sixteen years later: "As a settlement of the difficult problem of religious teaching in schools for a minority, it is unique in the world, and its main merit is the concordat between the State and the local authorities and the Churches concerned." [6]

What Scotland Has Gained by the 1918 Settlement

If it be asked what Scotland has gained by this admittedly generous treatment of a religious minority, the answer is an immense improvement in the educational and cultural state of a seventh of its people. In 1918, as has been recorded, primary education in the voluntary schools was at low ebb, accommodation, equipment, and teaching being deplorably inadequate. To-day the transferred schools are in all essentials up to the national level, and the scope and standard of their instruction are in no way different

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[5] *Catholic Schools in Scotland* (Catholic University of America Press, 1945), p. 196.

[6] W. F. Brown, *The Scottish Settlement* (National Union of Teachers), 1934, p. 8.

from those of public schools dealing with children having the same social and economic background.

In 1918 Catholic secondary education was very limited in extent, being confined to a few schools, mostly in the hands of religious orders; by 1943 there were at least twenty Roman Catholic senior secondary schools conducted by education authorities, and a very much larger number of schools or departments providing junior secondary education for pupils between the ages of 12 and 15.

Most striking of all, however, has been the growth of university education. Up to 1880 Roman Catholics were only a handful at Glasgow University, and even as late as 1914 the numbers had not grown appreciably. But with the passing of the 1918 Act they began to rise sharply, until to-day there are about seven hundred Catholic undergraduates at Glasgow University, with two hundred to three hundred more at Edinburgh.[7]

The attitude of Roman Catholic leadership to the 1918 settlement is unquestionably one of thankfulness and approbation, and even when a recent writer points out that the higher administrative posts—the inspectorate and directorships of education—still seem closed to his co-religionists, he does so less by way of complaint than as a reminder that responsibility for a policy of segregation does not rest with the minority alone.[8] Another Catholic authority advances as one of the fruits of the settlement "a greater sense of national and civil solidarity among Catholics. The sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons of the Irish immigrants are developing a 'Scottish sense.'"[9]

Scottish Opinion on the 1918 Settlement

It would be idle to pretend that Scotland as a whole has from first to last viewed the 1918 settlement with the same degree of satisfaction as has the Roman Catholic community.

The presence of a large and rapidly growing minority, alien in race and religion, inevitably arouses alarm among men and women jealous for the spiritual and cultural traditions of their own country, and throughout the 1920's the provisions for the transferred schools were frequently assailed, as calculated to perpetuate the separateness of the Scoto-Irish Catholic element in Central Scotland, which a wise policy should have sought to assimilate and absorb. Unquestionably, however, the passing of the years has brought a change of attitude. The Act of 1918 has had time to

[7] *The University of Glasgow and the Catholic Church, 1450–1950.* Reprinted from *St. Peter's College Magazine* (Scottish Catholic Historical Committee).

[8] James Handley, *The Irish in Modern Scotland* (Cork University Press, 1947), p. 332.

[9] P. F. Anson, *The Catholic Church in Modern Scotland* (Burnes, Oates & Washbourne, 1937), p. 196.

reveal its educational and social benefits. The steadfast witness of the Roman Catholic Church under Nazism and in Eastern Europe during the post-war years has won for it a new measure of respect and admiration, and in face of the totalitarian challenge Christian folk in Scotland, as elsewhere, are minded to dwell on what unites them rather than on what divides. There is, too, a disposition to go far in respecting the wishes of the parent in regard to the nurture of his child, and a new awareness of the truth that " religious liberty is not just one of the liberties—it is the pivot of all liberty." In this changed atmosphere, hostility to the 1918 settlement is confined to the few who sincerely believe that the right attitude towards a minority belonging to an authoritarian Church is one of consistent opposition and refusal of concessions, and to those others who would banish all forms of religious education alike from our schools. The great mass of the Scottish people would re-echo the conviction of the teaching profession that " the benefit to the children of the transferred schools has been enormous, and this alone would justify the settlement." [10] That is, however, essentially a pragmatic judgment; it is not a tacit acceptance of the thesis that till the end of time the only satisfactory set-up in a country of mixed religion will be a thorough-going denominationalism.

There remains the important question: Is the Scottish solution for export? Is the 1918 settlement of the denominational problem of general application? In theory, of course, the same concessions might as readily be made to a large number of religious groups as to one or two; but few Scotsmen will doubt that the situation would have been viewed very differently, had there been in the Scotland of 1918 large minorities of, say, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, and others, all claiming that degree of educational separateness which the Roman Catholic and Episcopal Churches deemed necessary to their well-being.

It was one thing to concede a denominational settlement to a seventh of the population, in the knowledge that an integrated national system of education, free from religious tests and ecclesiastical control, would operate over the six-sevenths. It would have been quite another matter to let the mass of the nation's schools, financed from public sources, be parcelled out among the various Churches, with the result that the majority of education authority members became primarily the spokesmen of religious interests, and teachers found themselves seeking employment and promotion not in a unified national service but within a denominational segment of it. While, therefore, it would be wrong to say dogmatically that the Scottish settlement could never be repeated elsewhere, it would be equally unwarranted to assume that it could

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[10] *Centenary Handbook of the Educational Institute of Scotland,* 1946, p. 284.

be applied *simpliciter* to the fundamentally different circumstances of England or the United States.

Religion in the Public Schools of Scotland since 1918

The story of religious education in the non-transferred public schools during the past thirty years is creditable both to the national Church and to the teachers of Scotland.

Legislative action enters into it hardly at all. When in 1929 *ad hoc* education authorities were replaced by education committees of city and county councils, the Act contained a provision that no decision by a council to discontinue religious instruction in its schools would be valid, unless confirmed by a poll of the local government electors of the education area taken for the purpose. Again, the Education Act, 1945, gave effect to a recommendation of the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland that it be permissible to give religious instruction at any point in the school day. Apart from these two statutory changes, the record is entirely one of free co-operation pursued under conditions of increasing trust and friendliness. The Church of Scotland has recognised that in the last resort the sufficiency of religious instruction in the schools will depend neither on statute nor on custom but on the goodwill of Scottish teachers, while the latter have reaffirmed a conviction which had found expression in the very constitution of their professional organisation seventy years before, that "religious training is of supreme importance in the education of the young." [11] In 1918 the youth committees of the two larger Presbyterian Churches, which later united to form the Church of Scotland, had issued a *Syllabus of Religious Instruction for Use in Schools,* in the framing of which representative teachers had had a part. After some years' experience it was felt that the Syllabus required careful revision, and to that end a joint committee was set up, representative equally of the Churches and of the teachers' organisation, the Educational Institute of Scotland. The new Syllabus (primary and secondary) was issued in 1930 after being approved by both the Church of Scotland and the teachers, and quickly established itself as the "normal basis of religious instruction in the schools, other than transferred schools, throughout Scotland, except in certain Highland areas where the omission of the Shorter Catechism is disapproved." [12]

The Syllabus, which tacitly accepts the established results of Biblical criticism, centres on the life and teaching of Jesus Christ.

In the earlier years by far the larger part of the teaching material is drawn from the Gospels, and, as the Syllabus develops, the gradually

[11] *Centenary Handbook of the Educational Institute of Scotland,* 1946, p. 73.

[12] Cmd. 6426, p. 13.

increasing share which is given to the Old Testament is presented as it was most probably taught to Him. Thus it is hoped not only to secure from the first a really Christian presentation to the pupil of the great religious truths concerning God and man, but also to set the life of our Lord in such a relation to the Old Testament that the Bible shall come to be known for what it really is, the gradual revelation to man of the Divine nature and the Divine purpose for the world.[13]

The joint committee next sponsored the preparation of a teacher's handbook to the Syllabus, which appeared in 1936, and these last years have seen a further revision of the syllabus and provision of very full teaching aids to it. How fully the work of the joint committee has commended itself to Christian Scotland is evidenced by the accession to its original membership of representatives of the United Free Church of Scotland, the Free Church of Scotland, the Original Secession Church, the Episcopal Church in Scotland, the Baptist Union, the Congregational Union, and the Association of Directors of Education.

No less important have been the indirect results of the co-operation of Church and school on the Syllabus. Discovering a large community of interest and purpose, the joint committee prepared a memorandum designed to promote a still closer co-operation and to remove any remaining causes of friction. This document, approved by both Church and teachers just before the Second World War, recommended the discontinuance of all formal inspection of religious instruction or examinations in religious knowledge, the avoidance of such terms as 'supervision' and 'inspection' in relation to religious education, as being incompatible with the closer co-operation desired by both parties, and the extension of Church-school co-operation from the centre to the individual education areas. Finally, both parties put on record "their profound conviction that religious teaching is the basis of that training in character which is the ultimate aim of the education given in our schools."

This local co-operation, which is developing in an entirely unforced and unhurried manner, proceeds by means of agreed recommendations to the education authorities. Ministers have been invited to act as religious advisers and chaplains to schools, and to take some part in the religious training of the children. School services are being held on a greatly increased scale, while at such appropriate seasons as Christmas, Easter, and the beginning and end of term, special church services for pupils and staff are becoming customary.

The 'Advisory Council on Education in Scotland' and Religious Education

The movement to give religion a new place and vitality in Scottish schools has found powerful support in recent years in the

[13] *A Syllabus of Religious Education*, 1947, p. 11.

attitude and pronouncements of the Secretary of State's Advisory Council on Education in Scotland. In Report after Report, it has made clear its "general acceptance of the great tradition of Christian theism as regulative for our national life and education."[14] It has recommended that the daily religious instruction of the primary stage should be followed by at least two periods weekly, *jealously guarded against all interruption,* throughout the secondary school. It has secured the removal of set times for religious instruction, thereby making it easier to assign an increased share of this important work to teachers who have "at least one of the two qualifications necessary, the personal conviction that gives life and sincerity to the teaching."[15] But the Council has laid no less emphasis on the other qualification, adequate scholarship, remarking on the paradox of our extreme insistence on the fullest qualifications for the teaching of other subjects and our seeming unconcern about "the one subject which is acknowledged to be of fundamental importance."[16] To remedy present deficiencies, it recommended greatly extended provision for the study of religion both in the training colleges and in the arts faculties of the Scottish universities, and already much has been done to give effect to these recommendations. Specially noteworthy is the emphasis laid by the Advisory Council on the supreme importance of the religious education of "the young people at the top of a secondary school", who "are often a more critical audience than any adult congregation",[17] and its support for the use of a specialist teacher at this stage. The Educational Institute of Scotland has had misgivings about the employment of such specialists; but there is in fact no conflict between the Institute's conviction "that this instruction is safe and thorough only when given by teachers who are willing and eager to contribute their services to this great task"[18] and the Advisory Council's advocacy of the specialist teacher of religion as "not someone divorced from the general life of the school or one whose appointment will preclude others from taking a part in religious instruction, but a trained teacher and regular member of staff who, while taking a full share in all school activities and some part in the teaching of secular subjects, will have a major qualification in Theology and will find his main interest in the field of religious education."[19] Specialists in this sense have already been

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[14] *Secondary Education,* a Report of the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland, Cmd. 7005, Section 48.

[15] Cmd. 7005, Section 564.

[16] *Training for Citizenship,* a Report of the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland, Cmd. 6495, Section 30.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Centenary Handbook of the Educational Institute of Scotland,* 1946, p. 290.

[19] *Secondary Education,* a Report of the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland, Cmd. 7005, Section 568.

appointed to a number of large secondary schools in the cities, and their contribution to religious education is awaited with hopeful interest.

A Summing-up

Such is the present place of religious education in the public schools of Scotland. Some would have it bigger, some smaller; but the great body of thoughtful Scotsmen are content to let it be, not in any spirit of complacency but in humble thankfulness that where rancour and disharmony might so easily have prevailed, a creditable measure of reasonableness, tolerance, and restraint has been forthcoming. There are, no doubt, loose ends and minor contradictions in the teaching, but it is no small thing to have ensured for all Scottish children some real familiarity with the Scriptures and with those great Christian affirmations from which have stemmed the decency and civility of the Western world. Nor should the other gains be lightly put aside—the acceptance by the teachers of Scotland of the truth that the primacy of the spiritual is at once the basis and the justification of all education; a concordat between Church and school which has banished old suspicions and greatly strengthened both; a right attitude to the 'good pagan', neither denying him a place in the nation's schools nor making it intolerable by requiring him to teach religion; and lastly, the very widespread adoption of a syllabus which, while leaving all reasonable freedom to the individual teacher, secures a sufficient degree of coherence and uniformity in religious teaching throughout the country. Religious instruction which lacks a firm doctrinal basis will never wholly escape certain difficulties, but those who are ill-reconciled to it would do well to remember that for the young to hear religion taught by different teachers with differences of emphasis or viewpoint may result not in a weakening of belief but in a strengthening of toleration, of that very costly virtue which must ever rest on the twin pillars of charity and recognition of the truth that in matters of faith honest men may differ and wise men will agree to do so.

PART II

Social and Moral Factors in the Nurture of Scottish Youth

Scotland has shared to the full in the changes which over Western society as a whole have aggravated the age-old difficulties of moral education and made its problems so intractable in our time—the break-down of a generally accepted philosophy of life, extreme urbanisation, the depersonalising effect of vast-scale industry, the disappearance of coherent and understandable social patterns, the disintegration of family life by modern transport and economic pressure; in a word, all the restlessness and rootlessness

of contemporary living. Moreover, many of the adverse factors have been peculiarly grave in the Scotland of the last two decades. The disbalance of population is extreme. In the war-time evacuation scheme, the average population of the sending areas was 14,000 per square mile, that of the receiving areas was only 100, though the five most remote and inaccessible counties were excluded. The incidence of unemployment has long been much higher in Scotland than in southern England, and—what is particularly significant—the number of men unemployed for long periods far exceeded that of any English area.[20]

Poverty was very marked in the years before the Second World War; Scotland had 20 per cent. of its population in the income group with less than 10*s*. a week per head, as against 10 per cent. for Great Britain as a whole. The housing situation was appalling. Whereas the percentage of families overcrowded in England and Wales was 3·8, the figure for Scotland was 22·6, and in certain Clydeside towns it topped 40 per cent. Almost half the homes of Scotland consisted of two rooms or less, and a recent committee records that "in few Scottish working-class homes is there sufficient living-space for all the members of the family." [21]

Infant mortality for Scotland was 77 per 1,000 as against 55 for England and Wales. These are the conditions under which the present generation of adolescents has been reared in Scotland, and it need occasion no surprise that from such a soil has sprung a rank crop of delinquency.

The pattern of delinquency in Scotland is markedly similar to that in England and Wales; the different classes of crime appear in broadly the same proportions, and the crimes which predominate in each age-group are the same in both countries. From close statistical analysis,[22] A. M. Struthers concludes that the incidence of crime among juveniles has almost certainly been higher year after year in Scotland than in England and Wales, and (with less certainty) that "between 1939 and 1945 juvenile behaviour deteriorated more in Scotland than in England and Wales." The worst ages for delinquency among boys are 12 and 13, whereas among girls the dangerous ages are from 17 to 21. In earlier adolescence, girl delinquents are only some 5 per cent. of the number of boys, but according to an experienced social worker, "they are more difficult." By far the largest class of crimes among adolescent boys are offences against property without violence, i.e. theft, fraud, and wilful imposition; the next largest are acts of malicious damage to property. This form of misbehaviour reaches its peak at 10, declines steadily to 14, and

[20] *Our Scottish Towns—Evacuation and the Social Future,* 1944, p. 24.

[21] *The Needs of Youth in These Times,* a Report of the Scottish Youth Advisory Committee, 1945, Section 25.

[22] A. M. Struthers, *Measuring Bad Behaviour,* 1950.

sharply thereafter. On the other hand, the later adolescent years see a marked increase in crimes against property with violence, i.e. housebreaking and shop-breaking. The vast majority of offences committed by girls and young women are, of course, acts of pilfering from shops and stalls.

Cause and Cure of Delinquency

If there is now a fairly clear statistical picture of juvenile delinquency in Scotland, there remains a large measure of doubt about its causation and still more about its cure. The following evidence in respect of a junior approved school merits consideration. The average intelligence of the boys is low—17 per cent. are below I.Q. 70, 70 per cent. below I.Q. 90, and the average I.Q. is 84. Almost without exception the boys are from very unsatisfactory homes. Ten per cent. of the children are illegitimate. The loss of one or both parents is fairly common, and domestic infidelity appears very frequently. A religious and moral background is almost entirely lacking, only 5 per cent. of the boys coming from homes with even a nominal Church connection.

The close interconnection of delinquency and low intelligence seems to be generally established. Yet there is force in D. H. Stott's contention that very many delinquent children may be in such a nervous, unsettled state as must seriously distort their performance in any intelligence test, and that their dull and backward condition may be consequence rather than cause of their mental disturbance.

Again, even the admitted primacy of the bad or broken home among the causes of delinquency leaves unanswered the baffling question why some boys from such homes become delinquent and others do not. It is worth recording, too, that in a recent discussion the head of an approved school could claim that "very few of his boys had parents who had been through the courts." Lastly, while few would gainsay the great steadying influence of systematic moral and religious upbringing, the fact must be faced that this alone will not necessarily keep a boy or girl from going wrong. When, in the course of a recent discussion on citizenship, falling standards were attributed to the decline in religious training and practice, a Scottish Roman Catholic headmaster commented: "But if that were the whole truth, the products of Catholic Schools should be outstanding in civic virtue compared with those from non-Catholic schools. Even after making due allowance for differences of social background, this is a claim which no Catholic headmaster or teacher could unreservedly support." [23] When all account has been taken of the various social and moral factors and of the psychological clue that every case of delinquency looks like

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[23] *The Dom Bosco Journal,* June 1948.

an attempt to break out from " an emotionally intolerable situation ", there remains in this problem a peculiarly baffling element, a sort of surd. Can it be that in the end we may have to admit the possibility that there is in certain children and adolescents such a thing as simple badness, evidence even in half-formed personalities of the tragically flawed condition of our human nature? Be that as it may, there exists a healthy awareness of our ignorance about the ultimate causes of juvenile wrongdoing, and an equally undogmatic temper in regard to its cure. " We have no really useful statistics, no knowledge about the success or failure of our methods ", said an expert in this field, and an experienced magistrate confessed: " I have no means of knowing whether putting children on probation, or letting them off, or sending them to approved schools is the best treatment."

The Cinema

That this large area of uncertainty and conjecture is not confined to the field of juvenile delinquency but extends to various factors influencing the ideas and behaviour of young people may be illustrated by a consideration of one of the most potent of them all, the cinema. What follows is based mainly on an inquiry, *Attendance of School Children at the Cinema,* conducted by Dr. D. M. McIntosh for the Scottish Educational Film Association, a survey which took account of earlier investigations in Edinburgh and West Lothian.

Eighty per cent. of Scottish children attend the cinema at least once a week, and of the remainder very many attend irregularly. Thirteen out of every hundred go to the pictures three times or more each week. " That children in the Infant Department (5–7) are in the cinemas practically with the same frequency as older children is a terrible indictment of many of the homes of to-day." [24] Boys attend, on the whole, more frequently than girls, and " poorer children go oftener than those whose home conditions are of a higher standard." When the post-primary stage is reached, the abler boys and girls attending senior secondary schools are much less addicted to cinema-going than are the pupils in junior secondary schools. Of the latter, scarcely any, in the cities and big towns at least, are not regular attenders, while no less than 68 per cent. of them go at least twice a week. The very recent Departmental Committee's Report, *Children and the Cinema,* finds Scottish children more regular in their attendance than those in the south and apparently at an earlier age. On somewhat slight evidence, it opines that more unaccompanied children are to be seen in Scottish cinemas at a late hour than is the case in England.

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[24] Douglas M. McIntosh, *Attendance of School Children at the Cinema,* 1949, p. 8.

Here again we have a considerable body of ascertained fact, but on the most important aspect of the problem, the effect of the cinema on the children who so frequently attend it, we know very little, though there is no lack of conjecture and hazarded opinion. Few can be unconcerned about the continual exposure of impressionable youth to the vulgarity and the distortion of values which so often mark the commercial film, nor can one regard as other than deplorable the over-stimulation by the cinema of that craving for excitement which makes 'the thriller' the almost universal reading of the schoolboy.[25] But to attribute to the cinema any major share of responsibility for delinquency or for moral laxity in young people is to forsake evidence for mere opinion. It may well be so, but the recent Departmental Committee follows McIntosh in returning the distinctively Scottish verdict "Not proven." What has often been argued—again, however, with plausibility rather than on a basis of fact—is that the cinema is a factor in juvenile delinquency in the sense that many children resort to theft in order to procure the money for their incessant attendance at the pictures. One question is pertinent to any judgment on the cinema at this stage: With the housing and general social conditions prevailing in Scotland, do children come by as much harm from the cinema as might easily befall them, were they denied the protection, physical and otherwise, of the picture house and spending their leisure in the other ways available to them?

The great need is for inquiry, and the *Scottish Educational Journal* rightly commends the Report of the Departmental Committee as "the first attempt to get beyond mere prejudice and cloudy sentiment" and to "remember how little of real substance we know at present."

Further Education

In passing to a brief consideration of factors making for the healthy upbringing of youth, one might perhaps begin more logically with the school; but a prior survey of the provision for further education, formal and informal, has the advantage of bringing out more clearly the tasks that face the day schools of Scotland and the degree of success with which they are being discharged.

Where it has been tried, voluntary day-release has proved its value to the full; but, while the national organisations of certain industries are alive to the importance of such training, the response at local level has been somewhat disappointing. This may result from the preponderance in Scotland of smaller industrial units, less highly organised and able easily to make arrangements for such

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[25] *A Survey of the Leisure Time of West Lothian School Children*, 1938, pp. 15–18.

release. But, whatever the reason, the demand by industry does not take up fully even the limited facilities presently available, and the best that can be said of the total of 8,500 young workers allowed day-release in 1948–49 is that it represents a substantial increase on the 1947–48 figure of 6,000.[26]

On the formal side of further education, by far the most important element is still the provision of evening continuation classes by the education authorities. Of the general, as distinct from the 'career', value of such classes there can be no doubt. They confirm young people in habits of study and mental alertness, afford worthwhile occupation for the winter evenings in our towns and cities, and make for the upbuilding of adolescent character through the growth of self-respect and proper vocational ambition. Nevertheless, from the side of social and moral welfare, the present contribution made by evening continuation classes can be regarded with only a tempered satisfaction, for the following reasons:

(*a*) Vigorously pursued, evening study involves some risk of overstrain to young persons fully employed during the day.

(*b*) Though the number enrolled in such classes has risen from 130,000 in 1945 to 222,000 in 1949, the extent of wastage, long suspected but now confirmed by reliable statistics, leads the Scottish Education Department to the depressing conclusion that in session 1948–49 "probably less than one in five young workers aged between 15 and 18 successfully attended any kind of continuation class." [27]

(*c*) What the continuation-class system is helping is the minority which by reason of its relatively high quality of mind and character is least vulnerable to the dangers and stresses of adolescence; what remains outside its influence is the far less stable and self-reliant majority condemned to almost purely routine and repetitive work.

(*d*) The content of evening continuation classes is so preponderantly vocational that even the minority who benefit pass from the activity of adolescence without in most cases possessing the developed cultural and civic interests which ensure the enriching use of adult leisure.

Informal Further Education

The post-war years have seen a very great expansion of informal further education in Scotland. The Education (Scotland) Act, 1945, made it the duty of every education authority to secure adequate provision throughout its area of all forms of further education. In regard to facilities "for adequate voluntary leisure-time occupation in suitable cultural training and recreative

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[26] *Education in Scotland, 1949* (Scottish Education Department), p. 33.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

activities," the Act clearly contemplates not that the authority make all or most of the provision itself but that it ensure such provision by co-operating with voluntary organisations. How this partnership of statutory and voluntary bodies is shaping so far may be judged from the following facts:

(*a*) There are in Scotland about 12,700 units of voluntary youth organisations, with a membership of half a million.

(*b*) There are 400 units of local authority youth organisations, with a membership of 38,000.

(*c*) In the year ending May 1949, education authorities incurred an expenditure of £117,460 in assisting voluntary organisations in their areas. When to this is added the sum of over £69,000 paid direct to various organisations from the Education (Scotland) Fund, it is fair to conclude—with no disparagement of the indispensable work of these agencies—that the traditional conception of a 'voluntary body' is undergoing rather drastic modification.

The decisive entry of the statutory authorities into the youth service has unquestionably been fraught with much good. It has made available great resources of money, specialised knowledge, equipment, and not least, of accommodation. But it has likewise raised fresh problems and created new dangers. The employment by the authorities of over two thousand leaders and instructors in their own clubs and centres, and their large-scale payment or provision of staff for the voluntary bodies, have brought about a situation in which, according to a very experienced leader in Scottish youth service, it is "proving increasingly difficult to get qualified men to do the work for nothing, when others are doing the same work and getting so much an hour." Again, with the emergence of a very large paid personnel, there is an inevitable tendency for vested interests to be set up and for progress to be viewed almost exclusively in quantitative terms—expanding membership and the multiplication of centres. Then comes forgetfulness of a truth which was ever present to the pioneers in this field: that at its best the service of youth must be very costly in just those things which money cannot in itself command—the sustained sacrifice of leisure for the benefit of a quite small group and the putting forth of virtue that even a few may be strengthened.

The Part of the Churches

It is impossible to particularise here all the various youth organisations which are active in Scotland, but one feature is too striking to be passed over: the very great contribution being made by the Churches or by bodies which claim a religious basis or avow a spiritual aim. Indeed, it is difficult to find a major organisation which is clearly neutral in this regard. Church agencies are credited directly with a third of the 12,000 youth service units and a corresponding share of the total membership. It is noteworthy,

too, that in addition to the 90,000 members of the Boys' Brigade and the Girls' Guildry, the Church of Scotland has some 800 clubs (14–18) with about 30,000 members; the Roman Catholic Youth Movement (11–18) has a similar membership; and the Episcopal Church in Scotland is doing a like service for some 5,000 young people.

The Strength and Weakness of Youth Service

It is hard to make a just assessment of all this work for youth. Beyond a doubt, Scotland would be vastly the poorer for lack of it, but set against the total need and the menacing features of our time, it must be accounted insufficient in extent and disappointing in quality.

In 1944 the Secretary of State estimated that of the 14–18 age-group only about 40 per cent. were attached to a youth organisation; and, while there has been considerable expansion since then, the Standing Conference of Voluntary Youth Organisations in Scotland has still to report that "there are large numbers of young people not attracted by the facilities presently made available, whether provided voluntarily or by statutory bodies."

Moreover, there is a widespread suspicion that the youth services have least grip just where the need is greatest. Do the clubs draw *and keep* 'unsettled youth', those adolescent elements from which delinquency may come? Such evidence as we have suggests that they do not.

But the principal ground of dissatisfaction with the youth service, and not least with the clubs that are multiplying under the auspices of the local authorities, is their poor showing on the cultural side, the disappointingly small part of their total activity which is in any real sense educational. For recreation in the form of provided entertainment the demand is great, but how easily satisfied is the appetite for anything that calls for effort of mind or a sustained cultural interest! To say this is in no sense to blame those who are engaged in youth service. They must come to terms with reality and run the clubs and centres at a level which holds the interest and maintains the attendance of the young people; and, if that level is such that much of what is done in the service of youth justifies itself rather as social salvage than as real preparation for the responsibilities of democratic life and the worthy use of leisure, the fault lies at the door of society itself.

The Schools and Further Education

The painful contrast between what is and what might be in further education has led to much heart-searching about the part played by the day schools in preparing boys and girls for life as distinct from livelihood. The Advisory Council on Education in Scotland saw in the voluntary education of the post-school years

"the very crown of all that the schools are called on to do and the proof of how they have done it",[28] and it is an open secret that in the disappointing attitude of Scottish youth to continued education they found a major reason for recommending radical changes in the methods and content of both primary and secondary schooling. Scottish education has a proud record; but its very virtues—its thoroughness and respect for learning—coupled with the immense influence of four ancient universities, have made it hard for us to realise how great must be the changes of aim and emphasis, if our traditional schooling is to be applied not to the more gifted few but to the whole body of ordinary children, especially in a time of profound unsettlement and rapid social change. It is, however, impossible to read *Young Citizens at School,* a Report on Experiments in Education for Living, without recognising that there is a new awareness of the importance of the school as a community; that much is now being done to repair our deficiencies; and that educational thinking and practice in Scotland are set in a hopeful direction.

Apart from the few for whom education still means little more than instruction, there would be general agreement that without neglecting either the immensely important training of an intellectual *élite* or the obligation to give the mass of children thorough teaching in the basic skills, the day schools of Scotland must strive unceasingly to achieve these three aims:

(*a*) To preserve throughout the whole period of compulsory schooling that happy union of freedom and purposeful activity which characterises our best infant departments. Only long habituation to the use of liberty will enable young people, when the days of compulsion are past, to practise that collective self-discipline which differentiates a social group from a noisy little mob.

(*b*) To provide for ordinary boys and girls an education which fosters self-respect and the sense of achievement. This is not a plea for cosseting and the removal of all difficulties, but just for the avoidance of excessive stress on the severely cognitive and on the too-systematic treatment of book-based studies. For, if we are constantly demanding the exercise of the very gifts of mind in whose bestowal nature is most grudging, school becomes for the many an experience in which failure bulks larger than success; and, since human nature takes oft-repeated failure with a bad grace, an ill-balanced or too-exacting schooling may well leave adolescents disheartened and sourly disposed towards anything which is later offered in the name of education. The bearing of this on further education needs no elaborating.

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[28] *Secondary Education,* a Report of the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland, Cmd. 7005, Section 25.

(*c*) To recognise the profound importance in normal human life of feeling, taste, and action, by giving a far more generous place in the curriculum to art and crafts, music, drama, and dancing. This is at once the field in which the majority of children can walk with delight and some measure of understanding, and that in which further education will have to seek much the greater part of its cultural content. Unless Scottish teachers are prepared to cultivate it with something of the thoroughness and devotion that have long marked their pursuit of 'sound learning', we shall not send forth from our schools young people to whom further education looks like an opportunity and not an imposition.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

Constitutional Provisions

THE constitutional status of education—I am thinking chiefly of primary and secondary—in the Republic of Ireland is radically different from the position in Great Britain (and Northern Ireland). This is not merely due to the fact that we have a written Constitution which the Supreme Court can interpret to invalidate legislation. The difference arises much more from the principles and norms embodied in the Constitution, which preclude the operation in Ireland of measures similar to the British Education Acts. The action of the state is severely limited, and local education authorities, except the committees for vocational education, do not exist. The provisions of the Constitution concerning education differ so profoundly from the ideas current, at least in governmental circles, under the former regime, that even in Ireland their implications are not yet fully realised. The time may come when certain regulations of the Department of Education, which are really a hangover from the British days, will be challenged; but so far the Supreme Court has been invoked only once concerning an Education Bill. Moreover, there exists as regards education considerable misunderstanding concerning the status of the Catholic Church, to which the great majority of the people belong. Finally, we in Ireland—and our voice has recently been heard in Strasbourg—hold that our constitutional principles guarantee parents against state encroachments and educational control. It may therefore be of general interest to consider in broad outline what are the principles which we profess.

For reference purposes the short article of the Constitution on education will first be quoted in full:

THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND (1937)
Article 42: Education

(1) The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family, and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.

(2) Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes or in private schools or in schools recognised or established by the State.

(3) *A.* The State shall not oblige parents in violation of their con-

science and lawful preference to send their children to schools established by the State or to any particular type of school designated by the State.

B. The State shall, however, as guardian of the common good, require in view of actual conditions that the children receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual, and social.

(4) The State shall provide for free primary education, and shall endeavour to supplement and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative, and when the public good requires it, provide other educational facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation.

(5) In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards their children, the State, as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and imprescriptable rights of the child.

The Church

Perhaps, at least to outsiders, the most significant and surprising aspect of this article is that it does not contain so much as a casual mention of the Church, which, as such, is not conceded any constitutional right in education. The only institution (except itself) in which the state acknowledges the right of education is the family. The only exception recognised is the case of the moral or physical disability of the parents. Then, and only then, may the state endeavour to supply the place of the parents, i.e. by carrying out the duties which they are unable to perform. Constitutionally, *vis-à-vis* our mixed state, the Catholic Church is recognised only in so far as it represents the families. It is true that there is another article (44), which has often been misquoted, and recently—I venture to think—quoted irrelevantly even by our own Supreme Court: " The State recognises the special position " of the Catholic Church " as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens." But this is merely the statement of a statistical fact which involves certain social amenities and respect. The article goes on to say that " the State also recognises " Episcopalians, Methodists, Quakers, Jews, etc., and guarantees freedom of conscience and religious profession and practice. Beyond making a ceremonial obeisance, the Constitution introduces no legal discrimination between the various religious organisations. The same article (44) continues: " The State guarantees not to endow any religion. The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief, or status."

It follows that, as regards formative education, no Church, *quâ* Church, has any constitutional status, and also, in so far as the Catholic Church, as an organisation for implementing parental rights, has a constitutional status in education, every other religious denomination has an equal status. Looked at from the inside, as

regards ourselves who admit its supernatural authority, the Catholic Church is much more than a natural association of parents. But as regards the Constitution of this state, we have, though numerically preponderant, the same status as the Church of Ireland or the Jews. Each of these bodies is recognised educationally only as it represents the parents who agree to send their children to the respective schools.

This pluralistic outlook does not mean that the state is indifferent to religion; on the contrary, religion is regarded as an essential constituent of education. It is nowadays increasingly recognised that there is a minimal social creed necessary for the continued survival of any community. But beyond this the Irish State makes no religious demand on its citizens, it guarantees the religious conscience immunity from all coercive pressures exerted by any agency of government. It does not deny or even doubt religious authority; it simply refuses itself to act as such; it holds that its ends will be best effected by ensuring the legal equality of all religious associations.

The Family

In Ireland education stands apart, morally and constitutionally, from the services which it is the duty of the public authorities to provide. The 'primary and natural' provider of the service is the family, acting singly or in association. It is the 'inalienable right and duty' of parents to provide education, which consequently is not a public service in the same sense as are police, law courts, roads. Our primary schools (which we call 'national schools') are not owned by the state or by the municipal authorities. They are an example of 'private and corporate educational initiative', which the state is bound 'to supplement' and to which it should 'give reasonable aid.' The national teachers are not public servants. Legally they are employed by the managers, even though for convenience the state as the manager's agent may directly transmit salaries to them. Neither have the teachers any intrinsic rights apart from having a professional status; they are *in loco parentis.*

In this country secondary schools are private state-aided institutions, which provide excellent, relatively cheap education in accordance with the cultural and academic wishes of the parents. (Incidentally we have here no such class distinctions as used to be involved between 'public' and board schools.) But what are our primary or national schools? They are not public schools run by the state or by local authorities; constitutionally they are not church schools. Their status is really that of parental or family schools.

Are they 'denominational'? They are *de facto*, in accordance with the wishes of parents of all creeds. But not *de jure*; the Constitution imposes no such obligation. If a sufficient number of

parents in any locality wished to establish an interdenominational or an undenominational school, there is nothing to prevent them, and they have a valid claim to the financial help of the state. It is purely a practical problem to give scope as far as possible to the denominational wishes of parents. Though the state helps in transportation, it is not always feasible for parents of a scattered religious minority to have a school of their choice; moreover, a few Protestant parents deliberately send their children to Catholic schools. Of the national schools 460 (or 9·2 per cent.), though under Catholic management, have one or more non-Catholic pupils enrolled; only 90 (or 1·8 per cent.) are under non-Catholic management but have Catholic pupils. These are inevitable border-line cases. Presumably section 4 of Article 44 of the Constitution was designed to meet this contingency:

> Legislation providing State aid for schools shall not discriminate between schools under the management of different religious denominations, nor be such as to affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending religious instruction at that school.

Only here, in the article on Religion, is there a reference to religious schools; and even here the Catholic Church is simply one of a number of legally equal religious denominations. The vague term 'the right of any child' presumably guarantees the parents against the child's compulsory attendance at formal religious instruction. There is no imposition of a 'mixed' school.

There is, of course, nothing revolutionary in the educational principles of our Constitution. The assertion of the inalienable rights of parents—vindicated for the Jews in the Middle Ages—and the rights of parents in distributive justice to obtain proportional aid for the schools of their choice will be found embodied, eight years before our Constitution was enacted, in a Papal Encyclical: *The Christian Education of Youth*, issued in 1929 by Pius XI. The same practice has been brought into operation in such places as Holland and Quebec. The same claim has been made in Great Britain by Cardinal Manning and in many subsequent episcopal pronouncements; it is contained in the French Catholic claim of *répartition proportionelle scolaire*. The interesting aspect of the position in Ireland is that this equitable solution has been voluntarily included in the Constitution by an overwhelming Catholic majority.

The State

The state has the right to see that the family schools carry out their task properly with qualified teachers and under suitable

conditions. Ever since the old regime, our department, while tacitly dropping certain usurpations, has continued exerting a certain control over syllabuses and textbooks, which is of extremely doubtful validity. In 1942 the Government secured the passing of a School Attendance Bill which contained the following clause:

> A child shall not be deemed for the purpose of this Act to be receiving a suitable education in a manner other than by attending a national school, a suitable school or a recognised school, unless such education and the manner in which such child is receiving it have been certified under this section by the Minister to be suitable.

This Bill—which was rumoured to be aimed at certain private schools and at the sending of children to be educated in England—raised a storm of protest. It was brought before the Supreme Court, which decided that the claim was unconstitutional.[1] It was admitted that " a certain minimum education " could be defined by Parliament, but " without contravening any of the other provisions of the Constitution " and provided it was " a minimum standard of elementary education of general application." The Court then declared:

> So long as parents supply this general standard of education, we are of opinion that the manner in which it is being given and received is entirely a matter for the parents and is not a matter in respect of which the State under the Constitution is entitled to interfere.

After this rebuff, no further attempt has been made to define the minimal standard of elementary education. The state does in fact exert a certain amount of pressure concerning 'the manner' of education in state-aided schools, from which it would probably be ousted if the issue were again raised.

According to the Constitution, " the State shall provide for free primary education." The version in the Irish language removes any ambiguity: " The State must arrange that primary education is available gratuitously." This does not imply that the state, directly or through local bodies, must itself undertake primary education, but only that it must make such education available gratuitously, e.g. by subsidising parental enterprise. All parents, of course, need not avail themselves of this; they can themselves educate their children at home, employ tutors, or use fee-paying schools. If the state were to establish schools, these would merely be at the disposal of parents who might choose to avail themselves of them.

Assuming, then, that it is not part of the normal function of the state to teach, let us ask why state aid should be necessary for schools. The ultimate reason is that the bulk of parents do not

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[1] *Irish Law Reports*, 1943, pp. 334-47.

receive what Catholic sociologists call a living wage. They are too poor and too unorganised to pay, directly and completely, for the education of their children, as the majority of them cannot provide for sickness or old age. And so the state has to intervene, not to exercise a right to educate which it does not possess, but by a measure of distributive justice to enable parents to exercise their duties and rights. In thus giving financial assistance the state is not providing a public service; it is acting as an organisational intermediary in redistributing income so as to help parents with insufficient means to exercise their inalienable right and duty. In this country there is a constitutional barrier preventing the state from taking advantage of the poverty of working-class parents to force on them some form of ideology which they do not want.

Thus it is apparent that in Ireland we take a definite stand on the great issue which confronts the world to-day. This is not primarily an economic question of the control of material goods, it concerns not private property but private souls. The fundamental issue is: Who is to control and to mould the minds of the young? The struggle is not between Church and State, it is between the Church-State and the Family. For when the state starts to be schoolmaster, it ceases to be neutral and liberal, it begins to inculcate a creed and to suppress all cultural rivalry and diversity, it becomes a monopolistic Church backed by physical force and overwhelming economic pressure. We in Ireland—Catholic, Protestant, or Jew—are determined to resist any state-imposed ideology.

ALFRED O'RAHILLY.

CHAPTER SIX

THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE AND ITS MORAL BASIS

THE first thing to be said in any discussion of the 'American way' is that it is not so much a descriptive term as a composite idealisation. It means not what life is like in America but what we in America think life should be like and in our best moments try to achieve. What we say about it is less in the indicative than in the optative mood. Not only are there sections of this vast and varied country where little semblance of American ideals can be found, but we are continually confronted with disparities between standard and deed, between avowed aspiration and actual behaviour.

Indeed, it may be fairly said that the American way includes this very incongruity. One of our eminent sociologists has said that the American national character appears to have three principal components: individualism, democracy, and humanitarianism. The American spirit exalts individual freedom, the right not to be 'pushed around.' This makes for a broad tolerance, even of those who do push people around. We pride ourselves on a high conception of civil liberty, but are slow to guarantee it for some groups in our population. In a sense our humanitarianism is a corrective of our individualism, and as such is often inadequate. And our democracy might not inappropriately be called a way of keeping in balanced tension the urge to resist external restraint and the inner compulsion to be magnanimous towards one's fellows. One of our leading philosophical thinkers has expressed this epigrammatically: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."

The interplay of these forces can never produce more than an unstable equilibrium, and our culture presents conspicuous moral contradictions. The treatment of the Negro population is doubtless the one that comes first to the mind of an observer from overseas. A widely quoted statement of this cultural anomaly was made by Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist who was invited to study race relationship in this country. In his *American Dilemma* he said that the race problem is a manifestation of a conflict "in the heart of the American." On the one hand there is the system of values which Myrdal calls the "American Creed", belonging to that plane on which the American "thinks, talks and acts under the

influence of high national and Christian precepts." On the other hand there are the values that are dominant on " specific planes of individual and group living ", where all manner of personal and group motivation is found.

To interpret this as evidence of sheer hypocrisy would be a mistake. One of our own typically American philosophers has pointed to a tragic contradiction between the meaning of America as deeply and sincerely believed in by Americans and the low level of performance as judged by our proclaimed standards. Perhaps we have what might be called an inverted sense of sin. We think it a virtue to take our faults in our stride. Continually mindful that we " have left undone the things we ought to have done", we take satisfaction in the fact that we 'know better', and would like to be judged by our reach rather than our grasp. We have plenty of self-criticism; our books and magazines are full of it. Yet there is a widespread belief that to be preoccupied with our faults is to foster a morbid and dangerous sense of 'guilt.' We want to be 'realistic' about life, but not to become too uncomfortable about it. We are being educated to avoid illusion, to face reality, and to achieve 'self-acceptance' as a basis for normal living.

With this bit of orientation we may proceed to our attempt at analysis. It hardly needs to be said that no interpretation can claim to be authoritative; every such attempt is bound to be challenged from some quarter. However, the writer has taken varied counsel in relation to this task and believes that a substantial body of opinion in America supports the views here expressed.

The Sources of American Moral Standards

Our available evidence indicates that the moral 'mind-set' of the individual is typically developed early and that the family group is of primary importance. That is to say, the family which has preserved its integrity and the functions ordinarily associated with it is likely to be a major positive factor in the moral education of its children. This may be taken as true at least for those of pre-school and elementary school age. With older children, and especially where family disintegration has occurred, the group to which a boy or girl belongs during periods of free association seems to be the most influential factor. We speak of this influence as that of the ' peer culture ', that of groups in which the members feel themselves to be equals. These are commonly neighbourhood groups, though in our cities ' neighbourhood ' is not always a geographical area. They are probably a major factor in the lives of teen-agers in the population as a whole.

In a time like ours, when the tempo of social change is high, the influence of the neighbourhood group is itself imponderable and unpredictable. If it has definitely displaced that of the family, there is a conspicuous lack of moral ballast. Even with the family which

is still a significant and wholesome force, the outside group—Nellie's 'crowd' or Bill's 'gang'—tends to be the chief problem for parents. It can be and often is put the other way round: the teen-agers' principal complaint is 'parent trouble'! This has its amusing aspect, and the mention of it is greeted with tolerant adult smiles, but discerning parents know that their sons and daughters are useful critics of the foibles and inconsistencies of the older generation.

The writer has before him at this moment two letters. One is from a university professor with a highly developed social conscience who has been a leader in a rather strict religious sect. The other is from his sixteen-year-old daughter, and was written at her father's suggestion as a counterpoise to the opinions he had expressed. He stressed the significance of family life, and recorded with satisfaction the wholesome social-ethical attitudes he had seen developing in his children through associations initiated within the home. In particular, a courageous equalitarian attitude had been formed which evidenced itself in defence of minority groups. (This is a touchstone of social conscience in America.) But the father was distressed over the children's iconoclasm in the matter of certain traditional moral standards.

Miss Sixteen writes: "I have always believed that I had high morals, but maybe my standards are lower than those of the older generation. The Church may not have as much significance in my life as it should but I do not feel it is all my fault. My brother's and my attitudes in regard to minority groups are quite natural, having always been taught by our parents that peoples are equal. These ideas are often in conflict with many of our friends, who show some prejudices. But these ideas we have had deeply embedded in us, so they will thus remain."

But here comes the conflict: "Since I have entered high school I admit I am more with my group than at home. But this, it seems to me, is like the majority of teen-agers or at least the ones I have come in contact with." She continues, "Recently I have been ashamed that my parents, and only my parents as I have so far seen, will not allow my friends to smoke in our house where his [her father's] friends can."

Here, then, is a case where a family was able to instil social attitudes which only a high degree of moral courage can sustain, but was unable to overcome the pressure of the peer group in matters that were trivial by comparison. It is perhaps not too much to say that in American culture at its best the tension between the home and the teen-age crowd is a major moral factor.

One of the most familiar themes in our sociological literature is the changing role of the family. It is highly significant, therefore, that in America, where technology has made its greatest inroads on family functions, there should be abundant testimony to the con-

tinuing centrality of the home in American life. A professional worker with excellent sources of information writes that the family "is still the best bet" for influencing children in a wholesome way. "The greatest moral influence in the life of the child is the parent." This means, of course, that where the parents' influence persists it tends to be paramount. Too often this influence falls below the threshold of potency and the youth 'contracts out' of the family. Moreover, some observers are much concerned over indications that family influence is being neutralised by less salutary forces in the social environment. "I cannot assume," writes the master of one of our university colleges, "in talking to young men who are in trouble of one sort or another, that they have come from a happy home or that they can turn to this home for help in a crisis." There is abundant evidence of this kind of cultural breakdown. The family as an institution has sustained severe shocks. But in view of the importance of the years of infancy there is great promise in the current preoccupation with the business of parenthood. The writer has before him a little 'pocket' edition of a book entitled *Baby and Child Care*, which is reported to have become a major factor in parent education. This edition has run to over 2 million copies. On the first page the reader finds this: "We know for a fact that the natural loving care that kindly parents give to their children is a hundred times more valuable than their knowing how to pin a diaper on just right, or making a formula expertly. Every time you pick your baby up, even if you do it a little awkwardly at first, every time you change him, bathe him, feed him, smile at him, he's getting a feeling that he belongs to you and that you belong to him. Nobody else in the world, no matter how skilful, can give that to him."

The school, public (that is, common) or private, is therefore on the whole a secondary factor in influencing standards and moral sanctions. This generalisation is, of course, subject to correction in many instances. Increasingly our educators are on the watch for emergent factors—sometimes seemingly isolated events—that have momentous effects on children and youth. Often a single experience has the effect of "re-structuring the field", as we say, and giving a new trend to social experience. Hence the school, though a secondary factor in the sense indicated, is often the instrumentality through which group associations are modified and new and significant friendships established, and in which counselling, which is with us a growing educational discipline, may give a young person a new 'slant' on himself. The fact remains, however, that the school is commonly limited in its efforts to build moral foundations by the effects of unwholesome family and group life, and of the low moral tone of a particular community.

Controversy goes on continually in America as to the influence of motion pictures, radio, the comics—and now television.

Educators are not in agreement on the point. The Press is probably more a reflection than a source of moral standards. At this moment, complaints are numerous that television is monopolising the time of school children to the detriment of their 'home work', and the portrayal of violence and lawlessness is widely deplored. The 'movies'—Americanese for cinema—have long been under attack as a source of unwholesome moral influence. As one educator has put it, "a poor neighbourhood group and cheap printed material and the thriller radio may send a child into destructive conduct *if* the home influence is weak." The 'comics' are eagerly devoured by children, and doubtless contribute their quota toward filling the juvenile mind. But our psychiatrists are divided as to their influence on children. Latterly, attempts have been made to capitalise the comic technique for educational purposes.

Aside from negative effect—that is, the consuming of time that might be more usefully employed—it is very difficult to appraise the influence of these media upon what we commonly call moral standards. There is abundant evidence that children whose homes and social environment have given them a desirable set of values have an indefinite capacity for disallowing untoward influences. A noted psychologist in a letter to the writer says, concerning exposure to mass media of communication and entertainment: "Most children seem to go through phases of tremendous interest in these things and come out of it all right." Our leading educators are convinced that moral character is not so much a matter of specific 'traits' as of total disposition, the 'bent' of one's life. The experience of a growing person is therefore conceived as a highly selective process in which what is 'accepted' and incorporated into character is determined not so much by the elements of the external environment as by the set of purposes he has already acquired. This developed disposition is also presumably the dominant factor in setting the stage for those epochal experiences referred to above which may alter the direction of one's life.

On this view of the matter the various environmental influences, aside from the home and the 'peer' group, may be assumed to be auxiliary rather than primary factors in determining the moral bent of young lives. Right or wrong, this seems to be the tacit assumption underlying most of our educational procedures. For the prevalent educational philosophy in America stresses freedom of initiative, non-imposition of authority, self-directed activity, and growth by assumption of personal responsibility. In considerable measure character is rated by educators in terms of free and responsible action rather than in terms of conformity to traditional standards. The criteria tend to be personal integrity and regard for the social well-being. This is in contrast to less sophisticated

judgments. The psychologist quoted in the preceding paragraph writes: "The moral defects that are complained of most are usually the ones that make most trouble for somebody. In fact the behaviour which makes most trouble is likely to be classed as immoral."

As the criteria of moral judgment are revised, moral censure tends to be replaced by social diagnosis. Educators and social scientists are continually stressing environmental influences as causes of behaviour defects or inducements to socially acceptable behaviour. The following remark by a correspondent is typical of the contemporary outlook: "The remedy for juvenile delinquency is the better understanding of the emotional life of the child in his environment, the bringing to bear of good influences and making it popular to do right rather than wrong."

There are many, to be sure, to whom the 'progressive' type of education seems unsound and unwholesome. They call it a 'cult' of freedom and experiment. Exponents and critics agree that there have been excesses; some attempts at application of progressive theories have been as ignorant as they were eager. Crucial points are the attitude towards authority and the value of tradition. These are obviously of basic moral importance. In recent years new emphasis has been given to the cultural heritage; the chief focus of interest in this respect is higher education, but it is having repercussions all along the line. Many adults are studying the 'great books.' It would not be far wrong to say that there is broad agreement among educators as to the fundamental validity and importance of what is called the Judeo-Christian tradition, in its *ethical* aspect. The same cannot be said of its metaphysical basis, for a large proportion of our intellectuals are indifferent, not to say allergic, to theology. This, as we shall see, is a very influential factor in relation to education.

Among the religious bodies which maintain parochial or other religious day schools these are the chief reliance, aside from the home, for moral education. Roman Catholics seek to enrol as many as possible of their children in parochial schools. Protestant and Jewish schools for children at the elementary and secondary levels seem to be increasing in number, but their aggregate enrolment is relatively small. It is probably safe to say that these schools are a potent factor in moral education, though there is no adequate basis for comparing the qualitative results with those of the public schools. A disturbing aspect of all attempts at measurement is the impossibility of factoring out the home influence. To what extent are the apparent results of the religious day schools in terms of character values due to a selective factor: that is, to the tendency of the homes from which children are sent to religious schools to be the kind of homes that accent the values for which the religious school stands? We have no answer to this question.

Probably most observers would agree that the selective factor is large, but by no means so large as to render negligible the religious environment in these schools.

The same difficulty attends any attempt to appraise the Sunday school, the weekday church school operating on marginal time, and the vacation church school. By and large, the homes from which the children come are probably more responsible for their character patterns than the respective religious instruction programmes. This can be said without disparagement, for basic moral education can hardly be achieved in marginal half-hours. Yet no one can question the potency of the Church as moral educator with that minority of American youth who are subject to its extensive and sustained influence. The word 'church' is used here generically, to include the Jewish synagogue and temple.

It is the writer's opinion, supported by a good deal of evidence, that special agencies of informal education are the most influential means, outside the home, of developing moral character and discipline. Familiar examples are the summer camps, the Boy Scout and Girl Scout troops, the boys' and girls' clubs such as those of the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., and parish churches, and the rural 4H clubs. The superiority of such methods, if this appraisal is correct, appears to be due to the fact that they make possible the organisation of a growing person's total experience around a vital centre and enrich it with significant personal relationships. The bearing upon this generalisation of what was said earlier about the peer culture will be obvious. Our young people seem to learn from each other more readily than from any other source.

Since we are disposed to think of character as a quality of the personality as a whole, and hence as a result of the totality of learning experience, we have a saying that "all good education is moral education." In this view moral character is never 'something added.' Much amusement has been occasioned by the story told by an educator of his encounter with a lad who was walking alone down a school corridor. Asked where he was going, he replied, "To Room 210, to get my character educated." Proposals to raise the moral level of youth by introducing courses in morals meet with scant favour from our educational leaders. Conversely, the over-all conditioning of moral character by the total pattern of community life is seen to be of fundamental importance.

It must be admitted, however, that we have been involved in no little confusion over this problem of character education. As is well known abroad, American education has put much stress on scientific study of the learning process. One of the major results of this educational research has been the theory of 'specificity.' It holds that what is learned in a given experience is limited by the learning situation, and that extensive 'transfer' cannot be

assumed. This runs counter to the older theory of 'formal discipline', which holds that certain subjects are useful in 'training the mind' and that the resultant training is a readily available resource in various fields of action. It is fairly generally agreed that such experimentation as was conducted by Hartshorne and May more than twenty years ago established the ineffectiveness of prevailing types of character education in producing reliable 'traits.' It was found, for example, that a child might be 'honest' in one kind of behaviour and dishonest in another. However, the conclusion drawn by many that there are no such traits proved to be singularly unsatisfactory. A professor of psychology might lecture with much assurance and much documentation against the trait theory and, on dismissing his class, return to his desk to find a blank awaiting him on which he must report concerning a former student now applying for a job whether he had traits of accuracy, industriousness, and personal integrity! Obviously there was something wrong with that picture.

As a prominent educator has remarked, if there were no such thing as transfer (such as the concept of character traits presupposes) there could be no education. To attempt to prepare growing persons specifically for every kind of life encounter would be quite absurd. Education can and does produce the kind of persons who may be depended upon in a great variety of situations to act in socially acceptable fashion. We in America seem to be moving towards an educational theory that will be free from naïve assumptions about carry-over from one type of action to another, but will at the same time recognise educative experiences which so vitally involve the personality as a whole as to affect many types of subsequent purposeful activity.

All this may seem very theoretical, but it is important for an understanding of the American educational scene.

Regional and 'Class' Differences

When speaking of American culture we commonly refer to 'sub-cultures.' We recognise a New England 'type', one characteristic of the 'Deep South', one belonging to the 'Bible Belt', and so on. Striking cultural differences are apparent also when one goes from an area peopled by one immigration stream to an area whose folk have a different derivation. Every distinctive culture pattern has its moral aspect, reflected in sanctions and behavioural norms. In general, religious conservatism, which often characterises a community as a whole, seems to be correlated with conventional moral judgments and sanctions. But the degree of conformity in *behaviour* to accepted sanctions is a different matter. Here much depends on the extent to which the cultural—sometimes national or racial—group to which one belongs is adjusted to the life of the community as a whole. A tragic aspect of American

life is the moral deterioration of a section of a given community which occurs in spite of the fact that the cultural antecedents of the population concerned may have been of a high order. A section of a large city may become notorious for lawlessness, and thus reflect discredit on the nationality it chiefly represents, when what has happened is really a social phenomenon of group segregation. It seems to have been well demonstrated in America that ethical behaviour is in large part a function of social adjustment. Normal social communication between groups is a condition of responsible social behaviour along that border-line.

Another factor, one that is emphasised in current studies of behaviour, is 'class orientation.' To an undetermined extent, individual standards tend to approximate certain class norms. Class, in this connection, is a sociological concept the components of which are primarily economic. There is little hereditary class awareness in America to-day, though what there is is of the never-forgetting sort. Nor is there much evidence of class consciousness in the Marxist sense. Indeed, it is commonly contended that a distinguishing mark of America is the absence of 'class.' It seems well established now, however, that when the population is classified on the basis of economic status certain characteristic attitudes and behavioural tendencies appear within the boundaries thus defined. This is not to be interpreted as intentional class loyalty or class solidarity, but rather as a community of tendencies which are related directly or indirectly to social status.

Too little is known about this subject to warrant cause-and-effect generalisation of any great scope. A grievous lack of security may be a definite cause of anti-social behaviour. This fact is balanced, however, by the equally obvious fact that an overplus of economic security also breeds social irresponsibility—in the absence of corrective influences. But the vast majority of Americans think of themselves as 'middle-class', and their moral standards inevitably reflect their involvement in the rough-and-tumble struggle characteristic of a dynamic competitive economy which affords a relatively high material standard of life. A major cause of the moral ambivalence we noted earlier is probably the fact that business success involves a degree of competitive aggressiveness which is the antithesis of that active goodwill and friendliness which Americans believe every man should manifest towards his fellows, no matter who they are. Since with us social status is only in a minor degree hereditarily fixed, class groups are continually formed and reformed, with economic level as the principal, though by no means the only, determinant. These groups have a tendency to create their own moral norms.

Cutting across regional differences and class orientation, however, is the effect of mass media of communication—motion pictures, radio, television, magazines, and the widely circulating

metropolitan Press. There is nothing regional or class-contained about forms of entertainment, sports, fashions, stock-market quotations—or interest in nuclear fission! They come into everybody's living-room, from coast to coast. There is room for the surmise that the forces making for community of interests and standards in the population as a whole are in ascendancy over those tending to perpetuate regionalism and class orientation.

The Influence of the 'Higher Learning'

The writer has been impressed by the number of negative responses to an inquiry concerning the moral influence of the universities. As a matter of fact, he was hardly prepared for a specification under this head in the friendly briefing given by the Editors of the YEAR BOOK. Apparently more is expected in England from the universities in the way of significant leadership than in America. Moral influence? "Very little", "none", "peripheral", say people who ought to know, about the contribution of the American universities. The question arises whether American universities have become so largely tributary to business, industry, and the lucrative professions as to preclude the fostering of a sense of cultural stewardship.

Over against this should be set the opinion expressed to the writer by an eminent college president: "It seems to me important for European friends to understand the significance of the residential feature of our university life. The wide development of housing units for undergraduates, the health programmes, the counselling programmes, the scholarship advisory systems, the opportunities for employment under university auspices, the chapel services, the organisation of community government, and of extra-curricular activities are all contributory to the education of students." From the president of a State university comes the comment that American colleges and universities are "a cross-section of American society", and therefore middle-class; and that "if the middle class has certain definite attitudes and characteristics, then the universities reflect, deepen, and enhance such characteristics." These comments are pertinent and cogent. Yet the critical voices must be listened to.

Nothing would be more erroneous or unfair than to infer from the prevailingly negative appraisal that the American university is bought and paid for by business. Instances have not been wanting, to be sure, of a lamentable accessibility of scholarship where ample retainers were in evidence, but they are far from typical. If the universities and well-endowed colleges are not giving the moral guidance which the nation has a right to expect, the reason must be sought elsewhere.

Perhaps a digression may throw light upon it. The writer was once asked by the late Lord Lothian, who was an eager student of

American life, where leadership in the making of public opinion came from in this country. He was puzzled by the fact that Americans do not look to Congress as Britons have been wont to look to the House of Commons for such leadership. There was no one answer to his question, and reflection leads to the surmise that he was unwittingly putting his finger on a major weakness in American democracy. Politics is never in very good repute in this country. Aristotle would have been confounded by our political scene. The idea that political leadership should be a preferred goal of higher education would seem bizarre to most American college and university students. And this remoteness from public affairs re-enforces itself by fostering academic self-containment, and a lack of public responsibility.

There is something very ironic about this. Higher education in America has been under attack for excessive vocationalism and lack of fidelity to an intellectual tradition. From the opposite angle it has been arraigned for following too closely the 'Old World' university tradition and deserting the common man. Yet the two judgments can be readily reconciled. The first is the voice of the neo-classicism which discerns a trend and laments it; the second is that of the utilitarians who are dissatisfied with the slowness of the pace. We have already noted that a counter-trend is in evidence; a new effort to make education a bearer of the cultural heritage, with all its moral potential. This is of a piece with the new concept of 'general education', which means education on a universal scale for citizenship in a democracy. Its terminal point is at completion of the junior college, or 'community college', programme. This means education for everybody who is able and willing to avail himself of it up to, roughly, the age of twenty. To the extent that these aims are realised—and it is too early to gauge their vitality—the gap between liberal and vocational education will be partly bridged.

Nevertheless, such a development will make the 'higher learning' higher still in terms of academic reach, and will not necessarily bring the universities into closer contact with the common life. There is good reason to think that the ultimate ground for the failure complained of is in the climate of academic opinion. The academic mood that has developed in recent decades is perhaps best described by the term 'scientific humanism.' It is secularist in the sense in which that word is widely used to-day, signifying preoccupation with the free play of man's intelligence without regard for any of his traditional faiths. Typically, it is not hostile to religion, but not more than dispassionately curious about it. Far from being unconcerned with questions of right and wrong, it often produces vigorous moral leadership. But the tendency is to regard morality as a concomitant of social and evolutionary processes, something that will take care of itself if science is only kept

free to gather more knowledge. The faults and the problems of men are alike attributed to lack of knowledge, and science, it is assumed, is the one discipline that has the answers.

In its extreme form secularism becomes a philosophy of life, denying all 'eternal verities' and 'cosmic sanctions.' It then becomes a *movement,* commonly called 'humanism', and is propagated as a religion. Its 'halo' concepts are Man and Democracy. The movement is not to be lightly regarded. It has a high degree of intellectual respectability, and among its leaders are found some of our most useful citizens. Their sincerity is not to be questioned. The literature of the movement is spotty: some of it is very superficial. In large part it takes its departure from the philosophy of John Dewey, but gives limited attention to some of his profoundest work. Yet on the whole it is a formidable challenge to all orthodoxies—and many religious leaders find themselves in its debt for furnishing a corrective to excessive preoccupation with metaphysics.

But it seems safe to say that this secularist, humanist movement, with its tendency to give complete autonomy to science and even to become a 'scientist' cult, is the major manifestation of a modern mood that is uncongenial to all traditional moral and religious philosophy. The emphasis here must be on the word 'traditional', and in large part the conflict was inevitable. Indeed it is a projection of the long struggle between science and theology, which, illogical as it may be, is an important historical fact. But science is now being given a new role—that of the great Illuminator of mankind, a sort of Angel of Light.

There is little evidence that the scientists themselves are interested in this apotheosis. Mostly they plod along humbly at their respective jobs. It is philosophers, educators, and writers who are making of science a great secular faith. In general the scientists seem to recognise that their unique power and function result precisely from their detachment *as scientists* from the business of evaluation of human ends in which *as men* they participate. As scientists they are at work with means; as men they are concerned with ends. This has had striking illustrations since the first atom bomb explosion. The distinction between the two roles was made manifest when the scientists, humanly conscious of the appalling possible sequel to their creation, became evangelists challenging the public conscience. But the cult of science as a great illuminator and emancipator continues to captivate the imaginations of those who are intoxicated with visions of a 'brave new world.'

The situation is rendered more disturbing by the fact that no synthesis of thought seems to be taking place. The scientific humanists stand by their guns, and the defenders of traditional religion and of the moral law as a sanction transcending the flux of things spend much time in elaborating the exclamation: "See

what devastation science has wrought!" The common ground of humanism and the traditional Western faith has not been constructively explored. However, this is sure to be undertaken; indeed it is beginning in connection with the controversy over the place of religion in general education, to which we now turn.

Church, State, and School

Any discussion of the moral basis of a national culture must include religious education. It is widely assumed among those who own allegiance to some religious faith that religion is basic to morality. In America this conviction is firmly held by a large part of the population. The latest statistics available at this writing indicate that 54·2 per cent. of the people have some religious affiliation, and an indeterminate number of others hold religion in reverent esteem. But the vicissitudes of our history have produced a unique situation. A little more than a century ago, when the common school was becoming established as a national institution, a sharp battle was fought over the place of religion in the schools. It was a sectarian struggle; that is to say, the issue was not joined over the propriety or importance of religion in the school curriculum, but over the acceptability to the several religious groups of any particular type of religious instruction that might be undertaken. A stalemate was reached, and religious instruction dropped out of the schools. The regret occasioned by this necessity was somewhat tempered by the hope that the newly-born Sunday school movement would to some degree fill this educational gap—a hope that was never realised, and could scarcely be realised by any device that utilised only marginal time.

It should be noted that this secularisation of the common school paralleled historically the rise of the secularist view of life and the exaltation of science to which we have referred. There are many among us who discount the sectarian struggle as a factor in the secularisation of the public school curriculum, holding that what has happened is, rather, a part of the evolution of the modern mind. The fact of the historical parallel cannot be without significance, but one who is acquainted with America could hardly be misled into concluding that our present educational system, in respect to the teaching of religion, is the result of a deliberate choice. Such a judgment overlooks several facts.

During the last century church membership in proportion to population has increased threefold, indicating a growing concern for religion and religious institutions. Again, there are many ways in which the state makes recognition of religion and makes itself party to a general affirmation of religious faith. Furthermore, in spite of the ban on sectarian religious instruction in the public schools, religious observances are widespread, and in some States are required by law. Bible reading 'without comment' is a not

uncommon requirement. Moreover, it will doubtless occur to British readers that the same secularising influences, the same 'acids of modernity', were at work in their own and other countries but without the result produced in America. It requires a great stretch of the imagination to account for the ban on religious teaching in American schools except by reference to the religiously heterogeneous character of our population.

But once adopted, this policy of secularisation acquired a momentum that carried it away beyond what seems to have been the original intention and gradually made the public school system a secularising influence in the community. Latterly, the formulators of educational theory have been in large part men and women on whom traditional religion had little or no hold. Put thus baldly, that statement may be challenged by many, but the answer will be found in the literature of educational philosophy, psychology, and counselling, and indeed in the textbooks of various disciplines at the higher level. A few years ago a study was made of college textbooks and assigned reading by a group of carefully selected scholars, in order to determine how the authors dealt with religious subject-matter when it appeared in the respective disciplines. Manifestly, in such disciplines as history, philosophy, psychology, and literature, religious subject-matter is inescapable. The results were so revealing and so relevant to the present task of interpretation as to warrant notice here.

Religion was found to be " neglected or ignored " in college textbooks, a condition that " may be attributable in considerable measure to incompetence of both scholarship and teaching practices among faculty members who might reasonably be expected to consider religious objectives as fundamental to their work." There was little evidence of " overt hostility to religion ", but a " kind of hostility " was revealed in the " apparently deliberate circumvention of religious and even the higher ethical issues in various fields." Also, a tendency was observed to substitute other subject-matter for religious reading. Many scholars, because of their " intellectual organisation and commitment ", appeared disposed to " accord to religion a position of inferior importance in their attention." Finally, there was evidence of " persistent opposition to creedal and institutional religion."

No avowedly anti-religious crusade is going on in American education. Indeed, the opposition to religious tradition and authority is carried on in the name of an emancipated religion—the religion of Man, the Captain of his Soul. The secular faith earlier referred to makes a strong bid for the loyalty of idealistic youth and it has a more authentic appeal than most religious leaders recognise. Yet it is anything but non-sectarian, despite the claims and beliefs of its devotees. From the point of view of traditional religion, as represented by more than two hundred and fifty Ameri-

can religious bodies, it is peculiarly objectionable, for a reason which one illustration will make obvious.

In 1944 a group of educational leaders of high calibre and unimpeachable integrity produced a little book entitled *Public Schools and Spiritual Values*. In it appeared an excellent interpretation of the school curriculum in terms of the finer values in our culture. For an understanding of contemporary thinking, however, the most significant feature was the Introduction, where the authors set forth their purpose. They defined essential spiritual values in the following terms: "moral insight, integrity of thought and act; equal regard for human personality wherever found; faith in the free play of intelligence both to guide study and to direct action; and, finally, those further values of refined thought and feeling requisite to bring life to its finest quality." Then they proceeded to "maintain both the logical possibility and the practical potential adequacy of the public school to teach such spiritual values as those named above and this on the basis of human reason and experience and without necessary recourse to religious authority." Nothing more revealing in relation to the matter of our present discussion has been published in recent years. This is, of course, full-orbed secularism—convinced, honest, evangelistic. Since the book appeared the term 'spiritual values' has become more or less synonymous with the secular faith which many would like to see enshrined in the public schools. Intrinsically, however—that is, apart from its avowal as a substitute for traditional religion—it defines educational content which would have universal approval.

These developments can be understood only against the background of the American doctrine of separation between Church and State. It is embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution, which reads as follows:

> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the Press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Originally this Amendment, the first of ten which together are known as the Bill of Rights, applied only to the Federal Government, but its application has been extended under the Fourteenth Amendment to the several States of the Union. That it was not invoked in the early history of the Republic in relation to education was due to the fact that the Federal Government was given no educational functions by the Constitution. Moreover, there is little reason to think that the authors of the Amendment had anything other in mind than protecting the people from imposition of any religious faith or of taxation for its support. This consideration is not conclusive, however, since the Constitution is continually reinterpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the

separation doctrine, as we shall see, has recently been restated by that tribunal.

But the States themselves have developed the separation doctrine in relation to education, and prohibition of sectarian instruction is quite general. Many people have therefore advocated the teaching of religion in the schools on a 'non-sectarian' basis. This would mean something like the 'agreed syllabus' in use in England. A major difficulty with this proposal is that 'sectarian' is not a legal category, and the only criterion available to a secular court is the reception by the community of a given programme of instruction. If opposition to any type of religious instruction arises, the courts have no alternative to ruling against it. The word 'sectarian' denotes, therefore, in practice, not something substantively prohibited but something about which someone feels sufficiently concerned to take it to court.

Latterly the situation has become very tense, owing to two distinct but not unrelated developments. One is the great discontent of the Roman Catholic Church over the denial, as a matter of Federal policy, of any aid from public funds either for its parochial schools or for the children attending these schools, in the form of transportation or other services auxiliary to their schooling. Some States provide such services and the Federal Supreme Court has upheld their right to do so. Parochial or other private schools are recognised in all States as fulfilling the requirements of compulsory education laws, and this practice also the Supreme Court has upheld. However, the Court in 1947, while upholding the payment out of State funds of bus fares for parochial school children, nevertheless promulgated an interpretation of the First Amendment which adds something to what it was generally understood to mean. The Court declared that—

> neither a State nor the Federal Government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practise religion. Neither a State nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organisations or groups and *vice versa.* In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."

There is much current debate over what this means, but it is agreed that it effectually closes the door against appropriation of public funds for the support of non-public schools. It also appears to ban everything that could be called 'religious instruction' in public schools. Auxiliary services are not construed by the Court as 'aid to religion', but influential elements in this country have withstood all efforts to secure Federal aid to the States for education which

would include auxiliary services to public and parochial school children alike.

The other development mentioned is the banning by the Federal Supreme Court in 1948 of the 'released time' plan as operated in a school district in Illinois. This plan has been in some sense the answer of the Christian Churches to the challenge of secularisation in public education. It involves co-operation of public schools with religious organisations in setting aside a brief period each week, out of the school day, for religious education under religious auspices. In the case in question the classes were held in the school buildings and the school administration was involved in specified ways. The ban was imposed in a ruling opinion by the Supreme Court, supported by 'concurring' opinions—that is, concurring in the actual result—which presented a variety of judgments and conflicting interpretations. As a result, only those persons who were greatly pleased with the outcome were able to find any clear indication of what is lawful and what is not. The chief consequence seems to have been the initiation of new efforts to have religious instruction introduced into the school itself, without any involvement on the part of the Churches. All such efforts are bound to be vigorously opposed.

It is important to note that the process of secularisation sketched above in the course of time won the support of the Protestant Churches. It came to be generally assumed that the public schools reflected, in general, Protestant opinion and outlook, and the Protestant Churches have assumed a proprietary attitude towards them. There is no doubt that Protestant anxiety about the growth of Catholic influence contributed much to this protective attitude towards the public schools. Only recently have Protestants begun to realise that a wholly secular education of the modern all-inclusive type cannot be interpreted as neutral towards religion when the latter is the one major human concern excluded from the curriculum.

This extended statement has seemed necessary in order to explain the very extraordinary situation in the United States with reference to the contribution of religion to moral education. At this moment no clear course is indicated. Those who oppose any modification of the secular trend are convinced that moral education can stand on its own feet. Some of them quite sincerely believe that religion in its traditional forms is of no value at all in character building, and they present figures about the religious affiliation of prison populations and of juvenile delinquents. Some, to be sure, are taking advantage of the current sharpening of the doctrine of separation between Church and State to agitate for an anti-theistic philosophy of education—which they assume would not be a violation of the Constitution. They uphold the separation doctrine so long as it operates in restraint of religion. Now

and then it is seriously proposed that a twenty-five-year-old Supreme Court decision upholding the right of parents to choose non-public schools for their children be modified. This would be regarded by millions as a move toward a State monopoly of education and a grievous infringement of religious liberty. Yet to its sponsors such a move would be a great stroke for democracy—and moral rebuilding.

Meanwhile a new approach to the problem of religion in public education has been suggested that would involve no religious 'instruction' at all, and no connection with church or synagogue. Rather, religious institutions, beliefs, and rituals would become subject-matter for competently directed study under school auspices as a part of the study of the culture. The pattern for this method is already set with reference to controversial issues in the social studies programme. It would presumably not fall under any Constitutional ban unless it should lead to protest as inciting to sectarian controversy, which, of course, is always possible. Such a plan would, by design, leave intensive religious education to the home and the Church.

It should perhaps be noted also that controversy between Catholics and non-Catholics turns largely on what is and what is not a religious question by virtue of being part of the Church's discipline. To a Catholic there is no doubt, for example, that the use of contraceptives is properly subject to religious discipline; secular critics of Catholic teaching and many Protestants hold otherwise. This issue is reminiscent of the battle over national prohibition. Then the shoe was on the other foot: Protestants made a religious issue of it, while Catholics—along with the secularists—regarded this as meddlesome political activity. It is a fair question whether at this moment interfaith controversy is not itself a major factor in the moral climate of America.

The over-all influence of religion upon public and private morals in this country it is not possible to gauge. Many are ready to contend that the moral base of our culture is quite independent of our religious organisations and activities. A noted novelist in a letter to the writer remarks that "in many ways our standards of personal behaviour are further removed from the preachment of theologians and moralists than perhaps at any time in history." Certainly the moral sanctions that operate in politics, business, and industry are secular in character, though they doubtless owe much to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Religion functions both as a critic of contemporary morals and as a defence against the further watering-down of moral ideals by a sensate, secular culture. The churches and synagogues have played no small part in sensitising the public conscience with respect to issues in social ethics. On the other hand, complaints are frequent that the moral drive behind movements for social justice and for political and economic

reforms comes often from secular rather than religious sources. Moreover, the shock troops are sometimes composed of former ministers whose religious impulse has carried them far beyond the consensus of the Christian community. The significance of this paradox is not sufficiently pondered.

By Way of Inventory

It is now time to bring this discussion to focus on the major cultural faults that are the occasion of moral concern. In this category probably most close observers would name, in one order or another, the divorce-rate as an index of family instability; lax sex behaviour; crime and juvenile delinquency; the tendency to irresponsible behaviour; violations of civil liberties; and the low level of political morals.

Many Americans would wish to include in a critique of contemporary morals the increase in alcohol consumption and the prevalence of gambling. Perhaps it is an important symptom of our national condition that except in the religious Press there is less evidence of concern over these matters than over the others that have been mentioned.

Concern over the divorce-rate is of course an evidence of the centrality of the family in our culture. At this writing the rate is receding from the high point reached after the war, but it is still a matter of great concern. Yet the inference to be drawn from a high divorce-rate is a controversial question. Many of our moralists are disposed to regard divorce as a symptom rather than a disease. They think the durability of the marriage tie is often a measure of social resistance to divorce rather than of marital success. There is ground for the judgment that the increase in the divorce-rate during recent decades does not indicate any appreciable lessening of the esteem in which marriage is held. It seems clear that the American emphasis on individual freedom operates to weaken the sanctions against divorce. Nevertheless, from what was said earlier about the role of the family it will be evident that increased durability of marriage bonds would be generally regarded as a sign of increasing moral health. To this end, marriage counselling and educational preparation for marriage have been widely introduced.

The level of sex behaviour is everywhere looked upon as a major moral challenge—even by those who regard the removal of traditional taboos as liberating. The public reception of the now famous Kinsey Report, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male,* furnished a sort of barometer. In view of its revelation of the very great departure from conventional, and even biological, norms, the public reaction seemed mild. Apparently the inner response of a host of people was on the order of "Now it can be told." On the other hand, there was something of a shock reaction on the part

of many thoughtful people who could by no means be called prudish. They found in the report a rather crude, excessively biological treatment of a subject that is closely related to high aesthetic and spiritual values. It certainly was a striking documentation of the disparity between the ideal and the actual which characterises American life. It is doubtful, however, if the scientists' findings recorded anything new except, perhaps, a readiness to talk about things formerly kept *sub rosa.*

The prevalence of crime and juvenile delinquency, so widely complained of, is in part a post-war phenomenon, but in part it reflects a national characteristic. We have been called a lawless people, and this is true in the sense that Americans are, as we slangily say, allergic to authority and resist the extension of legal regulation which is a feature of a rapidly developing industrial society. During the prohibition era it was not uncommon to find people of eminent respectability who violated the law in much the same spirit that animates a social crusade. Those who make much of class-orientation, discussed earlier, are impressed with the prevalence of 'white-collar' offences. This is a rather loose middle-class designation. An authority on the subject has enumerated typical offences on the part of people in this category:

> misrepresentation in financial statements of corporations, manipulation in the stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favourable contracts and legislation, misrepresentation in advertising and salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of funds, short weights and measures and misgrading of commodities, tax frauds, misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies.

He believes that offences of this sort far outweigh those commonly referred to as constituting the 'crime problem'. A Government agency has recently ordered certain large business concerns to desist from what is alleged to be fraudulent advertising.

The root trouble here disclosed is irresponsibility resulting from the gap between personal standards and legal ethics. It is in essence the same characteristic that is complained of in the 'younger generation'. There is obvious need both for better individual moral education and for reconstruction in the field of social ethics. Which is considered more urgent depends on one's general outlook. It appears that among educators, and among intellectuals as a whole, the latter emphasis prevails. The young person who is bent on 'getting by', upon doing as little as possible to meet the minimum requirements of a task, is really reflecting a distressingly conspicuous phase of adult life as he sees it and reads about it. The moral faults that are found in American life are only in small measure those of definitely anti-social persons; chiefly they belong to a pattern which combines noble traits with undesirable ones.

With respect to irresponsibility and lawlessness on the part of youth, discriminating observers stress the breakdown of 'communication' between the generations—the perennial problem of keeping adults and young persons in a relationship of mutual understanding and trust. This consideration focuses attention again on the family, which is the outstanding example of 'heterogeneous grouping'—a pattern highly favoured among exponents of democratic education.

Violations of civil liberty are numerous partly because of our indigenous race problem, and partly because of the rapid development of great industrial corporations with high concentration of power over masses of workers that were long pitifully inarticulate. There are many signs of improvement with respect to the treatment of minority racial groups, and labour has greatly strengthened its position through the exercise, with aid from Government, of newly won economic power. It is not too much to say that seen against our historical background the present temper of intergroup relations and the growing national concern for civil liberty register definite progress. At the same time, every morally sensitive American is made ashamed by the way our boasted virtue of equality is 'honoured in the breach' along the colour line.

To observers from abroad political corruption is a conspicuous feature of American life. The major plague-spot has been municipal government, but there have been scandals in high places that re-enforce the average citizen's contempt for politics. We have not yet achieved a truly moral conception of democratic government. It is taken for granted that the exigencies of political life inevitably involve a high degree of compromise, of reckless campaign promises and equally reckless patronage, and the taking of liberties with the truth which in private life would permanently damage a person's reputation. Perhaps the most grievous aspect of this social phenomenon is the impetus it gives to syndicated crime and racketeering of all sorts. Recognition of political debts that have to be paid and of particular 'blocs' in the electorate that must be kept satisfied creates a condition favourable to continuous dilution of ethical scruples and a relatively painless sinning by proxy. Evidence is not wanting that public morals in America have definitely improved within the last generation, but the lag is conspicuous and distressing.

The writer hopes that this article will be regarded as an example of American self-interpretation and self-criticism. But if it is characteristic of us to make parade of our national faults, it is also our habit to look hopefully to the future for a vindication of the ideals inherent in the American way of life.

F. ERNEST JOHNSON.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CANADA

PART ONE

RELIGION AND MORALS

In the history of Canada the relation of religion to education has been of recurring interest and importance. From the time of the earliest settlements religion has played an important part in the foundation and growth of the public schools and universities, and to-day, after a period in which public education tended to become secularised, there are in progress numerous projects which attempt to make religion once again an integral part of education.

Religion in the public schools of Canada has had a long history. When the first settlers came from Great Britain, France, other parts of Europe, and the United States, they established schools which were supported and controlled by various religious denominations and which were religious in emphasis. Religious instruction had an important place in the curriculum, and a knowledge of the Scriptures was considered essential. But gradually the Churches found that they could no longer support schools adequate for the rapidly growing population; only the state—which could levy taxes—could finance such a large enterprise. Also, as various denominations grew up in a community, the people were unwilling to let any one denomination have control of the schools if they were supported by public funds. Therefore the state finally took over not only the support but the control of education as well. Furthermore, since the denominations could not agree upon what religious teaching was to be given in the state-supported and -controlled schools, religious teaching was dropped from the curriculum almost entirely. Thus it was denominational rivalries of the Churches themselves, rather than anti-religious pressure from other sources, which were originally responsible for the exclusion of religion from the schools.

One of the distinctive features of the Canadian scene is the provision for what are called 'separate schools.' At the time of Confederation in 1867, Ontario and Quebec had 'separate' or 'dissentient' schools, and the British North America Act guaranteed the right of these provinces to maintain them. When Saskatchewan and Alberta entered the Confederation in 1905, they also were given the same privilege. While only these four of the nine provinces in Canada make provision for 'separate' schools,

yet they comprise about three-fourths of the population of Canada. This provision makes it possible, after a public school has been established in a community, for a minority group—either Roman Catholic or Protestant—to establish a school of its own. The 'separate' school so established has a similar course of study to that of the public school, is under Government supervision, and is supported by public funds—but it is attended by children of its own faith, taught by teachers of its own faith, and is under denominational control. In Quebec the separate schools are Protestant because the Protestants are in the minority, while in Ontario the separate schools are Roman Catholic because the Roman Catholics are in the minority. In Quebec a satisfactory dual system of education has been worked out, giving the Roman Catholics and Protestants control of their own schools but keeping them all under central supervision. Thus Catholics and Protestants may teach religion freely in their own schools, with the result that religion plays perhaps a larger part in the public school curriculum in Quebec than in any other province.

Laws Concerning Religion in Education

Various laws have been passed from time to time providing for religious training in the schools. Although they are not so favourable as they might be, still in most provinces they provide for more religious instruction than is being given at the present time. The laws, therefore, cannot be given as an excuse for neglecting religious training in the schools and universities.

The present laws concerning religion in the public schools may be summarised as follows. Quebec requires religious instruction in all schools, both Catholic and Protestant. Ontario provides for two half-hour periods of religious instruction per week, to be given, as a rule, by the teacher. Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta permit clergymen to give religious instruction in the school building the last half-hour of the school day. British Columbia has recently made provision for elective extra-mural high school courses in religion. Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick provide for instruction in Christian morality. Sectarian teaching is of course prohibited in all provinces, and there is always a 'conscience clause' to permit any children whose parents desire it to be excused from the religious instruction. Besides these provisions for religious teaching, all of the provinces either permit or require some kind of religious exercises—either Bible reading or the repetition of the Lord's Prayer or both. Thus the present laws are far from being a deterrent to further progress.

Projects in the Public Schools

There is a great renewal of interest to-day in the question of religion and the public schools. Not only clergymen but educators, editors, and statesmen are stressing the fact that an important

element is lacking in a purely secular education and that the religious motive must be introduced again into the Canadian educational system. The general public, too, has become interested, as is evidenced by the number of letters on the subject in current newspapers and magazines. Gradually advantage is being taken of the present legal provisions, and many plans and experiments are now in operation all over the country. There is not a single province which does not have at least some committees working on the problem, if not actual projects in progress.

Quebec, of course, has the most complete system of religious instruction, a discussion of which appears in Part III.

Ontario comes next in the development of a programme of religious instruction. Since the law requires that there shall be the reading of Scripture and repetition of the Lord's Prayer at the opening of school each day, an Interdenominational Committee selected Bible readings for different age-groups. After being approved by the Ontario Department of Education they were published as *Bible Readings for Schools* and are now used in certain communities in other provinces as well as in Ontario.

In 1944 an important step was taken in Ontario regarding religion in the schools. Previous to 1944 the only religious instruction which could be given was that given by a clergyman once a week before or after school hours. According to the new regulations passed in 1944 two half-hour periods per week, in addition to the time assigned to religious exercises at the opening of school, are to be devoted to religious education. The instruction is to be given by the teacher in accordance with the course of study authorised by the Department of Education, and issues of a controversial or sectarian nature are to be avoided. Also, by resolution of the School Board, a clergyman of any denomination or lay person selected by him may give the religious instruction in lieu of the classroom teacher. In actual practice, however, it is usually the teacher who gives the instruction. The texts supplied are an adaptation of the Cambridgeshire Syllabus.

The aims of the programme of religious instruction are set forth in the *Programme of Studies for Grades I to VI of the Ontario Public and Separate Schools.* It is pointed out that " the schools of Ontario exist for the purpose of preparing children to live in a democratic society which bases its way of life upon the Christian ideal ", and further, that " the school must seek to lead the child to choose and accept as his own those ideals of conduct and endeavour which a Christian and democratic society approves." The teacher is counselled " to bring home to the pupils, as far as their capacity allows, the fundamental principles of Christianity and their bearing on human life and thought." There is to be not only Bible teaching but the teaching of an appreciation of goodness, beauty, and truth. Religious instruction must aim to set up

ideals, to build attitudes, and to influence behaviour, as well as to teach Scriptural facts and Biblical texts. This programme of religious studies is now being carried on in a large majority of the public schools of Ontario with harmony and effectiveness.

In the Prairie Provinces—Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta—some schools have religious exercises, but so far little advantage has been taken of the law which permits religious instruction during the last half-hour of the school day. In a number of communities experiments in religious instruction are being carried on and will possibly lead to more universal instruction.

The Maritime Provinces—Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick—have made the least advance in introducing religion into the public schools. Their laws permit religious exercises, but no data are available as to the number of schools taking advantage of the privilege. The laws also provide for the teaching of the principles of Christian morality, which might be broadly interpreted to mean Christian teaching. It would seem possible, therefore, for the teachers to give religious instruction in the schools, but practically none is given. The difficulty seems to be that the teachers are not trained for this work and that the Protestant denominations have not yet agreed upon a common course of study.

The situation in British Columbia is quite different from that in any other province. The law stipulates that the public schools shall be conducted not only on non-sectarian but on 'strictly secular' principles. "The highest morality shall be inculcated, but no religious dogma nor creed shall be taught. The Lord's Prayer may be used in opening or closing school." This law is the least favourable to religious teaching of any in the Dominion, and yet British Columbia has taken a step forward by introducing a plan permitting high school students to take elective courses in Bible study for credit, the courses to be taught by ministers or teachers outside of school hours and outside the school buildings.

Religious Instruction Well Received

For the most part the projects in religious education in Canada have been received enthusiastically by children, parents, teachers, and school boards. There have been few instances of parents making use of the 'conscience clause' to remove their children from the schoolroom during the period of religious exercises or religious teaching. The experiments indicate that the Protestants can co-operate in selecting a course of study and in executing the programme of religious instruction. In fact, outside of Quebec and Ontario, it has most often been the local ministerial association which has instigated the project and divided among its members the teaching duties. After the difficulties of the past, when religion could not be taught because of denominational

rivalries, the present situation is surely a harbinger of further advances.

The need for religious instruction in the public schools is being strongly felt in Canada to-day. Few homes make any attempt to give religious training, and the Church is finding it impossible to do an adequate job of teaching religion because of limited equipment, crowded quarters, and sincere but often untrained teachers. Furthermore, a large number of the children in Canada never attend any Sunday School, and even those who attend regularly are there for only one hour a week—a short time in which to do an effective piece of teaching. The schools are having to assume their responsibility, and in many ways the school is the best institution to handle the problem. Attendance is compulsory, making it fairly sure that every child will have the opportunity for religious training. The children are in an atmosphere of study, and discipline is not the problem that it often is in the Church school. The schools have the proper equipment, such as slide- and moving-picture machines, materials for handwork, encyclopaedias, maps, etc., which are valuable aids in teaching and which the individual churches usually cannot provide.

The public school curriculum is not complete without some recognition of religion. Education is no longer instruction in the three R's, but 'education for the whole of life.' By excluding religion from the curriculum the schools have given the impression that religion was unimportant or unworthy a place alongside other school subjects. Too often children have come to think of religion as something apart from life, an added frill which might be studied on Sunday. Only when religion is given its rightful place in the child's life in school can the school curriculum be said to be well rounded.

Some have asked why it is not possible to have simple moral instruction or character education without bringing in religion. Attempts to have such training have never met with much success. Courses in character education have been helpful and worth while, but it has been the final conclusion of those teaching such courses that something was lacking, some focal point round which the moral teachings could be grouped. Courses in character education are like the Ethical Culture Society as a religion; they teach all the virtues, they do worthwhile things, but essentially they lack purpose and meaning. Mere moral teaching is not enough. There must be some foundation to give weight and authority to such teaching.

No one, of course, can say what the influence upon character of this religious instruction may be, but educators feel that they are at least providing some opportunity for the pupils to appreciate their religious heritage. Many things which are taught have values which cannot be measured and which are not readily evident.

One does not ask concerning the teaching of art or music: What are the tangible results? In fact, studies have been made which indicate that there is little direct relation between the teaching of rules of conduct and the conduct which follows. We would hesitate, however, on the basis of that indication to discontinue the teaching of ethics. Similarly, we cannot say that the teaching of religion is not of value simply because the effects cannot be measured. Even though no one can say that there will be a recognisable improvement in conduct after children have had religious instruction, yet it is felt that such instruction is of value in giving the child (1) a knowledge of the Bible for its cultural value, (2) character training, and (3) a Christian interpretation of life.

Religion in Higher Education

Just as the Churches were influential in the beginning of public school education, so they played an important part in the founding of colleges and universities in Canada. But, as with the public schools, after a long controversy, Church control was gradually supplanted by Government control, until to-day religion has a small place in the higher education of Canada.

There are only twenty-two universities in Canada to-day, five of which are Roman Catholic. The remaining seventeen include seven denominational institutions—King's, Bishop's, Trinity, Acadia, McMaster, Mount Alison, Victoria; four undenominational —Dalhousie, McGill, Queen's, Western Ontario; and six State— the universities of New Brunswick, Toronto, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia.

Throughout the entire history of higher education the Church has played an important part. Of the seventeen non-Catholic institutions, ten were originally founded as Church colleges, and in every province it was the Church which took the first steps towards the development of higher education. There was a strong conviction that the youth of the land ought to be instructed in the 'principles of true religion', and that the Church should provide for higher education so that the perils of secular education could be avoided. Also, the Church was impelled to promote higher education because the state failed at first to do so.

The first colleges established were controlled by the Church of England, but their exclusive character soon led to the founding of colleges by other denominations, all sharing in denominational grants from the Government. But there were not enough funds to go around, and the whole denominational system, it was soon seen, was wasteful. Attempts were made to do away with the rivalry and waste of the denominational colleges by federating them, with a fair degree of success. Then came the development of the state university. The state had from the beginning given

some aid to the colleges, but without exercising state control. At the end of the nineteenth century the idea of a state-supported and state-controlled institution developed, and when the four western provinces entered the Confederation it was provided that there should be one, and only one, such state university in each province.

The trend towards secularisation was thus a geographical as well as a chronological one. The first non-Catholic college to be founded in Canada was in the easternmost province of Nova Scotia. It was Church-founded and Church-controlled, with emphasis upon religious instruction and worship. As the frontier moved beyond Ontario and across the western plains, the state became the sole authority for higher education, and no religious purpose or religious programme was included. By the time plans were made for higher education in the westernmost province of British Columbia, a specific provision was placed in the charter of the provincial university prohibiting the teaching of any religious creed or dogma. And in that university no courses in religion have ever been given. Thus, as the frontier moved westward education became more and more secular.

Charter Provisions

An examination of the charters of the Canadian universities reveals that all had religious aims except the four western provincial universities and two others, which provided merely that the institutions should be non-sectarian and free from any religious tests. The statements of the religious aims are quite similar: " for the education of youth in the principles of true religion "; " education on sound moral and religious principles "; " to make the education here imparted religious, not in the sectarian, but truly Christian sense of the word."

There is nothing in any charter for denominational, undenominational, or state institutions which prohibits the teaching of religion provided it is not sectarian teaching and is not compulsory. The University of British Columbia says that no religious creed or dogma is to be taught, but this would not exclude the teaching of the history of religion, philosophy of religion, etc. The University of Manitoba stipulates that no students shall be required to " pursue the study of any materialistic or sceptical system of logic or mental or moral philosophy "!

The absence of courses in religion in some institutions, and their paucity in others, cannot be attributed to the provisions of the charters, with the possible exception of that of the University of New Brunswick, in which religion is not listed among the subjects which the legislature provided could be taught in the university. Obviously many of the institutions are not living up to the religious aims as stated in the charters.

Courses in Religion

Despite the important part which the Church played in the development of higher education in Canada and the religious aims of the founders of the institutions, the place given to religion in the university curriculum is exceedingly small. In four universities no religious instruction is offered; in three universities courses in religion are required; and in the remaining ten, courses in religion are elective. In those institutions where the courses are elective, such courses seldom appear in the suggested course of study and the percentage of students choosing them is negligible—except in the three affiliated colleges of the University of Toronto, where from 25 per cent. to 60 per cent. of the students take some course in religion.

The number of courses in religion offered since the founding of the institutions has become fewer in two universities, more in three universities, and has remained about the same in the other twelve institutions. Considering the great increase in the number of courses in every other department of the universities, it is evident that there has been a marked decline in the relative place of religion in the curriculum, as well as a marked decline in the relative number of students taking the courses.

The courses offered cover a wide range of topics. The one most frequently given is Biblical literature and history—in eleven institutions; six offer courses in comparative religion; five offer courses in the philosophy of religion; four in the psychology of religion; two in Christianity within Western civilisation; one in religious thought of the nineteenth century; one in Christian ethics; one in science and religion; and one in the concept of God in recent philosophy.

The above summary indicates that there is little attempt to relate the Christian message to the intellectual thought of our day, or to show the influence of Christianity upon Western civilisation, or to understand the history and expansion of the Church. Few, if any, of the courses could be said to be concerned with the attempt to relate religion to life, to discuss the place of religion in the contemporary world. The majority of the descriptions of the courses in Biblical literature and history stress the fact that they have to do with the Bible as history and as literature, not as a book of religion.

Religious Services

Little provision is made by Canadian universities to-day for weekday chapel services or Sunday services. The seven denominational institutions have weekday chapel services with attendance voluntary, except in Bishop's College, where attendance is required. Some of the institutions—Trinity, Bishop's, King's (all Church of England)—have a Sunday morning service which students are

expected to attend unless excused by the president. Victoria has a monthly Sunday morning service which the students are expected to attend.

The undenominational and state institutions make no provision for daily chapel services. Two of the state institutions, Toronto and New Brunswick, at one time had daily prayers, but these have been discontinued even though the statutes of New Brunswick still require daily prayers and Scripture reading.

Only one university—Bishop's—has a separate chapel building, and only one—Acadia—has a university pastor. In the University of Toronto there is a chaplain of Hart House, which is an official part of the university, but he is not paid by the university and has only unofficial recognition. There is not one denominational worker in any state or undenominational institution. The Churches thus have assumed little responsibility for the religious life of the students except in the denominational institutions. With the exception of providing some financial assistance towards the salary of the General Secretary of the Student Christian Movement, they have likewise assumed no financial obligation. Work among students in the large universities is still an unexplored field for the Churches.

The Outlook for the Future

Canadian higher education has taken pride in the scholastic standards it has been able to maintain. By limiting the number of institutions which may be established, and by limiting the enrolment in those institutions through fees and scholastic examinations, it has been possible to maintain a relatively high standard of scholarship. But the religious aspect of higher education has been neglected. In comparison with the universities in the United States with their chapel buildings, campus pastors, S.C.M., Y.W., and Y.M. secretaries, and professors of religion, the Canadian universities are doing little for the religious life of their students. The Canadian university has yet to accept its responsibility for moral and religious growth as well as for scholastic attainment. It must offer religious instruction and religious leadership if it would prepare students for life.

There are some indications of a new interest in religion in higher education in Canada. The Canadian Hazen Conferences have brought together leaders in Canadian education to consider the problem. Recently university presidents and other educators have repeatedly spoken of the importance of religion in education, and it is to be hoped that they will be able to put their ideas into practice. There is also pressure from below—as public and high schools are in increasing numbers giving religious instruction, the demand for teachers qualified to teach religion will be a further incentive to the universities to provide the necessary training.

The most important development in religion in higher education was the creation in 1948 of a Faculty of Divinity at McGill University. In this undenominational institution there is now a three-year course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Divinity. This new venture has been made possible through the co-operation of the Montreal Diocesan Theological College of the Church of England and the United Theological College of the United Church of Canada. The two denominations grant their own diplomas and give some of the specialised training, but the Faculty of Divinity is appointed by the university. A distinguished faculty, with Dr. James S. Thomson as Dean, has now become an integral part of the university, and it is planned to give in future years courses which will be open to all students of the university. The recognition of the place of the serious study of religion in a great university is an indication of a new trend of thought in higher education in Canada.

The needs of the future are for more courses in religion which give an understanding of our religious heritage and which relate religion to life; for university pastors and counsellors; for a new recognition on the part of the Churches of their responsibility; for a closer affiliation of theological colleges with the universities; for great care in the selection of university professors; and for a strengthening of the voluntary student religious organisations.

The period of denominational strife is past, but to exclude sectarianism from education does not mean the exclusion of religion. The responsibility of the public schools and universities to provide religious instruction can no longer be neglected because of past controversies. The new day of denominational co-operation can mean a new day in religious emphasis in public education.

K. M. GLAZIER.

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CANADA

PART TWO

EDUCATION AND MORALS

O'er the trackless ocean guided,
Led by Thee, our fathers came.
HYMN.

Whirl is King, having driven out Zeus.
ARISTOPHANES.

THE Canadian school, like the American, was born by reflection out of rebellion. The rebellion consisted first in the declaring unnecessary, and then in the actual overthrow, of the hierarchy set up to mediate between Man and Divinity, and between Man and Sacred Book. The reflection ran to the effect that the rebels needed some literacy to deal decently with the one and to decipher the other. If Everyman would be his own priest, Everyman must needs be a clerk.

Conceived thus, it was originally allotted an important, albeit relatively humble, function in preparing men fitly to make their mortal pilgrimage. The primary role assigned the school was that of purveyor of implements: the school should give the children the tools and the Church would finish the job which the home had already well begun. A solid and observant community, a secular equivalent to (or deputy for) the all-seeing Eye, would continuously inspect the product (and the producers); and, if when the job was done 'twere well done, the rewards of riches and honours in this world and salvation in the next were reasonably expected to ensue.

It may be said, then, that the predecessor of the present-day school began *out of* rather than *with* a preoccupation with problems of character. This is not to say that problems of character were thought to be absent, but that they were peripheral rather than focal. No pedagogue of the period could fail to note the plentiful, not to say abundant, evidence of original sin which his pupils presented: the perversity, the obstinacy, the wilful pride that must be humbled, and the prideful will that must be broken before the human young would come into the educational parlour. The heroic measures employed to root out these evils appeared, however, as means to the educational end rather than as ends in themselves—inside the school. The modern question as to whether any subject is justified of its place in the curriculum, unless it bears on the training of character or 'personality', is a measure of the distance travelled; yesterday's means are discussed as

to-day's ends. A long history intervenes between this day and that.

That idyllic simplification of the task of the school could not last for long. On both characterological grounds and sociological, a greater preoccupation with the formation of the child's character was bound to, and did in fact, follow. We cannot forget that these early pedagogues were themselves passionate Protestants, men with a sense of vocation, showing forth God's ways not only with their lips but in their lives, testifying in their works as well as in their words to the faith that was in them. On such ears, a recommendation to let well enough alone in the development of the child carries its satanic origin on its face. Even the recommendation to leave the task to others must contradict the notion that the fields are white to the harvest, and the workers too few. To have asked the teacher to forgo the present luxury (and the probable future reward) of picking accessible brands from the burning would have been to tax nature unnaturally, to have invited him to deny himself.

In any case, such demands were rarely made. Though the ultimate issue was held never to be in doubt, the forces of evil were felt to be of sufficient power and insidiousness to require total mobilisation on the part of the forces of good. The school was allotted a subordinate role, but nevertheless that of a full ally, in the procuring by the means then approved of the character then thought fitting. But precisely because the school as an institution was a Johnny-come-lately, and the teacher, in a pioneer society, a marginal person, the former could increase its importance and the latter his status only by demonstrating efficacy in the achievement of this task of such central concern. Thus injunctions originating outside the school fell on no unreceptive ears within it.

Under these spurs, the school set itself seriously to its task, and, if the moralising of teachers could have produced moralisation in the child, the outcome might well have been the mass-production, *modo Americano,* of a society of saints. A fortunate dispensation, some pre-existent harmony, ensured that the task of moralising need not be performed at the expense of drilling in the basic skills. By a happy thought of an economy-minded profession, it was discovered that if the child were to learn to read at all, he might as well learn to lisp forth the priceless wisdom of his age; if he were to learn to write, he might as well be forming his mind on Benjamin Franklin while he shaped his hand to copperplate; and if he were to learn to 'figure', he might well do his figuring around such sobering themes as work—particularly, such herculean tasks as could be performed by ten men in ten days, leaving the lesson of due humility when one saw how little one man—let alone a child—could perform in one day. In any case, this was the period in which a moral fairly had to adorn a tale, not only because

the tales had precious little else to adorn them, but because a tale without a moral was, like the human form without clothing, repugnant to the puritan mind. The crown of this intellectual edifice was furnished by the McGuffey's *Readers* which sold like wildfire and thus were self-evidently validated—" By their fruits ye shall know them."

Even this period, in retrospect, must seem somewhat idyllic in the perspective of the present day. The ' task of the school ' was so little in doubt as to seem self-evident to all right-thinking men—in a period where men were pre-eminently right-thinking. There was equally little doubt as to what constituted the good life, the kind of character that was the proximate means thereto and the principal product thereof, and the sort of pedagogical methods that would in fact produce that character.

Since that not so dim and distant day, the air has reverberated to the thunder of words spoken, and small forests have fallen to the march of words across paper, as the discussion on what, precisely, the ' function of the school ' is, has taken shape and speech. No educational book or journal can claim respectability that does not discuss these matters, and what the discussion lacks in definition and precision it makes up in rich allusion and, principally, in length. The task of the school ' is ', variously, to provide the tool-subjects, to ' make citizens ', to ' pass on the culture ', to provide opportunities for experience, to ' socialise ' the child, to maximise individual differences, to teach or indoctrinate for a ' core ' of knowledge and attitudes (held to constitute an indispensable minimum agreement for the functioning of a democratic society) to prepare the child for ' living rather than making a living ', and so on—to take but a few of the going definitions.

Though cast in the form, usually, of fact-statements—' the task of the school *is* '—these definitions are, in fact, intended as preference-statements, statements as to what the task of the school ought to be. If the definitions were taken merely as statements of fact, they would appear to be lamentably all too true. The school in North America is indeed widely and explicitly expected to do all these things and many more. The most defenceless of institutions has had laid upon it task after task as the older institutions of the society have confronted successive bankruptcies of faith and morals. Nor has there been only an increase in the number of tasks allotted to the school; the shift has been also qualitative. Home and Church, economic and political institutions, have not merely shifted *some* of their functions to the school; they have shifted precisely those tasks which modern conditions make difficult or impossible to perform. At just that point where the acids of modernity had eaten sufficiently far into the fabric of the ancient institutions as to cause them to doubt the ancient definitions as to

what was true, worthy, and of good repute—at just that point, and for just that reason, the task of providing ethical guidance and forming character on 'sound lines' was laid upon the school. This had the happy effect of permitting all other institutions, riven with differences within and between them, to agree at least in attacking the school for its failure to perform adequately the task of moralising the child. (The export of hostility and the creation of situations which will justify such an export is not a monopoly of nations, let alone of National Socialist ones.)

This process of devolving tasks upon the school occurred not only with reference to those that were becoming difficult or impossible to other institutions, but also, in a culture increasingly sensitised to the mysteries of 'public relations', with reference to tasks that were becoming unpleasant or unprofitable—if these are not synonymous. Economic institutions found that a propaganda that spoke in terms of the 'preservation of free private enterprise' while its protagonists moved rapidly towards something quite other and different, not only failed to light the fires of faith and loyalty in the minds of men, but rather fanned the flames of suspicion, doubt, and criticism. What could be more natural than to conclude that the same propaganda conducted from the irreproachably neutral podium of the schoolroom would hardly fail of its effect—particularly if it were conducted so early in the child's life as to ensure the lack of the kind of experience that might serve to raise critical questions. Hence the demand that the school teach a proper appreciation of the connection between 'free' economic institutions and all the other prized and priceless freedoms of a democracy.

Similarly, at just that point where the inescapable interdependence of all men everywhere had forced itself to the notice even of statesmen, and where the crushing weight and growing threat of armament had served to raise questions about the usefulness in that kind of world of the more old-fashioned kinds of patriotism—at just that point the inculcation of a suitable degree of national loyalty was suddenly seen to be a responsibility, if not a principal responsibility, of the state school. To crown the irony, at just about that point where the machinery of the League of Nations was visibly breaking down, and where pacifism and appeasement had clearly developed as their principal functions the encouragement of aggression—at just that point the schools were expected to provide that nice mixture of wish-thinking and confusion which was held to militate against militarism, and did indeed ensure the virtual disappearance of cadet cadres from the public school.

The latest developments include the widespread transfer to the school of responsibility for 'education for family life', for sex-education, and, finally, the reintroduction in some places of what

is known as 'religious education.' 'Vocational guidance' for the pupil and some indoctrination of parents as to what is desirable family life have been practised for some time. Lastly, under the slogan of the 'community-centred school' there has begun to emerge a school-centred community, school-centred already for the children and, incipiently now, for the adults as well. The school thus bids fair to be the institutional *factotum,* and to need, have the air of, and finally lay claim to omniscience and omnicompetence.

It would be unfair to leave the impression that the sheer defencelessness or weakness of the school has been the only factor in producing this result. The maiden herself is not altogether guiltless. There may always be reasonable doubt in such cases, but one cannot wholly escape the impression that if the maiden did not make the first advances, neither was she wholly overpowered from without—if she was not coy and encouraging, at least it could hardly be said that she put up any desperate resistance. What rendered her most vulnerable—if that is the right word—was precisely her heritage from the earlier period, both as to the inner feeling of a vocation most particularly with reference to character-formation, and as to the outer necessity to establish firmly an institution and a profession that was in constant danger of being defined as marginal and subordinate.

To this ready acceptance of a perhaps-fatal embrace, or series of promiscuous embraces, another set of circumstances, peculiarly North American, substantially contributed. Just as in Great Britain two institutions—the Church and Army—were peculiarly linked, in a society of marked classes and of primogeniture, to the solution of the problem of downward mobility (by taking care of the class-superfluous younger sons), so on this continent the school has played a peculiar role in the solution of the problem of upward mobility. With reference to its pupils, it goes almost without saying that it is intended to operate as the principal screening device whereby in each generation the social sheep who are destined for a higher status in the society are separated from the social goats who are destined to remain at that level which birth has conferred upon them. Although this has its own peculiar implications for the selection of teacher-personnel and the character of the institution, it is not to this primarily that attention should be directed. It is rather with reference directly to the role of the school in providing a means of social mobility to the teacher that the willingness of the American school 'to serve in any capacity' must be viewed. The school provided a reasonably reliable escalator permitting its personnel to effect the transition from rural to urban life, from upper-lower to lower-middle class status, and, frequently, Eros intervening, to upper-middle class or better. It also provided, Eros not intervening, a haven for unmarried,

permanently unmarried, females, in a society in which mechanisation had rendered spinster aunts an unwelcome luxury rather than an economic asset to family life.

For all these reasons (and quite aside from the marginal character of education itself in a society dedicated to the production of practically useful things as against merely decorative ideas), the school tended to be populated, as to staff, with personnel who felt themselves to be marginal in one important respect or another. Such persons tend to make ardent revolutionaries, or ardent conformists; and, whatever else may be said about the Canadian school, it can hardly be said to be a hot-bed of revolution. Thus, for reasons internal to it, as well as for those external, the school tended, if not gladly then not reluctantly, to accept the onerous duty of forming character, along with all its other commitments and obligations.

At the same time that the transfer of responsibility was going forward, the moral crisis of the age in which she lived was robbing the teacher of any stable guide-lines as to the direction in which she should proceed, if she knew how; and, simultaneously, a clamorous confusion of voices acted to shake her confidence in the value of any method of getting there, even if she felt that she still knew where she wanted to go.

Against the impact of the former, the teacher has been to a serviceable degree protected by the 'cultural lag.' With reference to every cultural change, there seems to be a period of grace during which one can go on repeating clichés that have been emptied of their meaning, and shibboleths that have ceased to have application, without becoming patently ridiculous to oneself or to others. Only here and there will some small *avant-garde* boy say, "But the king is naked", and he can be rapidly, decently, and sensibly hushed up in the short run. Only now—partly because of the 'protected' nature of the teaching enterprise, and partly because of the protected nature of the American situation—only now, is the uneasy feeling spreading that this period of grace is near its end, and the state of grace, far in the past, or, perhaps, the future.

The reaction in the profession to this unwelcome awareness is, for the most part, the usual one, the one first resorted to by the other institutions before they passed the onus to the school. The reaction consists in an increase in the force, the frequency, and the shrillness with which the values that are threatened are asserted and reasserted. If inquiry threatens tradition, then perhaps a new insistence on absolutes may rescue these from the threatened areas. But this procedure, sensible as it may seem, has served less to stave off the crisis than to bring it on. Since, by supposition, these absolutes exist and have overwhelming significance, it is essential that their supporters be able to agree with themselves and with one another in the definition of them. In this enterprise, they can

hardly be said to have fared better than did the instinct-psychologists in reaching agreement on the nature, number, and names of the instincts.

Against the attack on methods, the teacher was less adequately protected, particularly since the teacher-training institutions (to which, in America, the teacher is in permanent psychological tutelage) had prided themselves, *faute de mieux,* on training the teacher just in 'method.' It is a scant thirty years since the publication by Hartshorne and May of their *Studies in Deceit,* studies that, by implication, shook on their pedestals the topmost methodological gods. In mounting volume, successive studies, from those of Piaget on *The Moral Judgment of the Child* to those of Lippitt and his associates at the University of Iowa, made plain the futility of injunction and exhortation, the preacher-teacher's specialities, in the securing of a type of character that would meet the criteria of democratic citizenship, ethical acceptability, or, even, mental health. And what the studies of the psychologists had not made plain, the studies of the sociologists, students of the primary group, of group dynamics, of the making of consensus and dissensus, began to make crystal clear. If both these failed, such novels as Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World,* or George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four,* could spell out fully, as could the march of events in Germany and elsewhere, the implications of conditioning and drilling as methods of securing overt conformity.

Under the attack of this educational heartland, the forces regrouped themselves in a variety of ways. One wing, under the mistaken notion that the nakedness of coercion rather than the fact of coercion was the source of the problem, set out to make coercion palatable. The newer techniques of manipulation were, in any case, 'in the air', and the teacher was no inept pupil to the advertising man and the propagandist. Both underestimated to a serious degree the perspicacity of their audiences, and the teachers forgot, perhaps, that though one might be able to sell goods, one could not build character by poisoning the well of communication with ulterior motives. A character tricked into honesty, cajoled into it, or 'sold' it, is not the kind of character that would satisfy those ethical positions which were, one would hope, the teacher's original point of departure.

Another wing attempted to use 'the group' of children themselves in one of two ways: in the first way they were to act as a puppet government; in the second, as receivers. The first method consisted in the not-too-difficult subversion of the group process so that 'the people' appeared to demand, *mirabile dictu,* just what 'the government' had had in mind to give. The number of schools in which the 'student government' comes out annually with that same book of rules with which they went in, namely one prepared by or previously agreed upon by the staff, is sufficiently large as to

cause one to wonder whether this is another of those hidden dispensations, whether the students confuse the function of legislator with that of mind-reader, or whether indeed we have a phenomenon similar to the wondrous plebiscites of the *Third Reich.*

Where the students are to act as receivers we have at least the honest abandonment in fact, if not in form, of the process of character-formation to what David Riesman refers to as 'a jury of their peers.' The students, abandoning and abandoned by their elders and quondam betters, are dependent on one another for whatever formation of taste and character is to take place. The North American school thus tends to be characterised by a series of closely age-graded 'peer-group cultures' barely in touch with one another, and almost opaque to the world of teachers and parent-surrogates while quiveringly open to the media of mass-communication, and to the specialists who have put themselves in exploitative relationship to the new phenomenon: toy manufacturers, clothing manufacturers, and publishers who specialise in this new and profitable market.

How does the child fare under these circumstances? Two considerations make even a rough answer difficult. The first is to the effect that, despite what has been said, many institutions other than the school do retain influence over the kind of character that is to emerge. Games and athletic activities, for instance, have a tradition and a vitality and viability of their own, that is to an incomplete but sensible degree countervailing. The second consideration must run to the effect that any judgment made now is in a sense premature and may be contradicted by the course of future events. This is true both because the phenomenon of the modern school is relatively new, and its product relatively untried; and also, because the question of how the child will fare cannot be answered without predicting the future shape of society or invoking a new set of absolutes for which it would be difficult to secure agreement. A series of impressions may be recorded, however, for what they are worth.

The most striking impression is that the school, as described, is producing an altogether new and different character-type; a type perhaps better suited to a kind of mass society whose main outlines may already be dimly apprehended. One may distinguish roughly between the attitudes of the ideal-typical primary group—intimacy, affection, the valuation of the unique, intensity of identification, and close, near-spontaneous coherence—and those of the secondary group—distance, interest, the valuation of conformity, segmental identification, and engineered coherence. If one may call the former 'primary attitudes' and the latter 'secondary attitudes', then the new emerging character-type may be said to be one who manifests secondary attitudes both to members of his primary group and towards himself. Perhaps so condensed and

abstract a statement is inadequate to call up a picture in the mind of the reader.

The picture that it was intended to call up was that of a person treating and feeling towards intimate others, and even himself, as men formerly treated their employees, their superiors, or their business acquaintances. The dominant relation is that of detachment bordering on alienation; the dominant attitude that of rational exploitation and manipulation, including self-exploitation and self-manipulation; the dominant value seems to be conformity to norms very finely age-graded and reaching clear down to the level of feeling; the dominant range of feeling runs from ' fun ' to apathy, with no danger of those excesses of enthusiasm or fanaticism which have been said in earlier generations to characterise the young. It is a generation, moreover, better equipped perhaps than any previous one to protect itself against any deep involvement as to things, persons, ideas, or ideals.

The kind of society for which such a personality is a good fit is obviously among to-morrow's possibilities, and, in some respects, already now and here present. Whether or not such a society and such a character represents indeed the proximate fate of Western man depends, in some measure, on whether the schools of this continent continue to turn out such a type at the present rate or better. If they do, it is difficult to imagine how we are to avoid what the present writer can only regard as a cataclysm.

It remains to add by way of footnote and qualification some statement as to the degree to which the writer intends what he has written to be taken as a literal description of the American school, and also some word as to the limitations that would have to be made in application to the schools of Canada.

As to the first, it is obvious that no generalisation can be made that would have particular and literal application to ' the American school.' The range of variation among schools—and, even within them—is such as to require endless qualification by way of exception and restraint. What has been portrayed here is to be taken, then, as neither an invariable picture, nor even an average one. The writer has rather attempted a description of the ideal-typical, carrying what is empirically observable either to its logical conclusion or to its most probable temporal one. To this extent it may describe what is latent, imminent, or potential in the school rather than what is already fully realised, and past.

As to the second, there seems some reason to believe that the Canadian school is not so far along the road portrayed as is that of the United States. This might be true either because inventions, both mechanical and social, tend to reach Canada only with some delay following their establishment in the United States, or because of Canada's peculiar relation to alterna-

tive and transatlantic centres of cultural dominance. For whatever reason it may be true, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the possibilities of arresting the present drift of affairs here are, though minimal, somewhat greater than in the Republic to the south.

If that drift is to be arrested at all, if it does not already have the character of an irreversible process, if the school can sensibly affect the outcome—and it is unlikely that any other institution can or will—then nothing less is called for than a radical change in present emphases, methods, goals, and ideals. If these changes cannot be procured in the proximate future, the prospect for the values enshrined in the notion of a liberal education are dim, very dim indeed.

JOHN R. SEELEY.

CANADA

PART THREE

QUEBEC

THE Province of Quebec has a distinctive culture of its own. Its inhabitants form a block predominantly Catholic and French-speaking in the North American continent. In such a culture the methods of moral education or character-training will be somewhat different. However, no survey of these methods would be complete without taking into account the contribution of the environment and the family, in this Catholic country.

Social Background

The influence of the social milieu on moral behaviour has often been noted. Moral education is more than the outcome of the family and the school. In Quebec, the culture has been largely moulded by religion, to which it owes its morals.

In the minds of the founders and early leaders of the colony, in the early seventeenth century, the conversion of Indians was more important than any other objective. To preserve the new colony from any of the conflicting ideas which divided his kingdom, Louis XIV even forbade the immigration of any non-Catholic. And to this day, French-Canadians have preserved their unity, 90 per cent. of the population of the province (4 million) are Catholic, and 85 per cent. French-speaking. Only a few thousands of these do not share the religion of the majority.

Throughout history, the Catholic Church has retained its authority and prestige. No ugly conflict has ever divided Church and State; on the contrary, relations between them have always been marked by co-operation. People acknowledge that their cultural survival is due largely to the Church, and they recognise the

ever-beneficent role of its institutions. Religion is not questioned, even among intellectuals. The shrines attract thousands of pilgrims, and religious ceremonies draw the greatest crowds.

A particular feature of French-Canadian life is the parish, especially strong in rural areas. Everywhere across the land, the ubiquitous silver spire soars upward into the sky. The church is both the physical and moral centre of the community. All inhabitants of the parish share the same faith, attend the weekly Mass, listen to the sermon. The *curé* is the most influential person in his parish and his exhortations on morals exert a powerful social control. Numerous lay associations, centred around the church, help to encourage a high moral standard of living in the community. Leisure activities are often provided by the parish, in a building near the church. Industrial development has now made Quebec a predominantly urban province, but the parochial system nevertheless remains strong in the cities.

No important sector of life is left untouched by religion. As will be seen later, education is largely in the hands of the church. The church is also influential in Catholic labour unions. Newspapers, some of which are Catholic publications, maintain a high level; they avoid cheap sensationalism and do not exalt immorality. "Comics" are not a problem, as papers for children are published by religious Orders. Periodicals containing immoral illustrations are liable to confiscation, but cheap American literature has lately become most objectionable. Radio is usually wholesome and even offers a few religious broadcasts. As to films, no child below 16 may go to a public cinema, but special films are available to schools. Films for adults have to receive a permit from the governmental censorship.

Add to this a strong and somewhat aggressive desire to remain French, a high standard of living, the absence of great wealth or poverty, general honesty, a sound judicial system, the stern climate of the north, and you have an atmosphere particularly favourable to morals.

The Family

As a social institution, the Quebec family cannot be dissociated from the surrounding culture. Before the establishment of the school system, in mid-nineteenth century, it provided, with the church and society, the only means of moral education, and certainly with high success.

The family is still a strong social unit, the love of French-Canadians for family life being often cited. As elsewhere, it exerts the deepest influence on character, the child being usually what his parents are.

Families are often large. In 1949, the Quebec birth-rate was 30·4 in comparison of 23·6 for Ontario, the neighbouring province,

and 27·1 for the whole of Canada. The population of the province is 29 per cent. of the country, but it includes 35 per cent. of the children below 16 and 59 per cent. of the families with seven children and more. Thus the difficulties raised in the bringing up of an only child are infrequent, while the education that comes in large families from the give-and-take of numerous brothers and sisters is more widely enjoyed.

According to the Catholic social doctrine, the primary responsibility for the education of children rests with parents, who are often reminded of their duties and warned not to leave moral training to teachers only. Parents are expected to teach their children before school years the rudiments of religion. The old custom of family prayers is still alive in many a home. Modern urban living has made its impress upon family life, but the decline does not appear to be as serious as elsewhere, on account of religion and the traditions of the people. Divorce is non-existent; the proportion of married women with children who do outside work is negligible. Numerous 'Schools for Parents' have been established. Courses in preparation for marriage are followed by most young engaged couples. There is some juvenile delinquency in cities, but it is being actively combated.

The School System

Catholics being in the majority, they established a century ago a school system in accordance with their faith and respecting that of the Protestant minority. It is unlike almost any other as it provides for a dual system of state public schools based on religious belief.

Briefly, education comes under two committees, one Catholic, the other Protestant. Each committee has jurisdiction over the schools of its faith. The Catholic committee is constituted by all the bishops of the province ex officio and an equal number of lay members appointed by the government. These committees plan the curriculum, approve textbooks, draw regulations for their schools, and make recommendations to the government on school policy. A Department of Education supervises the working of the whole system.

At the local level, school boards, formed of five members elected by ratepayers, impose and collect property taxes, engage and pay teachers, maintain schools. A minority dissenting from the faith of the majority may elect its own trustees and have its own schools.

School expenses are paid from local taxes and Government grants, these being shared between Catholic and Protestant in proportion to school population. Such public financing of denominational education gives satisfaction to all and has brought a century of peace between the two groups.

Besides the public schools, there are a large number of private

and residential schools, maintained by religious orders. The whole school system is definitely oriented towards humanistic training, with emphasis on spiritual and moral values. It aims to develop men and women of character, able citizens, concerned with livelihood, but more with the good life.

Moral Education

Catholicism provides a philosophy of education, which is, of course, followed in the schools. According to this philosophy, religion is the primary function of Catholic schools. Catholics believe that what man most needs to know is how to attain a happy future life, therefore the school must include religious training, this being the core of educational content.

Religion cannot be dissociated from morals. Morality implies conformity to the will of God as expressed by Christ. There is thus a moral code, authoritative, universal, unchanging, obligatory. Religion offers the strongest sanctions impelling the individual to conform to these standards and to practise virtue. It teaches that every good deed has its reward, every wrong one its punishment. To the convinced believer, the hope of eternal happiness and the fear of eternal suffering provide the highest motivation and may mould a whole life. Indeed, for centuries, the Catholic doctrine has engendered countless saints and heroes and borne fruit in innumerable lives of self-sacrifice and devotion. The church has been rightly called the Supreme Character Builder, whose methods, however, are too little known. It has always devoted full attention to moral education. Modern educational literature and practice often ignore the responsibilities of the school in training character, but this deficiency could never be reproached to the Catholic Church.

Character may be defined here as conduct according to Christian morality. The objectives of character education are the spiritual advancement of the individual and therefore of the group, a sound knowledge of right and wrong, full self-realisation, moral excellence.

Training of the will is a primary element in character education. There can be no character without self-denial, sacrifice, effort, a fact that modern education tends sometimes to overlook. Like intellectual and physical aptitudes, the will must be trained and gradually perfected. Habit formation, emotional control, worthy ideals are other basic elements of character education.

Teaching Methods

A detailed review of teaching methods would be impossible here. Reference will be made only to what is more peculiar to Quebec schools. Generally speaking, methods of teaching religion are about the same in all Catholic schools.

The school day opens with prayers and catechism, the lesson

lasting half an hour. The teaching is carried out by a regular teacher, who, in half the cases, is a Brother or a Sister, a member of a religious Order. In many schools, the parish priest comes once a month for supervision. At the time of Solemn Communion, he himself teaches in church, during a full month, the pupils who are called. The *curé* is also an official visitor of the public schools in his parish.

The first aim of the teacher is to have the child understand to the limit of his ability the matter which is presented to him. The teacher begins the explanation with a story, usually taken from the life of Christ. Use of pictures, discussions, exercises, is made. After the lesson has been well explained, children are questioned in the teacher's own words; they are then asked to memorise a formula. The lesson ends by a practical application, a specific conduct assignment, a resolution, the stressing of a life value.

A detailed syllabus is traced for each grade; in Grades X–XII, apologetics and church history are taught. Questions on religion are asked in all official examinations. Moreover, definite guidance on moral training is given. Duties to God, others, and self are outlined. Actions are suggested for each theological and moral virtue. As to charity, for instance, the following are listed among others, with indication of the grades in which they are more particularly recommended: give little pleasures to your parents; help aged persons in crossing streets or from falling on ice; show your satisfaction in a companion's success; try to see the qualities rather than the defects of people around you; do your share in group work; do not tease others unduly; seek occasions to help others; take great care of your health, etc. Besides, in the monthly report to parents, character deficiencies that may occur are noted.

To classroom teaching is added the teaching in church, also prayers, the Mass, the sacraments, sermons, good deeds, and the whole atmosphere of the school, the presence of the crucifix and religious pictures, the teacher's personality and example.

Our schools, like all Catholic schools, give due importance to discipline, considered one of the most effective means of character development, provided it is meaningful, constructive, and tends to self-discipline. The beginning of discipline is obedience. The nature of the child makes authority necessary. Observance of regulations is expected, and it must be said that indiscipline is not a problem, as it appears to be in some other school systems. It may be added that there is no co-education at the secondary level.

In most schools sports are well organised, but no particular use is made of them for character training, more effective means being available. Thrift is promoted by many school banks, where children deposit their savings. Manual training is taught especially for its formative values: orderly habits, thoughtful planning, exactitude, self-expression, respect for labour.

Residential Schools

Character training is particularly fostered by the large number of private residential boys' and girls' schools, located throughout the province and attended by some 12 per cent. of the school population, a larger proportion than in most countries. It is a well-established custom in many families to send their children to these schools, maintained by priests or religious Orders. Indeed, numerous parents favour these institutions on account of the sound moral training they give.

The educative values of good residential schools are well known. Character training cannot be neglected there, neither can it be left to the home. Living during ten months of the year in a community of 200–500 fellow students cannot fail to mould character. Regulations must be obeyed, and the daily routine of these houses would be found austere by many. Rising is at 5.30 or 6, then Mass, study, breakfast. Classes start at 8 and fill four or five hours of the day. Personal study requires about the same number of hours. The day is interspersed by prayers, chapel, and occasionally a sermon. Improper literature is forbidden. Discipline is somewhat exacting, but the trend is definitely towards an increasing measure of student government. In the classical colleges (leading to the B.A. and professional studies), most students choose among the priest teachers a 'spiritual director' whom they consult freely for spiritual and moral advice and who often acts as guidance counsellor. The education given alike in these colleges to future priests, and to future members of the professions, contributes greatly to the happy relations between church leaders and the people.

It may be added that the school curriculum includes the study of ethics; in public schools, rudiments are given in Grade XII, while a more thorough study is part of the two-year course of philosophy in classical colleges. This latter course, which lasts one year, covers the nature and source of ethics, free will, law (eternal, natural, human, divine), conscience, family, parenthood, society, authority, the State, Communism, etc.

Catholic Youth Movement

A development of recent years in a great number of schools is the Catholic Action movement, *la Jeunesse Étudiante Catholique* (Catholic Student Youth). The movement aims to make students more actively participating in their own religious education. Boys and girls practise religion by living it in school. It is an application, with a social bias, of the activity programme to religious and moral training. When students wish to improve the quality of group life, they soon learn that changing others must begin with themselves and that Christianity is a call to dynamic living rather

than a set of prohibitions. Catholic Action aims at the same moral objectives as the school, but it provides a new way to attain them.

The J.E.C. works mainly through extra-curricular activities: sports, games, leisure, school paper, co-operative, discussion clubs, student council, etc. Students have thus numerous occasions to work for the common good, to practise charity and other virtues. In each school, the movement is supervised by a chaplain who acts as adviser. A central office co-ordinates activities and publishes a monthly.

The J.E.C. has brought about excellent results in every school where it has been established. It has revitalised faith, developed responsibilities, initiative, and social-mindedness, stimulated leadership, and incidentally favoured intellectual achievement. Besides the J.E.C., other associations, such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, 4-H Clubs, Children of Mary, Catholic Rural and Working Youth, contribute also to character development during school years or in the immediate years afterwards.

Girls' Education

A feature of our school system is the preparation of girls for family life. Marriage is the career followed eventually by most women, and it is felt that the school should not ignore it.

Through all grades, the curriculum seeks to build a truly feminine mentality, which is considered more important than domestic skills; it endeavours to inculcate respect for family life, it exalts the beauty of the home, its virtues, its unique function in society. In school, girls learn sewing, cooking, home maintenance. Half a day a week in each grade is allocated to these subjects. Moreover, some secondary schools, which receive special grants for that purpose, devote particular attention to household science. In Grades VIII and IX, the course, while being still predominantly academic, gives more time to the duties of a housewife. The superior schools of Household Science, of which there are thirty-six, emphasise still more, in Grades X, XI, and XII, the preparation for family life, to which they devote about two-thirds of their time. These schools have done remarkable work and induced much favourable comment. The curriculum includes, besides religion, French and arithmetic, child and adolescent psychology, child care, family education, science as related to the home, cooking, dressmaking, interior decoration, weaving. The students, organised into family groups, undertake in turn housekeeping, budgeting, shopping, preparation of meals, evening parties, etc., all these activities being carried out so as to promote the best family spirit.

Vocational Schools

Unlike academic schools, technical schools are undenominational. However, a Catholic chaplain is attached to each such school and

a short course on religion is given each week, non-Catholic students being dispensed from attendance. A recent innovation in the new apprenticeship centres, which train for various manual trades, may be worth mentioning here.

As the law required moral instruction, school authorities looked for literature especially adapted to this class of trainees and different from the usual lessons, but could not find any, either in French or in English. A chaplain then decided to prepare a suitable course himself. The course deals in a broad way with the human and moral aspects of work: the individual, marriage, family, citizenship, labour, wages, rights and duties of workers and employers, social legislation, the moral law and economics, etc.

For teaching purposes, the class is divided in groups of four or five, with a leader who has previously received special instruction. The discussion goes on for half an hour around one of the topics of the course. All groups reassemble for the last half-hour, for further discussion under the teacher's guidance. Each topic is summarised in an attractive booklet. These booklets have proved best-sellers in their field, and the course has worked great improvement among the men.

Conclusion

Much remains to be said on moral education in Quebec, but perhaps the above would serve as a general view of the matter.

Sir Richard Livingstone, in his pungent little book, *Education for a World Adrift*, deplores in modern teaching the absence of a true philosophy of life, a spiritual element, a moral standard. This guiding principle French-Canadians always had. They have a common faith, a common culture, common standards of conduct. For them, religion and morals are one, spiritual values are foremost. The knowledge and practice of religion is for them the core of education and life, which must inspire the whole educational process. They may not always live up to the ideals of their doctrine, but on the whole they have remained faithful, they have retained a way of life that gives primacy to spiritual and moral values which may serve as an example to the world.

The eminent English historian, Arnold Toynbee, wrote recently: "I suspect that the coming people in the Americas may be the French-Canadians" (The *World Review*, March, 1949, page 12). This prediction may appear debatable, but it indicates the opinion of a keen student of civilisation that this people holds values and standards that have proven their worth in the course of history. Their moral education has undoubtedly been a signal contribution to this achievement.

CHARLES BILODEAU.

CHAPTER EIGHT

AUSTRALIA

STATE, DENOMINATIONAL, CORPORATE, AND PRIVATE EDUCATION

Historical Background

THE first settlement in Australia was made in 1788. For over thirty years, education was haphazard; schools, often poor in quality, were set up by the chaplains or other individuals, in some cases with a little financial assistance from government funds. In 1825 an attempt was made to organise education throughout the colony under the Church of England, financed from a grant of church and school lands in each county and parish. Denominationalism, however, and the mixed constitution of the population—English, Scottish, and Irish—made this unworkable; this also frustrated the attempt of Governor Bourke in the eighteen-thirties to introduce the Irish National System and to put education under government control while allowing for selected Bible reading in ordinary school work, and for religious instruction by the clergymen of various churches to which the children belonged.

Education then became denominational. The Treasury provided subsidies for schools equal in amount to that contributed by the parents. This method proved to be unsatisfactory: there was no competent educational authority; denominational competition caused unnecessary duplication; and it was very difficult to obtain efficient teachers. The upshot was that in 1848 a dual system was introduced: denominational and national. The latter was a straight-out system of state education with provision for the visits of clergymen for religious instruction. For the former, a board was set up, through which government money was paid to churches to meet the salaries of the teachers; the latter were appointed by the clergymen who managed the schools. The board also endeavoured to raise and unify the standard of teaching.

The grant to the denominational board, however, was not sufficient to meet the needs of a growing population, and many of the denominational schools failed to reach the required standard, or else were not able to compete with national schools if any were established in the vicinity. As a result, primary education passed, for the most part, from the churches to the state, with the exception of the Roman Catholic church. This occurred in New South Wales during the period of the Council of Education (1866–80)

which replaced the two boards; while the Public Instruction Act of 1880 finally withdrew state aid from denominational schools.

The Roman Catholic church, by its insistence on education being given in a religious context, and through its teaching orders and the willingness of the majority of its parents to subscribe towards the cost, has built up a complete system of its own, including primary and secondary schools and boarding schools for boys and girls.

The other denominations, though emphasising the same general point regarding education and the religious context, could not obtain the necessary financial support from their members, nor have they possessed, with the rarest exceptions, teaching orders who served without salary, and so kept the cost of the schools within limits which the mass of parents could meet. They therefore dropped almost wholly out of the primary field. They did, however, maintain, throughout nearly seventy years of last century and since, a steadily increasing number of secondary schools—grammar schools and such like, mostly for boarders. These, of course, were open only to those who could afford to go to them. By the turn of the century, however, the state had entered this field also, and since then has developed its secondary education apace, adding to it technical, agricultural, and domestic science schools. These last three fields have only been adjuncts to the denominational or other independent schools.

The above brief survey refers to New South Wales, but omitting the earliest phases in colonies founded later, it is true in general outline for Australia. During the eighteen-sixties and eighteen-seventies the dilemma which confronted political and ecclesiastical leaders was whether denominational education should be an agency of the state, or whether education should be "free, compulsory, and secular." The latter became the accepted political principle, though Victoria alone prohibited readings from the Bible and religious instruction by church representatives in the schools.

Out of this context, a twofold approach to education developed in Australia: on the one hand, the state system, uniform in each state, and paid for by taxpayers' money; and on the other hand, denominational and independent schools, wholly maintained by parents and supporters, and marked by variety in methods. Some links have been forged between the two 'systems', but there is no sign that they will be unified.

The Present Position

The actual position is somewhat complex. Each state system is clear and uniform under its director and inspectors, with its own teachers' colleges, and complete range of schools: kindergarten, primary, secondary, opportunity, technical, agricultural, and domestic science. It is compulsory, free, and almost secular.

Especially in the kindergarten and primary schools, selected Bible reading and moral instruction by the members of the teaching staff, and religious instruction by church visitors, are now a regular part of school routine everywhere. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of teachers do try to lead their pupils into the ways of righteousness and of religious faith. In this regard their efforts are supported in the special periods taken by the clergy. Few of the latter, however, are teachers; moreover, their lessons seem like an interpolation and interruption in the time-table, and involve a breaking-up of the classes and of the school into denominational divisions. For these reasons, doubts are frequently cast on the value of such visits; obviously, much depends on the clergyman's personality and ability. But, at least, they are a witness.

The importance of the state schools cannot be over-estimated. Three-quarters of Australian children (that is, about 900,000) attend them, and from them come many of Australia's leaders in national and local politics, in commerce, industry and trade unions, in education and in the churches. If the state schools fail to inculcate moral and spiritual values, the outlook is gloomy.

Non-school Factors

Of course, the schools are not solely responsible for the character training of their pupils. The home and neighbourhood are potent factors; indeed, the latter, with its unrepressed and expansive mutual activity in the long non-school hours, effectively and almost irresistibly moulds the child of primary school age into a local neighbourhood personality, as distinct from the state-wide personality sought by the state schools. Values, attitudes, ambitions, and forms of speech intimately related to locality and limited interests are thus caught and developed. Until the state school systems, at present over-centralised, regionalise some basic aspects of their curricula, and develop the child within, and from, its actual neighbourhood environment towards the wider moral goals of total citizenship, the school is likely to remain an institution apart, in which a prescribed number of hours and years must be spent until freedom comes temporarily at closing time each day and finally on reaching the school-leaving age.

This is particularly true in the large cities, and in the more congested parts of them. It is therefore significant, because about half of Australia's population resides in them—the half which makes the greatest impact on the industrial and political life of the community.

This antithesis between the neighbourhood and the wider goal of the school is much less marked in country towns and settlements where the teachers do not go to their daily schoolwork from beyond the school neighbourhood, as is mostly the case in cities. On the contrary, they are part of the local community, and are

usually expected to take an active and influential part in its activities, especially those which are regarded as cultural and progressive. In these situations, by word, action, and example, the state school teachers effectively help to maintain and develop moral values and sound citizenship.

The influence of the family as an educational factor can seldom be separated from the neighbourhood, except in those types of suburbs where contiguity has little influence and kinship and friendship bonds are locally weak. In the latter, however, the wider moral and social influence of the school is greater, and generally is backed up by the attitudes in the homes.

The break-down of many families is, of course, a serious handicap to the growing personality. The rate of petitions for divorce, nullity, judicial separation, and restitution of conjugal rights to marriages is about one in seven. To this must be added the number of separations by agreement, which although not known statistically, are considered to be high, while the efforts of marriage-guidance clinics, a recent development, to prevent breaches, witness to further stresses and strains. All this is a sign that marriage and the family are not regarded as a vocation, but as phenomena which may happen. This means a lowering of responsibility for the moral and spiritual training of children—a task more and more delegated to the school.

With the passing of the great majority of children to the almost secular state schools, the churches, especially the non-Roman Catholic, concentrated on the development of Sunday schools, held once or twice each Sunday. The local clergyman was responsible, and church members responded to his call for teachers. Efforts have been made to provide some elementary training for the latter. This work has undoubtedly done much to pass on a knowledge of the Bible and of the doctrinal and moral teachings of the various churches to each generation. On the other hand, it marks a dichotomy between day school and Sunday school—between secular and religious education, a dichotomy seriously deplored by many.

Sunday schools still function, but during the past thirty years, in the face of increasing competition of interests such as: the love of outdoor life in 'sunny Australia'; the motor-car and other means of going somewhere for the day; and Sunday sports and other recreations, organised and private, in a degree undreamt of a generation or two ago. As a result, while Sunday school influence is still a valuable adjunct to the day school, it is much less extensive. Religious instructors in many of the government schools are astounded by the almost complete ignorance of the greater number of the children regarding the basic doctrines and moral ideals with which pupils of Sunday schools or children of Christian homes should be familiar. This, of course, reflects the changed attitudes, values, and standards of the age.

Australia has passed during the past four or five decades—swiftly during the past twenty years—into the condition of the regulation social and welfare state, with its director-generals. The state, more and more, in this period of crisis, lays down what can or must be done, and also provides for all the emergencies of life —birth, childhood, illness, accident, widowhood, and old age. The individual is relieved of responsibility—of deciding what to do, and of providing for emergencies. Trade unions and employers' organisations, through their presidents and secretaries, do much the same for the individual in the occupational sphere, and at the same time tend to identify the country's good with the good of an economic class. All this puts a discount on the moral concept of duty and on individual responsibility and initiative.

In this context it is difficult for the state school system to develop the moral character of its pupils as well as to increase their knowledge and understanding of their environment. In spite of this, very many good, and some great people come from the government schools, contributing factors being the personalities and sincerity of teachers and the ennobling influence of family and church, which have by no means quite passed away.

The Roman Catholic System

In spite of the financial handicap, but with the devoted service of its teaching orders, the Roman Catholic church has built up a complete system of primary education (mostly free) based on parish schools. These function in 807 of the 919 parishes in Australia. They have at present 150,216 pupils. Post-primary education has been established in some of these schools, but is left for the most part to the catholic secondary schools which number nearly 100. The teaching orders have their training colleges. There is an inspector for each diocese and a director of catholic education under the archbishop in each state. The latter co-ordinates diocesan policies and keeps in touch with the state education authorities. The syllabuses followed are, with some variations, those used in the state schools.

This independent denominational school system is responsible for the education of about one-fifth of the total school population of Australia, and for two-thirds of the Roman Catholic children. Its basic aim is to produce informed young people who will be good citizens because their education has been grounded on the doctrines and practices of their church. The hope is that they will always relate their secular occupations or professions and their family life to their religious faith and duties, just as their school classwork is related to their religion.

If successful, this system, affecting such a significant proportion of the population, should be a power for righteousness. This, however, is not easy to evaluate. But the great number of fine

churches, halls, schools, and other institutions, the comparatively good attendance at church services and duties, and the increase in the teaching orders, suggest a very definite loyalty to the church; and this cannot fail to be reflected in an effective degree of conformity to the moral and social teachings of the church. This is important, because of the Roman Catholic insistence on the vocation of the family, the indissolubility of marriage, and on social justice.

The strength of this educational system lies not so much in its sound organisation, nor even in its conviction of the fundamental place of religious education in the total scheme; it lies rather in the spirit of sacrifice which is required to maintain it without financial help from the state. It is a cause, and not merely a task. Moreover, it will not be surrendered nor compromised willingly or easily to any totalitarian system. The existence of such a strong independent educational system, an integral aspect of a well-knit fifth of the total population, with its emphasis on moral and spiritual values, is of especial significance at the present time of political, social, and economic change.

The Independent Corporate Schools

Nearly one-fourteenth (about 70,000) of the Australian school population is found in schools other than those of the government or Roman Catholic systems. These consist of two main groups—private and corporate. The former, of which there are many, are mainly small in size and are run for the profit of the person or persons conducting them. They have been a feature of Australian education since the early decades of the last century, and have often provided very good education. At present, these schools are concerned mainly with primary work, and tend to serve as feeders for the second group. In 1946 there were about eighty such schools in New South Wales alone.

The latter, and much more important, group consists of the corporate schools, run by councils under a trust, often on a religious foundation. The object is not profit, but the benefit of the school and the realisation of its purpose. This, an offshoot of the Arnold tradition of the 'great public schools' of England, is the training of the child as a whole, body, mind, and character, with the emphasis on character, through the running of the school as a community, a miniature of the world, for life in which the child is being trained. In this, special emphasis is placed on the teaching of religion, both as a regular part of the curriculum and through its central place in the school-community context. The chapel and the personality of the headmaster or headmistress and of the staff and senior pupils (prefects or monitors) are the important factors. Only a few of these schools have no chapels.

The system hinges on right selection—of the head by the

council, and of staff and prefects by the head. This distinguishes it from the state system; for in the latter the head is appointed and moved by the central authority, which also selects his or her staff and transfers them for various reasons, of which seniority is one. Only occasionally does a head have an effective voice in these matters. Moreover, the teacher's ambition is not to be a head, but rather an inspector, or to hold some important central office. Thus less emphasis is placed on the building up of a continuing community than on the corporate school system.

An important aspect of the corporate schools is that, ideally, they are boarding schools. In practice, this means only that most of them have a nucleus of boarders, though in exceptional cases the figure varies from 50 per cent. to nearly 100 per cent. A sample of nineteen leading corporate boys' schools in Australia in 1948 had 3,793 boarders in a total of 10,720; that is, over one-third.

The corporate schools are concerned mainly with secondary education, particularly in the case of boys. The girls' schools usually provide also for, at least, the upper primary sections.

Private and corporate schools cater for approximately one-fourth of the total population of the non-government schools; that is, about 70,000 pupils. The number is not great, being only about 7 per cent. including both types. It is, of course, less still for the 'great public schools' for boys (which include, in their number of forty-five, five Roman Catholic schools), and the larger and more important corporate girls' schools. Their influence, however, is considered to be greater than the proportion of their numbers, not only because of their total aims, which centre in the word 'character', but also because—

(*a*) the pupils come mostly from families who have made good, and in many cases exercise leadership in the smaller or greater community; because—

(*b*) the parents are willing to make sacrifices in order to pay what, for many of them, are heavy fees; because—

(*c*) many leaders in professional, commercial, political, and social life come from them; and—

(*d*) not least because they are not academically selective like the government high schools, nor nearly so academically ambitious as the latter, except for special pupils. As a result they aim rather at fitting the pupil to be a good citizen and efficient in the walk of life which lies ahead of him.

The claims made for these schools are high, but are not necessarily accepted. Some of their functions are obvious. They provide boarding conditions for children from country districts, who otherwise would be deprived of at least satisfactory secondary education, and probably be limited to schooling by correspondence. The state education departments have not been able to build up a satisfactory hostel system for such children. Moreover, these

boarding schools are a world of opportunity for the lonely and difficult child and for children from broken and stressful homes. The high and rising fees, however, are a very real barrier, but it is to some extent overcome by scholarships, bursaries, and grants.

A second and more general role is the opportunity which such independent schools have for educational experiment. Each school can have its own character, with its own growing and traditional way of fulfilling its moral and intellectual function, and is not simply a unit in a centrally directed system.

The *important* experiment is to test the presupposition of most of these schools that education for the responsibilities, duties, and privileges of life must be based on religious teaching and practice. It is difficult to assess the results of the experiment. There is much uncertainty as to how to use the religious opportunity, and, of course, the work of any school is limited by the religious and moral climate of the community. But those closely associated with the 'great schools' feel that the chapel, the personal and pastoral work of the staff, the religious and moral teaching, and the corporate life, must have a good effect on the pupils and on their future roles in society. In spite of disappointments, there is much evidence to support this belief and hope that these schools make a worthwhile contribution to the moral well-being of society.

The not uncommon criticism that they are class institutions is not nearly as sound as might seem. The actual range of class within any of the corporate schools is extensive. It includes country and city; business and profession; the wealthy; and the middle-class salary earners who find the fees a difficulty. The range for day pupils is even wider, and schools vary according to region and tradition. But though a few children come from artisan and small-shopkeeper groups, there are, with a few exceptions, none from the labouring class. Moreover, whereas boys from these schools go on to the land and into professional and commercial life, they do not go into apprenticeships. In some cases the schools are a way out of the small trading and lower-middle-class state. In other words, they serve in the main the middle and upper classes, and while they cannot be dissociated completely from some degree of snobbery and social climbing, that is an unavoidable excrescence, society and man being what they are.

The *raison d'être* of these schools, however, is the conviction of the majority of parents concerned that they provide something worth paying for, which the government schools do not give. One aspect of this undoubtedly is the life-club relationship between old pupils. This is stronger than is the case of the 'old pupils'' unions of leading state secondary schools, for they arise out of the school community-life, with its core of boarders and the spirit of mutual loyalty to the school and to one another which is fostered.

It is argued, as against criticism, that social, denominational, political, and economic divisions exist apart from these schools, and not because of them; that, on the contrary, they seek to inculcate the idea of life as a vocation, which should break down the asperities of these divisions. In so far as they do this, they are performing a valuable social function.

Further, in spite of criticisms and of rising costs, the corporate schools have long waiting-lists, which increase with the increasing population, though the most constant feature of the lists is the family tradition. The decision of most States to raise the school-leaving age to 15 or 16, and the general spread of the desire for higher education since the war, create a demand which the state systems find it hard to satisfy. Here, these corporate schools, like Roman Catholic schools, are of direct assistance to the states. Whether the financial burden will prove too much for them, or whether the governments will assist them financially, as is the case with eight grammar schools in Queensland, or whether there will be some system of co-operation and collaboration with the state schools, is a problem which needs solution in the near future.

This, however, is related to another problem, fundamental in political philosophy—that of liberty in a society which strives to express equality. But equality of opportunity may be interpreted to demand the same type of primary and secondary education for all, with no selection of schools, even at the expense of parents. As against this concept, the non-government schools aim to show that liberty in education need not produce unjust privilege, but that, by increasing collaboration with the state schools, both systems will be enriched. Providing together for the education of a quarter of the school population, the Roman Catholic, corporate, and private schools stand in no uncertain manner for freedom within the general system of education for citizenship, and as a bulwark against political or bureaucratic direction in the moulding of character. In so doing they are probably also doing good service to the state education systems; certainly the latter are autonomous, and directed by very able, conscientious, and sincere democrats.

A. P. Elkin.

CHAPTER NINE

NEW ZEALAND

EDUCATION AND MORALITY

It has often been remarked that what virtues the British people have developed in the course of their journey to nationhood have tended to be of a social, ethical, and moral nature, rather than intellectual, or aesthetic, or religious. No doubt such a generalisation and such a division of human experience into discrete categories does considerable violence to the complexity of truth; yet there is a good measure of truth in it, and Tawney's often-quoted words, written when the Commonwealth was facing its severest test, well express those basic moral values which, though by no means the exclusive possession of the British, have long been cherished as lying at the very heart of their way of life.

> Good faith; tolerance; respect for opinions which we do not share; loyalty to comrades; mercy for the weak; consideration for the unfortunate; equal justice for all—the ordinary decencies and humanities of intercourse between neighbours—these things are clearly part of it. So is the power to speak freely one's own thoughts, to obey one's own conscience, to do one's duty as one sees it. So is the right of the individual to be protected against violence, whether proceeding from other individuals or from public authorities; to live under a government which he has a voice in making and unmaking; to work by all lawful means to promote the reforms and advance the causes which command his devotion, however repugnant they may be to his rulers.[1]

These are the moral and ethical values of a people which has a strong sense of community and at the same time a deep respect for the individual—of a people, indeed, which is able to afford great scope for the development of individuality precisely because of its communal unity.

It would be foolishly idealising the British to think that such values have at any time (save perhaps occasionally in times of common danger) been found evenly spread throughout the population, or to ignore the plain fact that often they have been restricted in their application to members of a particular social and economic class. It would, however, be even more foolish to ignore the fact that as ideals and as values they have gradually come to be regarded as inhering in the life of the whole community rather than merely in certain favoured sections of it.

[1] R. H. Tawney, in a letter to the *New York Sunday Times,* July 22nd, 1940.

New Zealand and the British Tradition

More than in any other colony, the main aim of those who at its founding controlled the organised settlement of New Zealand was to transplant in the Antipodes a complete and representative cross-section of British life. The aim was not uniformly held in the different settlements, nor was it exactly attained in any one of them; yet more than any other dominion, New Zealand, whose European population is 98 per cent. of British stock, feels itself to be very closely tied by bonds of affection and tradition to the 'homeland.' Little wonder, then, that the basic values of the New Zealand people are similar to those of the 'old country.' The very isolation of New Zealand during its first hundred years on the Antarctic rim of the Pacific Ocean made its pioneer settlers do everything possible to build up around them a secure social environment of traditional British ways of life to counteract the emptiness and the strangeness of their remote new home.[2] Even the breaking down of that isolation by the speed of modern transport and communication has, during the troubled twentieth century, rather strengthened than weakened these bonds. A good deal, therefore, of what would be said about the manner in which values are passed on from generation to generation in Britain, both within the school and outside its walls, would be applicable almost directly to New Zealand as well.

There are, of course, certain differences, both in the morality and in the mode of its transmission, and these, when once the basic similarities are appreciated, become an important subject of study, and indeed may be regarded as most appropriate to such an article as this. Considering first the differences in morality, we must note that when a new and sparsely settled land is being broken in, and mere handfuls of people are uprooted from their homeland and thrown together almost fortuitously to create a new society, their fate depending on the speed with which they can clear the forest, bridge the rivers, road the wastelands, break in the soil, and harvest the crops, then certain qualities get etched deep into the character. Resourcefulness and initiative, and a profound belief that the 'first things which come first' are material and practical, helpfulness, neighbourliness, a willingness to share what little one has with those with whom one's lot has willy-nilly been cast, a readiness to accept or reject strangers for their own personal qualities rather than because of their class, or status, or family connections, or religion, a belief that people should expect a fair and equal opportunity to make good, and that 'getting on' in life is a laudable ambition at all levels of society—these are pioneer charac-

[2] M. H. Holcroft's studies of New Zealand's cultural life develop this theme. See *The Deepening Stream* (Christchurch, 1940), *The Waiting Hills* (Wellington, 1943), and *Encircling Seas* (Christchurch, 1946).

teristics found among settlers of British stock in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and North America alike. Add to these the honest, simple, and unreserved democracy which can develop in a community founded at least in part by visionaries whose motives were deeply humanitarian, and in a homogeneous community free from marked class or racial inequalities, and you get an approximate picture of some of the salient features of the New Zealand character.

The Home

The main agency concerned in handing down the approved character from generation to generation has, in New Zealand, always been regarded as the home, and the quality of the home is almost always judged from this moral point of view. For in this still sparsely settled country, where the qualities of the pioneer homestead persist, the home remains a much more important social unit than it is in the highly industrialised civilisations. The typical New Zealand family even in the largest towns (Auckland, the largest, has a population of just over a quarter-million people) lives in a single-storied five-roomed house of its own, set on a sixth-acre section with a small flower garden at the front, a larger vegetable garden at the back, and enclosed by fairly high fences or hedges. Little that is comparable with the tenements of Gorbals Street or even Whitechapel Road exists in a New Zealand town. The direct and intimate influence of neighbours is less, the necessity for getting out into the streets away from the cramped quarters of a one- or two-roomed tenement seldom arises, and both parents and children normally stay at home in the evenings—except perhaps for a weekly trip to the cinema. In rural districts, of course, neighbours are more important, but they live at a distance and their direct influence on the smaller children is slight. The immediate environment of the home, therefore, is of primary importance in the moral development of the child. It would not be far wrong to say that in the last analysis the behaviour and attitudes of the parents are the determining factors in the formation of the basic morality of New Zealand children; and the New Zealand home transmits the typical New Zealand outlook on life.

When the little child first plays with other children beyond his own immediate family circle there begins a process of mutual adjustment between his own desires and those of other little children of his own age. In New Zealand this adjustment process usually goes on under the close supervision of someone's mother or father, for the earliest social play of this kind almost invariably takes place in the child's own backyard or in his neighbour's garden. This early play, therefore, is also brought directly under the influence of parents, whose standards of fair play, honesty, sharing, courage, are woven into the fabric of their

children's games. The process is not without some conflict of standards. In the rough-and-tumble of play with other children the virtues of 'standing up for oneself', of courage in the face of adversity, and of fortitude in the teeth of opposition need to be learned, and these may, and often do, stand in opposition to the more co-operative and self-sacrificing virtues of the child's own family circle. The New Zealand child and the New Zealand parent are faced by similar tensions between conflicting social virtues in this sphere as are their American middle-class counterparts, so well described by Margaret Mead.[3]

The School

Complementary to the home, even though in some cases trying to counteract its influence, is the school. During the last half-century the school has come to occupy a place of ever-increasing importance in the life of the child, as schooling has gradually been extended till now it is compulsory for all children from 7 years of age to 15. And the New Zealand school, like the New Zealand home, tends to be judged very much by the criterion of morals and ethics, though the particular moral values stressed are a development from rather than a replica of those current in the home. They concern the wider life of society more directly. In attempting to make any estimate of the moral influence of the schools, however, one must note that even within the system of state primary and secondary schools, there are varieties of approach based on differences of tradition. A simple generalisation cannot be made. If one considers also the private schools, controlled in most cases by religious bodies, the matter becomes even more complex. At the risk of over-simplification, however, I shall outline certain of the more obvious features characterising the state primary and secondary systems.

The first secondary schools for European children in the pioneer country (if we disregard the common but usually ephemeral private 'academies' which taught both the rudiments and the 'accomplishments' to those of the colonists who were well-to-do) were supported by endowments of public land in those 'Wakefield' settlements which were intended to be models of colonisation. The first was started in Canterbury, that settlement which, more than any other, sought to reproduce a slice of English social life, complete from lord and bishop down to agricultural labourer. The lord never came, and the first bishop fled the rigours of pioneering life after a few months, but the little settlement survived and early showed its faith in higher education. In 1853, three years after the founding of the settlement, Christ's College and Grammar School was endowed. The deed of foundation is an

[3] Margaret Mead, *The American Character*, pp. 93–4 (Pelican edition, 1944).

interesting document, and in the following words clearly states the school's educational aim:

> We do hereby found the said College to the honour and glory of the eternal and ever Blessed Trinity for the propagation of the most Holy Christian Religion as it is now professed and taught by the United Church of England and Ireland, and for the promotion of sound piety and useful learning, more especially within the said province of Canterbury.[4]

Anglicans were dominant in Canterbury and in several other settlements also, but a strong dissenting element could be found in many parts. In Nelson especially, the tradition of dissent was influential. Four years after the Christ's College foundation, Nelson College was incorporated. Its aim, too, was " the advancement of religion and morality, and the promotion of useful knowledge ", and it was intended to be a " Public School on the plan of the great Public Schools of England, the course of instruction to resemble as nearly as possible that of Westminster, Eton, Winchester, and Harrow." In Nelson, however, it was recognised that since the endowment had been subscribed to by people of many different faiths, special denominational teaching would be out of place, and the school was intended to be ' unsectarian.'

In many provinces, similarly, grammar schools were set up along English lines; the Scottish settlement of Otago was a notable exception, however, for here the less exclusive type of parish school with a grammar school ' top ' introduced the democratic idea of a unified primary and secondary school system. The influence of both these factors in the development of New Zealand secondary schools is important, but for different reasons. The English pattern had the greater effect in determining the nature of the schools themselves, and the Scottish pattern later (at the turn of the century) was effective in the movement towards a unified and democratic secondary system.

The English ' public school ' ideal has been pungently delineated by G. M. Young. It was the ideal of an education for an aristocracy which, unaffected by the absolutism and revolution which had altered the character of the continental aristocracies, had become a type of ruling class peculiarly English in many respects.

> . . round this type, with its canons of leadership, respect for the past, energy in the present, and no great thought for the future, Victorian England formed a new ideal, in which the insolent humanism of the eighteenth century was refined by religion, and the industrious puritanism of the early nineteenth century was mellowed by public spirit; and to disengage, to affirm and to propagate this ideal, no better instrument could have been devised than the universities and public schools, with their routine of authority and old books and their home background of country life and sport.[5]

[4] Quoted by A. G. Butchers in *Young New Zealand*, p. 160 (Dunedin, 1929).

[5] G. M. Young, *Early Victorian England*, p. 499 (London, 1934).

In many of its typical aspects the English 'public school' could not be reproduced in a colonial environment—its patrons could not be so exclusively selected, it could seldom exist as a boarding school, and it was never able to confer special privileges as the avenue to certain of the highest positions in the State. Yet many of its essential features, especially those which concern the inculcating of morality, were retained. The autocratic hierarchy of government from the headmaster and house-masters, the authoritarian prefect-government (until quite recently prefects in one school at least retained the right to cane pupils who broke certain school rules), the emphasis placed upon the ritual of the sports field, the relative neglect of scholarship, the competitiveness of the 'house' system (even when in fact no one lived in 'houses'), the inculcation of the team-spirit and the spirit of loyalty to one's team, one's house, and one's school, the importance of the 'in-group' and the rigidity of its standards—these, and many other characteristics of the English 'public school' ethic (the bad points as well as the good), were influential in setting the tone and defining the values of the New Zealand secondary school during the latter half of the nineteenth century. While the grosser aspects of the system, its barbarities and its exclusiveness, gradually fell away under the democratising influence of colonial life, many of its better features have remained.[6] Restricting our view simply to the ethical field, we may note again that especially in the corporate life of these schools and in their sports, character training has tended to be regarded as of the greatest importance. Boys who, in the game of rugby, are slow in learning to pass the ball and thus fail to give their team mates a chance to score, and boys who are afraid to get into the 'ruck' and risk a gruelling, are regarded with greater opprobrium than are the ones who cannot solve their simultaneous quadratic equations or learn their irregular verbs.

It may, I think, be fairly said, then, and it seems to me an important point to stress, that many of the moral virtues of the English 'public school', freed from any associations with a privileged class, have tended to characterise the state secondary school; and since state secondary schooling is now free and non-selective and reaches a very large proportion of the young people, there is no distinction in New Zealand between classes of people in whom the elementary school on the one hand and the secondary school on the other are intended to foster characteristically different sets of virtues suited respectively to the different stations in life to which they are likely to be called. Hence many of those virtues which were reserved in the English system for children of the 'public

[6] See J. H. Murdoch, *The High Schools of New Zealand* (N.Z. Council for Educational Research, Wellington, 1944). Chapter IV discusses the corporate life of the high schools.

schools' are fairly evenly spread throughout the population. For contemporary evidence of this, one need look no farther than the record of the New Zealand Division in the Western Desert during the North African Campaign: the ordinary soldiers of this division gained a reputation for qualities of courage, resource, initiative, and leadership, which have not seldom been regarded as the prerogative of the British officer educated in the English 'public school.'

It will have been noted that, as in Britain, morality and ethics have not been made subjects in the curriculum but have been the special responsibility of the corporate life of the school. It is typical of the New Zealand schools, as it is of the English, that they have placed little emphasis upon verbally formulated lessons in behaviour. There is, in the secondary schools, no counterpart to the teaching of philosophy found in some European schools—the *psychologie, logique,* and *morale* of the French *lycée,* for example. The learning of morality, however, permeates the whole of school life, and no school activity fails to provide opportunities for acquiring the higher values of the New Zealand community.

The primary schools, too, have always been regarded first and foremost as places where morality is inculcated. "The whole of school life should centre in character-training," said the Education Department's *Syllabus of Instruction* of 1928, and again: "Character-training should not be regarded by teachers as a subject, even though a suggestive prescription is offered in the syllabus, but rather as the principal function the state calls upon the teacher to perform." [7] The words are strongly reminiscent of that well-known passage from the *Code of Regulations* for public elementary schools in England and Wales, which is probably as familiar to New Zealand teachers as to their English colleagues, owing to the popularity of the *Handbook of Suggestions* in which it is reproduced and from which this passage is taken:

> And though their opportunities are but brief, the teachers can yet do much to lay the foundations of conduct. They can endeavour, by example and influence, aided by the sense of discipline which should pervade the school, to implant in the children habits of industry, self-control, and courageous perseverance in the face of difficulties; they can teach them to reverence what is noble, to be ready for self-sacrifice, and to strive their utmost after purity and truth; they can foster a strong sense of duty and instil in them that consideration and respect for others which must be the foundation of unselfishness and the true basis of all good manners; while the corporate life of the school, especially in the playground, should develop that instinct for fair play and for loyalty to one another which is the germ of a wider sense of honour in later life.[8]

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[7] New Zealand Education Department, *Syllabus of Instruction for Public Schools*, pp. 6, 63 (Wellington, 1928).

[8] Great Britain: Board of Education, *Handbook of Suggestions*, p. 91 (H.M.S.O., London, 1927).

Again, in the primary schools as in the secondary schools, it is mainly by indirect means rather than by formal lessons that teachers try "to form and strengthen the character." In this present century the nearest approach to formal teaching of morality has been found in lessons on temperance and health.

The advent in 1935 of the first Labour Government (which remained in office till 1949) and the holding of an International Conference of the New Education Fellowship in New Zealand in 1937 signalised the readiness of the country to embark on great changes in all aspects of school life. The influence of these upon the moral development of children will no doubt be considerable, as indeed they are intended to be. Seen from the moral point of view, their essential characteristics are these: first, that they are applying to the usual curriculum and courses of instruction the values and standards that previously were found almost solely in the sports and other corporate activities of the school—co-operative work, mutual help, and activity methods of learning; and second, that they are encouraging the individual to choose his own purposes and goals within the co-operative framework of school life by their correlative emphasis upon individualising the learning process, adapting methods to the abilities of the child, and making provision for a varied choice of subjects outside the limits of the compulsory 'common core' of instruction. There can be no doubt that these two opposite yet complementary emphases have the basic aim of creating that kind of moral character thought necessary for developing an egalitarian and democratic community.

Other Agencies

Particularly during adolescence, the influence of various voluntary social groups becomes important in the moral development of young people. Boy Scout troops and Girl Guide companies have their codes of honour, their law, and their ideals of service which leave a deep and lasting impression upon the more sensitive of their members. Bible classes and other church associations work both directly and indirectly to implant a general ethic as well as a specific doctrine or creed. Lodges and friendly societies, too, have their youth groups. All of these, in one way and another, acknowledge it to be at least part of their purpose, and often their highest purpose, to lead their young people "to fear God and honour the King." On a more mundane level, numerous sports clubs excel in keeping alive the sense of fair play and sportsmanship.

Agencies such as these, however, cannot be compared in importance with the home and the school, since they reach only a relatively small proportion of the young people, and since the influence they have even upon their own members is greatly modified by the attitude of parents and teachers towards them. What, for example, the parents think about school, church, boy scouts, the

cinema, comics, radio serials, and so on, gives the young child a 'mental set' which may either intensify or counteract their influence upon his standards of behaviour, taste, and judgment. And it has been shown that even the level of attainment a child may reach in the purely scholastic pursuits of the school may be profoundly influenced by the attitude of his home towards education.[9]

The Schools and Religion

In the secondary schools it is traditional that the day should begin with some sort of assembly of the whole school in the school hall, and that the opening should be marked by the singing of a hymn, the reading by the headmaster of a passage from the Bible, and the reciting of the Lord's Prayer. Apart from this, any other religious observances and any form of religious instruction are rare in state secondary schools. Private schools controlled by different religious denominations have their own distinctive forms of worship and religious instruction.

The state primary schools are nominally 'secular', for the *Education Act* of 1877, which founded a national, free, and compulsory primary school system, stated that the teaching should be "entirely of a secular character." In the quarter-century before this Act was passed, denominational education had been tried in several of the provinces, but as it led to great inequalities in the distribution of schools throughout the country and was uneconomic, most provinces had by 1877 developed public school systems in which only 'non-sectarian' religious teaching (in the Protestant meaning of the term) was allowed, and with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church most religious organisations had not attempted to develop their own denominational school systems parallel with the public schools. In the original draft of the Bill that was brought before Parliament it was proposed that the school day should open with the Lord's Prayer and a reading from the Bible, but since even these observances were unacceptable to the Roman Catholic, Jewish, and other religious and non-religious minorities in the community, this proposal was finally struck out.

The primary schools, then, since 1877 have in law been secular. In fact, however, many of them have never been so. It was early the practice to allow the different denominations to use the school buildings for religious instruction and worship in the hour immediately preceding the opening of the school day, for those children whose parents sent them early for the purpose. This method did not satisfy the churches—voluntary attendance was seldom high—and they looked to the compulsory schooling legislation to help

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[9] G. W. Parkyn, *Children of High Intelligence: A New Zealand Study* (N.Z.C.E.R., Wellington, 1948). Chapter 4, section 6, gives an analysis of this process in the lives of intelligent children.

swell attendances at their religious instruction classes. A loophole in the Act was soon found which virtually permitted this to be done. Clause 84, sub-section 2, stated that the school should be kept open for five days in the week for at least four hours daily, of which two in the morning and two in the afternoon had to be consecutive. The next sub-section stated that the school buildings could be used " on days and at hours other than those used for public school purposes " upon such terms as the local school committees should prescribe. In 1896 a Nelson clergyman conceived the idea of getting the Education Board of the district to reduce the customary school day once a week from five hours to four and a half hours so that religious instruction could be given to children in the first period of the normal school day through the device of not declaring the school open till religious instruction was over. The advantages were obvious: the children, by custom, were all present, except for those whose parents deliberately withdrew them from religious instruction. The legality of this so-called 'Nelson system' was naturally called into question by those who favoured the secular school, but no legal flaw could be found, and the Minister of Education had to permit it so long as any school concerned could really be regarded as closed during the period of religious instruction—that is, so long as no secular instruction was being given to other children at the same time, and so long as any usual opening ceremonies took place " between religious instruction and the commencement of secular instruction."

The Nelson system has gradually increased its coverage, until now perhaps half the public primary schools permit it. Strict legality appears, however, to have gone by the board in very many districts. Not only do schools assemble and open their day with all the children present before the visiting minister of religion takes his class, not only do all other classes continue their ordinary school work as usual, but in many cases any period during the day is allotted for the purpose of religious instruction if it is convenient to the minister and the head teacher, and in some cases the assistant teachers are required by the headmaster to be present in the room where religious instruction is taking place in order to maintain discipline. It would be fair to say, too, that after the first time a decision has been made by a school committee to permit religious instruction—when the parents are sometimes notified of the proposal—no further intimation is made, and in fact over the years the instruction has come to be regarded by many parents as part of the usual school routine. In theory, those parents who wish their children to have religious instruction knowingly send them to school at the usual time on a day when the opening of school is nominally postponed for half an hour. In fact, the children go to school as usual; if they are in a class which is being included in the visiting minister's circuit they are given religious instruction without

their parents being consulted, and in most cases probably without their parents even realising that they have the right to be consulted.

Of even more doubtful legality is the practice in many schools of getting the teachers to commence the school day with 'opening devotions'—the singing of a hymn, and the saying of the Protestant version of the Lord's Prayer. It is not possible to give figures showing just how widespread these practices are, since not all Education Boards collect the necessary information from their schools, and only one or two boards publish their figures. The Otago Education Board in its *Annual Report* for 1948 states that nearly 80 per cent. of the schools in its district made provision for either religious instruction or opening devotional exercises or both, but noted also that the number of teachers taking part voluntarily in opening devotional exercises had fallen from 310 in 1947 to 274 in 1948 (out of a total of about 700 teachers). It is probable that the figures for Otago schools would be somewhat higher than in most other districts, and in many schools only a few classes are provided for. It is likely that only about half the schools of New Zealand, and fewer than half the children, are provided for by the Nelson system in some form or other, but it is impossible to guess at the proportion in which opening devotions take place.

On many occasions since 1877 attempts have been made to alter the secular clause in the principal Education Act, but always without success. The attempts have been made by those Protestant Churches which are willing to accept an 'agreed syllabus' of religious instruction and an agreed selection of Bible passages and hymns for use in schools, and whose ministers apparently cannot reach enough schools by the Nelson system. The methods proposed have varied from time to time, but have usually been intended to get the teachers, if they are willing, to take 'unsectarian religious instruction' as a normal part of the school curriculum; children whose parents might not want them to take part would be given extra secular instruction during the period of religious instruction. The Roman Catholic attitude to the question appears always to have been that adherence on the part of Protestant Churches to a strictly interpreted Nelson system would have its support, but that it would oppose any system whereby the state school teachers might be expected to carry out such instruction, since this could lead to invidious discrimination against Roman Catholic teachers, who would not be able to take part. Since, however, the Roman Catholic Church holds that religion should permeate the whole of education, that it should not be confined to one or two school periods a week, the Roman Catholics have preferred to build up a parallel education system for themselves rather than to use state schools and the Nelson system, except in districts where they have not yet built their own schools. The attempts have been opposed by the teachers' organisations on the ground that

the way would be open to a virtual imposition of religious tests upon teachers who did not wish to take part, by parents who, while not wishing their children to attend, would not want them to face the possible social consequences of being withdrawn, and by not a small proportion of the Protestant clergy itself who fear that if 'non-sectarian' religious instruction (claimed by the Roman Catholics to be in fact 'Protestant') were introduced into the state schools the Roman Catholic Church would have a strengthened claim for government grants in aid of its own widespread system of separate schools, which now provides for 90 per cent. of its primary school children. Indeed, this last reason is probably the one which the majority of interested New Zealanders who oppose the movement would hold. If grants in aid of the Roman Catholic schools were approved, there would be no reason to withhold similar grants from any other religious bodies or private groups which might wish to establish or expand their own school systems. The result might well be the disintegration of the national public school system.

The majority of New Zealand people, when faced with the possibility of a reversion to denominational systems, show in no uncertain manner (if we may judge from the way in which successive Parliaments have voted against various Bible-in-Schools Bills) that they attach great value to the national public school. Those who know something of the sectarian animosities and the educational inequalities of earlier times see in the national system one of the most powerful means of preventing the community from being sundered by the many divisive elements, social as well as religious, within it, and oppose any measures which might lead to eventual disintegration.

Religion and Morality

From time to time, ever since the 1877 Act, the state schools are denounced as 'godless', and are charged with being therefore the cause of increasing delinquency and crime. It would probably be true to say, however, that most parents and teachers regard such statements as preposterous. Neither the name nor the concept of divinity is excluded from the ordinary teaching of the school; indeed, the 1928 *Syllabus of Instruction*, already referred to, in its section on character-training, refers to the desire for purity and beauty 'implanted by the Divine hand' in every child. The fact is that the school as such is neither more nor less unreligious than the home as such, the club as such, or than any other association of the community except the Church itself, even though it is not regarded as the place for specific worship or religious instruction. As for morality, though it is impossible to get truly comparable figures for crime and delinquency in different countries, there is reason to believe that they are not, relatively speaking, higher than

in countries where the Churches have more to do with education than they have in New Zealand. And though, too, comparable figures cannot be obtained for different periods over the past fifty years,[10] there is no evidence to show that crime and delinquency have been increasing, or that they are more commonly found among those people who went to state schools rather than to church schools.

In answer to the above line of argument, however, it is sometimes said by those who advocate a religious education that there are immoral practices of which the secular law takes no cognisance, and that an absence of crime need not betoken a freedom from sin. Most New Zealanders are still, I think, pragmatic Anglo-Saxons in their appeal to experience on matters of this kind: good and bad, as facts of behaviour, they know and understand; grace and sin are concepts which seldom strike a responsive chord. When these matters are spoken of in ordinary New Zealand homes, one usually finds that the moral judgment takes precedence over the religious one. " You can be good without going to church " is a common saying which indicates that the major value is ethical. In a community in which this point of view is dominant, a secular but none the less emphatically moral public education system is not lightly abandoned.

Conclusion

I have tended to emphasise those aspects of the nation's morality which New Zealanders feel to be in some degree praiseworthy. Such an emphasis is inevitable in an article of this kind, for the educative agencies of a society have the duty of handing on to the children only what is thought valuable. There is, of course, a seamy side to New Zealand life, and there is a lack of certain of the graces and excellence of civilised human experience. In recent years much of our literature has brought a critical spirit to bear upon some of our defects, themselves in no small degree the product of the same pioneering conditions and the same adherence to the British tradition which together have been the source of real virtues. There are parents and teachers who accept the limitations uncritically or do not see them, and there are those also who strive to improve the way of life even as they hand it on. In music, art, and literature, there are already signs that some success is being achieved: in the field of general morality, however, it is much more difficult for an individual school or home to influence the greater society beyond its walls. More powerful forces than these will have to operate in society before major moral changes can be expected.

G. W. PARKYN.

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[10] Eileen Philipp, *Juvenile Delinquency in New Zealand,* Chapter I (N.Z.C.E.R., Wellington, 1946).

CHAPTER TEN

SOUTH AFRICA

LIKE other civilised countries to-day, South Africa faces the difficult and intricate problem of moral adjustment in a rapidly changing world devastated by two world wars in one generation. Here, as elsewhere, disruptive influences are at work, and their effects on the conduct and behaviour of the younger generation are only too apparent. Were South Africa a country with a population more or less homogeneous as far as race, culture, and language are concerned, there would be nothing new for me to report in connection with moral education in our schools and other educational institutions. My account would then follow the pattern of other writers in countries where Western European civilisation and moral sanctions prevail. I should then have to tell of the unsettling effect which the machine age has on the outlook on life of the whole population, but more especially of the young; of the demoralising influence of the world wars and of the attempts made by educators, social workers, legislators, and churchmen to help the young to evolve, in an all too rapidly changing society, a behaviour pattern adapted to present social needs without discarding the moral values which are considered to be indispensable for the continuation of Western civilised society. Unfortunately, such a comparatively easy task is not mine. South Africa is inhabited not by a homogeneous population, but by a heterogeneous one, consisting of at least four well-defined racial groups at different cultural levels and with different languages, standards of values, and habits of life.

The population consists of 11,259,000 souls; of these, 2,335,000 are Europeans; 905,000 Coloureds; 7,736,000 Natives or Bantu, and 282,000 Asiatics (Indians). Even the Europeans do not constitute a homogeneous group: about a million of them are English and 1,335,000 Afrikaners. As a result of geographical features and climatic conditions, only about one-third of the area of 472,000 square miles has a sufficient rainfall for intensive cultivation. This fertile area consists of a coastal belt, about 50 miles broad in the west and expanding towards the east until it reaches a breadth of about 200 miles in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Natal. The interior, about two-thirds of the country, is of a semi-arid nature. The great bulk of the population is therefore con-

gregated in the belt of sufficient rainfall, while the interior is sparsely populated and fit only for stock-raising.

The English-speaking Europeans

The English-speaking section of the population migrated mainly from the British Isles since the conquest of the Cape by England in 1806. On their arrival they moved by preference into the towns, and later into the mining areas, where they engaged in trade and industry and formed the professional classes. Although a number of them settled as farmers in the Eastern Province of the Cape (1820) and in Natal (after 1843), they form the bulk of the European urban population and are economically the most privileged class with the highest standard of living. In Great Britain they would fall into the category of good middle and upper-middle class. From overseas they brought with them the typical British way of life, attach great importance to the educative influence of the family, the church, the school (especially the boarding-school), sport and social and civic organisations. Since 1806 their ranks have been continually strengthened by a steady stream of English-speaking immigrants from overseas. Owing to their secure economic position, their traditional urban way of life, and the steadying influence of their educational institutions, they and their children have not experienced the devastating effects of industrial and moral crises to the same extent as the other sections of the population. So far they have been able to adjust themselves to the changing conditions with a great measure of success, though not to an extent sufficient to encourage self-complacency, as their contribution to the number of European juvenile delinquents amounts to almost 50 per cent.[1]

The Afrikaans-speaking Europeans

The Afrikaners form the oldest section of the European population. They are descendants of the Dutch colonists who came to South Africa from Holland during the Dutch occupation of the Cape from 1652 to 1806. Their language, Afrikaans, is a simplified form of Dutch as it has developed in this country during the three hundred years of their sojourn here. The Afrikaner element, too, has been strengthened from time to time by immigration from Holland, from Germany, and from France (the French Huguenots in 1688). As early as 1655 some of them became 'free burghers' and began to farm in the vicinity of the settlement on the shores of Table Bay; since then the great majority of them devoted themselves to farming, moved ever farther into the interior in search of land and pasture for their stock, opened up the Orange Free State, Natal, and the

[1] *Report of the Principal, Constantia Reformatory* (Cape Town, 1950).

Transvaal to European settlement, and became predominantly the rural and farming section of the European population. Shortly after the beginning of this century, however, owing to the inability of the countryside to carry an ever-growing population, the 'trek' from the rural areas to the towns commenced, bringing a great influx of Afrikaners into the urban areas and changing the English-speaking cities and towns into bilingual communities. This Afrikaner 'trek' from the country to the towns gave rise to a number of difficult social, moral, and educational problems. The great majority of these twentieth-century 'trekkers' were poor; for various reasons they could no longer make a living on the soil. A great number of them were 'poor whites',[2] i.e. so poor that they could not support themselves or their families without the assistance of the Government or of philanthropic bodies. The change of habitat had at first a demoralising effect on the newcomer to the urban areas. His poor economic condition forced him to settle in the poorer quarters or on the borders of the city, where poor housing conditions threatened the creation of slums; as an unskilled workman he had to undertake unskilled labour and compete with the Coloured and Native whose standard of living was lower than the European's; the language of the urban areas, English, was not sufficiently familiar to him and heightened his sense of inferiority; the ways of life and habits of the city were different from his rural and patriarchal way of life, and threatened to destroy his system of values and moral standards. Thanks to the unceasing and combined efforts of the Churches, the education authorities, philanthropic and welfare organisations, municipalities, the central Government and the developing industries, the economic, cultural, and moral condition of the poorer migrants gradually improved to such an extent that to-day "we hear practically no more talk of a poor white problem."[3] This does not mean that the townward migration of Afrikaners of the poorer class has ceased. Although not so strong as during the years 1911–36, the townward drift is still continuing, but it has become a more steady and orderly stream and the towns and cities are better equipped to house the newcomers and the industries to employ them. The final result is that the big towns and cities have acquired many large and well-built suburbs inhabited by thousands of valuable and well-conducted Afrikaans-speaking citizens.

Besides this economically depressed type of Afrikaner there were two other types who took part in the trek to the urban areas: (*a*) talented young Afrikaners who did not find sufficient opportunities for intellectual development in the rural areas and came

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[2] *Report of the Carnegie Commission on the Poor White Problem in South Africa* (Pro-ecclesia Press, Stellenbosch, 1932).

[3] *Report of the Native Laws Commission, 1946–48* (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1948, p. 7).

to the cities and larger towns for further education in the universities and other educational institutions, or for employment in the urban centres; (*b*) enterprising individuals of means who found in the cities wider scope for their activities. These two types joined the professional, commercial, industrial, and employer classes. For them the process of adaptation to their new environment proved to be much easier than for the poorer section, and they soon became part of the urban community.

This does not imply, however, that everything is now well with the Afrikaner migrant to the cities, and that he is no longer faced with moral problems there. During the year 1945 no fewer than 5,481 Europeans under the age of 21 years were convicted of some crime or other.[4] As these young delinquents came mostly from the urban areas, and as the Afrikaans population was responsible for about 50 per cent. of this number, the moral conduct of the Afrikaner cannot be described as immaculate. Indeed, so concerned was the Dutch Reformed Church over the moral standard of its adherents in the cities—and most of the Afrikaners belong to this Church—that it decided in 1943 to appoint a strong committee, assisted by eminent men and women in different walks of life, to study the problems facing the Afrikaner migrants to our nine largest cities and to report what the Dutch Reformed Church could do to maintain or improve the religious and moral standards of the Afrikaners in the cities. The report was published under the title: *Kerk en Stad (Church in City)* in 1947, and makes most interesting reading. The committee stressed the fact that moral preservation and regeneration was an individual matter and that the most potent institution for influencing the individual was the family. At the Constantia Reformatory near Cape Town, for example, it was found that 92 per cent. of the European juvenile delinquents came from 'broken' homes, i.e. homes in which the relationship between the father and the mother is an unhappy one.[5] The committee further found that for the Afrikaners in the city the strongest moral anchor was the Christian religion. Throughout its history the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population has always been sincerely attached to its Bible and its Church of the Calvinistic denomination. This love of Church and Bible, the trekkers of the twentieth century carried with them into the cities, just as their ancestors, the Voortrekkers, had carried it into the wilderness a century before, when they became the pioneers of civilisation in the interior of South Africa. The committee reported that as long as this love persisted in the urban areas, it was not too difficult for the newcomers to retain the cardi-

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[4] *Report of the Penal and Prison Reform Commission, 1947* (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1947).

[5] This is the largest reformatory for European juvenile delinquents in South Africa.

nal virtues which form the basis of a Christian way of life, but once they lose their religious beliefs, their moral life is apt to be greatly impaired. The great task of the Church in the cities should therefore be to co-operate with other organisations and institutions —the school, the City Council, State departments, welfare organisations, philanthropic bodies, etc.—to build up and maintain in the homes of its adherents a healthy, Christian family life as the indispensable basis for satisfactory moral conduct. These recommendations, if acted upon, will add enormously to the responsibilities of the Dutch Reformed Church and will greatly extend the scope of its activities, which will have to be even more closely co-ordinated than they now are with all other organisations working for social and moral objectives in the cities.

I have devoted a good deal of space to the migration of the Afrikaners, because their experiences are typical of those of the other racial groups in this country. The Afrikaners initiated about 1911 the great townward drift which forms the cardinal fact in the socio-economic history of South Africa in the twentieth century. From about 1921 they were followed by the Coloureds, the Asiatics, and the Natives.[6] The movement started by them not only reduced the numbers of the rural inhabitants and changed the complexion of our big towns and cities, but also gave rise to social, economic, and moral problems which have profoundly affected the task of moral education. The problems they had to face in their new environment were fundamentally the same as the non-European migrants had to face, although to the latter these problems presented themselves in an even more ruthless form than to the Afrikaners.

The Cape Coloured People

They are the descendants of the Hottentot tribes which the Dutch colonists found in South Africa on their arrival in 1652. They were then in the stage of nomadic stock-raisers moving about the Western Province in regular migration, according to the seasons, to find pasture for their flocks and herds. In the course of time they were decimated by smallpox and other epidemics, but continually received infiltrations of fresh blood from the Bushmen (chiefly women captured in their numerous wars), from the slaves imported into the colony from the west and east coasts of Africa, from Malays exiled from Java, and from Europeans. They early came under the influence of the Europeans, to whom they attached themselves in the rising villages and especially on the farms of the colonists, whose indentured labourers they became. The process of blood infiltration and assimilation of other racial elements is still going on, so that to-day they are almost half as numerous as

[6] *Report of the Native Laws Commission*, p. 7.

the Europeans and range in colour from almost pure white to very dark; in fact, the fair-skinned Coloured person is as difficult to distinguish from the European as the dark-skinned from the Native.

As a result of their long and close association with the European population they have lost their own indigenous language and adopted the two languages of the Europeans, viz. English and Afrikaans, just as they have adopted European dress, customs, and occupations. By far the greater number of them live in the Cape Province amongst the Europeans in the villages, towns, and cities, on the farms, and in villages of their own, like Genedendal, Elim, Mamre, Abbotsdale, Bethelsdorp, etc., where they were congregated in settlements by various mission societies chiefly during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Commencing as labourers and servants of the Europeans, they have remained such to a very large extent until to-day. Owing to their dependence on the Europeans for employment, they have remained economically inferior to their employers. The cardinal fact about the Coloured people is their depressed economic position; they form the poor, and to a great extent the poverty-stricken, section of the population, with a lower standard of living than the average European. Although a small proportion of them have been able to raise themselves to the level of independent workers and to engage in professions and trades on a European standard of living, the great majority of them live as employees in the poorer quarters of the towns and in labourers' cottages on the farms. Their problems of moral conduct and social behaviour are those which usually face the poorer or submerged section of the population in most countries. Poverty and need, overcrowding and poor housing conditions, are, amongst the Coloureds, strong inducements to dishonesty, theft, drunkenness, sexual immorality, and smuggling of alcohol and dagga (a narcotic weed) to Natives.[7] The Commission of Inquiry regarding the Cape Coloured Population, in its report in 1937, found that the main moral weaknesses amongst them were the following:

(*a*) *Deleterious home influences* on the children, especially amongst the submerged minority, but also general amongst the majority of the Coloured middle class.

(*b*) *Illegitimacy and prostitution*: " It would appear that 30 to 40 per cent. of all Coloured births are illegitimate. . . . In the larger harbour cities chiefly, prostitution for gain and the poverty of the Coloured female play a role " (p. 20).

(*c*) *Juvenile delinquency*: " In a comparison which takes the re-

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[7] To protect the Natives against the baneful effects of alcohol, for which primitive races show a strong predilection, the S.A. Government has prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors to them.

lative sizes of the population into account, the rate (of juvenile delinquency) for the Coloured is more than nineteen times [8] that of the European " (p. 21).

(*d*) *Intemperance*: " Intemperance is a major factor in crime among the submerged section of the Cape Coloured. For the years 1924 to 1935 there was a yearly average of 8,518 convictions of Coloured for public drunkenness, forming 21·64 per cent. of all convictions of Coloured for the different forms of prevalent crime " (p. 23). There is no doubt that the predilection of the Coloured for alcohol is one of the root causes of his economic and social backwardness, as well as of many of his moral delinquencies.

(*e*) *Dagga smoking,* i.e. of the noxious narcotic weed *Leonotus cannabis.*

(*f*) *Theft and dishonesty*: forming 17·57 per cent. of all convictions of Coloured."

The Natives

The Natives or Bantu of South Africa form a conglomeration of diversified nationalities or tribes of dark-skinned people of the Negroid type. They speak eight different languages and show different levels of development, some of them being graduates of South African or overseas universities and others still living under comparatively primitive tribal conditions in kraals or Native villages in the Native reserves.

Like the European colonists, they were immigrants to South Africa from the north, and were moving southwards along the coastal belt when they first met the Europeans in the Eastern Province of the Cape about the year 1770. They were a vigorous, martial, nomadic people who engaged in almost incessant intertribal warfare amongst themselves and in frequent contests with the European colonists. It required almost a dozen sanguinary wars to subdue them and stop their westward march. Since the 'eighties of the nineteenth century they have been living peacefully in their reserves in the eastern coastal strip and in Transvaal and in the Orange Free State. Since their first contact with European colonists the process of Westernisation amongst them has been proceeding at an increasing pace. Under settled conditions they became cattle farmers, tillers of their own soil, and labourers on the farms and in the towns of the Europeans. Owing to the rapid increase in their numbers [9] under beneficent European administration, and to their elementary methods of farming, the reserves

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[8] This figure appears to be too high. The Penal and Prison Reform Commission, which reported in 1947, gives the following figures for persons under 21 years of age convicted in the courts of the Union during 1945: Europeans 5,481, Coloureds 10,317, which gives a ratio of 1 to 5.

[9] Three and a half millions in 1905; 7¾ millions in 1946; no reliable figures obtainable before 1905.

became incapable of supporting them all and many of them infiltrated into European areas all over South Africa. With the rapid industrialisation of this country the influx of Natives into the urban areas increased greatly since the beginning of this century, and especially since 1921,[10] and gave rise to serious social, educational, and economic problems. Work in the mines proved a great attraction, and Johannesburg was at first the goal of Native migration, but to-day every city and every big town in South Africa has its Native population and its corresponding Native problems with respect to housing, sanitation, working conditions, educational demands, etc.

For the Native, the trek from rural and tribal conditions to the urban areas has brought moral and adaptation problems of an even more bewildering and serious nature than to the European trekkers, the more so as the Native men usually go to look for work in the urban areas without taking their families with them. It is thus not surprising that the moral standard of the urbanised Natives is not high, and that criminal offences are of frequent occurrence. The moral weaknesses and delinquencies found amongst the Natives, especially the urbanised Natives, are very similar to those found amongst the Coloured people, with the addition of faction fights, riots, and crimes of violence.[11]

Asiatics

The Asiatics in South Africa consist almost entirely of Indians imported as indentured labourers by the Natal Government between the years 1860 and 1911 to work on the sugar plantations in Natal. They were mainly of the coolie type, spoke at least five different languages, and there were among them both Hindus and Muslims. On the expiration of their labour contract of five years, most of them remained in Natal and became independent workers engaging in agriculture and artisan pursuits, but especially in trade and commerce. They found South Africa a more congenial home than their own country and have greatly prospered here, both in wealth and in numbers, their annual percentage of population increase being the highest of all the ethnic groups in South Africa.[12] They now number 282,000 and have, in course of time, spread to the Transvaal (37,500) and the Cape Province (17,000). According to the *Report of the Penal and Prison Reform Commission* of 1947, 1,721 Asiatics under the age of 21 were convicted of some crime in the courts of the Union in 1945, i.e. in the ratio of 2½ to 1 as compared with European juvenile delinquents, if the

[10] *Report of the Native Laws Commission, 1946–48*, p. 7.
[11] *Report of Penal and Prison Reform Commission, 1947*, p. 6.
[12] *The Official Yearbook for the Union of S.A.* for 1946 gives the following percentages per annum based on the census returns of 1936 and 1946: Europeans 1·54; Coloureds 1·63; Natives 1·61; Asiatics 2·55.

relative sizes of the population of the two groups are taken into consideration.

Factors Influencing Moral Conduct

As a result of continual migrations, the population map of South Africa presents a variegated scene of races, nationalities, and colours, and the cities have developed a chess-board pattern, with different areas occupied by Europeans, Coloureds, Natives, Asiatics, and mixed groups adjoining each other or merging into one another.

From the above all too summary sketch of the composite and complex nature of our population and its different cultural levels, the intricate nature of moral education and the almost superhuman task facing educators, educational institutions, religious bodies, and social workers will be readily appreciated.

To get an idea of the influence which certain specific factors exert on the conduct and morals of school children, a questionnaire was sent to principal teachers and inspectors of schools and to other eminent educationists. The replies received showed a great measure of agreement on the main issues raised, and were in close agreement also with the views expressed by the Penal and Prison Reform Commission on some of these matters.[13] These may be briefly summarised here:

(1) The environment, and especially the home, exerts a very strong influence on the conduct and morals of school children.

(2) The influence of the cinema depends on the sort of film shown. Some films are of high educational and moral value, others the reverse. Children from good homes are not liable to be so adversely affected by films as children from poorer homes and environment. This is also true for adults at different stages of cultural and moral development. The Penal and Prison Reform Commision states in this connection:

> In the opinion of the Commission it would be definitely prejudicial to the general welfare, even if not ordinarily offensive to decency, to exhibit to Natives and young children pictures of nude human figures, passionate love scenes, night life, the drug habit, white slave traffic, vice or loose morals, juvenile crime, the technique of crime and criminality, brutal fighting, drunkenness and brawling, pugilistic encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans and the rough handling and ill-treatment of women and children.[14]

It may be stated here that the Board of Censors, which has to scrutinise all films before they may be exhibited, tries to protect children and less advanced sections of the population by forbidding the exhibition to them of films which are considered to be harmful to their morals.

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[13] Pp. 16–18. [14] P. 17.

A number of replies expressed the fear that too frequent visits to the cinema by children may undermine the influence of the family.

(3) The Press, which generally maintains a good moral standard in South Africa, does not seem to have a great influence on school children, although too detailed reports of crime are considered to be harmful, especially amongst the non-Europeans.

(4) Cheap literature is not much read by children, books from school libraries being preferred. Some types of comics and comic strips which circulate among children are considered to be harmful. The Penal and Prison Reform Commission gives a good summary of the consensus of enlightened opinion in these words:

> While many of these comic papers are undoubtedly dangerous and undesirable for the juvenile mind, many of them are of a higher class, the reading of which can do nothing but good to any child (p. 18).

(5) Social services and organisations do not appear to be diminishing the home influence; they rather supplement and strengthen it. For the non-Europeans an extension of such services is very desirable. Some replies indicate, however, that the school-feeding scheme is apt, in the case of some parents, to undermine their sense of responsibility towards their children.

(6) Religion is considered to be essential for the inculcation of high ideals and moral conduct. This opinion is so strongly held in South Africa, that the education authorities were recently forced by public opinion to extend the scope of religious instruction in schools and to increase the time devoted to it.

(7) The influence of the family as an educational institution is diminishing, especially in the urban areas. The chief reasons given are: poor housing conditions; a growing tendency amongst Europeans to live in flats (apartments) or hotels; circumstances which induce both parents to go out to work; selfishness and desire for pleasure of individual members of the family.

(8) Youth organisations and clubs exert a good moral influence and their numbers should be increased, especially amongst the non-Europeans.

(9) As far as moral conduct is concerned, there does not seem to be much difference between the youth of this and the youth of the past generation. The youth of to-day has a different scale of values, acts and reacts differently, but that is due to changed social conditions. The most common faults of the present generation seem to be: lack of discipline, of conscientiousness, of respect towards older people, of a sense of responsibility; desire for pleasure; looseness of relations between the two sexes; dishonesty, especially in the case of children from poor environments.

In South Africa the school, with its many and variegated extra-mural activities and its close co-operation with the home and the

Church, is undoubtedly a most potent factor in the preservation and development of moral conduct in children of school-going age. All sections of the population strongly believe in school education. There is compulsory education for all European children between the ages of 6 and 16, but not for the non-Europeans. In 1946 there were 455,000 European children, or 19·5 per cent. of the European population, at school; for the Coloureds and Asiatics the figures were 226,200, or 19 per cent.; for Natives 649,000, or 8·4 per cent.[15]

The Real Problem

It is, however, not so much in the case of the school child that the problem of moral education in its most serious aspect arises, but in the case of the juvenile who has left the school, and very often the moral shelter of his home, to find employment and make his way in life by himself. It is he who experiences the full blast of the disruptive agencies and influences of modern society. This is even more true of the Coloured juvenile, who usually leaves school at an earlier age than the European, and even still more so of the young Native, for whom employment in most cases means the loss of the protective bonds of tribal and family life and the introduction into what is for him an alien society and very often an introduction into a vicious environment. There is accordingly a strong tendency in South Africa to extend compulsory education also to the non-Europeans and to increase the educational facilities for all juveniles in the form of adult education, technical and vocational education, youth organisations and clubs, sports clubs, community centres, juvenile affairs boards, etc., and to intensify the work of welfare organisations, Churches, and other religious bodies amongst juveniles.

Moral education, however, can never be confined to some part or aspect of the individual; it is fundamentally a process of character building and has to embrace every aspect of the human being, the whole person. Every kind of influence, from whatever source it may proceed, affects the individual for good or for evil and helps to mould his character or moral self. Moral education is thus the concern, not of one or more specific institutions or agencies only, but of the whole of society in its manifold and variegated manifestations. It may be a platitude to say that if society as a whole were of a high moral standard, the rising generation would inevitably be moral also, but it is nevertheless literally true. The final goal of moral education is therefore nothing less than the evolution of the moral educative society; but this cannot be done in any other way than by and through the

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[15] *Bulletin of Educational Statistics for the Union of S.A.* (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1947).

agencies and institutions of society itself. For this reason moral education in South Africa, as in all other countries, entails the closest co-operation with the family, the school, the Church, the State with all its departments, and especially those of more specific educational significance like education, social welfare, adult education, labour, and justice; with all societies, organisations, and associations working for economic, social, and spiritual uplift. In actual practice it would mean a heightened religious and family life, better wages, improved housing conditions, extension and intensification of all educational activities, more sport and recreational facilities, more social and cultural amenities in the shape of clubs, community centres, and libraries; in other words, a task taxing to the utmost the intellectual, spiritual, and financial resources of the whole nation and of every section of it.

Much of this kind of endeavour is already going on in South Africa, and has been going on for years; but the efforts in the past have been too isolated and unco-ordinated, resulting in overlapping and waste of energy and efficiency. Co-ordination, co-operation, and systematic planning should characterise our efforts in the future.

From my all too brief and inadequate sketch of the composition of our heterogeneous population and the different cultural and economic levels at which the various sections live, the stupendous nature of the task facing South Africa may to some extent be gauged.

So far, the small European section has had to shoulder the burden practically alone. Right gallantly, and to the best of its limited powers, it has undertaken the task and achieved a measure of success which is not always acknowledged by the non-Europeans or seen in its right perspective by visitors and critics from more happily situated countries. Apart from a small number of laudable exceptions, the non-Europeans have up to now tended to make demands—often impossible of fulfilment under existing conditions—rather than to render aid; to insist on their rights rather than to shoulder their responsibilities to their own people; and vociferously to air their real or imaginary grievances rather than to co-operate in removing them.[16] It has been too often the unfortunate experience of the European section of the population to find that so many of the educated and economically rising non-Europeans are apt to rise out of their ethnic groups and to become agitators exploiting their own people for their selfish purposes instead of devoting their talents to the task of uplifting them. If moral uplift and cultural development in South Africa are to keep pace with the social and political demands of

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[16] (*a*) *Report of Commission regarding the Cape Coloured People*, p. 17; (*b*) *Report of the Native Laws Commission*, p. 19.

the non-Europeans, the time has come for the more privileged amongst them to shoulder their part of the burden and to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Europeans in this colossal task of moral and social regeneration which faces every South African, whatever his race, his colour, or his creed may be.

J. F. BURGER.

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(3) the Department of Labour.
(4) the Department of Justice.
(5) the Department of Native Affairs.

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SECTION IV

CONTINENTAL EUROPE

Introduction

No other part of the world offers so much variety of custom, language, or religion within so small an area as does Europe. The differences between peasant life in Bosnia, Albania, Southern Italy, or parts of Spain on the one hand and, say, the way of life of urban workers in the Black Country or in the Ruhr is tremendous—the contrast is almost as great as any that could be found on the planet. One thing, however, is common to all the states of Europe: everywhere the old is going and industrialisation, based upon scientific technology, is being actively embraced. But the pace of change differs and this fact, together with the varying cultural and religious traditions, complicates the situation. In addition, the past lives actively in the minds of all Europeans: old injustices and wrongs rankle, producing resentment. Every child in this Continent breathes from birth the air of the past. The result is that the problems of moral education differ from country to country, and it is very difficult to make general statements which are both true and helpful.

Some European states seem determined to maintain, during the period of change, cultural continuity with the past, and have re-affirmed their adherence to the essential principles of their traditional religion while endeavouring to adapt themselves to new situations. Others have gone towards Communism, which implies a revolutionary break. A third group of countries, which are culturally and politically divided, is attempting to work out an acceptable compromise.

In the Communist countries, best represented by the U.S.S.R., moral training is not felt by theorists or administrators to present any problem. Straightforward open indoctrination in Marxism as interpreted by the government is the accepted solution. This is not thought to be wrong because it is urged that Marxism is scientific—thus to present it as *the* truth is no worse than telling boys and girls that the earth is round. Having established a state monopoly in education, all the means of modern propaganda—radio, film, theatre, youth organisations, press, etc.—are called in to help the school to train the new generation in the Communist morality. Such single-mindedness of purpose, such co-ordination of all

agencies, produces results quite unattainable in Western Europe. Even in Spain, where the government has also attempted to re-establish the monopoly of the Catholic Church and to employ similar methods, the results are less successful. Windows and loopholes are left open: there is contact with the Western world and with the republican refugees. In other Western European lands, the governments do not attempt to monopolise education and divided control is accepted.

In France, the older Catholic tradition is challenged by more recent influences, stemming back to the *Encyclopédie* and the Revolution but reinforced by modern industrial and Socialist ideas. The population is divided in its loyalties: with important exceptions, for instance in the south, the rural areas are rather more Catholic, the industrial centres are more secularist. Many liberal-minded Catholics are endeavouring to build bridges across the gap, basing themselves on French culture and Christian morality. But right-wing Catholics and extreme secularists remain as far apart as ever they did. In these circumstances, the moral training provided in Catholic schools is in many ways different, or at least based on different assumptions, from that given in public secular institutions.

Germany presents a problem of appalling complexity. Hitler pursued a policy of moral nihilism, endeavouring to reduce all Germans to monads polarised towards his ideas. The sufferings endured by the population in the later stages of the war, the loss in battle of millions of young men, the effects—always degrading—of occupation by erstwhile enemy troops, has induced a general mood of despondency, disloyalty to all values, generalised despair. On top of all this came mass migrations westward from the Baltic countries, East Prussia, and the parts now attached to Poland. The old, historical, well-defined cultural frontiers are no more. Eastern Germany follows the Soviet pattern, whilst Western Germany is an arena in which contend Catholicism, Protestantism, Liberalism, and Marxism, all of them moderated or exasperated by American, British, and French influences. It is scarcely to be wondered at that many young Germans see in a revival of nationalism, a nationalism perhaps less aggressive than the old, the only hope for the future.

Belgium also presents a complex situation though, of course, it is far less acute and poignant than that of Germany. Among the Flemings, there is a majority of Catholics; among the Walloons, they are in the minority. This difference is intensified by that of language and of type of occupation. It is lessened by the movement of the more fertile Flemings towards the industrial Walloon provinces, which has led to some demands for Flemish-Catholic schools in French-speaking areas, and by the industrialisation of parts of Flanders and Antwerp, which helps the spread of Socialism

and secularism. Neither side is fully satisfied with the existing legal compromise and there is strong competition for the loyalties of the rising generation.

In the Netherlands, the division into Catholics, Calvinists, and secularists (Humanists) has resulted in a plurality of schools, among which three chief systems can be distinguished, though all are maintained mainly at public expense. Economic change here, too, is disturbing cultural frontiers: new factories in Catholic Brabant attract Calvinist and Socialist workers; while the reclamation of polders in the Protestant north was accompanied by the settlement of Catholic farmers on the reclaimed land. All this creates new difficulties, though one hopes it may in the end lead to closer unity.

The three Scandinavian countries alone present a stable situation. The population is homogeneous, Church and state are in harmony, the Socialists are not anti-clerical. In such happy circumstances, there is sincere agreement between all agencies which promote the moral and ethical development of the people.

EDITORS.

CHAPTER ONE

FRANCE

CHRISTIANITY AND SECULARISM [1]

(*Christianisme et Laïcité*)

In his *L'église et le monde actuel* Father de Montcheuil points out how important it is that Catholics, confronted by the modern world which they would like to christianise, should no longer seem to be intransigently intolerant, and should clear themselves of the charge of clericalism.

The difficulties must be recognised. There was a period when in Western Europe the unity of the nation seemed necessarily to involve Christian faith. Loss of faith led to excommunication from civil life itself. To-day, however, national unity belongs on the plane not of religious but of strictly natural values: it is no longer necessary for a person to have faith in order to be and to feel French. French unity admits differences of religion. As far as the nation is concerned, it is not a man's religious life that matters, but his human life as defined by his rights as man and citizen.

We may have to examine how far this change in the basis of national unity represents progress or the reverse. We have to recognise that this change has provoked a crisis, which has not yet been resolved. It is eternal values which bind a nation together far more than the entirely sensual values common to all. And it is disagreement on the fundamental aims of community life which strikes at the life of a nation.

Certainly the establishment of national bonds on a secular basis was bound to bring about a crisis in a country accustomed for centuries to identify national and religious values. Many Catholics found it all the more difficult to accept this transformation of national unity because those who provoked it often did so in an anti-religious spirit. As a result a gulf was created, a struggle was engendered, in which the emphasis fell on differences rather than on unity. The crisis of unity precipitated by the secularisation of national life is at present undoubtedly less acute, but it is not yet completely resolved. And it is just at this point that we encounter

[1] Throughout the article the authors use the term '*Laïcité*' and not '*Laïcisme*', which latter has anti-religious connotations. In English 'secularism' has not the same anti-religious background as '*laïcisme*' in French, and is, we think, the best equivalent of '*laïcité*.'—Editors.

the criticism levelled against Catholics, against many of them at least, that they have not yet understood, and have not yet sincerely accepted, the authentic values embodied in the secular state. Their instinctive reaction is to judge national affairs from an exclusively denominational point of view. For instance, they approve or denounce a national constitution less on its merits than on whether or not it affirms the rights of God. Thus they favour establishing French life (the spirit of which the constitution should express), on the basis of their material demand excluding those who do not believe in God. In electing a political candidate, they disregard his administrative ability or competence should the candidate (even though an unbeliever himself) promise them some particular denominational advantage.

They are charged with showing real interest in public affairs only when their own denominational interests are affected, thus dissociating themselves, in effect, from many public-spirited enterprises. They fail to understand genuine public activities which are not denominational. They fail to behave simply as citizens and play their part with others in the organisation of all public functions on the secular plane. Their political sympathies are attached in advance to those parties and men who, even if they do not go so far as to wish to re-establish a State Church, can at least be expected to grant the Church a privileged position enjoying the governmental influence, so powerful with the mentality of masses, exercised in her favour. In their heart of hearts many Catholics have a deep nostalgia for *Christendom* and for that sociological co-ordination of secular and religious powers which characterised mediaeval Christendom.

This widespread Catholic attitude offended and irritated by the views of a narrow secularism, and which fears any participation of believers in public life, does not appear to be solely the result of historical circumstances or of a human tradition (which is not after all of very long standing, and which might change); apparently it is enjoined by the very doctrine of the Church. It is due to this fact that the Catholics appear to be 'constitutionally' intolerant. They may find it more prudent not to press their claims, but, for all their qualifications, nuances, and distinctions, it is still true that as far as they can, the Catholics will seek to promote a state which officially affirms the rights of God and of the Catholic Church. In doing this they seem but to follow the most confident pronouncements of the Catholic hierarchy and the pressing demands of the truth which they profess. The secular state is at best a '*pis aller*' which is endured or, if you like, is frankly admitted only in a country divided by faith. In no way and in no sense is the secular state a juridical structure corresponding to a deeply human psychological need which would be recognised as such, and even demanded, by Catholics themselves.

If this is really the Catholic doctrine we must recognise a radical divergence between Catholicism and the modern outlook. We must acknowledge that the distrust of the people and politicians for clericalism is well founded. In France, at any rate, for the majority of the people it is increasingly a principle commonly admitted that the state should be secular, and that secularism is a manifestation of progress which all free men should recognise and defend. Indeed, if we wish to be sincere, we Catholics shall confess that this intransigence of principle does not altogether satisfy us and we cannot fail to sense in it the seed of intolerance. We must recognise that this attitude will always hinder any genuine and whole-hearted collaboration with our unbelieving compatriots without mental reservations and without arousing distrust. We therefore feel the need to explain and to defend our principles. We attempt to give subtle explanations without claiming to attain simple and frank clarity.

The problem is an extremely serious one, and we have to face it squarely and to analyse anew its essential terms. We may be using words which no longer correspond to the realities of our epoch. Ways of thinking change, whilst language and slogans remain the same. We know that 'secularism' (*laïcité*) can have many meanings. The cardinals and archibishops of France have pointed out some of these meanings, and commented on them from the Catholic standpoint.[2] And it must be admitted that the distinctions they make in this remarkable document represent a hitherto unequalled attempt at assimilating what human truth there is in secularism. The appeal made in this document concerning the autonomy of the human being contains the essential statement, the implications of which we shall try to elaborate here. In the first section we try to view genuine secularism in the light of the fundamental Christian truth of the freedom of the act of faith. The second section indicates why secularism, in order to remain true to itself, has need of Christians. The third section explains how the full development of Christianity is served by genuine secularism.

I

Secularism as a Juridical Expression of Freedom of the Act of Faith

When we speak of the state or national institutions as secular, we mean, strictly, that it is not necessary for the citizen to possess religious faith to live loyally without restrictions in full and complete legality of national and civil life. In other words, the domains of state and Church are sharply separated by the act of faith, that is to say by an act fundamentally free which defines the essence of freedom. The state (still more any union of nations)

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[2] *Documentation Catholique*, 1946.

expresses the whole human life outside the act of faith (or rather outside the act of freedom which decides faith). The whole order of temporal actions lies within the sphere of the state. The Church expresses the life based on the act of faith. Therefore the secular state expresses juridically the freedom of the act of faith itself. *Secularism is simply the juridical projection of the living conscience of the freedom of the religious act.* It is the guarantee of this freedom.

It is easy to understand that if the national constitution is bound up with a religious faith, those who do not profess that religion are juridically outside the nation. They disobey the state, their action lies within the jurisdiction of the state, and is punishable by state measures. This path leads logically to the Inquisition and its methods, and to wars of religion. We may stop short of pushing the view to its logical conclusion, but we do so only by disregarding the letter of the law. Thus, religious orders have been able at times to live quite freely in France which does not recognise them. This situation, however, is not normal. It is desirable that the law itself should protect the freedom of citizens and that this should not depend solely on the goodwill of governments or of public opinion. But if we admit that the essence of a secular state lies in this protection, then we are able to understand certain statements (remarkable at a first glance) which have appeared under signatures and auspices both authoritative and worthy of respect.

" The secular state in its spirit represents the realisation of a Christian postulate: respect for conscience, and the tolerance resulting therefrom." [3] We must bring these assertions to their logical conclusion. The principle of this secularism was stated by Christ when he said: " Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." This was affirmed by Jean Rollin in *Les Études* of October 1946: " Secularism appears to conform exactly to the evangelical principle distinguishing God and Caesar." The principle of a secular state was introduced by Christianity when it asserted itself as essentially supernatural, proceeding from on high, irreducible to human efforts. Before Christianity such precise distinction between the state and religion would not have been possible. The state was religious, but not through the recognition of a supernatural sphere out of its own reach. On the contrary, by reducing religious sentiment to Eros—the human striving towards divinity—the state looked upon religion as within its own sphere. The state included religion. The Emperor was the *Pontifex Maximus*. Christianity alone made possible the distinction between state and Church because it placed itself above the state, answering man's strivings from on high.

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[3] M. Garail, *Pour une école nouvelle*, p. 11.

Its originality lay in the fact that it permitted religion its own development whilst letting the state find its true domain. It is striking how little positive help Saint Paul expected from the state in his preaching of the gospel.

But between us and St. Paul have come Constantine, Charlemagne, and the Christendom of the Middle Ages. And whether, as under Constantine, the Church was integrated with the Empire, at the same time safeguarding its spiritual supremacy, or whether, as at the time of the Barbarians and the fall of the Roman world, the Empire was integrated in the Church, whilst safeguarding its freedom in lesser services; in each case there was a sociological co-ordination between the Church and the state. Two social bodies co-ordinated their institutions for their mutual advantage in such a way as to make participation in both societies obligatory. Such co-ordination, as Cardinal Suhard reminded us,[4] could not exist without mutual confusion and 'intrusions.' Now, this centuries-long fusion of the two societies remains for many Catholics the ideal situation. They cannot think of it without nostalgia; it gives concrete form to that messianic spirit which is latent in the hearts of all men. This state of mind is, moreover, the more understandable in that the sociological co-ordination of the two societies has been followed by a progressive separation of powers which could only deprive the Catholic religion of that privileged temporal position which it possessed in Christendom, and which only too often developed into a struggle ending in opposition and negation. For a long time this prevented Catholics from perceiving the illusions which lay concealed in the idea of Christendom. We may now quote Cardinal Suhard:

> This confusion of the Church with Christendom is the origin of all historical maladjustments. . . . It is also the source of a serious illusion which takes two forms. One is the belief that Christianity prospered in former times because it officially entered into the life of peoples. The other is the belief that the Church has failed because her human work never attained a stable and definitive order.

These illusions have prevented Catholics from recognising the kernel of Christian truth concealed behind the anti-religious façade of secularism. That truth constituted its true strength, and Catholic resistance to it has given the appearance of a continual succession of withdrawals. These illusions have also prevented the Catholics from understanding how this conception of religious freedom, which is an integral part of the Christian heritage, could be more decisively strengthened and safeguarded by a distinction between the two powers. As man gained increasing understanding of his position in this world, as he was forced more and more to depend on his own judgment, and as the national community became increasingly the natural setting for his spiritual life, so the

[4] *Essor ou déclin de l'église*, p. 24, note 1.

idea of secularism inevitably gained favour with him. The Catholic of our time can and must recognise this historical necessity. He must recognise that, far from meaning a step backwards, the secular state can and should mean a step in the right direction. The secular state expresses in its institutions the victory of the idea of religious liberty; it corresponds to a civilisation which is acutely conscious of this liberty, and thus of the originality of this religion.

We understand quite well that secularism in its Western European form has worn other aspects than this. It has often been a counter-religion. But it has then been false to its own essence—to that inner flame which has been its unconquerable driving-force. If Catholics of our time wish to act upon a mentality of which secularism is one of the main elements, it is important to extricate the positive element in secularism in its purity, which perhaps Catholics will recognise as having been given to humanity by Christ himself.

Genuine secularism, far from being an expression of totalitarianism, is much more a defining and acceptance by the state of its own limitations. In this way the state recognises that it has no competence to interfere with the most fundamental liberties of the human spirit. The state does not look upon itself as a means necessary for the ultimate end of the spirit. *A truly secular state would be the least totalitarian of states,*[5] because a totalitarian state claims to represent the whole of man's spiritual life. A secular state, in so far as it is secular, stops short in front of the most free and decisive affirmation of man and thus by definition forbids itself to be totalitarian. If a secular state were to reject all denominational frameworks only in order to impose upon its citizens a ' religion of man ', in fact enforcing its decision on the freedom of man, it would not be truly secular, but religious.

This ideal secularism may be called neutrality in so far as it abjures any decision about the form man's life shall take other than the decision guaranteeing religious freedom; it is the neutrality of choice. But it is not a neutrality based upon ignorance and still less upon contempt. On the contrary, the secular state is conscious of being entirely at the service of the freedom of the human spirit. The secular state believes that the nation of which it is the ' authority ' is essentially a medium for making possible the development of the human spirit and the exercise of human freedom. It affirms, therefore, that the supreme human activity, of which it is a servant, is the act of a free conscience; and the whole role of such a state consists in rendering the exercise of the conscience and of freedom possible. But it cannot ignore the fact that the supreme act of freedom is an act

[5] J. Maritain, *L'Education à la croisée des chemins*, pp. 204–6.

by which man faces the problem of his destiny. The societies in which the answers to this problem take shape have always been religious. Thus the answer to that problem is essentially of a religious order, a religious act itself. Indeed the secular state, if conscious of its secularism, should recognise that national life culminates in a religious problem, that the ultimate concern of religious societies is on a higher level than its own, and that its own task is but to prepare potential members of these societies. It is no part of its task to ensure that its citizens adhere to any particular religious faith. But it is its duty to provide for all men conditions of development, of knowledge, and of freedom that will enable them to face up to religious problems in a ready and enlightened manner.[6] Thus it is obvious that denial of all religious belief is still an act of religion, because for man it is a choice of his destiny. For a secular state 'free thought' should be outside the religious problem; it should already be an answer. What the Church cannot accept is a state which makes it difficult for man to face the religious problem with understanding and to solve it with complete independence, a state in which only a man of genius would be able to understand the importance of the religious problem and in which one would need heroic qualities in order to solve it in accordance with one's conception of the truth.

It is evident, therefore, that the state in its laws should take account of religious groups not only by protecting the natural order against their encroachments (and in particular by defending human freedom against possible oppression by clericalism), but also by ensuring the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. It should be vigilant in providing facilities for the exercise of their spiritual mission. Nor can it ignore the relative importance for its citizens of different religious faiths, or try to treat them as if they were all equally important. In this respect it is bound to be guided by the facts of the situation while remembering that this situation may change under conditions of freedom. The preference accorded to a particular religion, however, should be based on its relative importance within the national community and not on any recognition of its 'truth.' The decision should rest on sociological facts, not on spiritual principles.

Secularism as we conceive it does not seem to be directly visualised and defined in the Declaration of the Cardinals and Archbishops of January 6th, 1946. But it would have the great advantage that it would enable Catholics who accepted it to avoid all reproaches of duplicity and intolerance. This secularism should not be merely tolerated, it should be defended in the name of Christianity itself; believers and unbelievers alike can find room in

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[6] René Hubert, *Traité de pédagogie generale*, pp. 449, 490, and 593.

it to live in a national community open to the possibility of diverse religious lives.

The Catholic, however, anxious to conform loyally to the authentic demands of his creed, would perhaps like to assure himself rather more carefully that this secularism does not run counter to the declared principles of his Church. He has still one qualm left. This applies even to Father Montcheuil: after long discussion he remains convinced that the Christian state [7] is an ideal to be attained on earth and that the secular state is therefore a step backwards. This scruple is understandable. In the course of the struggles of the nineteenth century we have grown accustomed to withdraw into a fortified intellectual strongpoint where we felt secure. This strongpoint is the distinction between the thesis and the hypothesis. It is only a construction of apologists, but it protected the riches which the Church will never abandon. It is always dangerous for the besieged to attempt a sortie in order to seek refuge in another citadel. But it may be necessary if a breach has been made in the defences, and it becomes still more necessary when the enemy has abandoned the siege and life has returned to the plain. What use is it then to live on a fortified hill, or to hold ourselves apart from life still? Perhaps life needs us; and we certainly have need of it in order to make incarnate the spiritual values of which we are the trustees. To assure ourselves that we can safely come down from our sheltered position and take up a 'missionary' role, let us analyse in more detail the theory of the thesis and the hypothesis. The thesis is what the Church would regard as *the ideal terrestrial situation,* which Catholics should try to bring about on this earth. It would be the situation in which the Catholic religion, shared by all or at least by a large majority, is the religion of the state. The hypothesis is the state of affairs the Church finds actually existing, in which it recognises differences of religious opinion which make it impossible to establish Catholicism as the state religion. In this hypothesis the Church asks only for universal freedom of belief; she is reconciled to being no state religion; and even demands that there should be none. It is not enough for the Church merely to realise that it does not possess adequate power to impose a state religion; this would be mere opportunism. It is respect for religious freedom which motivates the Church's behaviour; the Church holds, in effect, that religion must be practised freely, and that the pressure which would be exerted by a denominational state on unbelievers would violate religious freedom. However, the 'hypothesis' remains an imperfect situation, a *pis aller* which perhaps should be accepted and even defended here and now; it cannot be considered ideal.

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[7] By Christian state we mean denominational state.

I. How can one accept as ideal this difference of opinion on the most serious problem man can face? This difference implies that some are in error; it always leads to a fratricidal struggle of one kind or another. The ideal is the union of all minds in truth. And since for a Catholic truth is to be found only in Catholicism—the ideal is the union of all minds in the Catholic faith. To regard the hypothesis as the ideal would mean crediting ignorance and error with all the merits of truth. It would mean that all religious attitudes are valid and that error has the same right to exist as truth. Only a sceptic can accept this difference as ideal.

II. How can one accept as ideal a situation in which religion is regarded in practice as a private matter, with no participation in religious life by the community as a whole? Human reality is at once personal and communal, we know that well at present. Religion must express both these aspects of human reality, and therefore a religion without social manifestations can be only a makeshift.

III. Finally, how can one accept as ideal a situation in which human values themselves are endangered? "Societies which do not recognise God and Christ, which do not seek the help of the Holy Church, cannot in practice understand or respect the true rights of human beings." [8] That is, they do not understand the true purpose of human existence, that which constitutes its real greatness. Certainly the state has its own purpose—the natural welfare of its members. But this purpose is incompletely understood unless it is recognised as service of the act of Christian faith. This does not mean that ignorance of the spiritual (religious) order entails misunderstanding of the temporal (natural) order and therefore inability to serve it truly.[9] But it does mean that the free act of faith is in danger. The facts here in our secularised Christian West speak for themselves. It would be hard to prove that this must necessarily be the case, and that man without religion cannot exist for long. In fact freedom is given to us for religious action, and the worship which realises that freedom in practice is faith in Christ. Only through this worship can the value and the grandeur of freedom be understood. It is therefore the Christian who has above all else a motive for respecting that liberty which was created so that we may respond to God's love. Those who mistake the purpose of freedom cannot appreciate it fully or understand its true greatness. While freedom expands when it is offered to God, it contracts and hardens when the gift is withheld, because its inner purpose is violated. It is in danger of transferring its efforts to lower aims. The state without religion will direct

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[8] Lallement, *Principes d'action catholique,* p. 98. See also the Encyclical of Pius XI, *Mit Brennender Sorge, Actes* XVI, p. 88.

[9] J. Vialatoux, *Morale et politique,* pp. 112–22.

public welfare towards purely temporal and material ends, towards the possession of the world, and will risk undervaluing the essential human freedoms, if anyone opposes its temporal aims on conscientious grounds.

Would it not therefore be better to stand our ground and say: the reunion of all in the true faith remains the terrestrial ideal for Catholics. Father Montcheuil thus summarises the conditions on which state religion [10] would be acceptable: "If the nation were united round Catholicism it would demand of its own accord that the state, which represents it, should accept its public worship of God." That would be the ideal situation. It is in this sense that state religion is desirable as the union of minds is desirable. But it does not follow at all that under present conditions, where the nation is divided in its beliefs, Catholics must try to get the state to practise official worship. Such worship is worthless unless the state which puts it into effect represents at least broadly speaking the unanimous feeling of the nation. If the Church were to succeed in reuniting mankind in the one faith "there would no longer be a place for that freedom of conscience, which nobody would wish to claim, because all would have agreed to surrender themselves freely to God in submission to the one religious authority." Furthermore, it is by means of a priesthood, subject to no outside interference, that the Catholics must try to bring about this spiritual unity, and, as a result, a state religion.

It seems clear that these conclusions cannot but offend still more the Catholic who, out of religious faith, would safeguard more zealously, rather than suppressing, the meaning of freedom of belief. If even Father Montcheuil could not show that our doctrine and our steadfast faith must carry us farther than anyone in our respect for liberty, this shows that Catholics have not yet abandoned as their terrestrial ideal of Church the re-establishment of a temporal Christendom, in imitation of Constantine or Innocent III.

Father Montcheuil therefore supposes that a nation which is unanimously Catholic "will itself demand that the state, which represents it, should render to God a public worship." That would lead in effect to this Catholic nation having no other notion of freedom than this, which is the present situation with the nations which are almost unanimously Catholic. But let us imagine a nation which has accepted the idea of secularism, as set forth above, and which sees, in the nation represented by the state, solely a medium which should "create truly human conditions and thus create without seeking favourable ground for religious action" and will not transcend its role. In that case, knowing that the state claims no jurisdiction over man's freedom of worship, the whole nation will unite in unanimous vigilance, on the one hand,

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 166.

to keep the state to its true role, and on the other hand, to safeguard liberty of belief.

For this freedom would be doubly violated if a nation made up almost entirely of Catholics were to decree a state religion. On the one hand the small minority of unbelievers, which is admitted to be present, would have good cause to complain at seeing their public activities given a denominational character. Admittedly they would be able to continue to be unbelievers, and they would not be obliged to take part in official religious ceremonies. But it is a violation of freedom if there is a flagrant discord between what the nation has the right to demand of them and the legal provisions. We have already mentioned that the religious orders in France are able to enjoy many liberties, even when their existence is legally prohibited. But this discrepancy between the law and actual practice is not ideal, and it is always better to safeguard freedom by a text of law.

Yet, even if absolutely everyone had accepted the faith, freedom of belief would still be violated. For faith freely accepted can be freely lost, and this human freedom to lose one's faith is no part of the state's judgment. If a single human being were to lose his faith in this officially Catholic state, his religious freedom would be immediately restricted. Without doubt he will have every chance of being treated as an enemy of society in a nation which, by the hypothesis, has not yet a notion of freedom.

It must be understood that if the problem is to be posed in accordance with truth, it must be posed on the plane of freedom, because the truth it is concerned with (the truth of faith) involves essentially freedom of the act which it protects. It is said that: " Error has no rights ", or " The ideal is the union of minds acting freely." It is well understood that the Catholic has a reason for desiring a society explicitly Christian, that he thinks his faith alone contains the 'truth' which saves souls and terrestrial societies as well. But the Catholic has also a reason for not desiring a denominational state: his love of religious freedom, which he knows can be secured legally only by a distinction between the Church and the state, and his desire to safeguard the *originality* of the act of faith, which is expressed and guaranteed solely by the total originality of the Church, answering from on high to a state limited to expressing, here below, the freedom open to man. And whilst the intellectual ideal of the union of minds is a distant ideal of which we must say with Father Vermeersh [11] that perhaps " its perfect realisation does not belong to this world ", and of which Joseph Folliet [12] affirms that it is " a myth in a sorelain sense destined to direct the thought and action of the faithful and not a plan realisable once for all in history ", the ideal of respect for

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[11] *La Tolérance*, 1912, p. 281. [12] *Les Chrétiens au carrefour*, p. 107.

freedom is, on the contrary, an immediate ideal, which can be realised every day in regard to the liberties around us, struggling to discover its purpose. Again, viewed in terms of thesis and hypothesis, the acceptance of the hypothesis had strongly the appearance of a manoeuvre or compromise in face of a scepticism which places all religions on the same footing, and of only half-hearted support for tolerance from Catholics. On the other hand, viewed in terms of freedom, there can be no bargaining or compromise; through standing firm by the whole truth as the only means of saving the nations themselves, all the conditions necessary for freedom of belief are maintained out of respect for this freedom. And therefore, *the most tolerant are not the most sceptical, but those who most value freedom.* We have seen, and we shall see again, that they are those who believe, and believe in love. Authentic secularism contains no germ of ' doctrinal liberalism ', it in no way holds that all religions are valid. It asserts simply freedom of the act of faith.[13] Thus, when we hold that the thesis (the Christian state) can be realised in this world as a Christian ideal, we deny religious freedom and fall into temporal ' messianism ', which is the perpetual temptation of the religious man.[14] Certainly the division of minds is an evil, and Christians must strive to lessen it by apostolic means. But just as to try to prevent error from ever arising is to stifle the inner spirit, and in effect, to make it impossible to discover truth, so to try to prevent heresy (or unbelief) by banishing it from the life of the nation is to destroy freedom itself and the value of the surrender implied in worship.

Let us be more precise: it would be fruitless as well as objectionable to force the conscience to live in an open secularism which is not yet acceptable to it. It is only permissible and advisable to work to produce the state of mind in which such acceptance is possible. The narrowly secularist attitude can delay this result by provoking a healthy reaction from the faithful. We should not reproach Christians in such countries with returning to state clericalism and the Inquisition. They are a part of a general outlook which belongs to their opponents as well as to themselves. But we must believe that progress is represented by a state of mind in which religious freedom and the distinction between Church and state are better understood. Consequently we believe that our negation of a denominational state which promulgates a state religion has nothing in common with the doctrinal liberalism which is condemned. It might have seemed such to the nineteenth century when the promoters of secularism were militant unbelievers intent on the destruction of the Christian faith itself. To-day it

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[13] See also M. Mourret, *Le mouvement catholique en France de 1830 à 1850*, p. 230.

[14] See H. Dumery, *Les trois tentations de l'apostolat moderne*, pp. 121–56.

could be no more than a sign of respect for freedom of Christian belief, as has already been recognised by the authentic Catholics whom we mentioned above.

Meanwhile we must answer all the arguments on which the thesis of the Christian state rests, and discover the motives underlying the efforts of those Catholics who wish to rebuild Christendom or to christianise the state. It will at once be asked: how can we allow religion to be considered as a private affair with no possibility of any communal act of worship? It is true that narrow secularism (*laïcisme*) has made out that religion is a matter for private conviction and refused to have anything to do with it or even to allow for it on the social plane. Such a standpoint is absurd. But secularism properly understood does not consider religion a private affair; it understands that religion is also a communal and social activity, and as a result it recognises religious communities and assures them freedom of their cult. It merely lays down that this religious community is not the nation, but the Church. The Church is the society which is the outward expression of religious faith, or if you like it is the Church which is the community of believers. Communal acts of worship belong to the Church and not to the nation. Religion is expressed by actions of the Church and not by actions of the state. The relation between private and social activities has nothing to do with the matter; and this brings us back to the real question: are the activities of the nation purely an expression of natural human existence, or should they also be an expression of the supernatural life? [15] However, one can imagine the questions arising whether a particular knowledge of and worship of God does not belong to the natural order, and so ought not to give rise to a particular national religious liturgy. If the state is the expression of natural spiritual life, and if this life asserts a belief in God, the state must assert that belief officially. The answer is not as simple as it might seem. It supposes that it has already been possible to define the exact knowledge of God which man can arrive at through reason alone.

If we reaffirm our former definition of freedom, our answer will suppose that it has been possible to state precisely the knowledge of God to which necessity of reason must lead and the knowledge of God arrived at through the freedom of faith. For here again freedom constitutes the parting of the ways. On the one hand there is a God known perforce through a *necessary* act into which the question of freedom does not enter, and in which we are simply concerned with understanding the true nature of our spiritual life. On the other hand there is God known freely through an act of

[15] Here we may add that in and through Christian worship, national intentions may be offered to God. It is the Christian community within the nation which worships God in the name of the nation. *Domine salvam fac rempublicam.*

worship of which freedom is an intrinsic part, because this act must recognise the final aim of spiritual life, and that it is either a withholding or a surrender in response to a prior gift. Here we cannot put forward an answer which would be a complete theodicy. Let us only say: we other believers are strongly inclined to think that there is no difference whatever between the God of reason, affirmed necessarily, and the God of faith, affirmed freely. We enjoy our spiritual riches without always being sufficiently aware of their originality, because through family tradition and the catechism, we have found (at one and the same time) both the God of reason and the God of revelation. It appears to us—and the way in which apologists' manuals and theologians' treatises present the problem serves only to confirm us in our opinion—that the God of revelation is merely a little more exactly and a little more intimately known than the God of reason. Thus the God of Abraham, the original revelation of the faith, the revival, the new birth which represents the life of faith, the decisive importance of the act of faith, all these receive inadequate expression.

Let us follow the dialectics of Thomist argument. They claim that their logic is inescapable because it is the law of the mind itself, the law of intelligibility (causality, finality) which is at work within it. One could, moreover, apply the same dialectics in defining the act of thought itself. No matter. What is attained is the Absolute, as the source of all contingencies, as the source of all that is not absolute . . . *Et hoc omnes appelant Deum.* And this Absolute is what all men call God, indeed! But it is a long way from this Absolute to the Heavenly Father of whom Jesus tells us. It is the whole difference between posing a problem and solving it. The God of reason is a God who forces himself upon us; because the idea of the Absolute necessarily forces itself upon the mind as an expression of its most essential and intimate law. The intellect cannot avoid it. . . . Yet for the free soul this Absolute poses the problem rather than resolves it, because the free soul cannot be content with an answer to the problem of his existence which has been 'forced' upon him. The God of reason, moreover, would not, as such, know how to profit from the exact intuitions by which the light of faith sometimes illumines him.

The dialectics of the proofs of God have come to us from our contingent individuality; they have led us to the recognition and affirmation of an Absolute. The Absolute under the name of God is recognised with certitude. But this God, in the light of our freedom, constitutes a problem. Thus for the free soul, it is after the 'proof of God' that the problem of God is dramatically posed. It is posed in all its acuteness when to this soul, thus stirred to the depths of its free nature, there is presented, through the mediation of Christ and his Church, that gift of God which seeks a freely given answer. It is necessarily reason which presents the problem

of the Absolute to the free mind. But only faith, freely held, resolves this problem in all its fullness.

It appears to us, therefore, that secularism can and must pose the problem of God, thus leading to an understanding of the greatness of our spiritual destiny and awakening the soul to its greatest responsibility. But it can go no farther. It remains to be seen what kind of attitude this 'natural religion' implies. One thing seems clear to us: the child brought up in this atmosphere of secularism would have that sense of mystery and of the divine which always possesses man when he approaches the depths of his own being. The child would have a respect for existing religions, knowing that they give answers to this problem of God. It would have a religious uneasiness. . . We do not see what special form this necessary 'religion' could take. It seems that no one is anxious to attend some festival of the Supreme Being. What is natural religion but the 'natural character' (necessary) of religion? It expresses this problem so deeply rooted in the human spirit, which finds no true answer save through revelation.[16]

We should understand, better than they themselves, the uneasiness of the creators of the secular school, who retained duties towards God in their curriculum—it is difficult to find material for a secular curriculum if the truths comprised in religion are not to be included. It appeared to them a violation of freedom even to speak of God, for whom it was a question of giving one's life freely. For this God, in fact, is already the Christian God. On the other hand, we understand also the uneasiness of those who wanted to preserve the spiritual character of the secular school. By excluding from the curriculum the duties towards God they feel that they have excluded all that makes for the greatness and soundness of moral education. And even after it has incorporated aspects of religion in its curriculum, the secular school seems to have left out the most important element of spiritual reality: the soul confronting the mystery of the Absolute, the sense of mystery and of the divine. And yet it is possible, by an objective consideration of the relations between nature and the supernatural, to frame a curriculum for the secular school which would safeguard at the same time the demands of freedom and of the spirit, both in their necessary nature and in their free accomplishment.

II

Christians and the Rise of Secularism

There is still one objection which we have not answered. It is said that societies which do not recognise God and Christ cannot respect man fully, in fact or in law. We know it is necessary to

[16] See Mgr. Ancel, *Le sentiment religieux* (*Essor*, July 1949).

make distinctions here, but if it is a question of nations, which, on the whole, have returned a free and negative answer to the problem of God, we cannot deny the catastrophe which will overtake the whole human order through this violation of what appears to us, as believers, the essential in human reality. Thus *aporia* is posed in all its acuteness. If the national institutions are Christian, freedom is felt to be violated. But if the institutions refuse to be Christian, they very soon cease to be simply and entirely human.

It is quite clear that the *aporia* cannot be resolved except by conceiving an intermediate situation: in which the national institutions, without being denominational themselves, are not hostile to the different denominations, but ultimately allow everyone to solve for himself the problem of being or not being Christian. Even so, we can, and must, ask what are the conditions in which national institutions can maintain this just balance. The answer to this question will complete the precise definition of the attitude towards secularism which we suggest.

The secular state can remain truly human, thus always leading up to the problem of God (in other words, man's basic spiritual problem), only if believers actively participate in it. Indeed, their role is not only to endure it, but to desire it, to be among its resolute defenders.

Put it like this: true secularism will exist only when Catholics and all believers are there to establish it, or, more precisely, to perfect and justify it. The authentic realisation of secularism ought to be the work of those, i.e. the Christians, for whom free faith in God implies the corollary of rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Secularism will be a good thing when it is the Catholics themselves who are working to bring it about. Not on their own, for there would be a danger, psychologically, of their unintentionally colouring temporal institutions with their faith. But if they are absent there is a danger of unbelievers colouring with their unbelief and their scepticism those institutions which should express the wholeness of the spirit.

It is therefore good to have a blend, with believers and unbelievers collaborating in this very aim of establishing institutions which encourage freedom of worship and freedom for the soul to choose its ultimate destiny. We are not saying that this blend would be entirely good; it would be better if all were believers. But in human life on this earth this blend is the *milieu* in which liberty will be able to develop. The co-ordination of Church and state, which can no longer be sociological (working by direct co-ordination between institutions), must become 'moral', and work through the medium of the consciences of those who take part in the two social bodies. (This co-ordination will be expressed juridically by concordats.)

What a pity it would be if Catholics were to continue to leave

to unbelievers the monopoly of defending and organising the secular state. Now that the term (and the reality) are tending to lose their former anti-religious connotation, let us try to find the element of truth which should be even more precious to the Catholic than to the unbeliever. Let us repeat—if the Catholic is right to desire an explicitly Christian society, it is because he believes that the only true answer to the problem of God is the Catholic answer. But he believes also that this answer has no value unless it is free: that the Church ought to wish for and the state ought to guarantee this freedom and that the secularism of the state is precisely the recognition by the state of this freedom. That is why the Catholic is right to wish that the state should not answer this question itself.

The desire for secularism joins, in all of us, with love of freedom. But, as we have already said, because Catholics understand better the value of freedom, because they know the ultimate love to which it is directed, they are the ones who should most love everything which promotes this freedom. It is no longer a question of saying that true secularism is acceptable to the Church. This is taking a purely negative attitude. It looks like withdrawing under fire, and putting a cheerful face on it. It supposes that Catholics do not really want secularism, and just endure it, all the while waiting for the day when they can suppress it in the name of their religion. We must say, on the contrary, that true secularism is ardently desired by Christianity, for the benefits it offers both to human civilisation and to spiritual life.

We have just explained why secularism without the participation of believers is in danger of being only the denial of religion and even of man himself. The Church has often led the march of civilisation. Later the nations, having acquired more consciousness of themselves, have taken as their own responsibility the work of civilisation. This is a good thing, because only on a national basis could this work be properly developed. But the reverse is also possible. Profane values and institutions develop without or in opposition to the Church; for instance, social reforms. But the time then comes when the Church must step in to prevent these values from closing in upon themselves, thus hindering man's growth. The Church thus saves these values, and restores sanity and balance to these truths, without which they go mad. It is a tragedy if the Church is not there, or if she gets there too late. The Church, or rather the Christians, can work in the temporal sphere to keep it open to the supernatural.

One cannot fail to understand the gravity of the evolution which takes place in our presence, if it involves man's attainment of his spiritual majority, and the penetration of political forms and individual consciousness by a more profound sense of freedom. But does not this represent for man the temptation of earthly paradise,

arising afresh in a world controlled by science, and having a sense of mastery over things, and animals, and his own body? When man judges his position and knows himself free so to judge, will he choose to find his freedom in God, or will he proudly turn in upon himself?

If the Christians are not there, alongside tempted humanity, to represent the voice of God; if they refuse, moreover, to be tempted themselves (having surmounted temptation through the power of Christ within them); if they refuse to be found like their fellow-men (being outside the sin) how can humanity reject this temptation? Through the bankruptcy of Christians themselves, humanity will have sinned and fallen. In one sense the downfall of secular civilisation is always brought about by Christians—by their absence, or by their retreat into a fortress well protected against secularism. If the salt is lacking, how is secular civilisation to be preserved? [17]

That is why the many criticisms levelled by Catholics against secular institutions, against national institutions, may be turned in accusing the Catholics themselves. Some particular public institutions are permeated by a narrow and anti-religious secularism. This is true. But how should they be otherwise? Who are those who up to the present have been responsible for these institutions? Unbelievers, anti-religious almost to a man! How can you hope that such institutions should be open to religion? You know well that without religion man ceases to be a complete man. You Catholics, have you made the effort, a persevering and a joint effort, to 'save' this profane public institution in order to make it not actually Christian, but open to Christianity? You have been much more preoccupied with safeguarding your profane denominational institutions in opposition to profane public institutions. By this you have no doubt saved Christian souls, weak souls in particular, but you have lost in the process all public spirit. And the result, after such great effort, is "France country of Missions." *Haec opportebat facere sed illa non omittere.* A realistic religious policy does not consider only the dangers resulting from loss of denominational institutions, but also those resulting from refusal to participate in public profane institutions. Because of their mission (*vos estis sal terrae, lux mundi*), Christians are always to blame when they withdraw themselves from those who do not know Christ.

However, one protest can and should be made. It is not the fault of the Catholics if they have not been able to take part in profane institutions. Actually in many fields the wish to exclude Christians from public affairs is still apparent, although not officially. This is undeniable and it seems pointless to waste time in fixing the responsibility for it so late in the day. It is not worth while

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[17] See the *Epistle to Diognète.*

going over what has already happened except when it conduces to an understanding of the problem which can be useful in directing future action.

Now, at present, our outlook has changed; we are all much closer to desiring this open secularism, of which we have spoken, than we were fifty years ago. Certainly the game of the anti-religious parties will always be to keep the Church in the fortified retreat of her ‘ denominational work.’ What surer means could there be of preventing the Church from re-entering national life to establish there an open secularism? But we must not be duped any longer by these tactics. Without rashly destroying our fortified positions, we can best hear the call, unconscious perhaps but nevertheless real, of a nation deprived too long of the active presence of Christians. And we can now secure excellent points of vantage from which to advance our cause. We must become defenders of the true secularism, which defends freedom. If we are sincere it will quickly become apparent that much more than the Communist, the Christian lives in an atmosphere of freedom and carries that freedom with him.

We have already said there is no question of rashly leaving our fortified positions. On the one hand, this open secularism does not yet exist; on the other hand, many minds educated in a purely denominational atmosphere could not breathe the air of open secularism. But it is a question of knowing where we are going, what we want to do, and what we want to get ready for the day after to-morrow. The worst policy undoubtedly is that of the week's allowance—purely defensive and with no constructive plan. The policy which visualises only the preservation and augmentation of Catholic strongpoints, regarding this as an ideal in this world, instead of working at the same time to make the public secular atmosphere one which would be desirable for everyone—such a policy belongs to another age and leads to political and religious catastrophe. The present position is untenable. Firstly, the secular atmosphere has permeated everything, and the only means of protection are becoming more and more ineffective and are leading to still more dangerous crises. Secondly, public affairs have more and more need of us if they are not to founder in antihumanism. Catholics must return fully to public life in all its aspects, carrying the banner of freedom, not of mystical liberalism, and under the device of secularism.

We can and we must enlarge our horizon by looking beyond the frontiers of France. For we know that many men outside our own country, wishing to escape the materialism of the Great Powers, look towards France, traditionally the country of freedom. Perhaps our country, whilst unable to shoulder political responsibilities of the first magnitude, because of temporal weakness, could nevertheless bring to the world a sense of universal order, a common

foundation on which all men could unite. If France could unite round this open secularism, which means respect for freedom, she would at the same time give the world an example which is anxiously waited for.

III

Secularism and the Rise of Christianity

But it must be said, all the same, that in establishing a true secularism, both the Church and faith would find their place. If the state during the past centuries has seemed to 'gain upon the Church', the Church also 'gained upon the state.' If the Church is no longer protected, it is no longer subservient. In so far as bishops no longer possess political influence, they are no longer subject to political authority. We often underestimate the value of the liberties which the Church has gained from the state which has disowned it: the free promulgation of Pontifical Letters and the nomination of bishops. And how many of those freedoms which we proudly claim to-day would have been unthinkable in the days before secularisation. If the Church had to choose, we do not believe it would easily give up the advantages which secularisation has brought it, however imperfect the latter may still seem.

But we must go farther. One of the things which has weighed upon the Church has been the need to concern itself too often with many activities profane in themselves (in the first place through the default of the state, later through custom or through anxiety about the danger to which souls are exposed by a false secularism). These activities have at times taken on too much the character of worldly power and, since the rise of modern nations, have caused her to fall into a certain dependence on profane powers. Christ has already experienced this temptation; He rejected it: "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?" [18] We ought more often to meditate on this text in order to keep our apostolate in line with Christ's true mission! We often seem to be unaware of the spirit in which we are expending our efforts, our time, our money, on activities which are Catholic by convention but actually profane in themselves, while specifically Christian activities are neglected. We do not sufficiently judge our activities in terms of human souls and their spiritual suffering. Why, for instance, is it so difficult to interest Catholics in religious instruction for its own sake, without any political implication, or to unite them in action for an essentially religious end such as that of securing the time necessary for this religious instruction? Many, however, feel uneasy.

How many priests bewail their inability to spend more than a small part of their time in prayer, in preaching the word of God (and in preparing for this preaching), in confession, in visiting the

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[18] St. Luke xii. 14.

sick, in spiritual education with militant secularists? They are forced not only to 'serve at the tables' of charity (which 'is not reason'—Acts vi. 3, 4), but to devote from 50 to 75 per cent. of their priestly life to finding money, organising local fairs, teaching French or mathematics, supervising cinema shows, preparing conferences, etc. Oh, what a change there would be in the potentialities of the Church if all priests could wear not the mask of the man of affairs, preoccupied with worldly activities, but the aspect of a man of religion, recollected, always ready to answer a soul in distress! For too often they cannot. We mean that the occupations with which they are burdened are such, and often so worldly, that it would take an heroic soul to serve the cause of spiritual progress in spite of such an excess of activities. And heroism cannot be the general rule.[19]

Nothing, absolutely nothing, no appearance to the contrary, no proliferation of worldly activities, could compensate for the meagreness of that truly spiritual activity for which the Church has been ordained. That is why, if a true secularism could relieve the Church of these worldly activities which would no longer be dangerous to its children, the gains would be enormous. Yes, nothing is more important for the Church than freedom from obviously world anxieties, so that it can conserve all its strength for preaching its message of faith, hope, and charity. Everything which facilitates this liberation (and therefore all strivings for an open secularism) works towards the true good of the Church. Everything which hinders this (and therefore all failure to strive for this open secularism) decreases the true efficacy of the Church.

Those who have their finger on the true pulse of the Christian people, and know its real needs and desires, were not surprised at the enormous stir which the letter of Cardinal Suhard[20] created. It was one of the great spiritual events of 1947. One can say with certainty that no intervention on an educational or even a social question would so have stirred the active majority of Christian people. But it was concerned with truly supernatural directives such as no other authority can try to put forward. Specific directives given to Christians in a missionary spirit, and at the same time in a spirit of liberation from temporal concerns. "You are in the world, but not of the world." Here men's souls have found what their desire for Christian obedience was waiting for. This reaction on the part of Christians is sound. The Church is still in danger of failing in her mission, which belongs essentially to the supernatural claim, by failing to preach the Gospel sufficiently, as well as by failing to intervene sufficiently in social questions, where its official interventions are increasingly tricky,

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[19] See L'abbé Michonneau, *Paroisse-" Communauté missionnaire "*.
[20] *Essor ou déclin de l'Eglise.*

and risk losing in spiritual import all they try to embody in precise formulation. Precision is the work of laymen. (Here we are not speaking of the influence of the Christian doctrine exercised by Christians working in the temporal sphere.)

Certainly, as was rightly pointed out in *Masses ouvrières* [21] in June 1947, the transformation from a consecrated Christianity to a worldly Christianity will require Christians of strong personality; they will no longer be able to rely on the influence of their surroundings; they will have, on the contrary, often to react against their environment and always actively to influence it. The Christian community, the Church, will have to help them to acquire a more personal faith, a well-tried faith, of the same quality as the faith of the catechumens before the time of sacramental Christendom, when adherence to the Church was a highly personal act. But do we regard it as a bad thing that the Church should have to fit its followers to withstand the forces of unbelief?

This nostalgia for Christendom has in it also an element of reluctance to take upon ourselves the responsibility for our faith. "When everybody thinks as I do, I do not have to examine my own ideas critically, but when some people disagree with me, I am compelled to make the foundations of my thought secure; and my ideas draw light and power from this critical examination."

Minds brought up under difficult circumstances, and trained to be able to live under such circumstances, are likely to be stronger than those brought up in a sheltered atmosphere, *especially when life in a completely sheltered atmosphere is no longer possible for anybody.* And of the advantages that the Church would gain from a secular world, not the least would be that of being led to demand from her followers a freer and more enlightened devotion, and to direct all the education given to her children not so much towards mere preservation of faith as towards the creation of a faith strong, virile, daring, conscious of evil, and conscious that the love which faith brings with it is stronger than evil—*haec est victoria quae vincit mundum, fides nostra.*[22] To the extent that worldly anxieties are eliminated, spiritual cares will inevitably come to the fore, and will run less risk of being neglected. We are not competent to give further and more specific examples. But we are fully qualified, as faithful laymen, to give voice to the profound need we feel for a thorough-going spiritual quality in our clergy.

It is perhaps in the field of religious instruction that we can foresee most clearly the immense advantage which the preaching of the faith would derive from an authentic secularism which freed the Church from its present scruples. As faithful Christians and as fathers of families, we have the experience which entitles us to

[21] Pp. 26, 31–2.

[22] Encyclicae '*Acerbo Nimis*' of Pius X, *Actes* II, pp. 79–83. Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, Pius XI, *Actes* XII, p. 278.

speak of the misery of religious ignorance, and therefore of the primary importance for the Church of truly religious instruction by means of the sermon and the catechism.[23]

Perhaps the reader has already objected that we are urging the Church to 'disincarnate' itself, a course which would seem to be the last thing appropriate to our time. But this objection rests upon a complete misconception of the nature and implications of that open secularism which we are defending. We must say, on the contrary, that this secularism is an essential condition for the Church to be able to become incarnate, *according to its own nature*, as salt and leaven, which are not in one part of food or of the loaf only, but everywhere and nowhere, making the loaf rise and giving it shape.

Indeed, what would be the result of letting ourselves be led by what may be called the spirit of Christendom? *La Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, September 1945, told us quite candidly. Catholics are inclined to isolate themselves so as to realise their ideal of Christendom better. They have lost all hope of being able to breathe the general atmosphere, and still more of making this atmosphere more fit to breathe. They try to create a world apart, where they can live without too much danger. But in this way they cease to be either 'salt' or 'leaven' of the masses. They have deserted their post. "I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world." [24] In this absence of the Catholics lies the great and irreparable evil. Besides, the Catholic activities thus set in motion, apart from the others, draw in for most of the time only a small minority of citizens. They cannot avoid taking part in the surrounding environment, far more than the environment takes part in their activities, merely by the law of interaction of forces. And as, on the one hand, Catholic activities of a merely self-preservative kind have not succeeded in training strong souls, tempered in struggle; and on the other hand, they have left worldly activities to develop along their own secular lines, with the result that human values are endangered (as we have seen), so there is a decline in spiritual values on both levels. Everybody can judge for himself the truth of our observations by studying the programmes of our Catholic cinemas and by seeing the films which they are reduced to showing.

Far from leading to a withdrawal of the Church 'out of this world', the frank acceptance of secularism is a necessary condition for the true, effective, and ordered development of real Christian activity within this world. First of all, this Christian faith will be at work in the heart of every true Christian active in the affairs of this world. As the Christian combines with his fellow-citizens in

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[23] See L'abbé Colomb, '*Pour un catechisme éfficace*'.
[24] St. John xvii. 15.

the joint work of elaborating, preserving, and developing all worldly institutions, his faith will prevent these worldly, secular institutions from becoming corrupted. It is he who will keep alive that spiritual force in man, to which only faith can give enlightenment, confidence, and charity. Thanks to him, secular institutions will remain an open medium, favourable to the blossoming of Christian life. He will play the genuine role of 'salt' and 'leaven.' And through him, without any violation of freedom, secularism will soon feel anew the benefits of faith. This Christian does not implicate his Church as an institution; he does not take part in a Catholic 'movement'; but he personally participates, sometimes with danger to himself, in the worldly environment, and by his activity regenerates an organism of religious formation, which undoubtedly is the role of *l'Action catholique.*

To sum up, it is for the Church to solve two problems. First, among the 'works' actually suggested for the activities of the Church, which should be retained, which developed, and which left to secular organisation? Secondly, among the works recognised as the Church's province, which should be reserved for the priests and which should be alloted to the laymen of *l'Action catholique?* And it is evident that candid and clear acceptance of open secularism is necessary for the complete solution of these problems (especially the first); so that the Church may be able to act within the world of to-day with maximum spiritual freedom and efficacy.

So it seems that all we wish for is expressed in the post-communion of the mass of Sovereign Pontiffs: *Ut Ecclesia tua incrementa libertatis accipiet et in religionis integrate persistet.*

JOSEPH VIALATOUX.
ANDRÉ LATREILLE.

Note.—(1) This article appeared in French in *Esprit*, October 1949, and with the approval of the authors was translated for the YEAR BOOK OF EDUCATION. Most of the footnotes were omitted for lack of space, otherwise the text is unchanged.

(2) The authors have asked us to call the readers' attention to a note which was prefixed to their article in the review *Esprit* and which, they think, was not sufficiently taken into consideration.

In the note, they clearly specified that the ideas advanced in their article refer to the secularism of the *state*, and do not in the least claim to suggest any practical solution concerning the schools question. On the other hand, as the editors of *Esprit* have made it clear, the authors of the article " do not agree with every one of our views concerning the peaceful settlement of the problem". The article was presented by *Esprit* as " an entirely independent publication ".

EDITORS.

PART II: SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION IN ALSACE

THE present state of schools and education in the French province of Alsace and Upper Lorraine is the direct result of the succession of historical vicissitudes which have affected the destinies of these regions. To this it must be added that in no other part of France have local traditions, especially religious and political traditions, been so carefully handed down. Alsace and Moselle have clung to their habits of life and thought with an ardour all the greater because they have found in this fidelity to themselves a way of resisting the ascendancy which others wished to gain over them. French royalty had experience of this at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), and Germany to an even greater degree after 1871 and 1940. This phenomenon is, moreover, much more highly developed in Alsace than in Upper Lorraine. This latter region is in reality merely a part of the whole province of Lorraine. Only a very small portion of it is German-speaking, and Metz is a town as ardently French as Nancy. Moreover, if the character of a people becomes crystallised at the time of its greatest prosperity and greatest prestige, this period was for Lorraine in the eighteenth century (at which time the moral influence of France was at its height), but for Alsace it was during the fifty years which extend over the last part of the fifteenth century and the first years of the sixteenth century. These facts of long ago must be borne in mind if the present state of cultural problems is to be understood.

Two essential facts characterise this period of greatness. Even at the end of the sixteenth century Alsace had not emerged from the phase of feudal organisation. The country was divided up into principalities and free towns which were united to the Germanic Holy Roman Empire only by a very loose bond of obedience, which imposed no limitations on the self-government of the cities. Then there was a further division between Catholics and Protestant (and very small Jewish communities), but, with Martin Bucer, Alsace and Strasbourg played a part of the highest importance in the growth and propagation of the Reformation. The intellectual life of Strasbourg extended its influence on the development of all ideas which arose throughout the Rhineland from Bâle, from Geneva, from Zürich as far as the Low Countries. Lutheranism spoke to a wider audience than did Calvinism, at least this is true of the enlightened middle classes of the towns, whilst the ordinary people of the countryside were held in closer obedience to Catholicism. At an earlier date the towns of Alsace had played a large part in the spreading of the Humanism of the

Renaissance. This twofold influence shows itself in the development of schools in general and in the creation at Strasbourg of the *Gymnasium* founded by Johann Sturm.

The occupation of Alsace by Louis XIV brought with it no fundamental change in the way of thought of the country, nor in its institutions. In the course of the three centuries which followed, the middle classes of the towns learnt to speak French and became interested in all things French because at that time the language and culture of France enjoyed, in that class of society, throughout Europe, an incomparable prestige. But hardly any changes were made in local institutions, and kings recognised the fact that in Alsace such things were to be approached with extreme prudence. The religious toleration, in particular, which reigned in the whole region between Catholics and Protestants was not greatly affected.

Alsace attached itself all the more fervently to revolutionary ideas since the principle of liberty, of which they made so much use, seemed a further guarantee for the protection of local customs. The prestige of Napoleon gave the finishing touch. Nor, until 1870, did the Paris Government make any great effort to make Alsace more French. On the other hand, from 1871 to 1918, the Germans did their utmost to spread German ideas, and the only result of their attempts was the awakening of a keener national feeling directed towards France. Since 1918 France has introduced legislation only to a very small extent in the restored provinces. In particular, until 1940, the effort to spread the French language among the lower classes has been limited by the bilingual character retained by the schools. It is only since 1945 that German ceased to be taught in primary schools on an equal footing with French, and it is by no means sure that this exclusion can be continued for a long period. The chief argument in favour of excluding German is that from 1940 to 1945 the Germans forbade the use and teaching of French and that there must be some compensation for this break. But many Alsatians—or at least the political groups which guide them—say that they are eager to keep the advantages of their twofold culture, Germanic and French, and their desire to be bilingual seems to them one of the clearest ways of showing fidelity to local traditions and to the character of their province. This is the true meaning of what has been called Alsatian theories of autonomy: the wish to preserve certain specifically Alsatian characteristics and, in consequence, certain specifically Alsatian institutions, while at the same time forming part of the French provinces as a whole. It goes without saying that this tendency, especially firmly rooted in municipal affairs, has been known at times to cause friction when in contact with a legislation steeped through and through, since the monarchy, in a spirit of centralising unity.

The clearer outward expression of this divergence is apparent in

the system of education. Alsace still lives under the regime of the Concordat, abolished in France itself since the beginning of the twentieth century. The Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religions are given official recognition, clergy are considered civil servants and are paid by the state. It follows that education, at nearly every stage, is denominational in Alsace. In all the other regions of France public education is entirely divorced from religion and favours no one particular sect. The most recent Constitution even lays down the principle that schools should not come under the control of religious bodies. If parents wish their children to receive religious instruction (in secondary education, in *lycées* and *collèges*), they must make a special request. In Alsace such special requests are for children to be excused from such instruction. The result is that at the primary stage, at least, the influence of the ministers of the various sects on the young people at school, and at times on their teachers, is considerable. Religious instruction is included in the curriculum and teachers are bound to give it. It even happens that in addition to their school duties they take an active part in religious ceremonies.

The terms of the statute governing schools are laid out in the Falloux law (passed at the time of the great reaction against the revolution of 1848), and in France itself most of the provisions of this law have since been repealed. The curricula of the different types of schools are the same as in other parts of France (except for the continuance of religious teaching), but the normal schools in which teachers are trained are denominational. To be just it must be added that during the last few years a certain tolerance has arisen. The student teachers may ask—for reasons of conscience—not to attend the religious classes, just as the teachers who are no longer believers in their religion may ask not to take these classes. They are then replaced by the clergy. But in Alsace these dispensations are asked for by only a very small number of people.

Secondary education has the same structure as elsewhere, with its three types of *collèges*: classical (Latin and Greek), modern (based on the sciences and modern languages), and technical (in which technological training is allied to a general culture of as high a standard as that in the modern schools). Three series of certificates of education gauge the level reached and open the doors to the schools of advanced studies, both scientific and technical (faculties, national schools for advanced engineering). It is noticeable that there is a rapid falling off in numbers of students of the classics, especially Greek (a lasting influence of the time of the German occupation when they were neglected). This is a reflection of the tendency towards directly utilitarian ends of a people turning by choice towards commercial and industrial occupations, and the attachment, traditional in France, to studies which bring in little financial reward does little to restrain them.

Higher education is represented by university faculties and institutes. Strasbourg is the only town in France in which there are seven faculties. Two of these are Faculties of Theology; one of Catholic Theology and the other Protestant, then there are the Faculties of Political Law and Science, of Medicine, of Science, of Arts, and of Pharmacy. To these must be added a considerable number of university institutes in which more especially scientific research is carried on: canon law, nuclear research, the National School of Advanced Chemical Studies, a centre of Germanic studies (which works in connection with the army), political studies. In addition, and also linked with the University of Strasbourg, there is the National School for Advanced Petroleum Studies, which, until the war, was housed in Strasbourg itself and transferred in 1945 to the outskirts of Paris, to Rueil Malmaison. A large staff allows the university to provide teaching and to carry on research, but the number of French students, who come almost exclusively from the two departments of Upper and Lower Rhineland, does not exceed 5,000. It is true that Strasbourg is in a position to receive many foreign students, especially for the study of the Germanic, English, and Slavonic languages.

Technical and vocational education in Alsace owes its high degree of development in particular to the fact that apprentices have been trained in the factories and workshops themselves for a longer time than in those districts in which the great industrial revolution of the last seventy-five years has caused more radical changes. Here, too, the feeling for tradition has played its part. This education is of three different levels; there are centres for vocational training for workmen which cater for adolescents from the age of 14 or 15 to 17 or 18; there are technical colleges whose purpose is the training of the future minor officials who will take their place among the workpeople and in commercial undertakings. Here, side by side with the technical training, is found an education of general cultural value of the same standard as that given in other *collèges*. Finally, there are national schools and normal schools for the training of teachers which take young men and women who already hold general certificates of education and which train engineers or teachers intended for technical schools. Alongside the vocational training centres are numerous schools for further education (*écoles de perfectionnement*), which are attended by adolescents who work as apprentices in private firms and receive in addition general education for eight hours a week. However, it must be noted that the development of these centres, even if regarded with favour by large industrial firms, of which in any case there are not very many in Alsace, meets with serious opposition on the part of the artisans, who prefer the schools for further education (*écoles de perfectionnement*) which are more consistent and in keeping with their local customs. A certain

technological conservatism resists the spreading of methods of work and of organisation of production which might bring with them fundamental changes in the industrial structure. This shows a state of mind induced by moral and social causes which is disquieting from the economic point of view, since it might result in the small industrial firms, which still predominate in Alsace, finding themselves in a position of marked inferiority in the face of competition from the great industrial countries which surround the province.

In addition, further education on leaving school for all adolescents from 14 to 18 has been made compulsory by the authorities of the two departments of Alsace for a few hours a week. The purpose of this further education is chiefly to further the young people's general knowledge and to give them a more thorough grasp of the French language, which is often but imperfectly known.

Numerous complementary organisations work outside the schools with the same aims: centres of artistic and dramatic culture, circulating libraries, societies for reading and for lectures, French clubs for the spreading of the language, etc. Finally, there are holiday camps, which each year allow several thousand Alsatian children to be sent during the months of August and September to other parts of France.

Having sketched in the outlines and described the structure of education in Alsace, it now remains to attempt a characterisation of the actual state of the schools system as it works and in its results. This appreciation is made the more difficult because of the impact of special circumstances brought about by the war and foreign occupation.

However, from the intellectual point of view, the position in Alsace would be at least as satisfactory as in the rest of the country if teachers were not confronted by the fact that children learn the national language exactly as if it were a foreign language. It is true that the pupils show a lively intelligence, a great desire to learn, and especially to learn French. Yet it is easy to imagine the difficulties met by teachers dealing with children of 5 or 6 who can speak only a dialect, Germanic in origin, concrete, without grammar, and varying from one locality to another. Under such conditions, to teach them the rudiments of the language, reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, and all the other branches of knowledge, however elementary, is an almost superhuman task. It is rendered the more difficult by the fact that there is no question of abolishing the dialect! It would be madness in any case to try to do this. It would also be opposed to all traditions of French liberalism. The problem is not to make French the child's mother tongue but to make it a language which is no longer foreign and which may become in the course of time as familiar as a mother tongue.

Nor must one lose sight of the fact, which it is useless to hide, that

this policy of a national language meets, if not with actual resistance, at least with limitations. Religious instruction, which finds a place in the curriculum, as a result of a custom grown up through long years of teaching given by the clergy, is not always given in French, and for the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg there is a natural affinity between the ritualistic practices (chanting of psalms) and the language of Luther. In another sphere, local political thought feels some mistrust for a language whose clarity and precision make easy an approach to a critical outlook. Finally, there is the solidarity between generations which makes old people want to be understood by their young ones and not to see disappear the ways of speech which were their own. Economic interests add their weight, for it is expedient that one should be able to understand the neighbouring peoples with whom trade is carried on.

For these reasons, efforts have been made to maintain bilingualism and, in the form in which it has been carried on between the two wars, it is understandable and worthy of respect from many points of view. Yet twenty years' experience would support the opinion that in practice the result has been that the majority of children who do not go beyond the stage of primary education do not succeed in speaking either French or German correctly. It is a pedagogical heresy to demand that a child between the ages of 6 and 14—here one must except the minority who have not been brought up in a local dialect—should begin to learn two foreign languages simultaneously. I think that no educationist could bring himself to admit that this is a sound method of building and unifying a child's intelligence. In point of fact this situation only too often ends in making the Alsatian adolescent the victim of a real inferiority complex where language is concerned, with regard to both German and French; this feeling drives him in upon himself all the more, and he clings all the more desperately to the local customs of his ancestors.

To turn from actual teaching to moral education: Is the situation in Alsace and are the results obtained by the schools the same, better, or worse than those elsewhere? Many will be inclined to think that a moral education grafted on to religion and impregnated by it, since religious instruction forms part of the curriculum and is obligatory for nearly every child, must allow an especially high level to be reached: religious dogmas support ethical precepts, examples are there to support one's choice in practice, the way of life itself implies a more rigorous and more carefully guarded conformity, especially in a province over which are scattered hamlets and small towns in which all the inhabitants know each other and watch each other under the strict eye of their pastor.

Yet it is difficult to answer the question thus framed. First, because the minds of the young people of Alsace were subjected to

the pernicious influence of the doctrines of Hitler during the five years of Nazi occupation. To all those causes which have everywhere brought about a demoralisation of youth, in the case of Alsace must be added the sight of scornful pride, of enforced lies, of the necessary mistrust felt by everybody for everybody else, and sometimes things that were even worse. Moreover, to assess the influence of religion on morality one ought to be able to measure what the latter would be if it were not dominated by the former. The opinion has sometimes been expressed that, taking into account the forcefulness of temperaments, the individuality of characters, and the bitterness of the resulting antagonisms, the loss of Alsace to Christianity would inevitably bring about a lowering of the common ethical standards. Finally, one ought to discriminate between the different religious groups—Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish; between the different social groups—the middle classes in the towns and the middle classes in the country districts, workmen and peasants; between the different workers—city dwellers occupied in factories and business houses, countrymen spending their days in the fields, in the vineyards, or in the forests. The inquiry would be difficult and judgment must be reserved.

Yet it seems that a general impression stands out: the children of Alsace are by nature neither better nor worse than those elsewhere. Experience would seem to indicate that it is difficult to ascertain whether there is a relationship between religion and morality. The reason for this is no doubt that religion, because of its official nature, has taken on a formal, ritualistic, highly heteronomous character which means that it shapes customs, conventions, and outward appearances more than it fashions the deep inner life of men's conscience. The separation of the Churches from the state in France itself did not only result in harmful effects for the different religions. It has also meant for them an emancipation by which they have profited, with the result that they have a more refining and exalting influence on the soul. Moreover, among generations brought up under a secular regime there has grown up quite a strong feeling of intimate liberty and at the same time of moral autonomy and personal responsibility. Children are destined to become men, and men are, on the whole, what their education has made of them. If one excepts the lofty natures which, with the support of religion, can raise themselves to the heights, it would not appear that the average Alsatian gives evidence of exceptional moral qualities. Neither family virtues, nor scrupulous honesty in social dealings, nor eagerness for work and absolute probity in carrying it out are qualities found to be more highly developed in Alsace than in many other provinces. Nor is it certain that the great importance attached to conformity, from which comes the fear of possible scandal which might be harmful to the interests of the group, helps to raise the standards governing the life of the

individual; yet it is here that true morality is found. Once more, this is only a question of a general impression which would have to be verified by detailed inquiries and doubtless accompanied by the necessary statistical data.

However that may be, in conclusion this justice at least must be done to the teachers of Alsace. Confronted by a particularly difficult task, they show that they are inspired by a desire to do the right thing, urged on by a spirit of devotion and generosity. To these qualities it is only just to pay the tribute they deserve. Many school teachers are believers, Catholics and Protestants, who illustrate beyond doubt the truth of the aphorism that a sincere faith is a faith which acts. The nuns of Ribeauvillé especially, who conduct a certain number of schools for the general public, have been at all times not only model teachers but eager propagandists in spreading the language and spirit of France. Among teachers imbued with the secular outlook the love of their calling mingled with the love of children produces the same results.

René Hubert.

CHAPTER TWO

BELGIUM

Data of the Problem

THE problem which is to be considered in this article is found in a more complex form in Belgium than in the other countries of Western Europe. There are several reasons for this fact, and it is essential for these to be pointed out, for they lead to the very heart of the problem.

Owing to its geographical position, Belgium comes under different influences. As far as methods of teaching and pedagogical ideas are concerned, Belgium stands at the meeting-place of the French influence (conception of the humanities and of secondary education in general), of the Germanic influence, Switzerland, Germany, Holland (conception of pre-school and primary education), of the Nordic influence (with regard to manual work and physical education), and of the Anglo-Saxon influence (ideas of self-government and the 'new' type of schools).

Throughout the course of its history Belgium has been affected by its more powerful neighbours, and has found its true autonomy only for periods which have sometimes been short. In considering the last twenty-five years the student of pedagogical history will notice that in 1918 Belgium adopted the ideas of France, in 1945 those of England, and has acquired certain pedagogical ideas from this contact with two great nations. Since 1950 we see a return to a truly Belgian position, in that the traditional influence of France is once more predominant. This is shown by the successful introduction of the pedagogical methods in favour at Sèvres.

As far as its social development is concerned, Belgium forms a nation in which land is divided into small properties. Prince Kropotkin pointed out as early as the beginning of this century that Belgian Socialists were trying to become landowners and that the working class had the same mentality as the lower middle class. This need to possess passes easily from landed properties to people. Until recently, parents preferred to send their children to day rather than boarding schools. Another reason for the small number of boarding schools is that, in a country the size of Belgium, there are never great distances to be travelled, and in any case the transport system is good. This situation is to a certain extent changing because of the increase in numbers of only

children and the splitting up of families caused when parents have to work away from home. Immediately after the Second World War Belgium experienced a prosperity unknown to other countries, a fact which helped to stabilise pedagogical ideas. Ideas, notice, not organisation of schools.

Finally, the psychology of the people must also be taken into consideration. Belgium is a country in which common sense reigns along with realism, a love of work and sociability. Belgians rise in protest against extremist pedagogical methods because they are sensible people who prefer concrete reality to Utopia.

But through its great educationists, such as Dr. Decroly, its school and university pedagogical institutes, its plan of studies of 1936 and the revision of its educational system, Belgium has raised itself in the matter of pedagogy to a European and world level.

These four aspects supply the data of the problem to be considered in this article. They are complementary. For example, would this European and international level have been reached if Belgium were not at a crossroads geographically and historically? These data fix the exact limits of the general situation, of which the broad outlines stand out as follows:

(*a*) Belgians are individualists, but are building up a democracy in harmony with their conception of liberty.

(*b*) They fiercely oppose any threat to their independence while at the same time coming under the influence of foreign countries.

(*c*) They are building up their autonomy while clinging to their traditions and common-sense ideas.

These main features reappear in moral educational theories on a national scale.

Particular Aspects of the Problem

The content and form of moral education in Belgium are the direct outcome of the revolution of 1830 and of the resulting constitution.

Under Dutch rule, between the years 1815 and 1830, an educational system had been built up remarkable for the period. The revolution overthrew this system and replaced it by a conception of educational liberty peculiar to itself. Side by side with an independent system of Catholic inspiration there developed an official system.

The struggle for a secular educational system succeeded at a later date in Belgium than in France. It found, first in the Liberal Party, later in the Socialist Party, and above all in the Educational League (*Ligue de l'Enseignement*) (a close imitation of the Dutch Society *Voor't Nul Van't Algemeen*), ardent defenders. They contended that an independent educational system ought not to be subsidised. Immediately after the war of 1914–18, independent Catholic schools were nevertheless financed with the support of

the parties of the left who, later, had to grant further concessions.

These facts bring about important results, which lead us into the very centre of the problem examined in this short article.

The main points of this problem can be enumerated as follows:

(1) The official educational system is considered *neutral*, that is to say, attached to no one fixed moral philosophy. The children who are taught in these schools may be given, according to the wish of their parents, a religious training in one of the four recognised religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, or Jewish. They can refuse all of these and request secular moral instruction.

(2) The denominational educational system includes schools of fixed types (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, etc.) which provide an intensely philosophical training. Several things must now be pointed out:

(*a*) This system gives the Catholic religion a priority in the training of children.

(*b*) In large towns the official educational system has developed along authentically neutral lines thanks to the positivist tendencies, inspired by the University of Brussels, which is not linked with any religion.

(*c*) This undenominational University of Brussels, from its origin, has claimed for itself the right of freedom of thought and, by its prestige, it has given birth to a secular ideal in the whole of the official educational system.

(*d*) Parents who, within the framework of the official system, do not wish their children to attend religious instruction may bring this about by having recourse to a dispensation legally instituted and called "Dispensation from religious and moral instruction." A confusing name, for it is this very dispensation which authorises pupils to attend the secular moral instruction given in the official schools. The introduction of lessons in secular morality into state schools (it was the Ch. Buls Normal School which was the first to adopt this innovation) forms a safeguard against the spread of the Catholic religion. Immediately after the war of 1940–45 this safeguard was officially sanctioned in that an autonomous Inspectorate of Moral Teaching was set up in the Ministry for the inspection of state schools.

Aspects which are more closely connected with the Present State of Affairs

The conception of moral education in Belgian schools is also explained by a number of circumstances, among which the history of the political parties plays no negligible part. These circumstances have led to the formation of two types of moral education, one with a religious basis, the other secular and neutral. Immediately after the 1940–45 war various causes brought about a different conception. The war itself is among these causes,

because of the moral position adopted by the free countries in order to give their action its full value. Neutrality, according to the forceful words of Mr. Churchill, is unthinkable in the world of values measured in terms of action which are in reality moral values. The defenders of state education in Belgium have thought that secularity should be separated from neutrality, the former retained and the latter abolished.

Their arguments had an especial value at that particular time for the following reasons:

(*a*) The success of Catholic schools; attributed by them to the very fact that they are not neutral.

(*b*) The irrational character of a neutrality obtained by the admission of four sects into the very heart of state schools.

(*c*) The demand for a positive, that is to say not neutral, secularity based on an ideal of freedom of thought.

(*d*) The progressive extension of subsidies to denominational schools and thus to establishments of higher than primary school standard.

(*e*) The necessity of obtaining some guarantee against the extension of the advantages granted to denominational schools.

These principles, defended by people who formed part, moreover, of the state system of education and not of the denominational system as such, were ill understood and were publicly condemned by the 'Educational League' (*Ligue de l'Enseignement*).

The General Election of 1950 gave an absolute majority to the Christian-Socialist Party of Belgium. This Party claims a pluralism advantageous to Catholic schools and in no way similar to that put forward in the name of a respect for the human person by those people spoken of above.[1]

Although the further developments of this impact of ideas cannot at the moment be foreseen, it is important to notice that the events following on the General Election of 1950 have once more given rise to the opposition between clericalism and anti-clericalism. The bridges connecting the two educational systems—in reality the bridges between two types of moral training—have been cut. The war of the schools has broken out once more and rages with such an intensity that it seems impossible to come to a unanimous agreement on moral education.

The Present Trend of Theories dealing with Moral Education

There remains the fact that the influence of great currents of contemporary pedagogical thought—of an international nature—introduces profound modifications into the technique of moral education. The matter in question here is very different from 'doctrines' or the philosophy which forms the content of this

[1] J. Lameere, S. De Coster, 'The Principles of a Policy in National Education' (Brussels, Lebègue Collection, *Les Actualités Sociales*).

instruction. Tendencies of the same kind inspire the work of many educationists, whether they belong to the state system or the denominational system of education.

The principal aspects of these tendencies are as follows:

(1) The spread of self-government.

(2) The growth of youth movements.

(3) Open-air schools.

They are inspired by an earnest desire to integrate activity methods in character development, in opposition to the traditional methods of training and learning of moral ideas from books. They have a considerable influence on young people, and one which has an undeniably sobering effect on them. Moreover, Belgium is in no way escaping from the claims of young people for emancipation.

The twentieth century has given birth among adolescents to a need to consider themselves as forming a separate class in society with clearly defined characteristics: sincerity, desire for peace, respect for physical well-being, contempt of conventions.... These juvenile claims are acknowledged by the grown-ups: it has become seemly to be young, special fashions in clothes are even devised for young people. This implies that nowadays the educationist has not completed his task unless he gives recognition to the characteristics of young people, without faltering, nevertheless, in the pursuit of his aim: the improvement and raising of the adolescent to his full maturity.

Here are a few details concerning the methods which are becoming general.

Self-government makes use of a system similar to that which the Anglo-Saxons call self-discipline.

An imitation of this method can be seen in France in the Roches school, although the ideas of A. Ferrière have also done much to bring about the success of this method of conducting a school.

The Minister of Education has taken the initiative of recommending this system for use in all the schools in Belgium. The fact remains that it is often difficult to put these ideas into practice because so many schools in Belgium are in reality day schools. In youth movements the latent possibilities of adolescents are emphasised. In Belgium there is a falling away from the Scout movement once the age of 15 has been reached. Youth movements are numerous, and are subsidised by various political parties: this is one way of avoiding their control by the state. They borrow all the elements of pedagogy from that great educationist, the late Baden-Powell. It may be noted that the Scout movement is considered in many educational establishments as an essential complement to self-government.

Open-air schools show another way in which activity methods and moral education may be integrated.

In addition to the forms of open-air activities which have been known since the beginning of the century, attention should be paid to all the attempts inspired by those methods which first found expression in *Pro Juventute.* Schemes to train educators (in contrast to teachers and professors), schools for educators, courses at the C.E.A.M. (Centre for Training in Activity Methods), etc., are making popular the idea that character training is helped by out-of-school activities—among which are open-air activities—and that special teachers are needed who are thoroughly conversant with collective psychology.

Different Forms of Moral Instruction

Numerous attempts have been made to widen the scope of moral instruction. Schools no longer confine themselves merely to the syllabus set up by the Minister of Education. The underlying ideas which have brought about this change have not as their aim the spreading of subversive or eccentric doctrines. They come from an earnest desire to give a more lofty and intellectual content to an instruction to which many young people have turned a deaf ear. The ideas which stand out where this is concerned seem to be as follows:

(*a*) The adolescent should be provided with an instruction which borrows prestige and a source of fruitful meditation from the philosophies of the past.

(*b*) Use should be made of the resources of history by proposing a study of the evolution of customs side by side with that of the precepts and fundamental values of our civilisation.

(*c*) Literature (and especially contemporary literature) should be used to analyse moral values and human activity.

(*d*) There should be opportunities for free discussion in order to give these values and precepts an intellectual content. On this point it may be noted that two Anglo-Saxon methods have not always been successfully put into practice:

Debates, used by the educational service of the Belgian Army for moral, civic, and military instruction of recruits, are little imitated in our schools.

Youth Clubs have not been set up in as satisfactory a manner as in England.

Moral Education and Democratic Control

It is now the moment to speak of an attempt of a special nature which rises from an analysis of the problem of the autonomy of school children. If one thinks that an educational establishment is a place where adults, adolescents, and children gather together in order that a fixed activity may take place, it may be hoped that *a law of unity of work* may regulate the life of all the members of this community. In Belgian schools in which the autonomy of the

children has been introduced, one sees, nevertheless, two systems of organising work in existence at one and the same time. One grants to the pupils a conditional freedom and demands from them collaboration in school work; the other refuses this very freedom to the teachers and demands their submission to a much stricter discipline. One may be forgiven for wondering if this incongruity in the regime does not of necessity mean that the example of self-discipline is never given to the students by those very people who should be their models. Obviously, if the system of the autonomy of pupils is to have its greatest value, this same autonomy must be granted to the teachers in these schools. Surely the advantages which result from this type of organisation must be similar both for the teachers and for the pupils. Under such a system everyone plays a more active and intimate part in the work of the school, and there springs up in the relationship between masters and pupils a unique way of life based on an ideal of liberty and democracy.

An experiment of this sort is being made in one of the big schools of the capital. The aim behind such experiments is to put into practice among young and old by means of school institutions—and to some extent by action—three moral values: acknowledgment of the immense importance of the human person, absolute respect for truth, and an irresistible passion for liberty.

The Incidence of Demographic Conditions on Moral Education

Birth control affects demographic conditions in Belgium by producing a progressive decrease in the number of inhabitants.

Two results of these conditions introduce henceforth important modifications in the structure of the organisation of schools. On the one hand, the number of only children increases; on the other hand, the people are inclined by social capillarity to become more intellectual; that is to say, that people hope to climb the social ladder by means of education. As a result the number of students increases as the number of births decreases. For want of good advice pupils are often at a loss when it comes to choosing what subjects to study, whilst schoolmasters are struggling with a population whose psychology is unfamiliar and whose intellectual worth is often questionable. The family plays its part less well as the number of its members decreases.

Among the measures adopted by the school authorities to obviate the sometimes disastrous results of social capillarity should be noted:

(*a*) The setting-up of centres for educational guidance (*Orientation scolaire*) (not to be confused with centres for vocational guidance) in connection with establishments for secondary education. These centres have as their aim the successful guidance of students to help them to avoid failure in their studies. Such

failures often make young people unable to adapt themselves socially and emotionally.

(*b*) The large increase in the numbers of the youth movements already spoken of above.

In fine, the help thus given, notably to adolescents, permits a greater feeling for individuality. This very notion takes away from the rigidity of school organisation its drastic character, and, when guidance is successful, abates the opposition of young people who are embittered and disillusioned where adults are concerned.

It must be noticed, moreover, that a rise in the social scale by means of education produces for adolescents who are benefiting by the efforts of their parents a lack of balance and a feeling of opposition at the critical time when they are trying to find themselves. Because of the very studies which raise them intellectually and socially, these young people pass through a stage in which they become aware of their superiority to their parents. This state should be more widely known; if it is not overcome by a highly developed conscience, there is a risk that it will reduce to nothing all the moral education already acquired. A section of moral instruction should be devoted to this point.

Collective Mental Hygiene. The Objective Study of Moral Sentiment

The preceding statement clearly shows, as do the concise analyses in this article, the two conditions necessary for the success of moral education in any particular nation.

(*a*) It is permissible *a priori* to believe that moral education is an expression of the political and social state of a nation. Education forms indeed a factor contributing to social stabilisation. If harmony does not exist between education and society, one finds oneself faced by a division pernicious as much for the one as for the other.

Without considering this problem in its extreme form the fact remains that the histories of different nations reveal that, even at a time of relative internal stability, difficulties may arise in the relationship between these factors. An event which affects one of these factors ends by affecting the other because of an essential parallelism.

Therefore the mental hygiene of the general public ought to be given a not inconsiderable importance. Habits of exploitation, which arose during the war because of the black market, the spread of small businesses, economic collaboration, and opposition to the occupying authorities, have tainted the moral atmosphere.

Having become used to judging actions only in terms of usefulness at a time when there were valid reasons to trick the enemy, Belgians have not yet been able to recapture that moral balance which finds its finest expression in scrupulous honesty. The

anxiety brought about by fear of war, added to the division of Belgians over the Royal question, does not give rise to an atmosphere favourable to the moral education of youth.

(*b*) This does not alter the fact that young people, idealistic by nature, are still open to all the beneficent influences which flow from a well-understood moral education. At a time when pedagogy makes use of scientific methods to study the problems within its province, moral education cannot remain for the educationist merely empirical, and to a certain extent left to the good judgment of competent minds. Moral sentiment has in the past held the attention of several Belgian psychologists (Michotte, van den Berck, L. Buen, and Braunshausen). However, their researches, undertaken solely from the psychological point of view, cannot throw much light on phenomena which, by their very nature, owe their deep-seated characteristics both to collective life and to individual liberty. The study of moral sentiment is dependent—by its very aim—on a discipline in which psychology and sociology are combined, and are complementary.

Belgian psychologists and teachers have considered the problem in this light. In the undenominational University of Brussels a beginning has been made in this direction, and the results of objective studies of the evolution of moral sentiment have been applied to the general organisation and syllabus of moral education of the Ch. Buls Normal School.

It seems, however, that under the influence of UNESCO, which considers that tensions which arise between different groups give rise to a crucial problem, Belgian social psychology is travelling along this road. This idea finds further support in efforts made with the same aims by the undenominational University of Louvain.

General Conclusions

This contribution to the YEAR BOOK OF EDUCATION, 1951, had as its purpose the clear statement of the following facts:

(*a*) By means of an evolution that is slow but sure, moral education is being tackled in Belgium in a more modern way. The influence of ideas coming from various Western nations has been shown in this evolution. England has played a considerable part in the changes introduced into the education syllabuses and in the methods of discipline in schools.

(*b*) It is possible that, owing to the influence of internal politics, the organisation of the Belgian educational system may tend to become pluralist. This fact would have a considerable effect on the problem of moral education given in educational establishments.

It may be added that this organisation, because of its political character, will be difficult to establish and will rouse the opposition of a large part of the population.

(*c*) If the problem of moral education is reduced to its pedagogical aspect alone, it is to be hoped that Belgian research workers will clarify its data by means of objective investigation. To succeed in this enterprise, it is absolutely essential that sociology should be considered an integral part of the complex system of disciplines which go to form scientific pedagogy.

If the reader now refers back to the beginning of this article, he will certainly see that the sociological description of the conditions of moral education in Belgium is essential for a full understanding of the statements which form the body of the article.

S. F. DE COSTER.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NETHERLANDS

PART ONE

SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

A SOUND educational policy cannot be based upon abstract theoretical considerations; it must proceed from concrete knowledge of the whole cultural position of the country concerned. The aim of this article will be to outline the historical and sociological setting of Dutch educational efforts, by examining the relations which have existed in the past, and which now exist in the present day, between the schools and the main forces in social life, together with the way in which the schools exhibit the influence of certain principles. For convenience of exposition, I deal first with the historical, and then with the present-day sociological aspects; but it will be clear that these two aspects cannot really be separated from each other.

Historical

The Church

At the starting-point of the Dutch educational system there stands the Church. At the very beginning this was the Roman Catholic Church of the Middle Ages. There was then only the one Church and the one school system which had been founded by her, or at least had been admitted by her. After the Reformation in the sixteenth century the one Church became the Reformed Church. In the field of education a heavy task lay before her. The existing educational system had lost its spiritual basis, while the material provision had to be restored on a new footing. Here Church and magistrate worked hand in hand. The latter was the bearer of the scholastic rights and the administrator of the funds devoted to education. The former exercised the spiritual guidance. The supervision of the school was her unchallenged right, and her solemn vocation. Education aimed at glorifying God and at promoting the well-being of Church and commonwealth. The teacher had to profess the only true Christian religion.

It is thanks to the Reformed Church that the Dutch Republic so soon after its liberation from Spanish domination acquired a considerable number of schools.

The mainspring of all these great activities was the new appre-

ciation of man resulting from the Reformation. I am now thinking of the great stress laid by it on the general priesthood of the faithful. Every Christian was a personally called servant of God. He stood in a direct and wholly individual relation towards God. In this conception is contained the emancipation of man from the various forms of mediaeval bondage. From it followed an exaltation of the individual personality which had far-reaching consequences for education. From now onward it was no longer sufficient to confine education to those in whom the authority of the Church would be vested; every child had to be taught in such a way that it would eventually be able to find its own way to the Holy Scriptures, and live for God by its own responsibility.

At baptism in the Reformed Church the parents promise to teach their child, to have it taught, or to help in having it taught to the best of their abilities, the doctrines contained in the Old and the New Testaments, and the Articles of the Christian Faith. This is not merely a matter of teaching the child the Lord's Prayer and some of the Church formulae; it means that they are required to bring up the child in such a way that it will be able to read the Bible for itself, and to understand for itself this charter of our Christian faith. This pledge makes the " Formula for the administration of Holy Baptism to Children " one of the most important and most influential pedagogical documents in Dutch history. Through it an idea of lasting value was incorporated in our culture. With all the weight carried by the judgment of the Church, the task and the responsibility of the parents are here pointed out. They are, according to a Biblical principle, the foremost and main educators of the child. In this respect there rests on them a holy, inalienable duty.

And this naturally applies to everyone. There is no question of confining this responsibility, this right, this duty, to a few socially privileged categories of the population. The Church herself was democratic in her organisation. The education spread through her care has rightly been called one of the most democratic institutions of the Republic.

The State

Then, during the eighteenth century, the breach in the Protestant Christian culture of the Republic became evident and definite. Its unity was disturbed by changed religious and philosophical convictions, and changed conceptions of the state and society. The sharp lines of the spiritual image of the Calvinistic period of prosperity now began to fade. The Church, a prey to serious spiritual decay, became worldly, and thus disloyal to her holy vocation. Religious life assumed a somewhat jovial aspect quite foreign to the Gospel. The age of 'Enlightenment' became that of tolerance. Tolerance was now foremost among Christian

and social virtues. Discrimination against Roman Catholics and others who stood outside the Reformed Church was gradually rejected as an injustice.

Then there came a time when the Reformed Church lost her dominating position, and her close co-operation with the state came to an end. The " rights of man and of the citizen " of 1795, the Netherlands version of the " *Droits de l'homme et du citoyen* ", laid it down that no one could be excluded from public office on account of his religion. The principle of separation between state and Church became of fundamental significance to the new order.

In addition, the spiritual guidance of which the Church had been robbed was taken over by the state. We see this clearly in the objects of education, as formulated by the Education Act of 1806. Whereas in the flowering-age of the Republic mention had been made of the honour of God, and the strengthening of the Church, the talk now was of training children in social and Christian virtues. As we can see from the order of these adjectives ' social ' and ' Christian ', it was now no longer the Church which came first, but the state.

The teacher was no longer required to conform to the profession of faith, but he was told, in the first few years of the Republic, to submit a testimony of his civic loyalty.

School education now had a purely worldly purpose; it was to act as the ' social cement ' of free citizenship.

The state gave to our country what the Church had not been able to give: a national, systematically constructed school organisation. Adriaan van den Ende, for thirty-three years the mainspring of educational improvement, had the inestimable merit of giving shape to the numerous and fruitful suggestions which—often after examples from abroad—had been made from various quarters with a view to raising the level of the educational system. The Education Act of 1806, projected by him, became an example of legislative performance in this field, and was admired abroad.

The main principle of this Act was to have elementary education " exclusively a matter of supreme authority, and to have it guided and regulated by this authority." It gave shape to a unified school system, whose task it was to lay and reinforce the spiritual foundations of the nation.

The school was still to have a Christian character, for although the state might have shaken off the connection with the Reformed Church, it could not yet be called non-Christian. The schoolmaster was to go on teaching the Christian religion " in so far as the historical and moral part of it was concerned." Inside the school there was, however, no longer any room for the Church. Outside school hours it could provide for teaching the dogmatic side of religion.

Each Religious Community has its own Rights

It fell to the nineteenth century to recognise the claims of religious communities as against the strong concentration of power in the state; the demands of freedom against the far-reaching lack of it; the right of variety against imposed apparent unity.

Tolerance had also existed in our country in earlier days. But the private rights of local units and of groups deviating from the prevailing principle had to be won back from the strongly centralising and restrictive rule of our first king, William I, who reigned from 1814 to 1840. In and through the struggle necessary to this end, these rights were more consciously pursued than they had been before, more fundamentally based and confessed.

This we owe in the first place to liberalism, which during the long middle period of the age took the leading role in spiritual and social fields. This liberalism was inspired by a great measure of faith in man, and it cherished the most favourable expectations about the future of society, so long as man was given every freedom to live his life to the full, in accordance with his own nature and inclinations. For this reason it urged independence in every sphere of life, which was to give full scope to all man's vital powers; it was to carry the development and the civilisation of the nation to a higher level. The individual was to be set free from the galling bonds of state and society. It was a guiding principle with Thorbecke, the liberal leader and great legislator, professor at Leyden University, to promote a sphere of liberty, inside which independent efforts could develop in a diversity of forms.

The incorporation of liberty of education in the revised Constitution of 1848 must be viewed in the light of these liberal convictions. Thorbecke was convinced that the Government would have to take the lead in the field of education. Its guidance would be indispensable wherever private initiative failed. But he also thought it necessary to leave space for "original exertions made by members of the state, apart from the Government system." It might be possible to expect in this respect "some gain, improvement, addition, or perfection." Thus "the activities of the power of the state, and those of individual members in regard to the organisation of education, were to promote each other mutually."

Yet this shows, at the same time, the limitations of liberalism's contribution in the field of educational liberty. The issues brought to the fore by Roman Catholic and Calvinistic authorities have proved of far deeper consequence. For them the right of the parents constituted the grounds on which the state monopoly of education needed to be challenged. The difference from the liberal world of thought is conspicuous. There, liberty was a demand of the vital laws of society; here it was claimed as a right of conscience. There the aim was the highest revelation of life

in state and society; here it was a matter of the parents' obedience to the vocation in the name of God. Later on that parental right which does not repose on human opinions, but finds its origin in a divine commandment, was appealed to again and again, when the power of the state threatened to suppress the freedom of the people. Thus it was with the resistance to the German occupation, 1940–45. The school opposition was one of the most pent-up forms of resistance!

Originally, in the middle of the nineteenth century, those who campaigned for parental rights were inclined to favour dividing the one municipal school into three types, according to the parents' inclinations, viz. Protestant Christian, Roman Catholic, and Israelite.

It proved impossible, however, to find a solution along these lines. Making use of the freedom granted under the Constitution of 1848, Protestant Christian parents then founded schools managed by free societies, while the Roman Catholics founded their parish schools. The municipal schools increasingly lost their Christian character, and so could also be made use of by the rest of the population—the Jewish community, for instance.

Originally the expenses of the non-governmental schools were entirely covered by the parents, who as members of the communities thus paid their taxes for the municipal schools, which they thought unsuitable for their children, and at the same time fully covered the expenses incurred for their own schools. In the course of a bitter struggle that lasted for many years our nation began to see this as a gross injustice. In 1917 this struggle was crowned by a revision of the Constitution, developed in the Education Act of 1920, under which municipal schools and non-governmental schools were put on a level in regard to the public funds.

At present full justice is done by our form of government to the parents' right to their own convictions in regard to bringing up their children. The principle that schools run by societies and Churches should have equal claims on public funds with the schools run by the municipalities has taken deep roots in our national conscience. I think that in this way our nation has given an interpretation of the democratic principles of liberty and equality in the field of education, which has nowhere in the whole world been thought out so completely and carried out so consistently.

The Nation

It may be asked whether the absolute recognition accorded to the 'right of the religious community', and the diversity of educational provision resulting from it, have not proved detrimental to the unity of the nation. Have not the claims made by the groups injured those of the people? It must be admitted that, for a

variety of reasons, the sense of national unity has tended to confine itself to an increasingly narrow field. Vast areas of spiritual, cultural, and social life have developed in which sections of the nation lead a life of their own, with little opportunity for contact between people of different persuasions. This tendency has operated also in the field of education, where there has been too little in evidence, perhaps, the sense of a common responsibility towards the nation as a whole.

Nevertheless, it has been the great merit of our school system that it has made a unity of our country intellectually. Of great significance in this respect has been the training of teachers which, tied down as it was to uniform examination requirements, showed from the national point of view a certain measure of homogeneity which was afterwards expressed in the subject-teaching content of the national school. Education promoted unity in language and spelling. It contributed to the introduction of the metric system. It spread certain notions in regard to the form of government. Moreover, it has maintained that sense of national unity which still remained—for example, devotion to the House of Orange, Dutch history, and the national song. When the schools run by the municipalities began to be less loyal in this respect, our nation clearly showed disapproval of this deviation. The fall in the number of their pupils has been partly due to this. Moreover, it must be remembered that there are sound historical reasons for that suspicion of centralised state authority which has taken such deep roots in Dutch national feeling.

In the hands of our first king the improved educational system grew to be a mighty organ for the national education of the people. He plied it with autocratic authority. A time of reconstruction—we can realise this better now than ever before—demands a powerful government with a clear sense of purpose. And William I found himself face to face with a nation that was tired out by years of affliction, and little inclined to look ahead towards the future and to put the hand to the plough.

At no other time have such intensive endeavours been made in our country to make the school serve national unity. But no experiment ever failed so sadly: no effort to reconstruct our people ever contributed so largely to its discord. That which was to have brought harmony caused terrible disharmony. First between the Netherlands and Belgium, combined to form a united state by the policy of the great Powers; then between conservatives, Calvinists, and Roman Catholics. And if this bitter experience was not enough, the neo-liberal Kappeyne van de Copello made the state in the Second Chamber in 1874 face a similar task of unification, this time by the introduction of 'the modern attitude towards life.' "This teaches us," said this member of the Chamber, "to put the interests of the people as the highest purpose of the state. Only

from the state must and can originate that which is indispensable, if the people are continuously to grow in knowledge, in morality, and in wealth."

As a result of these experiences, there is a profound conviction among our people that anyone who seeks to bring about unity by such means (a unity after his own pattern) will in reality only succeed in dividing the nation. National unity, it is held, can never be attained by identifying one's own convictions with those of the nation. Only through recognition of variety and respect for it can our people find unity.

Sociological

The Economic Sector

In the European-American cultural sphere the economic system is in the stage of transition from free economy to planned economy. The trend of thought favoured by the adherents of free economy was simple and logical. It professed its belief in the decisive influence of the operation of the price mechanism as conducive to the attainment of a maximum degree of prosperity. This was supposed to lead to the most efficient use of the means of production, to the automatic restoration of the equilibrium in the event of its temporary disturbance, and to an equitable distribution of income and property.

The community in which the '*laisser-faire*' policy reigned supreme has proved to suffer from severe economic fluctuations with resultant idleness of productive capacities, and from demoralising unemployment in periods of economic depression. It was also marked by social inequity and a general sense of uncertainty. Another disadvantage was the organisation of powers the exercise of which involved the danger of impairing public interests.

We are now living in a period of transition from free to planned economy. Co-ordination and planning are no longer a question of preference or resentment; in the present stage of development they are indispensable. They are of vital importance because the impoverishment of our countries, as a result of war, calls for the rehabilitation of our economic and social system by the exertion of all forces which will have to be co-ordinated and combined to that end; this is no fiction, but hard reality.

Planned economy is also essential, however, because certain economic activities will have to be regulated by the Government and the organs of industrial life, and this regulation will be *a task of permanent character.*

In carrying out this task, the Government will have to take the lead. A primary objective of planned economy must be the maintenance of our present modest level of prosperity. In addition to this, it should aim at the increase of our national income, the

regulation of the purposes of production, a better distribution of the national income, and the prevention of large-scale unemployment as well as the suppression of the evils that account for it.

The form of planned economy does not necessarily mean state-governed economy. It does not imply the socialisation of every activity of national economy. We are not bound to choose between liberalism and the absolutism of the state; there is a third alternative that permits the maintenance of private initiative and personal responsibility, which, by influences emanating from decisive strategical points, are so conducted as to be made subservient to public interest.

All of these requirements make definite demands upon the mental attitude of the whole nation. We must see our national economy in its totality. Whereas, in the past, we concentrated our attention on elements—for we sought to attain the proper working of the partial functions in the belief that these would combine into an harmonious entity without any coercive influence—we should now be intent upon the coherence of the elements. It is not enough to promote the fulfilment of individual desires and private aims; we should always try to realise what will be the ultimate effect of the achievement of these individual ends upon those objectives which should be pursued for the benefit of the whole community. This, of course, will require a revolution in thought, a radical change of the mental attitude of both those who are called to conduct this process, *and* the general public.

We have been educated in the spirit of individualism. The subject-matter of tuition is divided into detailed subjects (in Holland this matter is even regulated by law); the space of time available for each of these subjects is defined to the minute, and in the higher branches of learning they are taught by specialists.

In scientific circles, specialisation is the object of esteem; consequently, there is too little appreciation of the value of the synthesising approach.

In our schools, the mind and will are moulded into a form which is bent too much on the individual and too little on the community. This form clearly bears the mark of competition and survival of the fittest as the main ideal to be pursued. The attainment of this end is, moreover, encouraged by our system of awarding marks to the pupils. Collaboration among pupils in the performance of their task is forbidden in schools of the traditional type.

What I have said about the economic sector of the cultural background may suffice to show that there runs a straight line from the economic to the cultural sphere. The co-ordination of our production cannot succeed unless there is a general disposition to serve the community instead of pursuing exclusively the interests of private enterprise. Our countries have failed to realise that a

purposeful economy, namely, planned economy—the only policy that can save us—presupposes a certain level of moral sense among our officials and private people, which is scarcely perceptible as yet.

The Social Sector

The social sector is marked by the dissolution of many forms of communal life and by an accompanying trend to replace them by new communal forms. Both factors manifest themselves in the fields of commerce, industry, transport, and agriculture. The ties that used to bind the employee to the employer and to his occupation have become very loose. As a matter of fact, they have been superseded by a rigid contractual relation, with the result that men perform their work individually and no longer co-operate as members of the community. The fostering of private interests has ousted the last remnants of the old spirit of devotion.

Naturally, there is a close connection between these facts and the complete change that has occurred in the nature of the work done. Technical development has made manual labour unattractive and dull; it has spoiled the enjoyment that could be derived from the personal production of a piece of work. Consequently, the use of leisure hours has become an urgent problem. From this spare time man will have to derive the values which he no longer finds in the performance of his daily work. The tragic aspect of the situation, however, is that mechanisation, spiritual shallowness, and undue hurry are exercising the same influence upon spare-time occupations as they have done upon industrial work, with the result that, even in the use of leisure time, the sense of community is dwindling.

Owing to the improvement of transport and the general disposition to migration, districts and villages have ceased to be secluded communities. There has been a continuous movement of population away from rural districts to the urban centres. Secluded communities whose members are absolutely dependent upon one another are becoming rare.

Religious and political strife has been a further factor working towards disintegration. Even the Reformed Church, weakened by its increasing secularisation, has lost its true communal character in many respects. Its social apathy accounts for the fact that it has lost much of the confidence it used to enjoy. Owing to the transfer of many of its functions to private societies, it no longer maintains its salutary direct contact with the people.

Family life has also been unfavourably affected by the dissolution of communal life. Its significance as a production-unit has been preserved only in rural districts. In the towns the members of a family have each their own sphere and hours of work, and this equally applies to their spare-time occupations.

There is no doubt that the disintegration of the old communities

has deprived human life of many of its real values. The citizen of our days has been reduced to what I may term a mere symbol in an endless number. Instead of being a member of a community, an organic structure, built in an hierarchical order—in which he is fortunate enough to recognise his own place—he has become a mere unit in the agglomeration of human beings clustered in our cities. His relations to his fellow-creatures are of an impersonal nature as a tradesman, a voter, a taxpayer, a pensioner, an *habitué* of the theatre, and so on. As a rule, his dependency on larger communities has become more intense, but his relations to them lack intimacy, cordiality, and natural humanity. In this connection, I may quote the term '*Pseudo-Integration*' used by Röpke [1] to denote that even the greatest possible crowding of human beings and their interdependency cannot prevent man from feeling spiritually isolated.

Society has degenerated to such an extent that it may be compared to a large heap of sand in which the individuals represent the grains. This aggregation is highly susceptible to mass-emotions and impressions and to the influence of what the author called '*Pseudo-Führung*.'

Here we are touching on the most difficult social-pedagogical problems of our time. What the masses need is guidance, and by what spirit those who give it should be imbued is a question of paramount importance for our cultural future.

It cannot be denied that, although many forms of communal life have been destroyed, new forms of community have sprung up in the labour movement, the women's movement, and several other organisations. I should mention in particular the youth movement, which in our country has succeeded in absorbing young people into new organisations which, unfortunately, are capable of embracing only a certain select group. The ramified system of organisations of young people and adults may hold out prospects of a regeneration of the community. This regeneration will have to be the object of our careful consideration and purposeful solicitude in the immediate future.

The International Sector

It is of vital importance to humanity that every individual should be able to feel safe in a community which is not too large for its members to have a sense of true participation in it. But it is of equal importance, for the happiness of man, that the individual should be fully conscious of the development of the community of nations. The interdependence of individuals and peoples is growing rapidly. Aloofness, isolation, self-sufficiency, and autarchy are

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[1] Wilhelm Röpke, *Die Gesellschaftskrise der Gegenwart* (The Crisis of the Community in the Present Age), (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1942, p. 24).

gradually becoming impossible. Economic life, in its modern form, is showing a marked trend towards internationalisation.

In his last book, entitled '*Civilisation on Trial*', Toynbee wrote: "It is now hardly conceivable that the ultimate minimum effective unit of the industrial system can be anything less than the entire utilisable surface of the planet and the whole of mankind." I may add that political life also is tending to manifest itself in ever-growing units. Toynbee said in this respect: "And, on the political plane, likewise the minimum unit is showing the tendency to increase in sympathy with the extension, to a world-wide range, of the operations of industry." Following the trend of thought, one may say that monetary problems and those concerning transport and communications, social provisions, public health and food-supply can be solved only on the level of comprehensive units.

In our age, the conversion of this interdependency into a real integration of the international forms of community will be a set task of our generation. We are now living right in the centre of the strains attending these developments. I will not dwell on the political and economic tensions.

We should realise, however, that their background is rife with acute spiritual differences. Each form of community presupposes a certain measure of agreement in the sphere of moral convictions. It is not true that those who think rationally can always agree. It would be an error to suppose that the controversy between East and West could be removed by a conference between Truman and Stalin. Those who believe that such a conference could bridge the gap between their principles and ideologies are labouring under a misapprehension similar to that which deceived those who thought they could negotiate with Hitler. "*Pour discuter, il faut être d'accord.*" If negotiations are not to be doomed to failure, the ideal views of their participants should have at least certain norms in common. Unless men and nations recognise a higher authority, a higher ideal than their immediate interests, there will be no possibility of agreement. For this reason the problem of world peace is primarily a spiritual problem.

The Spiritual Sector

Spiritual life in our American-European civilisation may be characterised most appropriately by describing it as the last stage of development leading from a world based upon transcendent and super-rational reality to a world believing only in the empirical and the rational.

The expression of the former culminated in the culture of the Middle Ages, when God was the only Reality and the highest Good. Mediaeval art was a form of religious worship; it was sacred in its form and substance, the expression of human per-

ceptions as the reflected image of an invisible world. In those days truth was conceived as that which God, by His Grace, had revealed to mankind. Ethics were based upon the Lord's commandments. Its values were absolute. It bore witness to God's infinite love of man through which man is sanctified. The trivialities of everyday life were regarded as the "stage properties, the costumes and rehearsals in the drama of the pilgrimage to eternity."

The different classes and strata of society were accepted as divine institutions; the authority of monarchs as proceeding from God and tending to His glorification.

The stage of modern life which we are now approaching is that of a culture representing empirical realities as the supreme value. The arts are no longer the exponents of transcendency; they have lost their symbolic character and reproduce only those realities which can be grouped by the senses or the intellect. They lack the restfulness of the Middle Ages. One of their essential traits is their dynamic character. This will be recognised in their agility, the vehemence of emotions and actions represented, as well as in their frequent changes in style and character. The main significance of these characteristics is that the arts no longer reproduce what the people experience as their spiritual good, as their '*summum bonum*.' The arts have become the province of a specialist minority, and have lost contact with the masses.

Science, too, is now largely based upon empirical principles. Natural scientific knowledge is held in esteem; it is gradually superseding religion and relegating theology and speculative philosophy to the background. It professes a materialistic and prominently biological view of mankind, culture, and society. Anything that will meet the physiological and psychological requirements of man is regarded as the ideal good. Owing to this trend of thought, absolute values have disappeared. Everything is moving in accordance with the laws of evolution and progress. Man only experiences the actual, direct reality. '*Carpe diem*' is the motto: "Enjoy the day and have no trust in the future." Nowadays man is inwardly empty; his soul is consumed by the hustle and bustle of modern life. The clear distinction between truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty and ugliness has been blurred; it is gradually fading away, owing to the theory that all opinions are relative. There is no longer true respect in human relations, nor is there room for real indignation. Legislation and jurisdiction are regarded as instruments of oppression of one group by the other; they are admittedly human institutions with a utilitarian purpose, to protect human life, property, peace, law, and order. Public authority is no longer based upon superhuman power; it is derived from, and maintained by, the will of the majority.

Thus, our European-American civilisation has lost its animating, guiding, and constructive motive. It lacks that element

of refinement that elevates man from his egotism, thus liberating him from his isolated position, and that is capable of communicating to his soul the sense of resignation to a higher reality, of self-restraint and self-denial. The result is a spiritual vacuum with all its attendant dangers.

Yet some remnants of a rich past have been preserved, even in modern life. Natural science does not recognise an absolute vacuum; in society it does not exist either. There are still possibilities of regeneration. Fortunately, our civilisation is not completely devoid of men with enough foresight to launch their criticism against those forces which are responsible for the decadence of modern life and the deterioration of public mentality. There are still individuals and tendencies in search of a new outlook capable of giving humanity a constructive, animating value, an incentive for a purposeful conception of life.

Some Conclusions

We may now ask how far the educational system has been adapted to meet the needs and requirements of the cultural situation outlined above.

Is the education provided by schools and universities directed towards imbuing pupils and students with that spirit of total community the need for which is felt so urgently? Do educational institutions cultivate a true sense of responsibility towards society? Do they develop character and foster the qualities of discernment and self-respect? Are efforts being made to counter those forces which tend to degrade man to the level of a 'mass-product'? Are efforts being made to enrich the masses, now so impoverished in their thought and experience, with a spiritual ideal?

As far as Holland is concerned, nearly all these questions must be answered in the negative. I feel, however, that they affect the entire Western sphere of culture; my views therefore cover a field much wider than Holland. Never before has the aggregate of our social-pedagogical provisions been subjected to a critical review with such an extensive background. The educational system, and the masses, have never before been seen as social functions which, in their mutual relation, should be made subservient to the material and spiritual welfare of a people struggling for its future. The main and fundamental defect of education, whether or not it is imparted in the school, is that it is still based upon theories of liberalism which have proved to be obsolete. Our educational system lacks the synthesising spirit, the ability to combine its elements for the performance of its great social function. The elements work separately, each in its own little province, and it may even happen that they work against each other. There is no functional connection between pre-elementary and primary, between primary and secondary schools, or between secondary

schools and universities. General pre-university and secondary education is separated from technical education by an 'iron curtain.' Although an organisational connection will occasionally be found between the Church and the school, they maintain scarcely any spiritual relations. There is very little sympathetic contact between the fine arts and popular instruction. There are few who understand that all these elements of the educational system should constitute one educational entity, with different branches of tuition but with one set purpose in common. The idea that the free play of forces, moved by some imaginary providential contrivance, will bring the various elements into harmony is a mere illusion. It is as yet little realised that, although our educational system performed its task fairly successfully in a period when democracy comprised only a select group of society, it will require a radical revision of its entire structure now that democracy is extended to the masses of the people. The knowledge which predominates under our present system of education is static. There is a marked preference for the absolute, for teaching knowledge of concrete facts; yet this is a procedure appropriate only to the problems and conditions of a stable society. Only when we become conscious of the revolutionary development of society, and realise that we must aim at renovation rather than at adaptation, shall we understand that our methods of education need to be based upon dynamic knowledge, and to be directed above all at developing the creative faculties of the rising generation.

We need to teach our pupils that they must not believe in traditional truths only, but that they should also be accessible to what is novel. The systematic infusion of factual knowledge is not the only object of our schools; the pupils should also be trained to learn more efficiently from life itself. That is what our educational system neglects; it fails also to foster the sense of community; not until that sense has been awakened will it be possible to cultivate that valuable quality which is called personality (which, by the way, is an old ideal). Only through being alive to mutual relationship will man attain the true development of his *ego* which leads to the recognition of his *alta-ego.* In our schools, the tradition of individual effort should be accompanied by the idea of joint effort. Education of the child in the smallest group of society—the family—represents the initial mode of cultivating the communal spirit. As soon as it enters the larger group—the school—the child should be taught that it will be dependent on communities of wider extent. There, our system of instruction will have to promote free communication between the school and society. The doors and windows of our schools should be wide open; it will be necessary to expel the stale air of the spirit of seclusion and introduce the salubrious air of the spirit of community. It will be essential to teach our pupils that they are elements in a large community

and to make them understand the coalescence of these elements; they must understand that every one of them will have to find his place in society, and will have certain responsibilities to it. Sociology is a branch of learning, its spirit should pervade our educational system.

It is in the light of this policy that the cultivation of international understanding should be seen: it implies an effort to make our pupils conscious of the fact that the nations of the world are interdependent in their mutual relations. They will have to understand that their country does not stand alone in the world but is an integrative part of an entity, the family of nations, and it may be emphasised that this has never been more true than to-day. The conditions for the development of this view are probably more favourable in Great Britain than they are in Holland, where, prior to the Second World War, neutrality used to be the main feature of her foreign policy. The sense of responsibility to the world cannot develop unless it is based upon a true understanding of new conditions.

This is how the school may serve our national and international community. Just as education lacks accessibility to these sociological views, it largely lacks susceptibility to spiritual values. Our culture indulges in a false sense of forbearance. The hypothesis that the solution of social problems can be facilitated by the avoidance of fundamental vital questions was one of the errors of liberalism.

In reality, every educational and cultural policy presupposes that, in regard to the values of life, a choice will have to be made; that we wish to uphold certain convictions and ideals, derived from our conceptions of the purposes for the attainment of which the authority of the state may be used. If these ideals are to be recognised as national aims, there should be a close connection between them and the spiritual ends which the nation concerned has espoused. I feel that this spiritual attitude is very similar in Great Britain and in Holland. I dare to say that our national life is based upon a Christianity which is not anti-humanistic and upon a humanism that is not at variance with Christianity.

I wonder, too, whether it would not be advisable to formulate the principles by which the cultural policy of a nation should be guided. The need for such formulation evidently has been felt in former revolutionary periods, as an instance of which I may recall the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, which was drawn up at the time of the French Revolution. I find endorsement for this suggestion in the efforts which are being made, nowadays, to formulate the principles by which our national policies must be guided. In this connection, I may refer to the Declaration of Principles of the UNESCO, to which Great Britain as well as Holland adhere through their accession to that organisa-

tion. I may also mention the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* of the United Nations.

In the Preamble to the Constitution of the UNESCO, a plea is made for democratic principles, such as " the dignity, equality, and mutual respect of man ", for " justice and liberty ", for the " intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind ", the " unrestricted pursuit of objective truth " and the " free exchange of ideas and knowledge."

In the *Declaration of Human Rights,* it is stated that:

> All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
>
> Everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.
>
> Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available, and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
>
> Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

One may say that every cultural policy presupposes such norms. In view of the impending chaos in our society as the result of to-day's nihilism, neutrality has become an impossible policy; the idea of a neutral government must be abandoned. The government does not derive its powers from its own authority, but from a higher Power to which it has to conform itself. A government that lacks the basis of conviction necessarily commits the people to self-destruction. I agree with Mannheim's assertion that " Our democracy has to become militant if it is to survive."

PHILIP J. IDENBURG.

PART TWO

THE SITUATION TO-DAY

As is well known, the Dutch are at heart a religious people, although gradually the effects of this religious conviction are tending to grow less noticeable. If one excepts the Roman Catholic Church and the Church known as the *Gereformeerde Kerk* (Reformed Church), the number of those who make an annual profession of faith in one of the Protestant Churches grows smaller.

Since 1798, when the separation of the state and the Reformed Church of the Netherlands was proclaimed, the Church has lost more and more of its influence in practical and everyday life, just as it has in the domain of cultural and scientific ideas. This change can be seen taking place in the sphere of primary, secondary, and university education. The influence of the rationalism of Descartes spread during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in spite of the opposition, at first fierce and later much weaker, of the official Church, which finally in the nineteenth century more or less gave in. This defeat of the Church is felt everywhere, but without any doubt most of all in the schools.

Schools in Holland, as elsewhere, had developed either under the direct control or under the benevolent eye first of the Catholic and later of the Protestant Church. From 1798, however, the bonds which linked Church and school became ever looser. In some schools prayers are no longer said before lessons start, no hymn is sung; teachers no longer make the children learn their catechism, saying that dogmas are too difficult for the child to understand; next they stop telling them the Bible stories which are incompatible with common sense. This fundamental change found considerable support in the opinion of many magistrates who, while making no actual break with the Church which, in spite of all, was still the official Church, had yet broken free and moved from its creed.

As the number of these teachers grew from year to year the reaction among the parents of children who attended these schools became clear. It was first shown among the groups of people who were strictly orthodox Protestants, and whose religious beliefs had not been influenced by rationalism. Immediately these parents decided to found, at their own expense, primary schools in which the religious education of their children on orthodox Protestant lines would be assured. Soon after this the Roman Catholics followed their example, and it was especially after the law of 1857, which gave full freedom for the founding of schools (without financial help from the state, however), that the number of these denominational schools grew considerably.

These events had an important repercussion in the realm of politics. It would be no exaggeration to say that the controversy concerning these denominational schools dominated internal affairs in Holland from about 1870 until the general settlement, contained in the law of 1920. No one could give an adequate idea to-day of the bitterness of this struggle which caused so much harm to the normal development of internal politics. On the other hand this very struggle gave rise to a considerable awakening in the realm of religious education, both among the Protestants who supported the independent schools and among those who preferred to send their children to state schools.

The state of affairs at present is as follows: about 27 per cent. of the children attend state primary schools; 28 per cent. independent Protestant schools; 2 per cent. 'neutral' private schools, and 43 per cent. Roman Catholic schools. The state and the local authorities share equally the expenses of these schools according to the provisions of the law.

At first sight one would be tempted to consider this position almost Utopian! Parents are free to open schools to suit their wishes, only restricted in that they must furnish a list containing the names of children who are not yet on the register of a primary school and whose parents wish them to attend an independent school. If this list is produced, the local authority may be asked to build a school and to supply the money necessary for everything else which may be required for instruction. But though there are no longer financial worries, the educational problems are none the less serious. The solution which has been found is far from satisfactory. If the difficulties which arise concerning religious education are to be thoroughly understood, it will be necessary to look at things more closely.

The origin of the independent Protestant schools is to be found in the absolute necessity to follow in school, where religious education is concerned, the same rules of conduct as those set up in the home. This is the cause of the cry which has not yet been silenced: "The school belongs to the parents." By this it is meant that it is the parents who decide the path to be followed by the primary school teacher. Now in practice things are very different: in reality the parents show little interest in the choice of teachers: it is rather their representatives that they choose or do not choose and who direct the affairs of the schools. In their turn these representatives have in general not the time, the energy, nor a sufficient knowledge of school life to influence the actions and deeds of the teachers. Consequently, the whole weight of the responsibility for religious education falls on the latter.

In general, the teachers tell Bible stories which last about half an hour, every morning or at least two or three times a week; in addition, the children learn a psalm or other religious song once or twice a week. Usually these hymns are sung in the morning and in the afternoon before and after lessons. In this way children are prepared for church singing. Children accompany their parents to church on Sunday, or else they attend a service specially for the young in Sunday school. Yet in spite of this extremely favourable situation it was discovered that knowledge of the Bible was far from satisfactory, even in those schools in which Bible stories were told every day. It is for this reason that little books have been written which give the story of the Bible in outline form, so that children can learn by heart essential facts and names.

As a general rule one no longer attempts to make children learn

the catechism by heart as was done in past centuries. Nowadays they are made to learn by heart only a few fundamental principles.

The essential factor in every respect is the attitude of the teacher, both towards religious education and towards the children. This education cannot be considered as finished after the Bible lesson. During all the other lessons the teacher has the task of putting into practice the religious principles in which he has stated his belief during the Bible lesson. When his practice does not agree with his theory the teacher commits a crime against the child. And it is not only in this possible conflict that the difficulty lies; the question to be solved is to discover if it is possible to uphold Bible principles in the other subjects: history, geography, and biology. Although during the last ten years every effort has been made to find a satisfactory solution, teachers in denominational schools do not by any means consider the discussion on this point closed.

There is yet another factor which tends to complicate religious education considerably. As we have pointed out, in principle it was the religious families who asked for denominational schools so that their children might find at school the same religious 'atmosphere' that they knew in the home.

Now at the present time it is no longer exclusively these parents who send their children to independent Protestant schools; many parents who have little or nothing to do with the Church also send their children to these schools. In big towns the percentage of children who fall into this group may sometimes be as high as 60 per cent. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the method of religious instruction must often change if it is to meet the special needs of these children. Moreover, the teachers must bear in mind the presence of those children who come from homes not particularly religious in atmosphere. It should be noted that these difficulties are certainly not insuperable.

The reader will doubtless wonder what may be the result of this religious education. This question is a very difficult one to answer. How can one show clearly the result of a spiritual influence? Is the success of this teaching to be measured by the number of the faithful who regularly attend Church services? Must a record be kept of the number of people who turn away from the Church or of those who, at the end of their lives, still remember their Bible lessons? In general, the influence of the school on the religious development of the child is admitted to be considerable, but material proof is lacking. After all, it is the same as with all efforts made on behalf of a religious or moral idea; one works, and one has faith.

Religious education is by no means completed at the end of the last year at school; on the contrary, it could be asserted that the period of puberty is more or less decisive where religion is concerned. For this reason parents and leaders of youth movements

make every effort to persuade pupils on leaving primary schools to join youth clubs in which are discussed religious, social, and even political questions according to the age of the new recruits. In this way they try to form new central groups in the Church and in Protestant political parties. Although this system has inherent in it great dangers (a certain narrowness of outlook, a feeling of spiritual superiority), success is achieved in forming a nucleus of well-informed, well-educated, and, what is more, enthusiastic young people. Before the last World War a greater percentage of young people were members of movements of this sort than nowadays. This is particularly true of orthodox Protestant groups. One often comes up against a certain scepticism, a thirst for what these young people call their 'liberty'; they have little moral strength; even in an environment over which strict moral principles still reign it is not unusual to notice a disquieting slackening. Yet it seems as if gradually the young people from these circles are turning back to what might be called 'the old paths.'

Young people of orthodox opinions are also faced with the problem of the cinema. On the whole it can be said that very strictly orthodox parents do not allow their children to go to the cinema, but when an inquiry was made a little while ago it was found that young people from such homes disobey their parents' orders. So that they may to some extent guide this tendency to seek more modern amusements some parents have grouped themselves together and arrange for the showing of films which they consider suitable to the age of their children, hoping thus to prevent young people from slipping altogether from their influence. Despite these prudent precautions the number of young people from orthodox homes who visit the ordinary commercial cinemas grows constantly larger. Moreover, let it be noticed that the preventive censure of the parish authorities is rather severe.

As we have said earlier, the state schools, or rather the local authority schools, present an entirely different picture where religious education is concerned. In conformity with the law, the teaching in these schools is 'neutral'; a term which during the course of the years has been the cause of many a lively discussion and which means in reality that the teacher takes no part in religious matters; he leads no prayer, the pupils learn no hymns. Yet these schools are not because of this anti-religious; it would not even be just to say that they are without religion. The law decrees that "civic and Christian duties" should be taught. Most often this instruction is given from a humanist point of view. For this reason it is sometimes said that local authority primary schools are humanist schools, which is certainly not true in every case. There are still villages in which the local school has very close ties with the Reformed Church of the Netherlands and whose teachers are among the faithful who attend church regularly.

So, as a general rule, there is no religious instruction in the state elementary schools. To make up for this the Reformed Church has often instructed the local pastor to give Bible lessons to the children who attend these schools. It is laid down by the law that the authorities must give any help they can, including the provision of lighted and heated classrooms. The parents of these pupils have the right to refuse to allow their children to attend these lessons. Despite the earnest requests of the Synod of the Reformed Church of the Netherlands there are still a number of schools in which no religious instruction whatever is given. Mention should be made of the few hundred teachers in these schools who, as representatives of the Church, give such instruction at their own desire.

Here also, as in the case of the denominational schools, one comes up against the difficulty of maintaining contact with the Church after school-leaving age. Very often children receive no religious instruction from the age of 13, the age at which they leave the elementary school, until they are 17 or 18 and attend the pastor's catechism lessons. It is obvious that religious instruction thus interrupted gives a very poor result; moreover, most of those who have left an elementary school never come back to the Church.

Confronted by this poor result the Reformed Church of the Netherlands makes every possible effort to meet these urgent needs. It tries to gather together young people in clubs which they themselves conduct under the fatherly eye of the minister or of one of his assistants; in this way a considerable effort is made to safeguard these young people from reinforcing the ranks of the 'asphalt youth' (young people who spend their time in the streets). The clubs have nothing to do with politics. It should, moreover, be noticed that the Reformed Church of the Netherlands takes no part in the quarrels between the supporters of local authority schools and independent schools, nor does it ever say that it is for or against any political party.

As for Roman Catholic schools, it is obvious that there is a close bond between Church and school. The clergy wield a very considerable influence over the choice of teachers, the methods they are to follow, and, as is natural, where religious instruction is concerned. A teacher is required to give Bible lessons and to have passed a fairly difficult examination according to the prescriptions of the Church.

Let us now pass on to secondary education. Here the differences are less great. In general, in Protestant schools religious instruction is given twice a week—Bible history or history of the Christian Church; in the state or local authority schools, religious instruction is rarely given: in this case it is usual for the pastors of Protestant parishes to count among their duties the giving of this instruction. During the last few years the number of these denomi-

national schools has constantly increased; this is the result of the fact that the Government now gives the necessary subsidies more easily than in former days. On the other hand it cannot be denied that many parents desire for their children, who are going to attend secondary schools, a religious instruction similar to that given in primary schools.

As for university education: most Protestants are satisfied with the teaching given in state universities; they consider that once their children have become students they no longer need to be educated in an environment in conformity with that of the home. The most orthodox group of Protestants, however, founded in 1880 a university in strict accordance with their own ideas, which is still in existence to-day; first its expenses were met by the Protestant groups, later by state subsidies as well.

The Roman Catholics have also founded a university which is in every way in agreement with their Christian ideas.

To sum up, it may be said that in Holland no general solution has been found to the problem of religious instruction. As it has been shown, the differences of opinion are great; notwithstanding, there is great freedom. It is sometimes said that anyone can found a school to suit his tastes and the state is forced to give its support, but there is no doubt that this assertion goes too far. The foundation of new schools has even been formally forbidden by laws and regulations. In any case, at the present time it is very difficult to get schools built because the housing problem for private individuals is still as acute as ever although the Government makes great efforts to put this right.

Before ending this article mention must be made of a great change in a large number of families: before the war young people found a haven in their home. Since the war it has been noticed that an unrest, a certain nervous tension, has gained a hold on young people. They no longer find the rest they seek; their home seems dull and uninteresting to them; they want something but they do not know quite what. Then they go out into the streets, seek enjoyment in the cinema, go to popular cafés, and marry as soon as possible although there are no suitable dwellings for them. This is particularly true of the working classes, and to a certain extent of the middle classes as well. In a word, here as elsewhere, the deadly consequences of a world war have not yet been overcome.

G. KALSBEEK.

CHAPTER FOUR

NORWAY

WHEN the Lutheran reformation was introduced in Denmark and Norway in 1536, the King became head of the Church as well as of the state; and from that date education of the broad masses of the people has been felt to be the joint responsibility of Church and state. Owing to the Lutheran idea of individual responsibility it was necessary that every citizen—every soul—should have sufficient knowledge about the fundamental Christian truths to be able to stand on his own feet in spiritual matters. Even if many other trends have altered the picture, the bonds between Church and state and their combined responsibility for education is still a marked feature of our cultural life.

There is now a long tradition of freedom of worship, but by conviction or tradition 3 million (i.e. 96 per cent. of the Norwegian population) belong to the State Church, whilst only 120,000 belong to other religious bodies or none (e.g. 5,000 Roman Catholics, 1,000 Jews, 11,000 Methodists, etc.). But according to the Norwegian constitution the King and at least one-half of the members of the Cabinet must be members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. All officials who have anything to do with religious teaching must be members of the State Church. This affects clergymen, professors of theology, headmasters, and the education officers of the elementary schools, but the rank and file of the teachers are under no such obligation. In principle a teacher can be a dissenter, provided he does not teach religion. This can easily be arranged in larger schools, where someone else can take over the religious training of a dissenting teacher's class. But half our elementary schools are one-room schools with only one teacher, so that special arrangements have to be made to guarantee that somebody else (probably a clergyman) will take these lessons. In practice, however, these problems do not often arise. In the secondary schools it is simpler for non-members of the State Church, as the teaching is specialised, the religious training mostly being given by university graduates in theology. Religious instruction is compulsory only for those children who belong to the State Church. The parents of the others can apply for their children to be withdrawn from these periods.

The parents are under compulsion to see that their children are given proper education. This may be done privately or by sending them to the public primary schools (which are attended by 99 per

cent. of the nation's children). All general education, from the elementary stage to university level, comes under the Ministry of Church and Education, which is the highest administrative authority for both.

To-day Norwegian elementary and secondary education is administered under Acts passed in 1935. These Acts stress that the aims of the school are "to contribute to the Christian education of the children and to give them such general education as ought to be common to all the citizens of the community" (Elementary School Act), and that "the school shall contribute to the Christian and moral education of the pupils and try to develop them into capable men and women, intellectually as well as physically" (Secondary School Act). In the regulations for both types of school religious education is the first subject mentioned. In the elementary school the number of periods given weekly to this subject are two or three; in the secondary schools one or two, taught on all levels. The two Education Acts dealing with general education which have been passed since the last war, namely the Continuation School Act and the Folk High School Act, do not have the Christian principle formulated as one of their aims, the last one saying simply "The aim is to give general education to young adults."

Ethics and morals can be taught in many ways, including practical ways. The living together in the home, the traditions of school life, the example of the grown-ups, are important formative forces, as well as the atmosphere and manners in workshops, clubs, etc., where ethical values and moral ideas are absorbed through the pores, so to speak, without being formulated.

Up till now religious training has been the means whereby formulated ethical influences have been brought to bear upon young people. We have no tradition of teaching morals, as in France. We have not even a tradition of undenominational religious training, as in England. In this field the Evangelical Lutheran tradition has been predominant.

The Elementary System

Administratively the elementary school has kept close contact with the Church. Any clergyman has the right to inspect religious teaching in the schools of his parish. The education committee of the municipal council of each of Norway's seven hundred municipalities has a representative of the bishop of the diocese in question, very often the rector of the parish.

Religious training nowadays is looked upon as important, but does not take up much time on the school programme. There are, moreover, sections of our people who would prefer to have all religious teaching abolished. But the reduction in religious training which has been necessary to give a broader general education is probably one of the topics on which there has been the hottest

discussion, in the National Assembly, in different organisations, and in the Press. When viewed historically, this is quite understandable. In 1537, the year after the Reformation, the Degns [1] of each parish were ordered by Royal decree to teach the children the catechism, making them learn by heart the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, the Three Articles of Faith, and the institutional words of baptism and Holy Communion. And the parents were ordered to teach their children as much as they themselves knew. In 1645 King Christian IV ordered that no young man or woman should be allowed to marry unless he or she had been examined in the catechism.

Very important in this connection, however, is the fact that confirmation was introduced in 1736, obliging the clergyman to teach young people for three months beforehand. For about a hundred and fifty years this teaching was based on a famous textbook, Bishop Pontoppidan's *Catechism through Questions and Answers*, 1737, which all schools were ordered to use. Our literature contains several descriptions of how this book was used, and what a gruelling task it was for young people to learn it. I myself was quite surprised when I had to look through it for research reasons a short time ago, and discovered that I knew quite a lot of it by heart—both my parents having learnt it so well that they often quoted bits of it. Despite its clear and excellent exposition of the Lutheran version of the Christian creed, it is certainly no book for children. Confirmation remained compulsory till 1912, and the great majority of young Norwegian people still go through this ceremony, with its preparatory course of religious training with the clergyman of their parish. According to later School Acts this has to be done after they have been through the elementary school course, which means that the minimum age of the confirmants will be 14½ years. The introduction of compulsory confirmation must be seen in connection with the Pietist movement, which came to us through German influence and which laid great stress on education. In the thirty years prior to this—through Pietist activities—much had been done for education, not only in regard to teaching the catechism, but also in the teaching of reading and writing.

In 1739 an Act was passed for the provision of schools in the country districts of Norway and Denmark; but this Act aroused very great opposition, as the whole financial responsibility was put on the farmers. This opposition led to an amendment in 1740, which maintained the principles of the Act of 1736, but left it to each parish to decide how it would manage its own education. From the educational point of view this was a great step backwards, but it is interesting politically, as it was the first step to-

[1] *Degn* (same etymology as 'deacon') was the title given to the parishioner who assisted the clergyman with the service and led the congregation in their singing.

wards local self-government. The Government officials, normally the clergyman and perhaps a judge, were to get together four of the best men in the parish to make all necessary provisions for setting up a school. The development that resulted was chaotic. During the following eighty years we find several hundred different local school systems; but the starting-point in each case was the School Act of 1739, which for the first time laid down the principle that every child has the right to learn such elementary things as reading, writing, and arithmetic. During this period of our history the typical figure in many parishes was the clergyman eager to promote education and sometimes achieving it, but very often meeting united opposition from the farmers, who objected to paying additional taxes in order to have their children taught more than the minimum necessary for confirmation.

The schools then had to be carried on in the cheapest possible way. There were no school buildings. The school consisted of a teacher who taught in turns in different farm-houses which had to accommodate this itinerant school. The teacher had to be given board and lodging for the period the farmer was obliged to put his house at the school's disposal. These itinerant teachers often learned a trade, very often they were cobblers or tailors in order to earn some extra money; but the most important inducement to recruit teachers came from the fact that they were freed from conscription if they taught for seven to ten years. On the other hand there were among them teachers with a real sense of vocation, and in descriptions of rural life up till about 1850 we often find words of recognition and gratitude to these men (or occasionally women). A classical description is that by Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson in his peasant novel *A Happy Boy*. And some of the most outstanding personalities in our national cultural revival were young farmers' sons without any means, whose abilities were discovered by the clergyman during preparation for confirmation, who were tutored by him and then sent out as itinerant teachers.

Thus 1536 stressed the Government's duty to see that children were taught the elements of Christianity. The 1736 Act laid down the principle of every child's right to some general education, which would contribute, broadly speaking, to the religious aims of teaching. In 1827 and 1840 Acts were passed which really put this principle into practice; and in 1860 came the progressive School Act which shifted the balance, so that the aim of the elementary school became general education with religion as an important subject. Later Acts have aimed only at developing this idea in harmony with the march of democracy and the progress of modern educational ideas and research.

To understand political development as well as cultural development in Norway it might be useful to have the following facts in mind: This country has no upper class proper—no upper class,

that is to say, based on land, money, or heredity. If we can speak of an upper class at all, the basis of such a class will be education, and its representatives will be civil servants. The civil servant with an academic education has played a very great part in political and cultural life. On the whole, education has been the ladder by which people have risen in the social scale. Under the conditions of our political life, with its extensive local government (since 1837) based on seven hundred municipal councils (i.e. about four thousand people per municipality), enormous possibilities were opened to elementary school teachers, who in a great number of the local government councils and committees came to be leaders, partly because of their political interest, but above all because they knew about procedure and had the necessary formal training. From this broad stratum of active local politicians, candidates for the National Assembly would often be chosen. Thus the elementary school teachers have played a great part also in the National Assembly, the percentage often amounting to more than 10 per cent. of the total number of representatives. Their political activities were especially marked when the main political parties were Conservative and Liberal, as very many of the elementary school teachers belonged to the Liberal party. Secondary school teachers have never been involved in political activity to a similar extent.

In the education committees (which are sub-committees of the municipal councils), the teachers have by law one or more representatives with full rights. Therefore the discussion of educational questions, especially those relating to the elementary school, has been carried out on a basis of much inside information, both at local government level and at the highest political level; and as a result elementary education has had a high standing.

The elementary school regulations lay down that the following shall be taught:

(1) The main contents of Biblical history.

(2) The most important events in the history of Christianity.

(3) The catechism according to the Evangelical-Lutheran confession.

In the teachers' training colleges an intensive course of religious training forms part of the curriculum, as a preparation for teaching in the schools.

The Secondary System

The secondary school regulations lay down that in the first year there shall be study of a textbook dealing with the life of Christ, and the first period of Christianity. This year's work must also include a short description of the political and religious background, and some knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. In the second year the syllabus must deal with the history of Christianity,

stressing the work to spread Christianity, and giving some information about the pagan religions with which present-day missions come in contact. To the third year belongs a short exposition of Christian belief and ethics. Then for the two top classes are prescribed selected texts from the Old and the New Testaments, and an exposition of the history of religions (including non-Christian). Under the former school regulations—which were in operation for roughly the first third of this century—the attempt was made to give religion a special place by deciding it should not be a subject for examination in the top classes of secondary schools, and that no marks should be given for it. But teachers of religion complained that the subject, far from gaining in inner depth, lost prestige to some extent through this system, and came to be regarded as quite unimportant by the pupils. So in the new Act of 1935 it was put on an equal level with subjects like geography, history, etc., for examination and marks. This has been a very controversial point.

Secondary education now plays a very great part in the nation's life. Compared with other European countries we have a very high percentage of secondary school pupils. But this is a fairly recent development. The secondary schools in former centuries catered only for a very limited group, but as such they have a very much longer tradition than the elementary schools, and their character has completely changed. Their traditions go back to the Middle Ages. The earliest ones were founded in the second century after the adoption of Christianity (probably 1152, when Norway was made an archbishopric); and their aims were to train ministers for the Roman Catholic Church, although they also had lay pupils.

After the Reformation these Cathedral schools, as they are still called, continued to educate future clergymen, but they also developed into schools preparing for study at the universities. To-day the secondary schools are more loosely connected with the Church than the elementary schools, though religious training is given. For instance, they no longer start the day with morning prayers, as is customary in Swedish as well as British secondary schools and also in Norwegian elementary schools.

In Norwegian secondary schools no teaching of philosophy is given, though one will of course touch on philosophical subjects in connection with literature, history, and religion. A short course on philosophy is given at the university for first-year students, who have to pass an examination in this subject. On the whole I think one can say that the Norwegians are a philosophically minded people, but philosophically untrained. We have no school of philosophy and no great philosopher. We are used to getting our philosophical ideas through literature. Several of our great authors might under other circumstances have become philosophers and philosophic scholars. A modern, highly intel-

lectual lyrical poet, Olaf Bull, is quoted as saying: "In this country we cannot afford philosophical scholarship, so we turn to literature instead."

The Norwegian universities play no role in the training and formation of moral character. Our undergraduates are very seldom younger than 19 years old, and the university sees it as its task to give a purely intellectual training, and to concern itself with research work and vocational training on the highest level. But even if the universities make no conscious attempts as such to influence moral character, the scientific and scholarly training itself, with its constant search for truth, ought to have a moral influence. And the way student life is organised may have an indirect effect through voluntary co-operation in clubs and in organisations with an ideal aim.

The General Situation

The religious background in Norway, however, cannot be understood by studying Church activities alone. One of the most interesting traits is the important part played by voluntary Christian organisations. The history of some religious trends goes back to a religious revival initiated by Hans Nielsen Hauge, an untaught farmer of rare abilities, who went on foot around the country about a hundred and fifty years ago, preaching the gospel, but always stressing the '*Ora et labora*' in his formulation: "The best Christian should also be the best farmer or fisherman." Thus, economic progress followed in the wake of his activities.

When the clergy out of jealousy dug up a more or less forgotten law against laymen preaching without the consent of the clergyman, Hauge was imprisoned and persecuted (but he had to be released during the Napoleonic wars when Norway was blockaded by the British, as he seemed to be the only man who could teach people the forgotten trade of making salt out of the sea water along our coasts).

To the activities of Hauge's friends and followers can be traced several of the important voluntary organisations, some of them also directly or indirectly important formative forces in our education. The oldest of these is the Norwegian Mission Society, founded more than a hundred years ago. It is interesting that the school syllabus lays down that for the second year of the secondary school course, religious teaching shall consist of Church history, stressing modern mission activities, especially the Norwegian mission, and such primitive religions (e.g. in Africa) and higher religions (e.g. in Asia) as our missionaries come in contact with. In this connection it may be worth mentioning that Norway has a long-standing tradition of being the country where the contribution to foreign missions is the highest in relation to the population of any country. Our unusually large merchant navy trading on the

seven seas, and the activities of the thousands of women's sewing meetings, which are the main economic basis of the foreign missions, have for generations, even before the distinct internationalism of our own time, created in wide sections of the people the feeling that there are people outside our own little kingdom.

Some of these lay movements within the Church have taken a great and active interest in education. Two hundred to two hundred and fifty years ago the Pietist movement was very active in the cause of elementary education; but in the last hundred years Christian voluntary effort has not been directly engaged in elementary education, but has taken an active part in the pedagogical debate, e.g. on such matters as the framework of religious education, including the weekly number of periods, as well as on the content of textbooks. The Sunday School movement tries to make contact with children and very young people in order to give them a religious view of life by means of children's services on Sunday mornings. There are Christian youth organisations, partly those with international connections such as Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., as well as Scouts and Guides. And apart from these many of the other voluntary organisations encourage youth groups in order to influence the young. But otherwise Christian voluntary effort in the field of education has mainly been concentrated on adult education. There are, of course, vocational schools for training missionaries in foreign countries and lay preachers in Norway. One of the most important contributions is that they have initiated a great number of boarding schools of the folk high school type, very often stressing practical training, woodcraft, needlework, agriculture, beside general education, and trying to keep a Christian atmosphere, although not demanding a Christian view of life from their pupils. In this field the traditional form of co-operation between state and voluntary effort has played a great part. The Government has been of the opinion that a school which does useful work should be supported out of public funds for its running expenses, on condition that the standard of staff, school-building, and equipment is satisfactory. Thus these schools have all the teachers' salaries paid out of public funds, but they appoint their own staff, with the sole proviso that the appointment has to be submitted to the Ministry for recognition.

In 1949 these schools for adults were the subject of a special law, 'The Folk High School Act', which concerns both public schools, organised by the counties, and private schools. The latter originate from two sources, namely, either inspiration from the Danish folk high schools, or a purely Norwegian influence, sometimes representing a Pietistic-Puritan view of life; but the differences now tend to be eliminated. In the framing of this Act much concern was shown to secure for these young people as tolerant and broadminded a milieu as possible. It is therefore laid

down that each of these schools shall have at least one of the big newspapers of each of the four political parties represented in the National Assembly, and that these shall be paid out of public funds.

There has for a long time been one training college for teachers in each diocese, but in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of this century quite a number were started by individual Christians or by Christian voluntary organisations. They followed the same syllabus and had the same standards as the public training colleges. Some of these, however, ceased to exist, others were sold to the Government, and the last which remained was taken over by the Government in 1947, a step which was preceded by a very lively debate in the National Assembly and which caused great consternation in wide sections of the people. As part of the Labour Party plan for nationalisation of teachers' training, all teachers' training now takes place in public colleges.

The university faculty of theology, which had provided the only course of training for ministers of the Norwegian Church and also for most teachers of religion in secondary schools, found a rival in the 'Congregational Faculty of Theology', which was set up forty years ago by a number of religious organisations which reacted against the so-called 'liberal theology' and wanted theological research and training on a more orthodox basis than that which the university stood for. This independent faculty has kept going for forty years and now has more undergraduates than the state university. Its graduates go into the civil service as clergymen or as secondary school and training college teachers of religion.

This may seem to indicate that the Norwegians are a very religious people. But I do not think a sociological investigation of this problem would put us in a special category. Perhaps it may be said that, since nearly everybody has come under the influence of direct teaching of Christianity, there will be fewer extremes; in particular we shall not find people in complete ignorance of religious issues as is sometimes the case in, say, France or America, where religion is a purely personal matter, and where the difference between the members of a religious body and those outside it may be much larger, but where on the other hand religious life may be much more active within the free religious societies, since participation is the result of a personal choice.

On the other hand my impression is that in Sweden—with its State Church—and in Great Britain, religious traditions have really a stronger hold than with us—that is to say, in everyday life as well as in political and organisational life. While the percentage of active Christians, atheists, and indifferent people perhaps remains fairly constant, a marked difference in the last fifty years is that among the numerous group which is largely indifferent to religion the younger generations have given up those religious

traditions which were taken for granted by their grandparents—grace before meals, regular attendance at church, or at least (in this country of long distances) the custom of reading the Sunday's gospel to the household on Sunday mornings, and going to Holy Communion once in the spring and once in the autumn.

But even those who consider religious teaching superfluous or dangerous, or who hold that religion should be a purely private affair, have come under the same influence as everyone else, often with the consequence that they reject Christianity intellectually, but practise its moral principles. The social conscience seems to have been very alert in many people of this type, who were once jokingly called "God's grandchildren."

One can say that both the older Luther's loyalty to authorities and the young Luther's individualism and opposition to those in power on grounds of conscience are traits that are found in the Norwegian people to-day, and are accepted as natural components of our character, which should be furthered by education. Whether one takes the religious or the purely civic point of view, there seems to be a direct line of descent from Luther, who at the Diet of Worms opposed Emperor and princes on grounds of conscience, to the thousands of Norwegian teachers who in 1942 protested individually against orders to take part in the regimentation and nazification of Norwegian youth "because it is against my conscience, and against my conditions of appointment."

HELGA STENE.

CHAPTER FIVE

GERMANY

Introduction

Moral forces require ideals and norms to give them direction and to achieve their objective. One sees them most effectively at work when they overcome the difficulties which fill the world to-day. This report on education and morality sets out from the fact that in Germany the present generation, the children and adolescents as well as the parents and teachers, are facing a most serious crisis. In many cases for these people the pattern of their life has been changed completely and fundamentally. For others it has been much disturbed, and for yet others completely destroyed. It is not the first time in history that the pattern of life has been disrupted. Only to-day, however, have we experienced so deep a disorder over such a wide area; so that the initiative and personal effort of the individual are no longer sufficient to remedy this disturbance. This time corporate bodies have been asked to help, and education—primarily that given in public educational institutions—has been presented with a very great and a new task. For education, the school was and still remains the focus. It is the place where its influence is the strongest, but, starting from here, its effect penetrates into all spheres of life. We shall succeed in solving the problems of moral education only if we face them in their entirety. In addition, however, an ambivalent element should be mentioned: the battle for a just and proper morality is being fought with great vigour on all sides; the positive effect of this is that the task is being taken seriously and being tackled with great impetus. The negative effect, on the other hand, is that the forces desiring to help are being disrupted, thus often defeating their own ends. A pluralism of moral and religious conceptions enriches the intellectual world, but it also presents serious difficulties in the practice of moral education.

Before examining these problems fully some explanation is required.

From this aspect necessarily a gloomy picture will be obtained. The fact must therefore be stressed that this report is not a description of the moral state of the whole German people. Very naturally it is possible to find, in Germany, people leading normal lives with healthy undisturbed morals. These provide the neces-

sary basis for education, and they are in the background of the picture without being described and considered in detail.

Moral education only helps to form the various patterns of life and must not be considered omnipotent. All branches of public life must help in a constructive effort with a single aim if education is to be effective. Education, although not a substitute for a social policy, is yet a necessary element in the social life of a community. Unanimity as to the role of moral education to be found throughout Germany is reflected in the educational and cultural policy pursued by the several governments. The following shows most clearly that, in Germany, legislation on the aims and norms of education requires close co-operation between education and morality.

The Bavarian Constitution, Article 131:

(*a*) Schools must not only teach factual knowledge and practical ability, but must also form the mind and character.

(*b*) They should aim at inculcating awe of God, respect for religious conviction and the dignity of mankind, self-discipline, willingness to accept responsibility, willingness to help others, awareness of all true, good, and beautiful things.

(*c*) The pupils are to be educated in the spirit of democracy, love for their Bavarian Fatherland, love for the German people, reconciliation between nations.

The Constitution of Bremen, Article 26:

The education of the youth is concerned mainly with the following tasks—

(*a*) To teach responsibility to the community, founded on the dignity of the human race, to teach the desire for social justice and political responsibility which brings tolerance of the opinion of others and peaceful co-operation between peoples and nations.

(*b*) To teach willingness to work, in a spirit of service to the community, and to teach the knowledge and abilities necessary for entry into a profession.

(*c*) To teach people to form their own opinions, to respect truth, to be courageous, to acknowledge their belief in these things, and always to do what is right and just.

(*d*) To teach people to share in the cultural life of their own and other nations.

The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Germany, Article 37:

The schools should educate the young in the spirit of the Constitution to be able to form their own opinions, to act responsibly, to be capable and willing to serve the community. The school as a cultural centre faces the task of teaching youth the spirit of friendly and peaceful co-operation between peoples, the spirit of true democracy. Through the parents' council they too should play a part in the education provided by the schools.

Although all the stipulations quoted above lay stress on the moral aims of education, yet the careful observer will notice therein the above-mentioned pluralism of the ethical and religious conceptions. This pluralism is not only apparent in the great difference

between the ideals of the schools of East and West Germany, which originate in their differing conceptions of democracy, but it is also visible in the constitutions of the *Länder* of the West. If the constitutions of Bavaria and Bremen are compared, it can be seen that the first is influenced by the Christian Social Union and the second by the Social Democratic Party. The differences are not fundamental. The aims in many ways are identical. It is quite clear, however, that different political ideologies lead to different accents on the ethical code. Thus it will be found that in the Bavarian Constitution stress is laid on religious values while in the Constitution of Bremen they are not mentioned.

It is of paramount importance that the items of education and morals should be mentioned in the constitution of a state whereby they become the law of the land. That implies that, to-day, the opinion held by some people who believe that moral education should be left to private initiative and to the interplay of free forces has been overruled by the conception that moral education is the concern of society and the state. This is a novel idea in German constitutional history. The Constitution of the German Reich of 1871 contains no reference to education, as it was not then considered to be the concern of the Reich, but of the separate *Länder*. But at that time the constitutions of the *Länder,* in their turn, e.g. the Constitution of Prussia of 1850, do not mention the aims of education in their stipulations concerning schools. The aim of education is mentioned for the first time in the Constitution of the Reich of 1919 (the Weimar Constitution), but only briefly. To-day, however, the constitutions of the *Länder* refer to it most extensively, as has been shown by the examples quoted. This peculiarity becomes the more striking if, by way of comparison, we consider the British system of education. Thus, the comprehensive Education Act of 1944 does not refer to the contents and aims of instruction. In contradistinction to present-day German constitutions the Education Act does not mention any ideals of education nor does it set up ethical postulates.

All these details have been given in order to justify that the problems under review are here being placed within the frame of public life as a whole. This, in its turn, throws up such a mass of phenomena and situations that this report must necessarily be limited to a discussion of such phenomena of life that are of paramount importance to Germany and which, for this reason, may serve as typical examples in illustrating the main facts, fundamental problems and the main tasks of moral education. The following report considers first the family, then occupations, and finally youth and its orbits of life.

It is not easy, at the outset, to give reasons for the selection made; it will be gathered from this review whether the selection made has been appropriate. But a word must first be said to explain why

the spheres of school, Church and state are not included in the selection, or why they do not take precedence in a selection that must needs be made.

The schools which have already been shown to be the centres of education are naturally woven into the framework which has been selected for discussion. They are not being discussed separately, as it is possible to make general statements with regard to schools only at the elementary level. The marked differentiation which appears in types of higher education is too great to admit of a general treatment. Furthermore, at this stage only a small percentage of the adolescents are receiving education in schools, while the majority are at work, continuing their education in special institutions while following their professions. It is therefore preferable to consider adolescents in a separate section describing all the cultural institutions to which they belong. Such a treatment will show the unity of the numerous organisations forming their environment.

The Church has a double role within the framework selected. It is an organisation in the state and society, and it is also the focus of religious culture. Certainly one cannot discuss education and morality without seriously considering the fundamental religious forces. Now it would be impossible to explain the relation between moral education and religion in Germany without simultaneously considering the relations between Church and state. This cannot be done briefly. A study of the role played in moral education both by the Church and the state would require a special report involving the examination of constitutional and legal questions which do not lie within the scope of this report.

This is not a statistical analysis, for such would be of only little value. The factors influencing this type of analysis would make it impossible to draw dependable conclusions from it. It is also quite possible that any conclusion obtained in this way would be entirely erroneous. The writer has instead tried to combine his own personal observations and his comprehensive reading, and from these to produce a reliable and exact picture. It will be apparent to the reader that he has included his own personal criticisms. In short, he has tried to be objective, being convinced that this is the only way to present a true account of present-day intellectual life in Germany.

The Family

In spite of the effects of the war and the collapse of the state, family life in Germany has, when viewed from the outside, remained for the most part intact. This is true wherever the family circle was not forcibly broken up. Wherever unfavourable conditions arose and family life was disturbed, great efforts were made to preserve or readjust it.

Where the inner harmony of family life corresponds to its outer stability it is still, as formerly, a rich source of all moral education—an education which forms and moulds the child and the young man, as well as the grown-up, more strongly than any other pedagogic institution which is found in public or private life. German educational theory holds fast to this basic conception which, in its most expressive form, was propounded and carried out by Pestalozzi. It is not only of theoretical importance; it has a great practical importance with regard to the policies of the schools. All efforts to encourage and deepen the joint work of school and parents are now being made in this conviction, since the school policy of the National Socialist regime, with its theory of the omnipotence of the state, had neglected and, if not on principle, at least to all intents and purposes, fought against this private sphere of parental education. It is quite obvious that a school education which wishes not merely to impart knowledge but also to form character must be acquainted with the home circumstances of the child and—in favourable cases—must co-operate with the parents.

The constitutions of German *Länder* and the Education Acts of recent years have by law guaranteed this sphere of parental education. The reason is the same in every case—that moral and religious education finds in the family a basis which cannot be replaced by anything else. The following may be taken as examples:

(1) *Basic Law for the German Federal Republic, Article 6, Paras. 1 and 2*

(i) Marriage and the family should stand under the special protection of the State.

(ii) The care and education of their children are the natural right of parents and, above all, their bounden duty. The State will watch over the actions of parents.

(2) *Constitution of the* Land *Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Articles 101 and 106*

Article 101.—(i) Community and state are built on marriage and the family. In the family obedience, respect, a public spirit, a feeling for responsibility, and mutual love and loyalty are encouraged.

(ii) The State regards marriage and the family as the most important bases of a moral and stable social life. It protects and develops them.

Article 106.—To educate children to be useful members of society is the first right and duty of parents and of those who, by law, have been entrusted with their upbringing. It is, however, also the task of the State and the Church or other religious communities.

(3) *Constitution of the* Land *Hesse, Article 55*

The education of youth in a sense of public spiritedness and in a sound physical, spiritual, and intellectual outlook is the right and duty of parents. This right can be withdrawn only by order of a court based on the law.

Accordingly the joint efforts of parents and school have been placed on a firm and legal basis, e.g. in the law concerning school

policies in the town of Hamburg, October 25th, 1949, Section 9, Paras. 1 and 2:

(i) Teacher, pupils, and parents together form the life of the school.
(ii) The parents contribute to school life by their advice.

In the several *Länder,* there are special statutes with regard to parent representation in the schools which serve to make a reality of the joint efforts of parents and school for the cause of education.

There is, however, a desire to supplement such forms of organisation by a private, non-organised and more intensive contact between parents and teachers. This promises better results for educational work since organisations, becoming the instruments of powerful political groups, may put general political aims before problems of education. The 'Provisions for Parent Representation in Schools' of the Schleswig-Holstein Ministry of Education of June 10th, 1948, shows this danger very clearly:

Part I, Para. 4

Parents and teachers should always be fully aware that parent representation neither is the place for the expression of religious, philosophical, or party-political views, nor does it offer an opportunity for the discussion of purely administrative questions; that it neither represents the interests of the pupils against the teachers, nor is it a school-inspection body. In special cases, however, there is nothing to be said against resolutions being made on important questions which are beyond the jurisdiction of the headmaster. The general interest in the successful education of the children should stimulate and lead school and parents to a mutual enlightenment which will be of great interest to both.

Since so much importance is laid on family education and so much expected from it, it is quite obvious that a crisis in moral education will result if the stability of the family is disturbed or destroyed.

We have shown that conditions are at their best whenever the outer pattern of life and the inner harmony of the soul are, at one and the same time, present and at work. Unfortunately it is just this inner harmony which is often lacking in many situations which, from the outside, appear intact. Therefore a clear picture of the various aspects of a disturbed pattern of life cannot be painted merely by taking into account those cases in which the pattern has been broken up because of outward circumstances, e.g. the war or the post-war periods. The inner crisis of the family goes much deeper, and its particular danger is often to be found in the fact that it is hidden under the cover of an outer harmony, and, unnoticed, undermines the moral structure.

In order to encompass all these various aspects and interpret them correctly, this main difference must be noted—that in some

cases the danger and disruption come from within, whilst in others they penetrate from without. This inner danger arises most commonly where the parents, because they lack sufficient spiritual and intellectual ability, as well as a moral conscience and a feeling of their own worth, create disconcerting conditions, never attain a harmonious social life, never successfully carry out their private duties, and are just as incapable of educating their children as they are of educating themselves. No one will deny that, in such a situation, all the natural advantages and supports which could ensure a sound moral education are lacking. The worst danger is that in this case heredity and environment react ominously and inescapably upon one another. For, as a rule, children of such parents begin their life with hereditary defects, and they are, from the outset, morally inferior and more reversionary than others—indeed, in extreme cases, even morally blunted and insensible. It is these children who are in need of efficient educational care, that have parents incapable in this respect and who surround them with an unfavourable environment. This vicious circle can be broken only by resolute action from without. But just as it is necessary to attack here with all the powers of modern education, so it is difficult to carry through such educational reforms in a practical manner, for the only method which can lay claim to such an authorisation is that of the state control of the family. State interference in Germany is, however, rendered more difficult owing to the establishment in German law of two sound principles. The first is the conviction, which has already been mentioned, that the family is fundamentally the most potent factor in education, and as such must be respected. The second is the principle, arising out of modern liberal constitutional development, by which the individual is protected from the state. When the 'People's Code' (*Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*) came into force in 1900, it surmised the existence of families which were outwardly and inwardly stable and that it was only in extreme and exceptional cases that the state would have to interfere. Therefore a long list of offences committed by parents in respect of the education of their children was drawn up; these offences must be carefully established before the state can interfere on the basis of juridical decision.[1] War and the post-war period have naturally resulted in a larger number of children being

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[1] *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*, Section 1666, Para. 1:
Should the spiritual and physical well-being of the child be endangered by the misuse by the father of his right to care for his child or by his neglect, or if he is guilty of dishonourable or immoral conduct, the court of guardians has the power to take the necessary steps to remove this danger. The court of guardians can also order the child to be placed in a suitable family or in an educational institution.

Reichsgesetz für Jugendwohlfahrt (of September 7th, 1922), Section 63. Concerning the provisions for trustee education, Paras. 1 and 2:

endangered and increased the difficulties in dealing with such cases. Therefore, in the realm of family education, youth work, and of trustee education, as well as in social pedagogy, the problem of how to arrive at a practical method of educational relief has become acute. In the lively discussions which are being conducted on this subject stress is laid not so much on the juxtaposition of the educational rights of the parents and those of the state, but rather on the right of the child to be educated, and this right will be protected by the state if necessary against parents who are incapable of fulfilling their duties as educators or who do not take them seriously. Young people who grow up with the possibility of losing this inner balance are, in a time of great instability of life, likely to be completely deprived of it. The most potent proof of this lies in the fact that a great number of neglected and, indeed, criminal adolescents comes from such home circumstances.[2]

By the side of these extreme cases of the inner disruption of family education which rests both on the incapability of parents and the spiritual and intellectual weakness of the children, situations arise in which the parents do not succeed in establishing an harmonious family life and in which a visible disruption of family life is caused by the result of this is clearly seen—the parents living apart or being divorced. It is sufficient only to mention it here without depicting more clearly the unfortunate effects on the education of the children, since it is not a problem which is characteristic of the present situation in Germany alone, but is to be found among all peoples and all nations.

Similarly the case of unmarried parents and of illegitimate children need only be mentioned briefly here since it, too, appears everywhere in the social life of the present time. German constitutional law has for a long time, especially since the end of

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(i) A minor, who has not yet completed his 18th year, is to be handed over, by the decision of the guardian court, to trustee education if:

(*a*) According to Sections 1666 and 1838 of the *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*, a child under age should be taken from its home in order to prevent it from going astray and yet no suitable accommodation can be found without employing public aid. This handing over, however, is not permissible in order to prevent the child from being neglected physically.

(*b*) Trustee education is necessary because of the lack of normal education.

(ii) Trustee education may not be resorted to if it offers no apparent prospect of success.

[2] It is not possible here to give examples, for there are so many. Instead of that, it is sufficient to give one source, which is easily accessible, in which such experiences are competently gathered and explained: *Unsere Jugend—Zeitschrift für Jugendhilfe in Wissenschaft und Praxis,* published under the auspices of the Youth Bureaux. It has appeared monthly since January 1949. (Publisher: Wilhelm Steinebach, Munich and Düsseldorf).

World War I, busied itself with the problem of improving the position of the illegitimate child. But neither the German Constitution of 1919 (Weimar Constitution) nor the constitutions in force to-day have really proclaimed the complete legal equality of the legitimate and the illegitimate child.[3] The greatest hindrances are not to be found in moral issues but in the basic principles of civil law, particularly the laws governing the family and inheritance. This equality has, however, been accomplished in the educational field. This is particularly important because naturally the child of unmarried parents needs to a greater degree the help offered by education. That follows from what has already been said; the very fact of this incompleteness in the family—even if the mother or father has high moral qualities—puts the child at a disadvantage as far as education is concerned. It is of particular value for the moral development of these children that the deep-rooted prejudice against the illegitimate child, which has been in existence for hundreds of years, has lost its effect, firstly amongst the children and adolescents of large towns, and then gradually amongst those of smaller towns and villages, where tradition dies hard. This is a direct result of the war and the post-war period. From agreed observations, it has been noted that young people make no moral distinction as to whether, for example, their companions come from a family which, from the first, was incomplete or which has only become so through the events of war.

In addition to these cases of broken family life, a large group of those families which have been disrupted by outside events must be taken into account. This is, of course, no specifically German problem; it arises everywhere where war has left behind its scars; indeed, to-day, it is an unfortunately common occurrence in this world.

In every country, however, the causes of this disturbance spring from different sources, and, above all, in each particular country, the means whereby help can be given will again differ and be

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[3] The Constitution of the Reich of 1919 contained a very general statement for future legislation:

Article 121.—"The same conditions should be given to illegitimate children with regard to their physical, mental, and social development as to legitimate children."

The Basic Law of the German Federal Republic of 1949 has incorporated this Article almost word for word, thus showing that, even to-day, no definite solution has been found for this problem.

The Constitution of the German People's Republic (East Germany) of 1949 declares in Article 33:

"Illegitimate birth must be a disadvantage neither to the child nor to its parents." "Any conflicting laws or decrees are hereby repealed."

With this a further step has been taken, in that some unfavourable laws have been withdrawn. However, this stipulation remains very general, since the same rights are not given, it being merely stated that illegitimate birth should be of no disadvantage.

limited by what is possible in the circumstances. This report will present the special problem in Germany.

The disruption of the home appears in three forms: it is caused by the loss either of the father or of the mother or of both. One can regard this as the general fate of mankind. Unfortunately, however, the war and the post-war period have greatly increased the number of children who are orphans, and thus, because of its suddenness and violence, this aspect of the problem has been greatly aggravated. The father has been killed, is missing, or is a prisoner of war; the mother has died either during the war or in the process of flight—often, indeed, this fate has overtaken both parents. This report, which is inquiring into the moral education of children, will limit itself to those cases where, even in the midst of ruin, the children have remained alive: it cannot refrain, however, from mentioning in passing the worst and most extreme cases of all—the liquidation of Jewish parents and their children.

In almost all the cases in which children have lost, partly or completely, the stability of family life as a direct result of the war or the post-war period, this has happened at the same time as a change in the general situation. And this change, this complete economic uncertainty and insecurity, enforces itself, to the exclusion of everything else, upon the attention of the young people. From many examples, that of the refugee will be chosen, for it creates the most difficult problem for moral education in Germany at the present time.

Amongst the many aspects of this problem, e.g. the political, legal, and psychological, the last interests us most here, since it is of great importance whether moral education can find any fruitful means of attack. Therefore a short general survey of the mental state of mind of refugees is not out of place here. According to the method by which they have been rendered homeless, two quite different groups arise: firstly come those who deprecate the name of 'refugee' and call themselves 'displaced persons.' They are mostly people who left their homes because of military retreat or who were ordered to leave. The others emphatically call themselves 'refugees.' They are people who have deliberately escaped from a situation which they could no longer endure; they are, first and foremost, 'political refugees.' This distinction is neither trivial nor unimportant. For, nuances aside, the typical difference is that the displaced person wishes to make clear what he has to suffer is not of his own volition, and he regards his circumstances as provisional and remediable; therefore, either he will fail completely to settle down in his new surroundings or else he will do it very slowly and with great difficulty. Inwardly he resists the new demands life makes on him, and although he may be of an active and positive disposition, yet, to the new world in which he

is living, he remains a stranger, apart, hostile and passive. Amongst the 'refugees' are many who, because of their various activities, have come into conflict with their original environment and who now, with the same zeal, seek and find new chances of life in a changed situation; they affirm their faith in the new world into which they have entered. It is easy to understand that the development and preservation of moral personality are, in each case, quite different. Both have their weak and strong sides and their dangers. There, it is the preference for self-security and self-preservation with, however, the danger of being passive and denying life; here, it is the strength which lies in activity, and the danger arising from an adventurous disposition and an adaptability which can weaken the moral fibre. It is of great importance to which moral group the children and adolescents who are victims of this fate belong. Therefore such psychological considerations play a large part in the present moral education of refugee-youth in Germany.

But all this is true only when the search for ways and means of giving suitable education is considered. Even more important is the aim. This lies not in finding artificial substitutes for lost standards of life, but in making young people independent in the new social order. The necessary element in moral education is, for such as they, not a substitute for the family but the finding of a calling.

It is one of the major tasks of theoretical pedagogics and of practical work in education to recognise all this and to turn it to practical use. It is only desperate social conditions that make it clear that here lies the broadest and most fruitful means of furthering the moral education of youth, and indeed of adults, particularly when one cannot hope, for internal and external reasons, for the support which family education should give.

So long, indeed, as the parents are motivated by a true desire for education, is it possible with their help to lessen the crises of moral education. It is easily understood that many causes of such dangers to children and to adolescents are to be found in the difficult conditions of the post-war period. Unfortunately it is often the case that the parents, with the best will in the world, cannot find the means of giving a successful moral education. Therefore school and youth authorities have attempted to give more advice to parents concerning the education of their children. Naturally the concern for moral education holds first place. Serious educational difficulties which the parents cannot overcome by themselves are the result of injuries done to the character. Here it is a question of suitable diagnosis and therapy in which pedagogic, psychological, and, if necessary, medical experience must unite. These arrangements, which have already been in existence for some time, have now been increased and expanded because of the growing educational crisis in Germany. It is true that this

work is finding many difficulties, both within and without: the large towns have a wider basis on which to build and better financial possibilities for giving educational advice; but in the small towns and in the country things are, in comparison, very much behindhand, although it has been realised for a long time that help and advice are particularly urgent here. In individual cases the conditions in the village are often more favourable when the teacher or clergyman, if he is educationally or psychologically interested and if he has won the confidence of the parents, takes this work upon himself. But the giving of advice is only one side of the matter although it suffices, in easier cases, with sensible and well-meaning parents. Effective help is given in the more difficult cases by taking the children from their broken family circumstances and placing them in surroundings where a meaningful education is possible. Here, however, the work is hampered for economic reasons by a lack of the necessary institutions. The number of these homes which give remedial education is very small, although here the Churches, with their welfare schemes, as well as the state authorities, are looking for ways and means. A further hindrance to this educational advice work is to be found in the fact that the advice is by no means sought by all who urgently need it. The removal of moral injury is most difficult just where it is neither felt nor recognised, and as soon as the authorities step in because of suspected neglect, advice which is dependent on regulations loses its point, since the seeking and giving of advice is possible only if it is spontaneous and if founded upon the equality of both seeker and giver.

This educational advice work in Germany has received valuable suggestions from the organisation and work of the Child Guidance Clinics, particularly those in England and North America. Yet it must be pointed out that, for good reasons, a mere imitation of these institutions is, in face of the present circumstances in Germany, not to be expected nor, indeed, to be wished. Moreover, there is a danger of considerable sums invested by large organisations in diagnostic methods being out of proportion to the therapeutic effects achieved. Germany, at present, cannot do more than try to cope with the crises in moral education—in town and country—by the moderate means of expert advice and by enlisting the help of the parents.

Occupations

After the family, the sphere of occupations is the most important element in moral education. This point of view has only slowly dawned on the German mind. It is only the painful experience of a deep and widespread upheaval in the working world which has made clear the close connection between the two. If this upheaval in the world of work can so obviously weaken and

destroy the moral powers of young and old, then similarly it must be hoped that a stable approach to work will form a fruitful basis on which to build moral education and to fight against moral crises. That is not to say that stability in work will guarantee a moral way of looking at life, but rather that if this stability does not succeed, the indispensable basis for moral education will be lacking.

The range of this problem in Germany is seen by the fact that nine-tenths of all the children from 14 to 15 years of age go to work. If one-tenth of the children of this age-group do not begin work but enter a secondary school, it does not mean that a small number of adolescents, for the sake of erudition, is being carefully sheltered from work, which all the rest have to do. Whether apprentice or secondary school pupil, the child is facing the same world. The scholar is not yet in the professional world and he certainly enjoys a mode of living which is more nearly suited to his own temperament than that to which the majority of his own age-group are subject. This delay in meeting the outside world arises in order to make possible the necessarily longer general and basic education which is needed for later qualified professional work. Thus the life and activity of the secondary school are ordered with an eye to the later demands of the vocational world even if, for good reasons, specialist education which is needed by the apprentice is consciously avoided. In spite of all the differences, which ought to be brought to light here and not glossed over, between those who leave the elementary (‘*Volksschule*’) school and those who have passed through the secondary (‘*Höhereschule*’) school, this fact, which has great social and political importance, emerges—that work is the basic element in all dealings between adolescents and the world. Since, however, moral quality finds its expression in one's practical behaviour in the world, so too is it clear that moral education finds its greatest support in the stability of work which, as seen above, is the refuge of those who have lost the stability of the family.

The problem in Germany is acute since, for adolescents, there is no sure path which leads to an occupation. Conditions are particularly difficult in the West German Federal State, whereas they seem, at least from the outside, to be well organised in the East German People's Republic. This results from the social conditions and the political structure of the two regions. The population of the Federal Republic has increased by more than ten millions because of the refugees and displaced persons. The state itself has, in accordance with its constitutional principles, left all matters concerning the admission to occupations to the agencies of the German economy; owing to the precedence taken by private enterprise the state by itself cannot contribute to a solution of the problem either in its own enterprises or by measures taken by state

agencies. Debates in the several parliaments have resulted in an absolute rejection of any kind of compulsory labour service. In East Germany, on the other hand, the population is much smaller, and the state directs the economy, while the greatest industries are under its control. Use, too, is made of compulsory labour service. Moreover, the conditions in the two regions cannot be compared, as the free choice of occupation and compulsory labour service represent two entirely different systems. Since the aim of this report is to view the tasks of moral education which are the result of a disrupted pattern of life, I shall now concentrate on the ways and means which have already been found and are still being sought to lessen this critical situation.

From the point of view of morality and education, the question arises as to whether one can speak, in the true sense of the word, of 'vocation', or whether it is not better, when speaking generally, to talk of the 'working life' of the man in the street. This is certainly no specifically German problem; it is connected with the change in the economic structure of the modern world. The German word 'vocation' (*Beruf*) has an extraordinarily high ethical and even religious ring. In order not to confuse the conception of the word and what it actually means, it is essential to ask whether the old word can still be called adequate. It is a strange paradox, which is not sufficiently noted, that the words 'vocational work' have appeared just at a time when the connection between vocation (i.e. inner calling, '*vocatio Dei*') and work has become openly questionable. In this way the word has gradually lost its meaning, and has even come to mean the opposite, when, for example, something is called 'vocation' which would be better understood as 'the doing of work of necessity.' Under the pressure of social conditions people rarely consider what is meant when they speak of 'vocation' or say that they 'chose' a certain career. Often it is a mere mockery when a young person speaks of his 'choice of career', when in reality he has only seized the first chance which presents itself within the narrow limits of his experience. A sober and penetrating report, as this sets out to be, cannot refrain from remarking that, to many classes of people, the important thing is whether the work brings social and economic advantages. The distress in the German working world has become so great that to-day the number of those who choose their work because of some inner calling is smaller, in relation to the total population, than ever before. In place of the profession embarked upon on one's own initiative has arisen more and more clearly the idea of such and such a career being suitable; this suitability is decided less by any desire to realise one's self than by the judgment of others. This is not so unusual when one realises that here children of 14–15 years are being considered. But the opinions of others with regard to the suitability of an

occupation for young persons can be of real help only if they are readily accepted by the adolescent who does not remain inwardly unresponsive and aloof. Numerous dangers lie in wait here. The writer does not wish to discuss now the basic difficulties of the psychological diagnoses and prognoses of adolescents, because they are common everywhere. But the formation of a clear judgment is rendered difficult by motives inherent in the special sociological situation of present-day Germany. A glance at the 'Labour Advice Bureaux' (*Berufsberatungsämter*) will make this clear. In deference to the totalitarian principles of the National Socialist labour and economic policies these bureaux were burdened with an additional task over and above their proper tasks. They had to make psychological diagnoses and give advice accordingly but, at the same time, they had to regulate the approach to individual professions according to a contingency plan which was worked out from the viewpoint of definite economic needs and which did not concern itself with pedagogic and psychological considerations. The emphasis was therefore placed on economic considerations and not upon the young person himself. Had these circumstances been emphasised when the bureaux were first constituted it might perhaps have been more pertinent to call them 'Labour Inducement Bureaux.'

With the end of the National Socialist regime these orders with respect to the direction of labour have become inoperative—at least in West Germany. This has not been the end of the matter, however, since the pressure of industrial realities has taken the place of official direction. It is only just to say here that many career advisers who take their work seriously still try to remain true to their task of giving real advice and to act according to their educational consciences—which is often very difficult. In this respect, however, the adolescent is not always on their side, for in such social conditions as are in existence to-day he calculatingly turns to those things which glitter and which offer a prospect of success, yet without being prepared to bring his own capabilities into account. Thus the question arises as to whether in this changed situation the dictum can be maintained that the realm of work is a basic element in moral education. If one disregards those examples of the approach to work which have already been described, then the answer must be in the affirmative: the life of modern man is so constituted that the path to everything which he expects from life must pass through the field of work. Whatever he wants from life he must procure by his work. On the other hand he draws to the utmost, from the richness of life and the world, that which appears within the limits of his work. Therefore, in spite of impediments of all kinds, the most powerful means of forming personality lie in the sphere of a man's occupation.

In the completely changed business world of to-day, the points of attack as well as the methods of moral education have indeed changed, but the basic relationship between work and morality has become broader and firmer than ever before. It should be realised that educational work in Germany consciously draws its conclusions from this fact. This can be shown by three examples:

(1) The work in a school, which an 8- or 9-year-old attends in order to find an occupation later, insists more firmly than previously that the pupil should be well prepared to enter the field of work. This is to be seen in the choice of subjects. Teaching methods have to ensure that this aim does not lead to unnecessary specialisation and hardship, and that the imaginative and emotional world of the child is not harmed. The highest educational art consists in finding a compromise between the demands of life and the mental care of the child. For again, it is the harshness of social conditions which necessitates that the child's education should not be isolated from the world. The main concern of moral education is to fit the child for life in every sense. In this respect the much-quoted saying, formerly propounded by the National Socialists and used to-day, though indeed for quite different reasons—" It is not mere factual knowledge but character that matters "—is proved to be an untenable juxtaposition and rupture of what is, in essence, one and the same thing. Without knowledge of the world even the most noble aspects of character cannot unfold and develop. Just as work can do little to affirm moral powers, so mere learning cannot guarantee character. He who wishes to develop the good sides of his character will not go very far if he renounces all knowledge of the world.

This view is confirmed also by the experiences of the post-war period. There are often to be found among the refugees young people who, though their characters promised well, have experienced a quite unsatisfactory intellectual development. The more open-minded and active they are the more they suffer from their state of ignorance. They see how others take precedence over them, they remain on the edge of life, they can—in spite of everything—be inwardly ruined because their spiritual and intellectual activity can find nothing on which to expend its energy and, indeed, no clear objective. Learning is, in such a case, the saving of character. Thus it is obvious that a school which prepares children for their future work is doing a great service to moral education. It will welcome all chances by which moral education can be put into practice and confirmed in the real situations of school life and in the practical behaviour of the pupil. This is general in education the world over, and therefore nothing further will be said about it here.

(2) The confirmation and practice of moral qualities lie in the training for a career. All responsible institutions—the state,

industry, education, etc.—have realised that it is a question of producing morally sound specialists in all walks of life; they have realised, too, that all characterless specialists are a great misfortune to the nation. Therefore various united attempts are being made to-day to train young people for a career, particularly that of teaching, in such a way that all human qualities are developed. Thus mere specialisation is replaced by training which enables the individual to satisfy the different and changing demands of his particular profession. This, however, demands the exercise of intellectual activity, the development of manifold spiritual functions, independence, and a broad outlook—in short, elasticity and open-mindedness. All this is the essence of real character formation, in which not only intellectual but also moral capabilities are preserved. This is not a mere theoretical supposition but follows from the structure of the modern economic world. Previously it might have been possible for a specialist during his whole life to get away with the knowledge he had gained in his youth and to deal with anything new which might arise without any trouble. At the present time progress and change in all spheres of work have been so speeded up that he who wants to be *au fait* with his work for any length of time must always hold himself ready to absorb new knowledge. This open-mindedness, however, must in the first place be inculcated during the training period. While this is general everywhere, the social condition in Germany necessitates this open-mindedness in order that a person may be capable of changing quickly from one profession to another. This is not merely a case for a wide-awake intelligence, but also for a sureness in one's moral life so that, in the event of such changes, courage and creative power are not destroyed.[4]

Apart from material considerations, the moral education in training for a profession consists in placing the apprentice in a situation in which human qualities are nurtured and not hindered. It is of prime importance that the relationship between master and apprentice and among colleagues remains intact, and that self-confidence is strengthened whatever arrangements are made and instructions given. Self-discipline, too, should be considered more

[4] Eduard Spranger has just published an essay on these actual questions entitled '*Umbildung im Berufsleben und in der Berufserziehung*' (published in *Die Berufliche Ausbildung im Kanton Bern*, 1950, Edn. 3, pp. 41 ff.).

Two main ideas are discussed: (i) Will lasting occupations be possible in the future? (ii) Within what limits will a free choice of profession be found in the future? The report continues by saying that, in the future, permanent professions will no longer be taken as a matter of course, and that the choice of profession according to inclination and ability will be even more limited than at present. This is the result of the changed structure of the national economy and world-wide interconnection. Professional education must take heed that neither the worker nor the human being behind the worker is morally neglected.

important than any direction or regimentation of work. This ethical education in the working world is looked upon as more essential than warnings or moral sermons from which little practical good can be expected.

(3) Since the elementary schools lead only to the threshold of the world of work, and since any practical training cannot take over the wider task of education, special value is laid on the 'vocational school' (*Berufsschule*), which should go hand-in-hand with training. School policy since 1945 has taken over the compulsory vocational schools and extended them. In this the same motive is constantly recurring: it is not only a question of establishing a broader basis of knowledge, nor even of continuing the elementary school education; it is, first and foremost, a question of cultivating human values and a sound character which will later ensure for the young person an independent existence in his profession and a personal participation in the events of public life.

Everywhere an attempt is being made to turn these plans into a reality. School and industry, teacher and engineer alike are concerned in it. As is quite natural because of the many different people involved, there are differences of opinion as to which facets of the work are most urgent and should receive priority. There is, however, complete unanimity on the question of the inseparability of training for a profession and moral education. What has been described here, therefore, is no sphere of theoretical pedagogy but a basic fact of education. It would, however, be a one-sided hypothetical picture were this fact not added—that this branch of education is suffering severely from the stresses and strain of the present social position and that, therefore, results vary considerably. There are many cases in which this training has, under favourable industrial conditions and with good apprentices, reached its goal—that of professional and moral education. On the other hand there are cases in which the first steps have hardly been taken, which in other places have already become a reality.[5]

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[5] Educational journals in Germany are trying to find out in detail exactly what is the position with regard to these various questions. Three are mentioned here:

(i) *Archiv für Berufsbildung—Organ der Deutschen Gesellschaft zur Förderung des gewerblichen Bildungswesens* (appeared since 1949), (publisher: Westermann, Braunschweig).

(ii) *Berufserziehung—Wissenschaftliche Zweimonatsschrift zur Verbindung von Beruf, Erziehung und Leben* (since 1949), (Bayerischer Schulbuch-Verlag, München).

(iii) *Berufsbildung—Zeitschrift für das berufliche Bildungswesen, zugleich Organ des Deutschen Zentralinstituts für Berufsbildung* (since 1946), (Volk und Wissen-Verlag, Berlin and Leipzig).

The first journal discusses these questions from the point of view of professional life; the second from the point of view of the vocational schools. The third deals with the situation and conditions in East Germany.

Youth and Its Orbits of Life

As has been shown in the introductory remarks, in order to obtain a true report on education and morality in Germany, a glance at youth is more rewarding than a description of the moral education of children in, for example, the family, kindergarten, and elementary school. Special German conditions arise here. It is true to say that the contemporary situation which places new tasks before education becomes significant only when the young people set out as workers and have gone far enough in spiritual growth to face independent moral experiences, to take decisions, and to know which environment to enter and which to avoid. This psychological question is not to be pursued here nor the attempt made to classify the manifold mental phenomena by which behaviour is interpreted.[6] What is of importance for this report is the environment and mode of life of German youth. The deductions with regard to the problem of moral education will be quite obvious.

The present social order and cultural situation place before young people three quite different methods by which they can come into contact with the world:

(i) By means of their work.

(ii) By means of the fulfilment of the demands of education and culture (and also of training).

(iii) By means of the assumption of habits of private social life and, in connection with this, by contact with happenings, social events, organisations, and institutions of public life.

Points (i) and (ii) have already been discussed, so that now we shall deal with point (iii). Immediately the question arises as to whether there is a narrow connection, perhaps even a basic relationship, between the world of work and public and private life. It is clear at once that all these things are interrelated. Therefore a division seems necessary if this survey is to succeed. On one side stand those forms and measures which belong to the sphere of work or arise from it; on the other those which are entirely independent of it, and which are deliberately held at a distance. To the first group belong all forms of planned leisure time which, because of their content, are connected with the occupational world. Looked at individually, all are attempts to serve culture and education (i.e. by voluntary further education or participation in adult education). Here, too, belong those institutions and organisations by which public bodies seek to influence, lead, and eventually win youth (e.g. the political parties, guilds, trade unions, and the

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[6] The author is attempting this in an article '*Die Jugend und die Welt—Ein Überlick über die Jugendprobleme unserer Zeit*' in the journal *Studium Generale*, 1951. (Publisher: Springer, Heidelberg and Berlin.)

Church). Among these, those which try to encourage youth culture take special place. (The historic example is the German Youth Movement.) The second group embraces many typical forms of modern social life. These are quite neutral with regard to work and attract, and even hold under their spell, an extraordinary number of young people irrespective of their profession. Among them, those social pleasures and diversions which are, in a greater or lesser degree, erotic or of a sexual nature are found to be in the majority. Everyday examples are dances and the cinema. Next come the sports clubs, which exercise an enormous magnetic attraction on the population and particularly on youth, and, a little behind them, the various institutions of the technical world, ranging from exhibitions to the works of amateur technicians. While in the first two examples (i.e. dance and cinema) male and female are equally concerned, the male element has precedence in sport and in the technical world.

These organisations and events often lay claim to so much of the time and interest of many young people that nothing else is taken into account. Leisure time is often felt to be a release and unburdening of the wear and tear of professional activity. Because of this a complete antithesis arises: the value of an occupation is not measured by what it entails but by whether and how far it opens up a way to those pleasures which are to be experienced in one's free time. It is astonishing how few of these general facts are debated when the problems of youth are discussed. Probably this does not come into the line of vision of those who reflect upon the normal path of youth education, or else these manifestations are considered so unimportant that they are ignored. The author of this report, however, feels himself compelled to emphasise these facts—particularly from the point of view of education and morality. They appear generally where the neglect of youth is widespread. The consequence is that usually an ideal picture of youth, as that which knows how to use its leisure time to advantage, takes the place of a knowledge of the true conditions in which the greater proportion of young people are living, without, however, actually being neglected. In view of this, the often-made division between those who are high-minded and those who are not is unreasonable. Such valuations, which are mostly undertaken with a tone of regret, have no effect on the young people, who never consider the possibility of leaving the one group and joining the other. Youth workers should not see any disparagement of their work in this. Indeed, their work can be honoured in full only if a true picture of the situation makes clear the enormous opposition with which the moral education of youth is faced.

Justice cannot be done to the youth service in Germany until it is remembered that there is an inner and outer way of looking at things, i.e. many individuals and organisations can quite justifiably

and convincingly prove how successful their work has been within their own operational field. (That is the inner view.) This operational field is, however, exceedingly small in relation to the enormous number of adolescents. (That is the outer view.) Here, where *facts* are being considered, the outer view naturally must have precedence. So long as the relationship between the two groups is obviously such as has been described, it is not possible to eliminate the larger for the benefit of the smaller. Moral education would be false to its aims and deny its urgent task if it were satisfied with working within a limited area—with the motto, perhaps, 'not extensively but intensively'—or if it regarded that other group as '*quantité négligeable.*' In any case, this '*quantité*' is far too large and influences youth's way of living to too great an extent.

He who wishes to have a clear theoretical and practical picture of the educational problems of youth must take the trouble to bring all young people within his ken. Until the greatest portion of young people is reached a meaningful and satisfactory solution to problems of youth has not begun.

The general survey which has been given here has uncovered a large vacuum in youth education. Attention, therefore, must be drawn back to the methods by which leisure time can be planned and made constructive. The question arises as to how far this can affect the moral education of Germany. From the theory that the occupational world plays a special part in the formation of young people's way of life, those leisure-time organisations must be regarded as the most sensible and practical which, in connection with professional activity, serve to educate young people. They also offer a wider approach to that great wealth of culture which lies outside the sphere of specialist work, and awaken, broaden, and exercise the mind for the tasks of public life. Here are to be found those adolescents who are ready not only to 'kill' time but to use it to equip themselves for life. They are concerned with enriching the relationship between their culture and their work, and thus they come to a more personal and more conscious contact with the occupational world. This does not mean that they are ready merely to seize any opportunity of advancement which offers itself. It is true to say of the majority of people that all lasting enrichments of life which go beyond the limits of mere work come only to those who are, or have been, successful in their profession. This linking of culture with success in one's profession has importance for the awakening of the moral personality and, if rightly brought about, is a valuable piece of moral education.

The difficulties which have already been described in the adolescents' approach to work have the result of their so forming and using their leisure time that even their prospects in a job are thereby bettered. This, indeed, has become a powerful motive in

the self-education of young people, whilst any sort of cultural activity which is completely severed from their work is often regarded as a mere game and abandoned when other enticements call.

A very important development in youth work should be mentioned here which has grown out of the social need of refugee youth and displaced persons. It has managed, with great success, to bring together those lonely, abandoned young people. The towns and villages suddenly found themselves faced with the fact that homeless adolescents were coming to their districts who, unaided, could not come to grips with work. Often their unhappy experiences of life had turned them into criminals, and if something were not done, a complete moral disintegration and an embedded criminality would have to be reckoned with. This must be stopped, not only because we owe it to our young people, but because it is in the interests of the communities in which they live. In consequence, advice centres have arisen in different places, under the names of 'Youth Reconstruction' (*Jugendaufbauwerk*) and 'Youth Social Work' (*Jugendsozialwerk*), etc. What is being planned and brought about is shown by this comprehensive report of the '*Jugendsozialwerk*' of Ulm (Württemberg-Baden).[7] The justification for such an organisation is seen in the reference to the present condition of those adolescents who are homeless:

> Among the 2,000,000 unemployed at the end of this winter there are 470,000 homeless and uprooted young people of 14–25 years of age. After careful estimation, 100,000 vagabond adolescents, who because they have never had any regular work have never really been identified, must be added to this number. Neither the Federal Republic nor the individual *Länder* have as yet grasped the seriousness and scope of this problem, still less have they found a solution to it. Such delays in the cause of youth are more serious because the system in the Eastern Zone has been well organised and given a great deal of propaganda. This system has understood, too, how to order youth most effectively, how to seize on new ideas and, somehow, how to replace what has been lost. West Germany must see that, above all things, its youth, on whom will later depend the fate of the nation, is not left to itself in a time of unemployment and instability. It must not rely only upon older people, for in this way it easily makes an enemy of bitter and hopeless youth. A great attempt must be made to transform these young people into worthy and reliable citizens.
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> As in all towns, these homeless and uprooted adolescents are to be seen also in Ulm in the waiting-rooms of stations, before the doors of

[7] Oberburgermeister Theoder Pfizer, *Jugendsozialwerk Ulm—Ein Versuch, der heimatlosen Jugend zu helfen* (1950).

Apart from the journal *Unsere Jugend*, mentioned in Note 2, there is one other source in which problems of youth work in the Federal Republic are carefully and clearly discussed: *Unsere Städte und ihre Jugend—Vorbericht zur 3 Hauptversammlung des Deutschen Städtetages Köln, 30 Juni bis 1 Juli, 1950* (Publisher: Büro des Deutschen Städtetages in Köln, Marienburg, 1950).

> the social and labour bureaux, or sleeping in ruins and public parks. Only a percentage of them have come illegally from the Eastern Zone. Others have been driven from their homes or have failed to settle down in Western Germany. They are without parents or relations and, after years of forced labour and service in the army, of captivity, of black marketeering, of stealing backwards and forwards across frontiers, they are broken in mind and spirit, resigned, hesitating. They increase the number of those other uprooted people who wander the German streets (page 3).

This statement caused the town council of Ulm to found a special institution for the help of these adolescents:

> The aim—based on the idea of self-help—is to lead these young people once again into regular and regulated work and to give back to them a sense of their own worth and social independence. In connection with this an attempt must be made, by means of a home atmosphere, by the example of teachers and by real friendship, to bring youth back again into society. Finally, young people will be helped to regain their physical strength, to attain a sound mental outlook, to cease to be insensible to things of the mind, and to become self-reliant, responsible, and sterling citizens (page 4).

The conditions necessary for the realisation of this plan are shown as follows:

> (1) Above all things, suitable work must be found which, far from being regarded merely as something to keep him occupied, is looked upon by the young person as an opportunity for contributing to the general well-being.
>
> (2) After the experiences of the last decade all constraint is to be avoided; work must be based on a voluntary basis.
>
> (3) It therefore seems right to form small groups which can be watched over and directed, thus giving the opportunity of influencing each individual. These groups will need no extensive system of organisation, will be far removed from any idea of life in barracks, and will represent no mass-organisation.
>
> (4) Special care is to be taken in the choice of leaders and teachers. It is not a question of officials and schoolmasters of the old type, neither of the more or less homeless hireling. Educationally mature and capable people must be found who have had experience of youth work in its widest sense and who are not too far removed from the imaginative world of those who are entrusted to their care.
>
> (5) The emphasis must be placed on the educational work in order to reawaken in the adolescents the feeling of independence, responsibility, friendship, order, and cleanliness of thought and action. Most important of all, the adolescent must be encouraged to take his share of work and responsibility.
>
> (6) In every case the aim must remain that of giving a sense of value to work and the community, and of establishing and stabilising the young person. Any semblance of militarism must be avoided.

All who have founded such institutions elsewhere are in agreement on these points. This reflects the ruling opinion in Germany, which is seen everywhere where not only the aims of youth work are discussed but practical work is performed.

In all the various forms of youth work which have already been

under discussion, the main idea is always the well-being of the young person. There are, however, other public organisations which concern themselves with youth, though from a different standpoint. The most striking and important example is that of the political parties. They form youth groups and emphatically assure all their young people that they have only their well-being at heart. At the same time they find it impossible to hide the more elementary, yet understandable, fact that they are interested in winning young people for their cause, thus ensuring their own continuity for the future. It is therefore neither mere indifference nor a frustrated belief in a regime which has collapsed which causes youth to be so unresponsive—a fact complained of by all West German parties to-day. The reason is to be sought rather in the feeling of the young people that these parties are not concerned primarily with the interests of youth. On the other hand, this concern about the future of the party is answered by many in the following manner: they declare that their aim is not so much to change the world by political means and to enrich the inner life of the organisation, but rather to prepare for the individual as favourable a life as possible. They expect much from a union of politics and work.

If the political power is absolute, youth is dealt with in a different manner, as is shown by the present Government in East Germany and by the controlling Socialist Unity Party, as well as by the two Free German Youth organisations which are supported by both. There is no need for individual canvassing, as is necessary in the many-party state of West Germany. All adolescents are subservient to both since work is made dependent upon political service—indeed, the state and the party must take first place in everything.

Mention must be made of a special form of youth culture which must be clearly distinguished from these aforementioned forms of youth work and youth organisations. This youth culture was, before and after the First World War, to a great extent a result of the Youth Movement. Since the Second World War new tendencies have arisen which, however, in face of the completely changed social position, have not as yet been fully developed. The most obvious example is the attempt made by the former adherents of the Free German Youth to renew their league and carry through their ideal, which they proclaimed in 1913 and which, since then, has been known as the '*Meissner Formula*': "The members of the Free German Youth wish to determine and be responsible for their own life, acting always in a spirit of truth. They are determined to uphold this inner freedom in all circumstances." However, results have been disappointing in the present post-war period, and only here and there has it been possible to re-establish even small groups of young people. Those,

therefore, who originally formed the younger generation, are attempting to bring these earlier ideals into the public and, above all, the political life of the present time.[8]

The Scout movement also has connection with the old traditions of the youth movement, and has emphasised the independence of its work and organisation by affirming the political and moral tasks of contemporary education. The following is part of a proclamation issued in 1950:

> An essential condition for the reconstruction of our German nation is the education of youth in a high standard of physical, mental, and spiritual health. The future needs people of a firm character, responsible individuals able to judge fairly and to have minds of their own, people who are capable of accomplishing much in their work and in public life.
>
> The Scout movement has a large part to play in the fulfilment of this educational work. Free from any sense of regimentation and from the narrow limits of party politics, free, too, from every feeling of class distinction, the Scout movement is attempting to educate youth to be healthy, aspiring men, giving them the best means by which to develop themselves.
>
> The educational aims of the Scout movement demand that all connection with political parties or similar organisations shall be broken. Consequently all material support which might be obtained from such organisations must be renounced.

These 'Leagues of Youth' are only now being developed; whether or not they have a future is not yet known. What is important, however, is that the danger of separating the realities of everyday life from its duties is now more clearly recognised than before.

To sum up:

Those social forms, institutions, and entertainments are most widespread and exercise the greatest appeal which are totally unconnected with work and are not specifically concerned with youth, but which allow young people freedom in which to fulfil their own interests and desires. Naturally a fruitful method of stimulating moral qualities is not to be found here. All attempts to do so would be illusory.

Everything, however, which helps to develop the right use of leisure can strengthen moral qualities and indeed exercise a great influence on youth, especially when the occupational world and its interests are taken into consideration.

Attempts are being made by certain powers in public life to inspire young people with their aims. Their influence, however, is small and their sphere of work limited. Exceptions are those absolute powers which put pressure on adolescents to become members

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[8] Amongst others, see *Freideutscher Rundbrief*, 1948, Nos. 5–6 (Ed. by Freideutscher Kreis, Hamburg): *Die Freideutschen in der Situation der Zeit*; also *Bericht über die Herbstwoche 1948 auf dem Ludwigstein* and *Beschlüsse des Freideutschen Konvents.*

of their institutions. For these young people leisure becomes a time of service.

If this threatening vacuum, which is outside the occupational world, remains, and the majority of young people spend their free time in such a way that there is no basis for moral or self-education, the question arises as to whether this large number of adolescents really stands outside the field of moral help. The answer must be given that this danger is not present as long as the young people have steady work, for it has already been shown that in the field of work strong moral qualities are released and developed. These will give an inner purpose to those young people who only waste their free time. The task remains of educating as many as possible to plan their leisure usefully and thus strengthen and enrich those qualities which result from, or are encouraged by, the sphere of work.

With the collapse of Germany in 1945 it was not only a political regime that was brought to an end but also the comprehensive pattern of life of the people; the state itself was shaken to its foundations. The Germans are now faced with the problem of finding a new social order, and public opinion is convinced that education must take part in this new political reconstruction if the plan is to succeed at all. A description of this new order would be as important as this outline of the public and private educational life of Germany, its development since the end of the war, and its present position.

At the beginning a statement was made that the upheaval in the pattern of life always meant a challenge and the mobilisation of all powers of education and morality. Now, finally, a brief answer will be given to the question of whether the attempts which have been reported upon here are also of value in the reconstruction of the state. Formerly one would have given a cautious answer and ascribed an indirect importance and a merely initial power to the moral energies of the family and the profession, since the state was far more important than any other organisation. Since the National Socialist regime has stretched this conception to its extreme and misused it, the idea has grown in a Germany which has renounced all forms of totalitarianism that the state is not an isolated unit and far above the common people, but that it is the essence of all the intellectual and moral energies, thoughts, plans, and wishes of its citizens. The fate of the new democracy is dependent on the political volition and insight of the people in all its sections. It therefore follows that everything which moral education can accomplish, in the family, work, school, youth work, and the various youth organisations, without any doubt serves the reconstruction of the state and helps to solve the most difficult and comprehensive problem with which Germany is at the present moment faced.

HANS WENKE.

CHAPTER SIX

SPAIN

WHICH institution and what means do you consider most effective, at different age-levels, in impressing upon children a high moral standard of behaviour?

To answer this question we must determine which moral influences are most powerful in our country. We must consider the moral climate in which Spanish youth is moulded, the criteria which shape its values, and the fundamental qualities which decide its success or failure.

In the last twenty years Spain has lived through a period of supreme national crisis, and has regained, through suffering, those basic elements of its national entity which are the only sound ones for its children's education. We mean by this that moral education cannot be understood independently of other educational factors, because human actions, which are the basic atmosphere of moral education, are in effect determined by the following factors.

(*a*) By the objective nature of man as a whole. Questions of origin and end must be grouped around this anthropological basis. In principle, acts conducive to the perfection of the human being are good, or at least, cannot be classified as harmful for the *Ego,* which is its origin.

(*b*) By the ordained hierarchy of the values of things. An objective conception of the world must result from an inspired valuation of the metaphysical status of Beings.

(*c*) By the relation of values emanating from a comparison of both types of objectivity.

If that which asserts the true ego is morally good, we must inquire into the comparative importance of the various spheres which integrate this ego. To reply by affirming the priority of religion, of sensibility, or even of intellect, is to become involved in the most intimate structures of the human being.

But we have already said that the hierarchy of objective values plays a decisive role since man's action is impossible without an ultimate end. When we take into account that an absolute Being regulates the existence of all possible objects and even of ourselves, it is evident that the standards of our moral conduct necessarily refer to the Being that makes possible the indefinite scale of contingencies.

Spain affirms the religious sense and the divine essence as the absolute foundation of ethical order.

So we say that what is moral is in Spain deeply saturated with metaphysical qualities such as are demanded by the Catholic conception of life.

We are now in a position to answer the question as to which institution carries the main responsibility for moral education in Spain. It is the Roman Catholic Church.

We are not now concerned to establish the basis upon which the moral criteria inspired by religion are built; this would be a purely ethical theme. We would rather point out those methods by which Catholicism actually influences Spanish education most efficiently, creating a favourable medium for the culture of all those activities which have demonstrated a true capacity for the education of human freedom.

And this is realised primarily because Catholicism asserts the existence of this freedom, redeeming it from psychological determinism.

From the pedagogical point of view, any attempt at the scientific interpretation of human education is valid only when accomplished by educational or therapeutical rules, as the case may be. A pure diagnosis, however exact, will never have the slightest curative value, and all formation in responsibility and for responsibility rests upon this psychological freedom. On this basis only does the struggle to affirm the better side of our ego make sense.

This faculty of moral realisation or freedom from frustration —" the most precious gift of the soul "—is intimately linked with the most decisive standard of human dignity, the cultivation of which has created in Spain the characteristic Spanish '*Caballero*.' There is, perhaps, no more significant expression of the nobility of the Spaniard than the culture of honour, as seen, for example, in the ethical productions of our classical theatre.

Even if we allow for the effects of a distortion of this ideal, the fact remains that a high and noble conception of humanity underlies the thoughts of a community who value honour so highly. We refer here rather to a fundamental honour rooted in the very heart of man than to the '*honnête homme*.' As Calderon beautifully said once and for all:

> Al Rey, la hacienda y la vida
> se han de dar, pero el honor
> es patrimonio del alma
> y el alma sólo es de Dios.[1]

We are confronted here by an overbrimming of the spring which signifies the ontological dignity of the human being, and this

[1] " Fortune and life belong to the King, but honour is the heritage of the soul and the soul belongs only to God."

dignity of all that is human has nursed itself on those same thoughts which made one of the most glorious representatives of tradition write: *Persona significat it quod est perfectissimum in tota natura.*

This personality, thought of here on the metaphysical plane, lies for Spain at the very root of all the problems covered by the phrase, 'moral education.'

But in spite of this definite declaration we cannot limit ourselves to this statement, for the simple reason that no teacher will ever be able to influence the metaphysical person of the pupil. Education takes place on the level of moral personality, and the metaphysical Being acquires moral qualities when it acts with full control over its own movements, which are "the true centre of attraction and responsibility and the 'asterisk' to everything relating to man in the universe."

Starting from the inevitable moment in which the child confusedly becomes conscious of its own untransferable ultimate end—a moment which coincides with the phase of discovery of the ego—we can plan a course of education, in preparation for this end, through progressively conscious and progressively free actions.

We mention here the famous antinomy—*Authority-Freedom*—which has been the subject of educational debate ever since the period of the Enlightenment. According to this, any authority is suspect, any command irksome and any obedience degrading.

An authority so situated is fatally damaged by the pin-pricks of its critics, whether this authority is educative, political, or religious. In modern times, Spain has encountered many ways of destroying authority and habit, but she has also known a solid, firm base on which to support them: the Church. The Church educates morally by restoring confidence in authority, because it teaches the servitude of the master and the dignity of the servant. If the father commands, it is not by virtue of dominion over the son, but in order to perfect the sacred trust of the offspring.

Legislation by the state takes place not "because its laws confer the human condition upon its subjects", but with the object of creating a commonwealth capable of practising a virtuous life. These laws are indeed subject to the biological, the economic, and even the cultural needs of its subjects.

The commandments of the Church are derived from this spiritual authority which is the only one that can achieve the delicate inward mastery of souls; an exalting and sublime government in which freedom of the child, youth, and man finds the sweet and austere discipline of standards that are strictly eternal. Only at the end of the road, when the will has had the courage to deny itself repeatedly, will a true land of promise be found in which to read the following words: "There are no laws for the just," "truth will

free you," or, finally, the marvellous invitation to the summit: "*joge convivum.*"

With this Authority–Freedom antinomy always in mind, we must raise the question of the autonomy of such education.

A moral education which is based on the principle of the human being cannot be designated heteronomous as if in opposition to some supposed autonomous activity; for in reality, the relations of man with his Creator transcend and excel the distinction 'heteronomy–autonomy' which, in the present case, lacks any justification.

We consider that this situation in relation to authority is a powerful means of discipline. As powerful as the severe criticism which is inspired by the strict principles of the persons who embody them. By a morally formed personality, we understand one who can submit without being servile, in order that later he may be able to lead benevolently. But such plants do not flourish in intellectual climates which look upon the fundamentals of religious and civil laws as only relative. The rich possibilities which arise in youth arrive at complete maturity only when they have found the measure of unconditional surrender to those who can command. If we were to deprive Spain of the double notion of obedience and of the simple one of command, the very essence of ethics—which has always been the fountain of all those energies in which freedom thrives and matures—would also be diluted in the process.

There could probably be substituted for it a mere external system, but this is not entirely the sense in which moral education is understood in Spain. We think rather of an intimate ripening by means of the progressive tension of spiritual situations which, while demanding fidelity and firmness on the one hand, give self-control, security, and freedom on the other.

For this freedom, like the fruits of education, is the moral freedom of man which we cannot confuse with that psychological freedom mentioned earlier, upon which all moral education builds.

Do we, then, educate for freedom? Yes, for true freedom, which is *Freedom for the Good.*

For the word 'freedom' by itself has always sounded hollow to us, rather like the interlacing of a rope which may be employed for hanging or for salvation. Consequently we regard it as wholly symptomatic that the increasing craze for freedom in education goes hand in hand with increasing uncertainty about the religious and social values of this period of world crisis. Spanish education, in accordance with its traditional teachers, always thinks in terms of the moulding of virtues, in terms, that is, of a virtuous freedom.

If we now ask what is the most effective agent of this moral education, we must admit that this is no other than the family.

In intellectual education the school undoubtedly has more influence than the family, but the latter takes the lead when it is a

question of instilling sentiments and standards of belief. Ideas about right and wrong, the honourable and the dishonourable, the duties which it takes heroism to discharge—these are principles which the child demands from life, even more than from school.

Family life in Spain is scarcely touched by the crisis which other countries are going through. We have always been surprised by the careless optimism with which some sociologists record certain new patterns of modern family life, assuring us that there is nothing to fear from them, since the family is enjoined by nature itself and is, therefore, inherent in humanity.

Nevertheless, it is believed here that moral education is not just a matter of saving any form of family life, but rather of making secure the values found in healthy families, in which the children progressively participate in a vigorous spiritual atmosphere, as they grow up to manhood. It is above all a matter of the existence of families where moral virtues are ingested in the mother's milk and where, almost from birth, each new member forms part of another superior and supernatural society which will co-operate to perfect it, not only indicating what is right, but giving it strength to attain this. However, as the experience of many centuries has shown that the child's moral powers will grow to maturity only in an environment where love and sacrifice are sufficiently effective to impel and restrain, we may conclude that the family in Spain is the great educator, because Spain holds the view that a propitious atmosphere for the spiritual development of children is the essence of conjugal union.

The child participates in one of the greatest elements of its education—social tradition—through the family; this same tradition comes from the parents, and through them, also, come habits and customs. To this end the parents can call upon two sovereign means of influence: the children's innocent love for their parents and their unlimited confidence in them.

Spain, in company with other countries, is in effect introducing a broad system of social services for children. But schools tend to view the moral education of their pupils as if the family had no say in the matter; and we believe that, despite individual instances of good intentions and high principles, there is here a real danger of diminishing the degree of influence of the family. We believe that systems of education which deprive the child of family influence can only be advised when this contact is pernicious both morally and physically. In all other cases, action upon the child is always preferable through, or at least, in agreement with the family.

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SECTION V

ASIA AND AFRICA

Introduction

LACK of space has prevented us from dealing more adequately with these two vast continents, and so the countries grouped together in this section belong to four different cultural complexes. The Arab States of the Middle East represent the historical centre of Islam, an area where the people of the Old World met and exchanged both material and cultural goods. The heterogeneous elements were, in the course of centuries, moulded into a pattern by the penetrating influences of the Arabic language and alphabet and by the teachings of the Koran.

Facing the West geographically and culturally, Arab countries have, for more than a hundred years, been incorporating the political and economic institutions of Europe while adapting them to some degree to their own traditions. We thus observe, in all of them, two sources of moral training. The teachings of the Koran form the basis of the individual religious and moral behaviour of the Arabs, while their political administration and their social relations follow European models and are thus not fully attuned to Islamic traditions. It is possibly in order to do justice to both streams of influence that the Arab governments have separated religious instruction in schools from civic-moral training of a secular kind. In addition, of course, the presence of large and influential Christian minorities, not only in Lebanon but elsewhere, made it somewhat difficult for them to use the religious ideas of Islam as the nucleus and principle of unification. There resulted a growth of nationalism and of educational secularism.

The sub-continent of India, apart from smaller States like Nepal and Bhutan, consists of the three Dominions: the Indian Union, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Their civilisation rests on a common foundation, and long association with one another and with Britain has increased their economic and cultural resemblances. In Pakistan, however, one notices nowadays a tendency to minimise the importance of the Indian heritage and to move closer to the western Islamic countries. How far such a policy can succeed in eastern Pakistan, where the population is Indian by race, custom, and language, only time will show. The Indian Union, with a multiplicity of languages and a great variety of religious expression

lacking the unifying influence of a hierarchical church organisation, is a plural society in the full sense. The educational system is secularised, and moral training based on natural cultural traditions is little connected with religion. A federal language has not yet been fully adopted, and the exact forms of provincial or regional autonomy have not yet been fully worked out: these features aggravate the difficulty of achieving closer unity. Although Buddhism is the predominant religion of Ceylon, there are large minorities, such as the Tamil, whose culture is that of South India. Thus here, too, a secular solution of the problem of school control has been found advisable. The various communities are not yet fully conscious of their common citizenship, and it will take time to mould them into an homogeneous nation.

In the Far East—in China and Japan—there have been no organised Churches with the power and influence of those of Europe. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Bushido were used as codes of social behaviour and, during periods of intense nationalism, did little to hinder nationalist indoctrination—indeed, they were sometimes made subservient to it. The emergence of Communist China raises the question whether Confucianism can co-exist on equal terms with Marxism as a source of moral training. The industrialisation of Manchuria, mass movements of population from north to south and south to north, and the gradual opening up of the Border Provinces, may break down the isolation of the provinces and promote the growth of a uniform national consciousness with a Marxist bias. A careful observer has written:

> Is Confucianism still a living force? In the cities the Communists are already succeeding in remoulding the life of the people and exterminating the old Confucian virtues. The rural areas will be a more difficult problem, and it remains to be seen whether the passive resistance of the peasants will be able to stand against the rule of Communism. Will the Chinese, with their talent for eclecticism, take Communism and absorb it into Chinese life, and will this wise, kindly, tolerant people soften its sharp edges and create a new form of Communism suited to their genius? He would be a bold man who dared to give a definite answer, but it seems more likely that Communism will mould China rather than China mould Communism.

In Japan it seems that neither the humiliation of complete defeat nor the vigorous attempts of the Americans have resulted in a drastic and fundamental change of attitude and of moral ideas. It is said that many still worship the Emperor as a deity and, in spite of American supervision, nationalist indoctrination can still be found.

Kenya is the only African country dealt with in this volume, but it will serve as a reminder that vast areas have not been included in our survey. Dr. Beecher's article shows clearly the immense difficulties to be overcome when one attempts to promote

the advance of a population which is unprepared for a European way of life or for a Christian morality. The presence of dominant groups of Europeans, Indians, and Arabs still further complicates the difficulties of acculturation. The possibility of the appearance of African nationalism and even racialism is not altogether excluded even in East Africa: what happens in this field will depend upon the course of events in West Africa and, above all, in South Africa.

EDITORS.

CHAPTER ONE

INDIAN UNION

EDUCATORS all over the world will congratulate the editors of the YEAR BOOK OF EDUCATION on the choice of this year's topic. The present world, if it needs anything, needs moral education. From the Indian point of view the choice is specially apt not only because it is opportune, but also because it is in tune with the present emphasis that Indian education puts on this aspect of her education. The young republic of India is keenly aware that her educational system needs rejuvenation and revitalising, and of all items needed for a reorganisation to achieve these objectives, she has put the emphasis first on the need to mould it in harmony with true Indian culture. The emphasis is meant not to narrow down the horizon of young Indian students, but to seek solutions to the difficulties and problems of a frustrated humanity in the light of Indian culture. The emphasis that is being put on Indian culture is not the only aspect that is important from the point of view of education and morals in India. Primary education in the country is fast getting remodelled after the national basic education pattern of Mahatma Gandhi, and the educational philosophy of Gandhi, if it is anything, is a philosophy of morals. Indian universities, which during the three years after independence have grown from twenty to twenty-seven in number, are also not neglected in the scheme of moral education. A Commission on Indian University Education, consisting of experts in all branches of arts and sciences, hailing not only from India but also from Great Britain and the United States of America, was appointed late in 1948 and was given very wide terms for inquiry and report. The Report of this University Commission, issued towards the end of 1949, is a document of outstanding value, and aims at giving a new orientation to university education in India. It is significant that the Commission had as its chairman Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the great Indian philosopher, whose personality is very much in evidence in the discussion of the aims of university education in India. Here again one notices the emphasis on Indian culture and Gandhian ideals. A study of the way in which the various Indian institutions contribute to the formation of moral character, sentiments, attitudes, ideals, and ethical standards in India will need an examination of the above-mentioned factors as well as of

some other trends in modern Indian education, like the programme of social education in the country.

Present Emphasis on Indian Culture—Its Evolution

For a correct appreciation of Indian culture and its influence on educational thought, it is necessary to have at least a cursory glance at its history. The history of the growth of this thought is a long one, extending over several hundreds of years. And when one studies these long periods, the one significant fact that stands out in great relief is that in the history of a nation what matters is not one's success or failure at a particular period and under particular circumstances, but a philosophy of life which sustains man during the periods of storm and stress, as well as during those of national peace and plenty. This is a fact of outstanding importance for the proper understanding of Indian educational thought. In the long and chequered history of the country, the India of the Aryans, Huns, Kushans, Rajputs, Turks, Mughals, and of the English, one may notice the growth and decay of many an institution or ideal, but what will strike one most is the majestic continuity of the growth of the culture and the educational thought. Like the mighty Himalayas, with its innumerable ranges and high, unmolested cliffs, it has defied attacks and assaults, and stands to-day as the vast, inexhaustible store-house of intellectual and moral food. Time and again, in times of conflict and of harmony, Indians have turned to it for the solutions of their troubles and the furtherance of their plans. This is not a legend; it is a fact. It is as true to-day as it ever has been. And with the coming of freedom Indians are turning to it with renewed confidence.

Pre-Aryan India was a considerably advanced country. There is no dearth of scholars who trace the growth of many ideas and institutions to this period. Without minimising the importance of the origin of the Indian thought in the indigenous cultures of the land, we may peep into that age of romance, of lyrical excellence, of reasoned logic, of speculative genius, of moral and ethical heights called the Vedic times. This was a time when the Aryans in the regions of the five rivers (Punjab) thought, speculated, and sang, evolved codes of conduct, laid down moral and ethical principles, and perfected the Sanskrit language, which still commands respect as one of the richest languages of the world. This age was followed by that of the Upanishads, a period in which cold logic alternated with warm speculation, an age which gave some of the greatest books India has ever seen, or will ever be proud of. Taking a total view of this literature one could find at once how dignified man could be, for in this rich literature one cannot find anything that brings discredit to the dignity of man. Modern Indian education, if it has to achieve moral values, cannot ignore

this literature. Indeed, one cannot think of an India without the Vedas and Upanishads. An India without these is an India without a soul.

Towards the end of the Upanishadic period, there was a general growth of heretics, who were discussing the problems of man, his life, and his destiny in an independent way. Their discussions gave birth to different ideals, leading to a new movement which was destined to influence a vast fragment of humanity in the fields of art, science, and philosophy. It culminated in the birth of Buddha and Mahaveera—the two apostles of peace, peace for the individual and for society—the unique gift of India to humanity. The extent to which Buddhism influenced the then known world is a matter of common knowledge. It was then that India was the heart of Asia, and supplied to her neighbours the necessary quota of mental food in the true spirit of Buddha. If the Vedic and the Upanishadic periods in the history of India were periods of spiritual and intellectual awakening, the Buddhistic was a period of humanistic tendencies, an age in which the earlier era of spiritual and intellectual achievements was properly yoked to the purpose of educating man to render him noble.

With the decay of Buddhist ideology newer and newer ideologies arose. These later ideologies are best represented by the Vedanta of Shankara, Vaishnavism, Shaivism, and Trantrism, both Hindu and Buddhist. These new systems of thought and philosophy differ from each other not only in ideals, but also in rituals. The simultaneous existence and growth of these diverse and often conflicting ideologies without acrimonies and quarrels is a standing testimony to that system of education which made it possible. That man could live in peace in spite of differences is at once a great achievement, and a lesson to those who wish for the harmonised existence of humanity.

The Muslim episode in the educational history of India is not a mean one. It brought to India the ways of the Muslim world, and the Muslim way of life affected the Hindu and a common culture began to evolve. The fusion produced a lasting effect upon the cultures of both, as is evident in the painting, sculpture, art, and literature of the times.

Then followed the British period, an era unique in itself. The meeting of the Englishman and the Indian on the Indian soil produced far-reaching changes. The story of the English in India, their business ventures and political successes, has in itself been a great provocative factor to the Indian thought. It led to an acute analysis of the factors that made possible the achievement of the miracle—a small nation controlling a whole sub-continent, and that, too, from a long distance! Was it due to superior intelligence or superior culture? These and a host of other questions had to be discussed and answered. These searching questions led to

different responses. The Englishman responded in one way and the Indian in another. To the Englishman it was but a proud fact that he was the ruler and that, therefore, his was a superior culture. To the Indian it could not but be a matter of conflict, a severe conflict. Was he really an inferior being and should he give up his inferior ways and adopt the ways of his masters? Fortunately the world of scholars is more critical than the world of politicians. As contacts increased, the West began to reveal itself more fully to the East and the East to the West.

The influence of British thinkers, especially political thinkers and administrators, was felt very deeply in this country. Their political and social ideals deeply impressed Indian students. A new ideology began to haunt the minds of the young. A re-examination of the ancient ideas and ideals was becoming a necessity. The new demand gave birth to a host of saints and reformers who began this difficult task. The most impressive of these were Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the great intellectualist who passionately fought for introducing English in Indian schools; Sri Rama Krishna, the great saint who explained in practice the fundamental unity of all religions by his saintly life; Vivekananda, his celebrated disciple, who strove hard to explain the wisdom and saintliness of his master in India and abroad, and Swami Dayananda, the revered founder of Arya Samaj.

Another aspect of this influence was the inauguration of an unparalleled era of scholastic research. This forms, perhaps, one of the most important features of this influence. Hosts of scholars dedicated themselves to collecting, collating, and editing ancient Indian manuscripts in all Indian languages. Thousands of books were collected and placed in the safe custody of libraries and museums; thousands were translated and made available to students in India and abroad. The masterpieces of Indian literature were thus placed in the hands of the educated world, a step which ultimately led to an era of a better and mutual understanding.

As this mass of new materials became available to the common man and the average student, a new interpretation was given to these ancient materials. The deficiencies and the excellence of Indian literature or art or science or sculpture were brought to the notice of the nation. We have already seen that the culture of the West was invading the mind of India. As this mass of Indian literature became available, the invasion ceased and a synthesis in the receptive mind of the Indian began. This new age gave birth to apostles of peace like Mahatma Gandhi, great poets like Tagore, scientists like Raman or Ray, world citizens like Nehru, philosophers like Radhakrishnan, and artists like Nandlal Bose.

In recent years more attention is being paid to exaggerating the

influence of politicians and statesmen at the expense of the constructive contribution of the scholar, the artist, and the scientist. It is unfortunate that the extent of the influence of the scholar and his associates is not properly emphasised. It is more the scholar than the politician and statesman who resolved the conflict between India and Britain.

The enrichment of Indian culture by the fusion of the Indian and Western ideals was not an isolated fact. Political or social consciousness was fast growing. But the important fact, and this often passes unnoticed, is that cultural consciousness preceded political consciousness and produced far-reaching effects in moulding the character of the latter. It would have been an interesting study to survey the cultural pattern that was moulding it. But that is beyond the present purpose. For our purpose what matters is that the Indian independence movement that followed was influenced and shaped by this cultural pattern. It declared its uncompromising faith in truth and non-violence and banished the idea of violence against the British rulers as the most unworthy and humiliating of all the means of achieving its objective. The signal success of this pattern is now well known to the world. The Englishman rose to his full dignity and nobly abdicated in favour of the rightful rulers of India. It was an achievement of which not only the Indian and the Englishman, but also men all the world over, can be proud. To the Indian, however, it is of special significance because it points to the preserving powers and fundamental truth of his age-old culture.

It is no wonder, then, that since the dawn of freedom, educational administration in India has been stressing the importance of Indian culture and the need for reorganising education in the country in harmony with that culture. The Government of India have been setting apart substantial amounts to aid research in the field of Indian history, archaeology, and ancient culture and also to finance institutions like the Santiniketan, the celebrated Indian university founded by Rabindranath Tagore and modelled on the true Indian pattern.

Spread of Primary Education and of the Gandhian Philosophy of Education and Morals

While the search for more and more ideas and patterns that are truly Indian is in swift progress, a silent revolution is taking place in a less spectacular, but more extensive and more vital, sphere of education. Primary education is spreading in the country and the speed of its progress, though conditioned by the available finance and trained personnel, has been substantial since the advent of freedom. This will be evident from the following:

STATISTICS REGARDING PRIMARY EDUCATION IN THE INDIAN UNION[1]

Items	1947–8	1948–9	*Percentage of Increase*
Number of primary schools	174,059	188,105	8
Number of pupils in primary schools	15,876,601	17,592,820	10·8
Expenditure on primary education Rs.	22,73,65,571	27,59,53,301	21·4

The vast majority of schools started during the period mentioned above are working on the basic education pattern of Mahatma Gandhi. A significant portion of the old structure of primary education has also been remodelled on the same pattern.

If there is any scheme of education that stands for the moral education of the growing generation, it is the basic education scheme of Mahatma Gandhi. Seven years' free and compulsory education for all boys and girls in India, this education to be imparted in the mother tongue of the pupil, the centre of instruction to be not the book, but some important and suitable basic craft through which children may engage themselves in productive activity and produce articles which should be useful and saleable in the market—this, in brief, is the basic scheme. The basic craft becomes the medium of instruction, but it is not the only medium. The physical and social environments of the child provide also the media, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that proficiency in all fields of knowledge is to be acquired through the focus of the basic craft and the media of the physical and social environments of the child. The diagram on the opposite page will give a clearer idea of the basic scheme.

Previous YEAR BOOKS have described the basic scheme and it need not be repeated here. What is important in the context of education and morals is the educational philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and the entirely new outlook that one notices in the basic schools which try to translate this philosophy into action.

Gandhi's philosophy is in complete accord with the idealistic trends of ancient Indian educational thought. Gandhi seeks to establish the kingdom of God on earth. For him God is the manifestation of truth. Self-realisation, according to him, is the realisation of God. He seeks to realise this ideal not for himself alone, but for the whole of mankind, through the establishment of a non-violent social order free from greed, rivalry, jealousy, and exploitation in any form. Such a social order would be based on love, justice, morality, and service. His educational system is the practical side of his philosophy and aims at realising his ideal of

[1] By courtesy of the Ministry of Education, Government of India.



spiritual society as the first step to the realisation of truth which in his opinion is identical with God. The formation of moral character is the coping-stone of his philosophy of education. Contrary to popular beliefs, he attached little value to literacy in his scheme. He firmly holds that a rustic possessed of good moral character is more useful, and hence a better citizen of the world, than one who has received the so-called literary training in an ordinary school without a corresponding development of character, healthy sentiments, and high ideals of selfless service. Gandhi maintains that the one and the whole aim of education can be summed up in the concept of morality. He observes:

> I had always given the first place to the culture of the heart or the building of character, and I feel confident that moral training would be given to all alike, no matter how different their ages and their upbringing.

Purity of personal life is, for Gandhi, an indispensable condition for building a sound education. " Students have to search within ", he affirms, " and look after their personal character, for what is education without character, and what is character without elementary purity?" To Gandhi's mind, schools and colleges should concern themselves primarily with the development of character. Children are sent to schools and colleges so that they may become good men and women. He does not deny the value of knowledge and scholarship provided they help towards the attain-

ment of a good character. All our learning or recitation of the Vedas, or the knowledge of Sanskrit or Latin or Greek, will avail us nothing if it does not enable us to cultivate absolute purity of heart.

Gandhian philosophy has its roots deep in Indian life and culture. Character building, as the supreme aim of education, does not sound unfamiliar to those who are acquainted with the history of Indian educational philosophy. In the scheme of ancient education, moral training occupied a more important position than mental training. The development of character of the student was considered as one of the essential aims of education. Dr. Radha Kumud Mukerji, one of the outstanding authorities on ancient Indian education, writes thus on this question:

> Mere intellectual development without the development of character, learning without piety, proficiency in the sacred lore with deficiency in the practices it implies, will defeat the very ends of studentship. The part of education that deals with the life of the students probably fills a larger place in the ancient pedagogic scheme than the part that deals with mere intellect.

Moral training, which is the quintessence of Gandhi's philosophy of education, finds its reflex in every aspect of the basic scheme. His advocacy of a craft-centred education is designed primarily to build up an honest society in which every citizen will become self-reliant and be animated by the lofty ideals of service and self-effacement. The basic school will be a community centre where the first lessons of co-operative endeavour and citizenship would be taught to pupils as well as to village folks through the celebration of national and religious festivals and a host of other activities. The balanced curriculum of the basic school will produce better men and women who will do their utmost to free the world from all ills to which it is a prey to-day.

This is not all. The basic method aims at training the individual to lead a natural life of love and service as opposed to the materialism of might and possession which the prevailing system of education has been inculcating all these years. Shri K. G. Mashruwala, one of the foremost disciples of Gandhi and the presnt editor of *Harijan,* the paper founded by Gandhi, explains this ideology of his great master. He finds that the kind of society which the prevailing educational institutions have been encouraging is the wrong one, and that a career for which a student fits himself by a training in these institutions is more compatible with war than with peace. The student craves for military or civil service, or one connected with large-scale production, colossal industries, armaments, or politics. He is trained to live a busy and luxurious life and wants to be constantly moving about. He becomes a misfit in his village and cannot live in its rural surroundings of fields and cattle, of looms and cottage

industries. Village life, even if it guarantees a decent house, proper diet and clothing, healthy social and cultural life, will not satisfy our youths trained in these institutions. They prefer bustle to peace even if it means the suffering of others and destruction of property.

The message of basic education is the opposite of the above. It stands to develop goodness and not might, and to foster in the minds of the youth a love of peace, harmony, and joy, as against war, violence, and discord. Basic education does not consider living creatures as so many cogs of a mighty machine, important, if they could be fitted in it, otherwise deserving to be ignored and even liquidated without remorse.

Since character building is to be the fundamental factor in educational matters, Gandhi felt that every teacher should be a person of sterling character. He would not have the commonplace teachers whom he described as the products of factories known as training colleges. They only din into ears of children so much of mathematics, history, languages, and the like. The capacity to teach school subjects is of secondary importance; the primary essential is that they should be men and women of sterling virtues.

It is the above philosophy of education that the workers in the field of basic education are trying to put into practice in the basic schools of the country. These ideals are slowly getting extended to the upper and lower stages of the basic school, and as a result numerous pre-basic and post-basic schools are coming into existence all over the country. Even basic colleges are on the anvil, as for instance, the one contemplated in the model basic centre in South India, Periyanaikenpalayam.

The workers in the field of this great adventure in education meet once a year to review the work done and to plan for the future. This annual Basic Education Conference met for the sixth time in April 1950 at Angul, in Orissa, and was attended by many of the distinguished educationists of India. The resolutions passed at the conference recorded the success of experiments in the basic method at the pre-primary and post-primary stages and the self-sufficiency at the post-primary stage. They also advocated the desirability of following the basic method in adult education, the need of accelerating the output of teachers trained in the basic method and the adoption of the basic scheme in the education of the refugee children, and urged the Government not to allow the economic crisis in the country to come in the way of the spread of basic education. The resolutions show that the basic scheme has on its programme the spread of its principles in all stages of education—infant, primary, secondary, and higher. Its spread signifies the spread of the educational philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi—a philosophy aiming at education and morals.

It should not, however, be taken that the basic scheme as it

stands to-day is perfect, or that it is a scheme of education that is the last word in educational theory and practice. Such a belief, which unfortunately is present in some basic education quarters, will hinder the growth and perfection of the scheme. It is one thing to say that the basic scheme presents the nearest solution to the problems of education and morals in India; it is another to say that this scheme alone is good, reliable, and valid. In the hands of the politician the latter view is bound to grow, while in the hands of the educationist the scheme will go through all the stages through which all great educational schemes and enterprises have passed, stages of adjustments and amendments leading to improvements and finally to perfection.

One way by which this could be achieved is to get the universities to introduce basic education as a special method in their training colleges. As matters stand at present even the graduate basic teachers are trained, in most of the States, in institutions which are outside the influence of universities. In training institutions under government control, the scheme has less freedom to grow because of the rigidity and rituals enforced by governments. If the scheme is left in the hands of the educationist to be nurtured, it will have few parallels as a great and noble weapon for the education of man in leading a life of peace—peace with himself, with his neighbours, and with the rest of mankind.

New Aims of University Education

As pointed out before, the Report of the Indian University Commission is expected to bring out far-reaching reforms in the sphere of university education in India and these are bound to have a beneficial effect on the lower stages of education as well. The outstanding part of this Report is a learned chapter on the aims of university education in India. The Governor of the Orissa State, when inaugurating the 1950 meeting of the Central Advisory Board of Education, referred to the University Commission Report as a monumental effort to cover the entire field of education and said that its chapter on the aims of education deserved to be made a compulsory text for all the members of the faculties and alumni of all universities in India. In this chapter it is pointed out that the social philosophy which should govern all educational institutions in India, should be in accordance with the basic and fundamental ideals stressed in the preamble to the Constitution of India, which reads thus:

> We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign DEMOCRATIC Republic and to secure for all its citizens JUSTICE, social, economic, and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation ., do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this constitution.

The Report emphasises that the ideals of *Democracy, Justice, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*—national and international—should be the ideals that the university and other educational institutions should put before their students.

The Report considers that for true *Democracy,* education should aim at the development of body, mind, and spirit of each individual, and stresses the relation of different subjects of study to the growth of the individual, the nature of human freedom, and the need for social changes.

> There can be no democratic freedom without social justice which demands the freeing of the individual from poverty, unemployment, malnutrition and ignorance. This is not enough. We must cultivate the art of human relationships, the ability to live and work together, overcoming the dividing forces of the time. Social harmony can be achieved by wise leadership and proper administration.

Under *Justice,* the Report considers how universities should train technical men of all types, social leaders, and wise administrators. Under *Liberty,* it refers to the liberating character of all education, the need of the autonomy of the universities and of freedom of thought and expression for the teachers. The meaning of equality of opportunity in education, the barriers to it, specially the economic, and the need for assistance to backward communities are considered in the context of *Equality.* The idea of *Fraternity* is treated at two levels, national and international. Closer co-operation in colleges and universities between the teachers and the taught, the development of the residential system, of corporate life, and a knoweldge of India's culture and history will help to promote the former, while the latter could be achieved by fostering among the members of the university, the spirit of ' one world ' and by acquainting them with the cultures and achievements of other peoples.

The Report emphasises the dynamic nature of Indian culture and its value in a scheme of education and morals. It points out that one of serious complaints against the system of education which has prevailed in the country for over a century is that it neglected India's past and that it did not provide the Indian students with a knowledge of their own culture. It has produced in some a feeling that they have no culture of their own, in others, what is worse, that they should imbibe a culture very different from their own.

Indian culture has survived even the darkest days of political depression and degradation. There were people who nursed it, and through their efforts it has been preserved in an uninterrupted continuity. To-day, in the loving hands of a free people, it has regained its former lustre. The University Commission finds in it a single social pattern where the wisdom of different ages is stored up, and looks upon it as the sole guiding star for the young generation of India.

The literacy figures of India, as everyone knows, are very low. They were estimated at 18·4 per cent. by an educational statistician who made the survey and presented his results at the Indian Science Congress held at Poona in 1950. In spite of the alarming illiteracy in the country, there is a strong redeeming feature. All Indians, whether literate or illiterate, have a rich cultural background. The University Commission has correctly diagnosed the factor that has contributed to this redeeming state of affairs. Indian poetry and folk-lore, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata,* Indian art and architecture have lifted for the illiterate masses of this country the veil from the hidden beauty of the world. The epics of India deal with problems of ethics and politics and are at the same time great literature. They play an important role in the life of India. As the Report points out, they are told in the homes, chanted in the temples, and recited under the village tree. The grandmother tells them to the children, travelling minstrels present them in towns and villages, scholars interpret them, and people love to enact them. In these epics we see greatness in spiritual vision and moral teaching, as well as an artistry of language and imaginative eloquence. The epic literature is a part of the tradition of the Indian race and has great value in any scheme of education and morals. These epics speak to us about the rights of the weak, the lust for power and its nemesis, the problem of reconciliation and atonement for wrongdoing, the sufferings of the vanquished, and the debasement of the victors. There is no doubt that, if we are to work for a model society of human beings, we must start with a vision of great and good men. That indeed should be the centre of all good education.

In the discussion of the various specific problems of university education in India, the Commission have kept before them the above-mentioned lofty aim. The specific problems discussed by them cover the entire field of university education, viz. teaching staff in universities and colleges, standards of teaching, courses of study, reform of examinations, post-graduate teaching and research, professional education, religious education, medium of instruction, students' welfare, women's education, constitution and control of universities, university finances, and problems of individual universities. The Report has been well received by the public and also by the different universities in the country. What is more important, the Central Advisory Board of Education met in April 1950 to consider at length the recommendations of the University Commission, and after careful consideration accepted more or less all its recommendations. The Board has recommended to the Education Ministry of the Government of India that they should accept the suggestions and implement them as soon as possible. It is hoped that the dawn of a new era in Indian university education is imminent, and that in this new era

universities will be concentrating on education and morals and on training leaders who will put into practice the high principles enunciated in Free India's Constitution.

Social Education Replaces Adult Education

In view of the new situation that has arisen in the country on the advent of freedom and the adoption of the new Constitution, Indian leaders have felt acutely the need of providing a broad-based adult education for the citizen who did not have the benefit of education during his school-going age. For this the primary concern was to enlarge the concept of adult education which in pre-independence days was synonymous with making people literate. To-day it is more important to provide an education which would include within its scope a training in social and communal harmony, personal and community hygiene and sanitation, training in a simple craft that appeals to the adult, imparting of general knowledge about everyday things, and inculcation of the spirit of service, tolerance, and brotherhood. It is realised that the use of the term 'adult education' and talk about it have been overdone in India, and that it is necessary to plan it on a broader basis and widen its scope. Therefore the term 'social education', which includes all the above-mentioned aspects, has been accepted. The Central Advisory Board of Education at their meeting in 1949 adopted the following twelve-point programme for social education:

(1) The village school will be a centre of instruction, welfare-work, sports, and recreation for the entire village.

(2) Separate times will be allotted to children, adolescents, and grown-ups.

(3) Certain days in the week will be reserved exclusively for women.

(4) A number of motor-vans fitted with projectors and loudspeakers are being secured to visit schools. Films and magic-lanterns will be shown and recordings of talks played. It is proposed that each school will be visited at least once a week.

(5) Schools will be provided with radio sets and arrangements will be made for broadcasting special programmes for school children, adolescents, and grown-up people in the light of the scheme of social education sketched above.

(6) Popular dramas will be organised in the schools, and from time to time prizes will be given for the best plays produced.

(7) There will be provision for teaching national and community songs.

(8) Arrangements will be made for giving simple instruction in some craft or industry suited to the locality.

(9) Lectures will be arranged in co-operation with the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Labour to instruct villagers in simple laws of social hygiene, methods of agriculture, cottage industries, etc.

(10) In co-operation with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, suitable films and slides will be shown from time to time. Arrangements will also be made for visits by public men, to speak to the villagers on problems of national importance.

(11) Group-games and competitions will be held between different schools and villages.

(12) Periodic exhibitions, fairs, and excursions will be organised.

There has been significant progress all over the country in putting into practice the above-mentioned social education programme. Great enthusiasm is displayed in all States in opening literacy centres, conducting social education camps and village libraries, and in training social education workers. Every State has started a new department to look after social education work.

Problems of Mass Education

From what is stated above, it will be noticed that educational enthusiasm has not been wanting in India since the advent of freedom. Rapid progress in education has been advocated by all, and the type of education that is advocated is one suited to the Indian genius and temperament and one that would help the individual to live in peace at home and in harmony with the rest of the world. The Gandhian ideals of non-violence and truth are deeply rooted in the country, and these find plenty of expression in all modern educational planning. This planning, which has been often on idealistic lines, has not sufficiently realised the practical difficulties in the way of its success. A nation jubilant over an independence that came to her after years of struggle and sacrifice can be pardoned if, in the wake of freedom, it is led away by a revolutionary enthusiasm rather than by a conservative sagacity in its educational planning. Its Constitution, which is one of Secular Republic, guarantees freedom for its citizens to grow to their full stature unhindered by any class, communal, or political consideration. This Constitution itself is the greatest force for the moral education of its citizens. Preoccupied with the framing of this Constitution, Indian leaders have not been able to realise the colossal magnitude of the problem of education in the country and its financial implications. Soon after the advent of freedom the Central Advisory Board met and decided that they would not be satisfied with the Sargent Scheme, which aimed at providing within forty years universal free compulsory primary education, adult education to wipe out the illiteracy of the masses, and adequate secondary, university, and technical education to bring India on a par with other civilised countries of the world. It was suggested that many of these items, particularly universal primary education, should be provided within five years. At their next annual meeting, in 1949, there was a better appreciation of realities, and it was decided to provide it within ten years. The Indian Constitution that was framed during the same year makes it obligatory on all States to provide universal primary education within the same period of ten years. The 1950 meeting of the Central Advisory Board has not

been very encouraging. It announced that in spite of the urgency of the problem of education, the Government could not go ahead with its planned programme because of the paucity of funds.

India cannot ignore the fact that to-day the major segment of her population is illiterate. The literacy figures, as stated earlier, stand at 18·4 per cent. This level can be raised only by well-planned schemes of universal primary education and social education. A close examination of the plans that are now in progress leaves one with the impression that drastic changes are needed to bring them within the reach of practical achievement. Thus it is seen, from the recent studies made by the Indian Institute of Education in Bombay, that the financial implications of the Bombay plan to provide free universal compulsory primary education in the State within ten years are beyond the economic capacity of the State. The Madras Education Minister has announced that the State will not extend compulsory primary education beyond the few districts in which it has already been introduced until basic teachers become available in adequate numbers. Other States are faced with similar difficulties.

The issues involved in providing free universal primary education in India appear to be very clear. The Indian Constitution demands that such an education should be provided within ten years. From the point of view of education and morals this is an imperative need. As already pointed out, the plans formulated by different States are more on idealistic than on practical lines. The dearth of funds and of trained personnel are the important obstacles. To overcome the former difficulty there is the need, at least during the period of emergency, to adopt devices like the shift system in schools, increasing the number of pupils per teacher and going slow with idealistic legislations like prohibition. The latter obstacle can be overcome only by some method of conscription of teachers. In India an extreme point of view has been advocated that all matriculates and graduates, before they are granted their certificates, should be made to teach for a specified period. The present writer had an occasion to examine at length the problem of conscription of teachers in his presidential address on "Teachers and Educational Reconstruction" to the Psychology and Educational Section of the Indian Science Congress, 1949. The nature of the problem and the solution suggested are as follows:

(1) The minimum requirements of educational expansion in India will amount to about 2·3 million additional teachers.

(2) To raise this army of teachers, some kind of conscription is inevitable.

(3) The idea of conscription has to be examined in the light of what educational thinkers and systems down the ages have advocated as the essential requirements of teachers, and the modern research conducted to fix the qualities and traits needed for success in teaching.

(4) Educational thinkers and systems here and abroad have stressed

the importance of certain qualities, of which intelligence and knowledge, character and personality traits and professional skill, are indispensable.

(5) Modern researches have shown that to be successful, a teacher should have personal, professional, physical, and mental equipments and also a cultural background, emotional stability, and social adjustment.

(6) Conscription of all matriculates and graduates as teachers in the sense in which the term 'conscription' is generally employed is therefore a dangerous proposition. Even for an emergency we should have only a 'selective conscription', in which at least emotional stability and social adjustment should be stressed, it being granted that matriculates and graduates have the necessary mental equipment.

(7) The candidates so recruited by 'selective conscription' should be given an emergency training.

India is bound to evolve ways and means to find the funds and train the personnel necessary for her educational expansion stipulated in the Constitution. From the point of view of education and morals, there can be no more opportune time than the present for this educational expansion. The reasons for this are obvious. For one thing, Young India to-day looks for its principles and ideals in the Gandhian philosophy of truth and non-violence. For another, it will, for many years to come, continue to look for its leadership to the great world citizen, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and will feel, think, and act with him in terms of his great ideals of nationalism set in the background of international understanding and co-operation.

T. K. N. MENON.

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CHAPTER TWO

PAKISTAN

Islam as a Dominant Factor

PAKISTAN has been often described as a couple of splinters off the Indian land-mass, but it is forgotten that these two splinters which 'bracket up' the sub-continent account for 75 million people—twice the population of France and an area three and half times that of the United Kingdom. The emergence of Pakistan on the world map had aroused a few hopes but it had given rise to many fears. Yet during the brief span of two years and odd months it has falsified all predictions and has allayed several misgivings. According to competent observers the young state holds the promise of power and prosperity and will presently be recognised as unquestionably the greatest of Muslim lands.

But the pre-eminence of Pakistan does not arise merely out of geographical factors like those of area or population; it is essentially related to the moral and political basis of the new state. According to Sir Agha Khan it was the rivalry of Great Britain and Germany that "brought about in the twentieth century a new world in which the birth of a truly independent state, with all the advantages that can give a nation trust in her own destiny was made possible. That mighty infant is the Pakistan of to-day. Her numbers, her resources, her geographical position, the fundamental unity of her population in sentimental aspirations give Pakistan all the advantages which the Muslim world lost some two hundred years ago. Incredible as it may seem, there has not been before Pakistan a really independent Muslim State since about 1750, i.e. the last two hundred years."

Moral Foundations of the New Social Order

The moral foundations of the state have been based on the objectives resolution passed by the Parliament, which opens with the historic declaration that "Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust."

This reaffirmation of the supremacy of the authority of God in political life when realised in practice would be an epoch-making feat of modern history. It gives a new orientation to the problem

of power in a state, and offers up the only hope of its solution. It may not result immediately in the final victory of 'peace, progress, and happiness' for the entire world, the triumphant note in which the resolution ends, but it provides an insight into the spirit of the constitution and the outlook of the educational system based on such an ideology.

Urge for International Understanding

This urge for international understanding is not an isolated phenomenon, it is the manifestation of a long process of historical and cultural evolution.

The creative urge for unity and synthesis is inspired by the cardinal principle of *Tawhid* or Unity of Divinehood which is the very essence of the Islamic religious thought and social outlook. In India it functioned as a dynamic force for creating unity out of diversity and welding its heterogeneous elements into cultural, linguistic, and administrative patterns of great homogeneity.

This irrepressible passion for unity worked itself out persistently in creating bridgeheads across chasms which separated one group from another within this mighty museum of racial and religious types. Externally it developed a new awareness of international kinship. Ever since the hordes of Chengiz Khan sent the Muslim princes of Central Asia flying to the court of the Delhi Sultan, the town has been an international metropolis in spirit and composition. The great divide between the Middle and the Far East lay somewhere on the sub-continent; only recently has it been demarcated by the frontiers of Pakistan, a country which stands with its face turned towards the West and not the East.

The manifestation of this spirit was discernible as early as the 'eighties of the last century, and according to a keen observer, "[United] India held the first rank in Haj (the annual pilgrimage to the sanctuary at Mecca) and all things concerned, it is the most important land where the Muslim faith is found. [United] India has probably a closer connection at the present moment (1880) with Mecca than any other country." The tendency of wedding this region more closely with the rest of the world has gathered volume and intensity since then.

Historical Background of the Urge

The inevitable association of the political renaissance of Muslims on the sub-continent with one international issue or the other is a phenomenon of an extremely fascinating nature in their recent history, the Turkish problem often providing an inexhaustible source of stimuli in this respect. It was an interesting blending of idealism and psycho-political attitudes. These issues would galvanise them again and again into activity and release thereby tremendous reserves of national energy. Right from the Balkan

Wars to the Palestine problem, the political trends of the Islamic world have closely synchronised with the curve of national awakening.

With the emergence of Pakistan, this desire for international understanding has undergone a fundamental transformation. This happy change is as much an outcome of self-assurance arising out of independence as that of the shifting patterns on the political chessboard after World War II.

From a negative, regressive, and to a certain extent exclusive tendency, it has developed into a positive, progressive, and all-inclusive attitude. Originally the urge had the air of a defence mechanism against capitalistic colonialism. Purged of its psychological excrescences, it has become an inspiring ideal for world peace.

Its Modes of Expression

The urge has found fresh modes of expression, comprehensive in nature and far-reaching in effect, during the new era. In the cultural sphere there is a growing faith in values transcending the national and the passionate desire for discovering the principle of unity out of diversity. Even the brief span of international contacts with the Islamic world since the creation of Pakistan has brought overwhelming evidence of the basic truth that different national cultures are the various facets of a magnificent prism which represents the original core of Islamic culture. Elsewhere are given the technique and organisations through which this analytico-synthetic process is being brought to a consummation in the cultural field.

The international Islamic economic conference represented the manifestation of this zestful desire to co-operate on the economic plane. The challenge of a common economy, the rural economy of underdeveloped countries, had created a keen consciousness to meet it on a common basis. The very realisation of the common danger and the desire to meet it transformed the gathering into a dynamic instrument for international education. One of the important proposals considered by the conference was the establishment of an institution for the training of technical manpower for the change-over to modern economy. In the opinion of the President this institution should be run as a co-operative venture by the Islamic countries.

Linguistically, the new urge has created a more lively interest in the learning of modern languages, especially Arabic. The state is seriously considering a proposal for the adoption of the *Naskh* script for Urdu, which will bring it closer to Arabic, the *lingua franca* of the Islamic world.

Its Philosophic Basis

The philosophic and the emotional basis of the Muslim renaissance had been provided by the thoughts and poetry of Dr.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the Prophet of the great transformation. In the works of this ' laureate of Islamic Humanism ', the secret of self and that of selflessness represent the two phases of a bipolar process. While his emphasis on the development of individuality aroused the sleeping beauty of Islam and stimulated it to her fullest consciousness, the other principle led him on like a kindly light to the discovery that the whole world is the family of God. On the one hand he conceives of man as a being who shapes his destiny and does not suffer one, an heroic figure who would tear up the foundations of the universe and cast its atoms into a new mould: on the other, his spirit is not circumscribed by any mould whether that of the East or of the West. The ideal man resembles the transcendental sun " whose nature is free from the East and the West, although on account of its birth it is said to be of the East."

The social and educational transformation which is coming over the country owes much of its inspiration to the dynamic activism preached by Iqbal. According to him the universe was not a completed act; it is an unfinished, growing universe which is being constantly advanced by man, and by God through man. The inspiring conception of the role of man on earth " who had made his Fall the first rung in the ladder of his glory " has kindled in the hearts of the people the passionate desire to create a new world out of the old.

Understanding on the Cultural Level

The Muslims of the sub-continent have loved the land of their birth with that wealth of feeling which has found expression in a poetry, pulsating with deep emotionalism, but all along their spirit always transcended physical barriers and yearned for the universal, not only in terms of the ethical and the religious but also those of the cultural and social values. They would preserve for the modern times that broad humanistic outlook which made the cultured man so universally loved and, what is more important, understood in mediaeval Europe and Islam. " My spirit is not imprisoned by the charms of Delhi, the romance of Ispahan or the glories of Samarkand ", sang Iqbal, who symbolises this resurgent, catholic spirit of the Muslims. This urge had led to the ' Discovery of India ' through the Arab traders and scholars and was responsible for the extension of the confines of the Middle East cultural region eastward.

The indigenous institutions for Islamic education received a perennial stream of scholars from such far-flung quarters as Kazan in central Russia or Indonesia in the distant south-east. Pakistan seeks to cherish the cultural traditions of the Muslims in this region and to draw its people closer to the Islamic world, as the first stage in this international adventure.

The deepening of these cultural contacts with the Islamic

countries is primarily meant to work for one world in terms of cultural and intellectual understanding. The Minister of Education had remarked in his inaugural address that it was natural that they should initiate the experiment by establishing cultural contacts with the Islamic countries, which would broaden in extent and variety with the passage of time until they were tied in silken bonds of love and amity with the rest of the world.

Cultural Associations

A beginning has been made by establishing cultural relations with four regions, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and the Arab countries. Last year has been extremely fruitful in the enrichment of the programmes and activities of these organisations. The Pak-Arab Cultural Association has established an Arabic College at Karachi, a project which has been warmly supported by representatives from the Arab countries. The idea of planning an *Encyclopedia of Islam* in Urdu and Arabic has gone on apace, and distinguished Islamists like Professor Ahmad Amin of Egypt and scholars of Iraq have expressed their enthusiastic willingness to participate in the project.

The social and intellectual activities of the Pak-Iran Association received special impetus during the year because of the visit of H.I.M. the Shahinshah of Iran, an event more cultural in its import than political. Common celebration of the Islamic festivals by nationals of different countries staying in the West has often provided an impressive evidence of the spirit of fellowship and *camaraderie* engendered by Islam. To these has been added the common birthday celebration of great personalities belonging to various Islamic countries. During this year Iqbal Day has been celebrated for the first time on an international scale, in Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Great Britain.

One of the most elusive but valuable gains has been that feeling of kinship which possesses invariably all visitors from these countries when they come to Pakistan. According to an Iranian, " the atmosphere impregnates the mind with that pleasant confusion wherein all distinction between the guest and the host disappears."

One of the primary functions of these associations is the exchange of students and teachers and the sending of cultural missions.

A Translation and Publication Bureau has been established under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Education. Its main objectives include:

(1) Preparation of original works in Urdu, Arabic, and other languages.

(2) Translation of standard works of high literary value.

(3) The propagation of Islamic culture.

(4) Providing a meeting-ground for the scholars, authors, and translators in Pakistan with those of other Islamic countries.

(5) The publication of a journal in Arabic which should function as the organ of the bureau.

(6) Holding conferences, with proceedings both in Urdu and in Arabic.

(7) Sending deputations for propagating the aims and objectives of the organisation outside Pakistan.

(8) To propagate the Arabic language through all possible means and to adopt it as the medium for its conferences and correspondence.

(9) Establishing its branches in Pakistan and other Islamic countries.

(10) Establishing a college for the teaching of Arabic.

(11) The establishment of schools for the masses.

University Education

Somebody has said that democratic leadership is worthy of gods; and even gods fail therein because they tend to become dictators. In fact, leadership for a democracy implies a far greater sensitiveness to the nature and quality of human relationships than leadership for a totalitarian state. Hence the training for leadership in a democracy is a much more intricate and responsible job. In countries with a large proportion of unenlightened, uneducated electorate, and in the absence of the restraining influence of democratic traditions of government, leadership may wield immense power for good or evil, and unless its education is conducted in the spirit of a sacred trust, it will frustrate the very object which it is meant to serve. Moreover, underdeveloped countries require a devoted band of pioneers and captains in every sphere of life. All these considerations have imparted a new importance to the organisation of university education in Pakistan.

Through partition, the university life in the country has lost in the range of its contacts, but it has certainly gained in depth and intensity. The universities of Pakistan have become leaders of intellectual and cultural life in a way which could hardly be conceived in the pre-partition days.

They are providing a natural rallying-ground for the intellectual and cultural agencies in the country, which has developed considerably the scope of directing and integrating their activities and investing them with the capacity of self-assessment and the constant expansion of the meaning and scope of their work.

The universities of Pakistan, though few in number, are rich in traditions of higher education. The University of the Punjab has been functioning as the cradle-bed of Oriental learning and has done pioneer work in determining their place in the scheme of higher education. Along with that, it has maintained a high reputa-

tion for scientific research and leadership in games and sports. The Dacca University was the first educational venture on the residential system as recommended by the Calcutta University Commission.

A new planet has arisen on the educational horizon which would illumine the craggy defiles of the Khyber Pass with the reflected glory of new learning. The new educational experiment in the form of the Khyber University, with its programme of research work in scientific and other studies, is pregnant with tremendous possibilities for Middle Asia. The region has functioned as a radiating centre of religious and intellectual influences in ancient India, and the sponsors of the idea are convinced that the university is destined to play a great role in the future.

New Awareness in the Universities

There is a far keener awareness by the universities of the wider intellectual life outside the country, and a quickened consciousness of their kinship with the outside world. The stream of distinguished scholars which has continuously fed the university life of late has revived those noble traditions of the institutions of mediaeval Islam, which had served the purpose of a *sanctum sanctorum* for the wandering scholars, where they were received with princely hospitality.

Exchange of visits by students is an auspicious portent for the future of cultural relations, and such visits have been considerably increasing recently. The itinerary included Turkey, Iraq, and Iran during last year. The universities in United India were exasperating in their indifference to the teaching of modern languages, and this unconcern was more the result of political sequestration than of intellectual insensitiveness. The subject has received added impetus since the creation of Pakistan. Modern Arabic and the Iranian language are becoming increasingly popular, while Urdu is being recognised as a university subject in the Islamic countries. The Teheran University has established a chair for the language.

Increased interest is being shown in the Muslim countries in the philosophy and poetry of Iqbal, and one of the foreign diplomats made an impassioned appeal recently for the foundation of chairs on ' Iqbalics ' in the various Muslim countries.

The universities, like the country itself, have just negotiated their way out of the sheltering security of a British protected lake. The great volume of waters outside is still an uncharted expanse for them, but they are feeling their way surely and steadily, with all the thrill and romance of the new adventure in their hearts.

Medium of Instruction at the University Stage

The educationists are very much exercised at present by the problem of the medium of instruction at the university stage. The issue is being gradually crystallised and there is an overwhelming

feeling that Urdu should be adopted as the medium for the major part of the syllabus in the universities of West Pakistan. The only debatable point which has given rise to more sparks than light is the most appropriate time for introducing the measure. It can materialise only when more adequate literature is available in the Urdu language. The same difficulty is being faced in another quarter also. The Parliament may adopt Urdu as the national language of Pakistan, but it would take some time before it would be possible to replace English in administration.

Of all the languages spoken on the sub-continent, Urdu is pre-eminently most suitable for administrative and educational purposes. It has a remarkable power of assimilation and adaptability, and the very meaning of the term *Urdu* (camp or market-place in Turkish) reveals its common origin and the trend of its evolutionary process. It is remarkably free from the puristic tendencies which have created a chasm between the languages of the masses and the élite in the case of other Indian languages.

Its universal appeal and practicability was recognised by the British when it was adopted as the language of the Indian army in Roman characters. It has been used as an official language by the majority of the Indian states, with considerable effectiveness and efficiency. Besides, it is the only language of the sub-continent which has been used as the medium of instruction at the university stage, and the experiment has been carried out successfully since the inception of the Osmania University in 1918. Competent observers have been highly impressed by its success.

All these factors have strengthened the claim of Urdu on genuinely educational grounds and it holds the field unrivalled and unchallenged even by Arabic, the classical medium of instruction for indigenous education which has been advocated for this purpose in some revivalist quarters. It is hardly necessary to add that the emphasis on Urdu would by no means detract from the importance of English as a rich treasure-house of literary and cultural traditions, and for some time to come, even as the language of higher teaching in scientific studies and research. Arabic and English would always hold their ground as the media of international understanding.

Although the universities have not laid down any well-defined policy on the subject, individual faculties with a flare for educational adventure have adopted Urdu as an optional medium in some cases. The Central Training College, Lahore, has taken a courageous lead by introducing the language for the degree of Bachelor of Teaching, as an optional. The Central Government has constituted the Urdu Committee to devise ways and means for implementing the decision of the Parliament on the language problem and making it a suitable instrument for teaching purposes at the university stage.

Rebuilding at the Secondary Stage

One of the tragedies of education in United India had been the absence of any well-defined aim for the various stages of education. The educational ladder was envisaged as a walled passage with hardly a landing-place to relieve its monotonous ascent.

The very use of the term 'entrance' examination for the matriculation revealed the spirit in which the entire scheme of secondary education had been conceived. The tyranny of an unimaginative system of educational organisation kept all the pupils at one dead level, and there was no scope for differentiation according to the abilities and attainments of various pupils. It resulted in a tremendous wastage of talent due to psychological and vocational maladjustment.

After the Calcutta University Commission *Report*, the Punjab University inquiry committee of the early 'thirties was one of the first educational bodies to emphasise that secondary education should be recognised as an autonomous stage, and not merely as an ante-chamber opening into the portals of the university. Under the inspiration of the Sargent Scheme, the eleven-years plan came into operation in more than one province. It was being felt in Pakistan that the reform was long overdue, and the first step for the emancipation of secondary education from the overpowering influence of the university is the passing of the Bill for the Board of Secondary Education at Karachi which will provide the administrative machinery for implementing this emancipation.

Curriculum Reconstruction

The educational superstructure was rocked to its very foundations by the impact of the storm which followed the partition of the country, but the contents of education had to stand a yet greater shock. The curriculum had to face the searching examination of its foundations and a reinterpretation of its value in terms of their functional use in the building up of a new socio-economic order.

Reorganisation did not imply the assimilation or the elimination of certain elements; it demanded a basic transformation of the entire scheme of studies in the light of social needs and requirements.

The curriculum was to be used primarily as a dynamic instrument for implementing the Islamic ideology and way of life, essentially based as it is on the principles of social justice, equality, and brotherhood of man. Morally and socially, it was to be infused with the genuine spirit of Islamic humanism and reorganised accordingly. Technically, it required the transposition of the curriculum patterns from the national on to the international basis, which implied a considerable extension of factual knowledge in terms of spatial and chronological relationships.

In the cultural sphere the new curriculum had to counteract the pernicious tendency of the past, which made the pupil a cultural alien in his homeland. The child was to develop henceforth his individuality and his social self through the cultural media of his own people. The aim was the self-perpetuation of Islamic culture in terms of national life and to envisage the heritage in the perspective of world culture and civilisation. The way towards this extension of meanings lay through the national, Islamic, and international pattern of cultural thought and content. All this meant a redrafting and recasting of the syllabus for history, citizenship, and social studies.

A dynamic adjustment with the physical environment and a husbanding of its tremendous resources for social ends and purposes are an urgent need of the underdeveloped countries. The new schemes insist that no student should leave the school without a basic knowledge of the scientific heritage. While science has come under a cloud in the West for that large-scale devastation for which it is not responsible directly, science teaching in Pakistan is enjoying a spring-time of popularity and an enthusiastic welcome, reminiscent of the days of the industrial revolution. Younger nations desire scientific knowledge not only for building up the physical foundations of life; they need it also for a rationalistic approach towards life problems as a whole. " Should the basis of ethics to-day be science or mere faith? " asked a distinguished scientist at the Science Congress held recently at Karachi. " I for one would favour science, and recommend that definite direction be given to science teaching to attain a true appreciation of moral values with reference to a social organisation as ours." There is a general feeling that this belated awareness in the disciplinary values of science, directed and illumined by the deep spiritual urge of true religion, would help the educationist in redefining the place of science in the scheme of life.

It would be out of place to discuss the causes which led to such a preposterous estrangement of the curriculum from the life-needs of the community, but the urge for its revision was never so keen as in the days immediately following the creation of Pakistan. It was a landmark in the history of the sub-continent, when committees were constituted for the reconstruction of curriculum which had representation of the legislature and other public bodies. The work of the Punjab syllabus revision committee, as directed and organised by a set of keen educationists, is bearing fruit in the form of new syllabi, more in conformity with the spirit and ideology of the country.

The new tendencies in curriculum making reveal a remarkable sensitiveness to the changing environmental conditions and social needs, and the doctrine of self-determination is as much moulding the political pattern as the educational.

Supply and Training of Teachers

Schemes for educational reconstruction envisage a considerable expansion of the school system in the near future, while industrialisation would not only necessitate a change in the contents and methods, it would require a more intimate and vital relationship with environmental conditions.

All these new changes would demand a more generous supply of trained personnel, men who are trained not only in the new methods and technique of teaching, but, what is of greater significance, in the technique of a new way of life.

The new socio-economic order is still in the making and its details are being forged out by the Constituent Parliament, yet the objective resolution has provided a general conception of the basic principles which should constitute its foundations. Accordingly, the study of Islamic religion as a moral and educative force has been introduced as a compulsory subject in the training institutions for the Muslims, while the non-Muslims are expected to study the ethical and educational basis of religion in general. The intellectual basis of the teacher's personality has received attention along with its moral foundations, and the introduction of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction at the Central Training College, Lahore, has conceded to the teacher in training an educational birthright which had been denied to him up to the present.

The unprecedented expansion of educational programmes can be implemented only if there is a far more abundant supply of trained teachers than at present. Facilities are being provided in all, and specific attention is being paid to placing the educational pyramid on sound foundations by creating a large number of normal schools for the primary teachers.

Teachers' Salaries

Under the old social order the prestige of the teacher stood very high. He was as much a directing force in the economy of village life as the spiritual leader of the community. With the disintegration of the village economy and its self-sufficiency, there set in a deterioration in his status, and the downhill progress has been hardly checked till recently. There has been a flagrant discrepancy between the significant role which the teacher is expected to play in the reconstruction of national life and its economic return. Moreover, professional unity was strained to its breaking-point by a multiple code for various classes of teachers.

War conditions had created a situation in the country which demanded an immediate reassessment of the scales of remuneration in the teaching profession. Heavy depredations were made on the profession during the war, and although the teachers who joined the armed forces did not fling back the parting shot, " Thank God,

I have seen the last of it ", their colleagues who remained behind thought that they had considerable justification to say so. The partition of the country created a great scarcity of teachers in science and technology.

With the creation of Pakistan there has been an all-round awareness of the great role which the teacher is expected to play in the building up of the new society. Although the demands of defence have overshadowed other items in the budget, there is a widespread feeling that the role of the teacher is more significant than that of the soldier. " While the soldier watches over the physical frontiers, the teacher stands guard over the shining boundaries of the soul."

The most reassuring feature of this quiet and fundamental revolution in the re-evaluation of the social significance of the teacher's function is the growing consciousness of its importance among the masses.

One immediate result of the changed outlook has been a revision of the teachers' scales of pay in more than one province, and schemes for improving the economic prospects of the profession in others. One of the provinces has claimed to be paying the highest salaries for teachers throughout the East. It would be a poor satisfaction even if such a claim is substantiated, as the salary index for the teacher has touched very nearly the freezing-point in most of the Asiatic countries.

But there is no doubt that the increase in the scales of pay in Pakistan has been substantial; it has ranged from one-third of the basic pay to two-thirds in certain cases. The central government is considering also the implementation of a scheme of state insurance for the benefit of teachers.

The stirring of a new consciousness is also visible among the teachers, who have been voluble, sometimes even vehement, on problems dealing with educational administration and organisation. The teachers' associations are gradually quickening into life under the impulse of new forces and are realising that they should no longer function as a post office for transmission of teachers' grievances to the authorities, but should act themselves as an authority or a directing force in education. In fact, their demand is not a tinkering with the educational machinery or the teacher's status; they desire a reinterpretation of the role of the teacher in the entire scheme of education.

Women Look Ahead

The tremendous chaos which swept over the country after the partition was a great challenge to the women of Pakistan, and in the words of the President of the All-Pakistan Women's Conference, " If they had to find for themselves a respectable place in the scheme of national life, they could in no way afford to ignore the challenge."

The womanhood of Pakistan rose in those memorable days and they rose to a woman. In the flaming passion of their new mission, they rolled up the walls which surrounded them as if they were the fragile shelters of a tent, and went on a march. The march developed in some cases into the goose-step and has given us the Pakistan Women's National Guards, that 'snappy' contingent which has received appreciation from such distinguished visitors as H.I.M. the Shahinshah of Iran and others. According to a Western observer, "For the first time since the Mughals, women are beginning to become a force in Asia. They have come from behind the veils, demanding a better level of living. With fire in their eyes they are doing things men did not think worth doing."

There is a qualitative difference between the genesis and development of women's movements in the Orient and in the West. In the first place, the chronological factor has influenced to some extent the nature and methods of the two phases of the world movement. The renaissance in the East, which flamed up later on, missed the peril and romance which were the fortune of the pioneer.

Secondly, the Muslim woman is merely claiming back what the Islamic law had awarded to her thirteen centuries ago. All these rights had been gradually taken away by man from her for a mess of pottage.

The causes of restlessness and disaffection were more or less identical in the two cases. It was a protest against man-made values and civilisation; yet the movements differed in their points of emphasis and mode of expression. In the West it had the deepest dye of the political variety and the suffragette movement was the hostile demonstration of voteless womanhood. One of its natural outcomes was that woman entered the entire scheme of life as a contestant and not as a complementary factor.

By the time the crest-wave of this movement reached the Orient, it had been shorn of much of its frenzy and extravagances. The victory of the democratic ideology had cleared the brambles and had paved the way for theoretic equality of the sexes. But the sanction of the law had yet to be confirmed by social and economic justice.

The economic struggle is hardly on in the Orient because competition by women is not a menace as yet and will not be for some time to come; the essential social services requiring women personnel would absorb the onflow of educated women. But still the women are most jealously on the watch and there is a glint of battle in some eye corners. They have not entirely shaken off the suspicion that man would not still hesitate to kick up a cloud of romanticism round their figure in order to keep them safely incarcerated within the home.

But there is every hope that the psychological and other factors, which functioned as blinkers from seeing things in their true perspective, would lose their grip in the case both of men and

women, ultimately resulting in a more harmonious adjustment of vocational relationship between the two sexes.

Physical freedom is the first prerequisite of the process of emancipation, and the first attack on the rock-bound citadel of old-world ideas and life-patterns was delivered on the physical front. Physical education for women was as much essential for hygienic reasons as for the harmonious development of woman's personality. Under the regimentation of the old life-patterns she lived collectively as the member of a group. But the challenge of the new era demanded not only far greater physical mobility but individual alertness and sensitivity which could be the fruit only of a well-developed personality.

Physical education for women has taken various forms, and one of them, which was an outcome of the emergency period, was the Pakistan Women's National Guards, which has been organised to infuse into women a high sense of civic responsibility, selfless service, and discipline. After a review, H.I.M. the Shahinshah of Iran had expressed the desire that women in other Islamic countries should also follow in the footsteps of their sisters in Pakistan on their march to progress. Distinguished visitors from Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries were also highly impressed by the performance.

The Girl Guides movement has opened rich and abundant opportunities for growth and development for youthful spirits. The movement existed in the pre-partition days, but the Muslim girl was practically out of the picture for more than one reason. The average parent, who imposed upon himself most exacting standards of chaperoning and guardianship in case of girls, would hardly trust her free hours to an organisation about which he knew so little.

The joining of the Muslim girls *en masse* was a psychological phenomenon which was as much hastened by the social crisis involving millions of refugees as by the spirit of self-reliance and self-confidence which is the fruit of freedom and independence. The movement is now well on its way to prepare for the country a body of strong and brave daughters of the nation.

Nursing and the Medical Profession

Women gave a good account of themselves in the days when insanitary conditions and epidemics ravaged the refugee camps, and turned out in thousands to help the ailing humanity. This rich experience was an indirect stimulus in several cases to follow the example of the 'Lady with the Lamp' and adopt the profession of a nurse. There was a heavy fall in the number of trained nurses on account of the wholesale opting out of non-Muslims for India, and their number had dwindled down from seven thousand to five hundred. This frightful gap was filled up by organising a number

of centres for professional training throughout the country. A Pakistan Nursing Council has been established in order to maintain equality of standards and for purposes of general supervision. The girls are being sent abroad in increasing numbers to maintain the highest standards and for keeping a vital contact with the educational developments in other countries. The Pakistan Trained Nurses Association has been affiliated to the International Nursing Conference.

The country envisages a large-scale expansion of this essential service, and a comprehensive scheme has been drawn up which aims at the target of 160,000 nurses, on the basis of one nurse for five hundred citizens. One full-fledged degree college has been started to meet the growing need for more lady doctors, and the medical institutions for boys have been thrown open to girls in order to provide facilities for those who would like to join a co-educational institution.

Women's Associations

It will not be out of place to make a passing reference at this stage to some of the women's organisations, which have functioned as a leaven for this large-scale fermentation of ideas which constitute the intellectual and social background of the movement. The All-Pakistan Women's Association was the main driving-force for the self-perpetuation of that tremendous enthusiasm for social service which was released under the stress of emergency and which it proposed to foster and cultivate, as a permanent social attitude, when the state of emergency had passed away.

The main objective in founding the association was to give direction and coherent meaning to the spirit of zestful activity which was the manifestation of the spirit of woman in the new era. In the words of the President, " the Challenge made me feel, as Alice's walrus put it, that the time had come to talk of many things, not in small, isolated groups but as a representative and co-ordinating body, so that out of unity may come strength and out of both these may come service in the widest and fullest sense."

The three-pronged programme of the association deals with education, culture, and social service. In the sphere of education, some of the more adventurous branches have already forged ahead with literacy work, women's clubs, and homes. In the field of culture they are attempting to recapture old cultural traditions and revive those ideals which gave to the Muslims a galaxy of great women in the past. In their social service programme they intend to propagate and popularise maternity homes, infant welfare centres, and day nurseries. A training college for nurses also features as an important item on the programme. Indigenous arts and crafts had undergone deterioration and decay during the last phase of Indian history, and one of the objectives of this organisa-

tion is to initiate a renaissance of the great artistic traditions which were the most cherished cultural heritage of this country.

The Pakistan Domestic Art and Craft Association, which has organised a number of industrial centres for refugee women, is affiliated to the A.P.W.A. and represents its ideals and aspirations for an artistic revival and its perpetuation through education and training.

Women's education in industrial arts and crafts was a direct outcome of the rehabilitation programme for the refugees, and has been converted from the emergency basis to a permanent one. Industrial homes are being established on a voluntary basis by women's organisations like the A.P.W.A. They have a great significance for the future because they are bringing the message of a new freedom to that large body of women belonging to the masses who have not yet received the baptism of the new ideas. These homes are helping indirectly in a revival and preservation of some of those old arts and crafts which are fast disappearing under the impact of Western methods of industry, a task so essential for the continuity and development of aesthetic traditions of the country.

Contacts with the Outside World

The solicitude for international understanding manifested among women does not arise out of a mere fancy for participating in the councils of world womanhood; the primary consideration is to establish contacts with the rest of the world in order to seek help and inspiration for the problems which are facing the women of a young nation.

From the very outset, the A.P.W.A. has set about welding these bonds of kinship and amity. The organisation has been affiliated to the International Women's Alliance, while it participated also in the world exhibition of domestic art and crafts held recently at New York. The welfare work for women and children as conducted by the agencies of U.N.O. has always aroused the keenest co-operation from the highest ladies of the land.

Technical Education

Economy in educational effort and foresight in planning demanded that the architects of reconstruction should raise the superstructure on the foundations of old traditions wherever they provided a safe and secure foothold. The greatest tragedy with the development of industrial and technical education has been just this lack of vision and foresight in preserving the old traditions and harnessing the technical talent of the working classes for the industrial revolution.

All over the sub-continent immense harm had been done to the old traditions of arts and crafts by establishing a system of technical schools which were an uncalled-for departure from the old tradi-

tions, and which took no account of the transitional stages through which the schools or the apprentice system of a pre-industrial economy could be shifted on to an industrial basis. These institutions were instrumental in alienating the working classes who were entirely displaced under the new industrial set-up, and their place was occupied by the rising class of the bourgeoisie—men who belonged to the white-collared professions and were taken up with minding their white collars more than the machines. According to an industrialist of United India, he had yet to come across an Indian engineer who could set the machine going without the help of an illiterate mechanic.

The immediate urgency of the demands created by World War II set even the stagnant waters of technical education seething with a new life, and for the first time perhaps the educational administrator realised the need for an all-out effort to marshal the technical talent in the country. These schemes, though not directly concerned with education, had an indirect influence in enthusing the old technical schools with a realistic approach which was alive with a new meaning and purpose. Most of these training centres were located on the campus of the old technical institutions and exercised all the influence that physical proximity and vocational affinity could ensure.

Resettlement and Rehabilitation

The technical training centres of the Department of Employment and Resettlement were primarily meant for the benefit of the demobilised or the disabled soldier who had not returned home only with a snappy accent and a cocked hat. He belonged to that privileged group among the masses who had an opportunity of going abroad. His vision had been widened by a new universe unfolded to his wondering eyes, and his hands were no longer like the gnarled paws of the peasantry, they were really thinking and feeling hands whose veins had tingled under the thrill of new experiences and whose finger-tips were dancing a tattoo to do something anew. The centres imparting training had to maintain perforce a vital and dynamic relationship with life conditions, and had to provide skill and capacity for producing marketable goods of utility and taste. But the scheme was confined to the ex-Service men and the discharged war workers in the pre-partition period.

A great step of a decisively educative value which extended considerably its scope and utility was the opening of the scheme for the benefit of the civilians. The measure was necessitated on account of the mass exodus of persons who had lost their moorings in that terrible period of storm and stress which had followed the partition of the sub-continent. These centres went some way in rehabilitating the uprooted refugee in the vocational and psychological sense. The measure enhanced the value of this training

considerably in putting a broad base to benefit a larger section of the population and developing a vital contact with life conditions.

Another decision to convert them into training and production centres improved considerably the organisation of their work in the economic and vocational sense. The sessional work is organised on a terminal basis beginning with a knowledge of the tools and their functions and ending with the final production of marketable and consumable goods. The grant of a stipend and full maintenance for the refugee trainee has made these institutions a genuine training-ground for the masses.

Another project which is meant to preserve and cultivate the vocational talent of the working classes is the Kashmir technical training scheme, which is also sponsored by the same department in collaboration with the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.

The Kashmiri craftsman and artisan has a worldwide reputation for products of exquisite taste and utility, and their migration after the terrible aftermath of the partition has brought into the refugee camps and the civic population a fair sprinkling of artistic talent which would have petered out for want of encouragement and expression. A number of these centres has been established in the Azad Kashmir area and the Punjab. They have not only provided opportunities for those men who have been hounded out of their homes to occupy their time in a profitable manner; it has been an efficacious measure for rehabilitating them in the psychological sense.

Planning for the Future

The war did not only set our industrial plants working at peak load, the crisis gave the sharpest edge to educational planning and organisation in the sphere of technical training. The Wood-Abbot Report of 1938 had provided a thought-provoking basis for its reorganisation, while the scheme of technical training by Sir John Sargent presented a realistic approach in terms of war needs and requirements. The polytechnic idea captured the imagination of the educational planner, but as chance would have it, most of the polytechnics and industrial plants were left over in India. The Government has set up a Council for Technical Education which is following earnestly the polytechnic idea. It is proposed to establish two institutions of this kind in East and West Pakistan. Much spadework has been done in connection with the opening of the Karachi Polytechnic. The council has been recently engaged in consolidating and improving the course of studies in the three engineering colleges in Pakistan.

For an underdeveloped country, industrialisation constitutes an essential item of its reconstruction programme, and in these days of rapid developments in the technique of production and organisation, no country can keep abreast with the changing conditions if

it does not visualise the entire industrial process from a dynamic and vitalising viewpoint. For this purpose, there is a move to establish a council of scientific and industrial research which will plan and organise research work on scientific and industrial problems concerning Pakistan, and build laboratories in various branches of science and technology.

Adult Education

Since the partition, the problem of adult literacy, which had been shelved during the war, has emerged out of its dingy corner and has assumed an unprecedented importance. All efforts in this direction have hardly given any sense of achievement as yet; only the conception of adult education work appears to have been considerably enriched and amplified. There is a keener consciousness of the main problems, psychological and pedagogic, which have made all efforts in this direction fruitless and abortive. Far more consideration is being devoted to the economic, social, and religious interests of the adult learner in the planning of fresh campaigns for the liquidation of illiteracy.

The new schemes do not envisage adult education work as the learning of a few skills and symbols; they define it as the literacy of the whole personality. The heart of the adult illiterate has been as unassailable as a rockbound fortress to the assaults of the social worker, but the new plan proposes to make a determined attack and open out windows and eyelets, letting in thereby a world of rich and variegated interests—religious, industrial, cultural, and social. The adult centre will no longer be a battered hutment whose cultural influence hardly proceeds beyond the ring of dirty light thrown by a kerosene lamp; it will be a radiating centre of cultural and social influences for the rural and urban environment. The multi-shift centres functioning at present in the Punjab will be all converted into social service centres providing social amenities like education, library service, reading room, dispensary, and a child-welfare centre.

Youth Work

Youth movements in the country have passed through three phases, political, social, and the most recent phase, the educational. Before the partition, the younger generation passed through a hectic period of political struggle for the achievement of Pakistan followed by a high tide of social service and relief work in the refugee camps. Since then, their magnificent display of enthusiasm seems to have petered out for want of a stimulus worthy of the adventure of youth, and they had to fall back upon the less spectacular but much more constructive programme of self-realisation in the educational and moral sense.

One of the provincial education departments proposes to canalise

this tremendous reservoir of energy by erecting youth hostels in the Murree Hills, with a chain of youth huts throughout the valley for providing opportunities for physical adventure, in the form of camp life and mountaineering. Similar youth hostels will be opened also in places of historical and cultural interest. State efforts in this direction would be welcomed, but the only guarantee of the success of the movement is the self-effort and self-help of the youth themselves.

This brief survey of educational development in Pakistan will hardly bring an overwhelming sense of achievement to the reader. It can provide only an idea of the tremendous possibilities for educational work and the direction in which the tendencies of educational reconstruction and planning are heading. The rather small scale on which educational adventure is proceeding may give occasion for certain misgivings, but the attempt should not be judged by its achievement, as it would be premature to expect an educational harvest at such an early stage. The efforts should be evaluated by the potentialities of future development which it holds in promise.

In fact, the work of educational reconstruction is so tremendous and the obstacles in its way so gigantic, that the progress would be slow-paced in the beginning. But the experiment deserves to be studied with sympathy and understanding because in a world resounding with the echoes of battling ideologies, it is an attempt to plan out the educational system on a way of life which claims to be a reconciliation of the best elements.

Geographically it is being conducted at a strategic point in the international theatre, a region which has been the meeting-ground, rather the melting-pot, of ideologies in the past and even to-day is full of tremendous possibilities, both moral and political.

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CHAPTER THREE

CEYLON[1]

The Religious Background

It would be fitting to commence this article with some account of the religious background, for society in Ceylon still remains religious and every branch of life is tinged with the religious colour. Though the religious tree does not always put forth beautiful blossom nor always bear edible fruit, there can be no denying the fact that our art and literature, our philosophical and ethical systems, our customs and folkways, run deep religious roots.

Four great religions have their followers distributed among the seven million population of Ceylon, in the following percentage proportions:

Buddhists, 64·5; Hindus, 19·8; Christians, 9·1; Muslims, 6·6

The so-called races of Ceylon, which are cultural rather than ethnic groups, bear some relationship to distribution of population by religion:

Sinhalese, 69·4; Tamils, 22·7; Moors, 6·1; Burghers, 0·6

Generally speaking, all Buddhists are Sinhalese and all Hindus are Tamils, the Christians being Sinhalese, Tamil, or Burgher—numerically in that order. The mother tongue of Tamils and most Moors is Tamil, that of the Sinhalese is the Sinhalese language.

Buddhism and Hinduism, the two main religious traditions that

[1] There has been little educational research in Ceylon, particularly into the sociological aspects of education. The absence of any previous work in this field made the task of the present writer difficult. He is, however, indebted to over fifty men and women, representing a good cross-section of enlightened opinion, who answered his questionnaire on the subject and suggested many helpful ideas. The section on the Agencies of Education is almost entirely based on these answers, and in fact may be regarded as a conspectus of views held. Those who sent replies to the questionnaire represented a very varied experience covering, among other things, school and university life, the churches, social work, the probation service, medical and health work, business, government administration, and the Ceylon Parliament. Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam were all well represented; there were also a few agnostics. Considering this variety of outlook, it is significant that there was a large measure of agreement in the diagnosis of the situation and in the remedial measures urged.

have supplied the pattern of life over many centuries, are the two great streams flowing from the great Indic civilisation. Much of what is distinctive in the culture of the island even to-day is to be traced to the influence (an indirect but still potent influence) of these two interdependent traditions. Their contribution to an exalted view of life includes ideals such as an unconquerable belief, even among the unlettered peasantry, in the supremacy of the spiritual over the material; the ready acceptance of the principle of non-violence based on the idea of the unity of all life; and a spontaneous attitude of toleration towards all religions on the principle that they all strive towards the same spiritual goal. These and other values have been cherished from early times and transmitted largely through oral tradition, the main vehicles being the home and the temple.

At the same time there exists under the guise of these religions much that is really a blot on any society: caste, with its attendant idea of untouchability, is perhaps the darkest of these stains, but there is also a large body of superstition which passes under the name of religion. To say that much degeneracy has crept into these religions is also to say that these religions have lost much of their early vigour. The Portuguese and Dutch occupation of the maritime districts of Ceylon during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries had something to do with the weakening of Buddhist and Hindu influence, but the very success of the foreigner was itself primarily due to internal decadence.

Long before this, during the mediaeval centuries, Islam had arrived in the island as the faith of South Indian and Arab traders. It is remarkable how this religion, which never enjoyed any political power here, has continued to exercise comparatively greater influence over its adherents than the earlier religions over their adherents. Remarkable, too, how the Hindu caste system, which has made inroads into both Buddhist and Christian society, has failed to undermine the essential egalitarian nature of Islamic society. But Islam's strength has also been its weakness; it has been a closed society, powerful within its own frontiers, but with little ideological influence without. A more serious weakness of Islam has been its failure to take advantage of modern progressive education, especially for women; the community pays the penalty by remaining backward in many respects.

There is evidence that there was a colony of Christians in the then capital of the island, Anuradhapura, as early as the sixth century, but the present Christian population dates from the sixteenth and subsequent centuries. The conversions effected by preaching as well as by indirect political pressure during the time of the Portuguese and the Dutch led to the growth of a large Christian community, but conditions of religious neutrality introduced by the British early in the nineteenth century had the result that a

number of these Christians reverted to their ancestral religion. On the other hand, the arrival of missionary evangelists and educators in that century brought in fresh and better converts. Moreover, political preferment continued to exist in more subtle forms, and Christian education enjoyed state patronage. This, coupled with the fact that the Christian community was ably served by a succession of distinguished missionary educators, explains at least in part why the Christians still enjoy a position of vantage in the field of education. The percentage proportion of students by religion at the University of Ceylon, compared with the distribution of the total population by religion, speaks for itself:

Buddhist students, 43; Hindus, 22; Christians, 31; Muslims, 2·5

The above reasons, plus the fact that the Protestant Christians have always been a middle-class community, explains why out of the 31 per cent. Christians at the university, nearly three-fifths are Protestants, though in the population the Protestants are less than one-fifth of the total number of Christians.

Like Islam, the Christian religion exercises a great influence over its adherents, and some of its ideals have reached far beyond the boundaries of the Christian community. Through their churches and schools and a multitude of other organisations the Christians have provided for their young, and even for the young of non-Christians, a training which no other religious community has so far been able to provide. Some weakening of the force of religion in our own time notwithstanding, the Christian religion continues to have a hold on its votaries. Particularly striking is the fact that of the urban working class, who are perhaps the least religious-minded of the entire population, the Roman Catholics certainly bow in some measure to the discipline of their church.

The Christian schools are all state aided. The fact of the matter is that the state has very generously assisted all denominational schools, but the Christian institutions, with their superior resources in leadership and organisation, have been able to make the most of this help. The criticism can, however, be justly made that there has been a tendency for religious bodies to be more interested in the control of schools than in education, religious or secular; and rivalries connected with the control of schools have duplicated schools in many areas, lowered their efficiency and generally arrested educational reform. Though the present government is very favourably disposed towards denominational schools, there are bitter critics of this policy both within and without the government party, and the advantageous position of Christian schools may not continue for all time. It is, however, a safe prediction to make that no discriminatory policy or anti-religious outlook is likely so long as the mass of the population retain their characteristic belief in religion and in religious toleration.

We have already noted that internal weakness no less than external pressure led to the decline of Buddhist and Hindu influence in the modern period. There was, however, a Buddhist revival in the eighteenth century, and a Buddhist and Hindu revival again during the last quarter of the last century. Both these are mass religions, and for a new movement to reach down to the ordinary people and energise them spiritually there needs to be a powerful religious awakening. That has yet to take place. In our own time the cause of religious education in schools has won large Buddhist and Hindu support. Contributory factors are perhaps the impact of World War II, the Gandhian movement in India, the political emancipation of the country as well as denominational rivalries in the educational field, and the desire to catch up with the progress made by Christianity in the schools. Two Education Ordinances may be quoted to indicate the significant change of attitude. The main Education Ordinance of 1939 disapproved in general of religious instruction in any government school and did not, in its conscience clause, object in an assisted school to instruction in a religion other than that of the parent provided the parent consented to such instruction:

> No instruction in religious subjects shall be given at any Government school as part of the ordinary course of studies at the school. (Ord. 1939, Sec. 29 (i).)
>
> No child belonging to a religious denomination other than that to which the proprietor or manager of an Assisted school belongs shall be permitted to attend any Sunday school or any place of religious worship or to attend any religious observance or any instruction in religious subjects in the school or elsewhere unless the parent of the child has expressly stated in writing his consent that his child shall attend such place of religious worship or receive instruction in religious subjects in the school. (Sec. 30 (3).)

The Education (Amendment) Ordinance of 1947 reveals a completely changed attitude on both these points:

> Subject as hereinafter provided, instruction in the religion of the parent of each pupil in a Government school shall be given to that pupil, as part of his course of studies in the school, by a person who is an adherent of that religion and who has been approved by the Director. (Ord. 1947, Sec. 29 (i).)
>
> The principal or any person for the time being in charge of a Government school or an Assisted school shall not require or permit a pupil of the school to attend, in the school or in any hostel of the school or in any chapel or place of worship situated within the premises of the school, any instruction in, or any worship or observance connected with a religion which is not the religion of the parent of the pupil. (Sec. 29 (2).)

Following the new Ordinance, the Education Department has published syllabuses in Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam for the School Certificate, and specially written textbooks in Buddhism and Hinduism have appeared. These are happy signs,

but it is still premature to say that one notices any deep stirring of the national religious conscience.

The Agencies of Education

We shall now proceed to study the various factors that contribute to the formation of character and attitudes. Here we are faced with a complex task. The people of Ceylon are of widely different social, cultural, and religious groups, and any attempt to seek the determinants of behaviour, whether in moral or in other terms, is faced with difficulties arising from the lack of demographic homogeneity. It will be helpful, however, to classify the population into three broad social classes, the English-educated middle class, the urban working class, and the rural peasantry. We make also a distinction in each class between children (say, under 14) and young people.

First of all, then, what is the order in which various agencies are effective in moulding the standards and ideals of children? There is practically unanimous agreement among those who have sent replies to the questionnaire that the moral pattern of children of all social classes is primarily fashioned by the home, and several indicate that the family itself is cast in the traditional mould and transmits values we have referred to as connected with religion. The neighbourhood group is regarded as the next most potent influence upon all children. When we come to rank the third most effective influence, significantly different influences are indicated for the different groups. The educative processes of school life are, in Ceylon, almost entirely confined to the children of the middle class. In children of working-class parents in the towns, the third factor which shapes their outlook is parental occupation. In the rural areas, however, the standards of peasant children are still influenced by the caste setting, though caste is no longer the sole determinant of social obligation.

When we repeat our question with respect to young people, the answers indicate some important differences. The family still remains the most powerful determinant of ideals for middle-class youth and peasant youth, though its influence among the middle-class youth is slowly declining. What, however, is of greater significance is that family influence sinks to third place for young working-class people in towns; their attitudes are determined, firstly, by their own occupational set-up and, secondly, by the group with whom they work. For farmers' sons the neighbourhood group and caste remain effective forces next only to the family. For young middle-class people the school becomes the main character-training institution immediately after the family; social tradition is the third factor. The school, be it noted, plays little part in shaping either the ideals or the destinies of urban or rural workers, whether children or young people.

On the whole, then, the picture is still that of an antiquated agricultural society with primary groups like the family and the neighbourhood conditioning the rising generation. Westerners can have little conception of what the family means in the East. It is not merely the parents, brothers and sisters; it is the joint family, quite a crowd, though all these persons do not occupy the same household in Ceylon as they do in India. The important point to note is that, with child-rearing techniques following ancient patterns, the child, brought up in absolute obedience to the parent and absolute dependence on the family, becomes a submissive adult with little initiative and self-reliance. There is, indeed, much to be said for preserving the family as a unit of civilisation and a vehicle for the transmission of culture. But unless that culture is persistently subjected to the criticism of an enlightened education, there is a danger that in the process much lumber from the past will be passed on to the new generation. This has in fact taken place, for how else are we to explain the spectacle of young men with honours degrees to their credit choosing their brides with the aid of parents and horoscopes and solemnising their marriages at so-called auspicious hours? Is it not due to the persistence of the practices of a by-gone era that a young man's job, like his bride, is settled for him by parental aspiration and parental effort rather than by his own desires and deserts? The rise of the social-welfare state has not diminished the role of the family; even our new democracy tends to revert to the ancient pattern of a paternal state. But there are pointers that a new and higher individual ideal has its appeal to educated young people, and we may hope that that ideal will increasingly gain ground.

It will be noted that religion as a direct influence is no longer held to be effective with any social group, and that school plays some part only in the case of the privileged middle-class minority. Other formal agencies of education like the library, books, and organised clubs affect a still smaller number. Indirect agencies like the Press, the radio, and the cinema have as yet very limited significance. Occupation has its influence and in the villages may have some humanising cultural elements, but urban labour is hardly organised to secure any but utilitarian economic ends.

The Failure of Education

We must next inquire why school education, in spite of its long history, has failed to become an effective influence in shaping the people's attitudes and standards. For there has always been a tradition of popular education in Ceylon, especially in connection with the Buddhist *pansalas*. During the Portuguese occupation of the maritime areas there was some educational activity on the part of Jesuits and Franciscans. The Dutch in their time went farther and endeavoured to make education compulsory in these districts.

After the establishment of British rule there was considerable missionary activity, and compulsory education from 6 to 14 was legislatively planned some forty-four years ago. It is therefore all the more surprising that there is not yet full educational provision; that not more than half the pupils of primary school age ever complete their primary education; and that not more than half of those who complete their primary education stay on in school till reaching the compulsory age of 14. The criticism gains force when it is revealed that, in a country with so-called compulsory education, the national literacy figure is no higher than 57·8 per cent., and that even after all the emphasis on English education ever since 1833, English literacy is just 6·3 per cent.[2]

The average primary school, unplanned, ill-equipped, poorly staffed, aiming at little beyond literacy, is not calculated to give children the good education which is their birthright. Even permanent literacy is not always ensured to those who leave the primary school, owing to the phenomenal wastage in attendance during that stage. The verbal, bookish, and academic type of teaching in the early years makes whatever education is imparted very unreal and unrelated to experience. It will therefore be too much to speak of this kind of education as implanting character or inculcating ideals.

Nor can we regard with more enthusiasm the schools at the post-primary level. We should grant that some of the English secondary schools are the best schools in the country, well-staffed, drawing their pupils from the higher social groups, and educating them for a relatively long period. These schools have some definite character about them, and they succeed in giving their pupils something of value for life beyond mere instruction. However, the European culture on which their education is based remains an incongruous, exotic thing, and the products of this education remain 'marginal men' little influenced by and little influencing the way of life of the mass of their fellow countrymen. But in most of the institutions (they all call themselves 'colleges'), where no acculturation is intended, the system becomes utterly irrelevant and entirely farcical, lacking any spiritual or social purpose and offering little to meet the intellectual and moral needs of adolescence or youth. It is in truth a utilitarian, examination-dominated, employment-centred education. Judged even by its own examination standards the system must be pronounced a failure: witness the fact that the average age of School Certificate candidates is well over the normal age elsewhere and that, apart from the large number of wayside casualties every school year, 70

[2] The literacy figures as well as those for the distribution of population by race and religion are taken from the *Census of Ceylon, 1946*. It should be noted that literacy is counted in Ceylon from the unusually early age of five; presumably children attending school are reckoned literate.

per cent. to 75 per cent. of the candidates presented fail to get through the School Certificate examination.

Perhaps a better test would be to find the answers to two questions: What kind of literature do pupils read at school? What kind of books do young people read after leaving school? To answer the second question first: The majority of so-called educated people do not read any books at all. In part, it may be they cannot afford to buy them; in part, that there is lack of library facilities; we shall come to the main reason in a moment. To the first question, the answer is not much more heartening. Apart from school textbooks the fare, in village schools, consists of religious stories and fables. In the town secondary schools, comic magazines, thrillers, and sporting newspapers make up the reading-matter of most pupils. If books have an ethical, aesthetic, and intellectual value, here is a serious limitation. In fine, our two questions are really two sides of the same problem: What you read at school will determine whether you form the reading habit for good.

The ultimate test of any education should be in the character and ideals of the men and women who are its products, and in the kind of society of which they are members. Judged by this test, we shall presently find that our education has signally failed to build up a community that really is a community.

A Disintegrated Society

With little national effort in that direction, Ceylon found herself an independent Dominion on February 4th, 1948, just as, with little democratic conviction, she had accepted universal suffrage in 1931. The truth is that, in spite of external coats of paint, we are as yet neither a nation in the social and psychological senses in which the term is understood in the West, nor a real democracy. It is not even a case of 'two nations', but rather of a people with elements of a common culture, no doubt, but nevertheless fragmented socially into several segments and pockets and held together by a political unity and rule of law imposed from above. When national leaders speak of equal rights for all communities they unwittingly reveal that we are no nation.

The fact of the matter is that before political unity was imposed by the British administration early in the nineteenth century there was no conception of nationhood or of patriotism. The community of caste and race and creed constituted the real fatherland. To the extent that there was any territorial tie, it was loyalty to the self-governing village, which itself was a composite community made up of a number of interdependent occupational groups. We were thus a no-nation when the onrush of Western nations reached our shores; but there was a stable socio-economic organisation and a society with definite values. There were understood relations

between groups, and individuals had rights and obligations which were clear and duly discharged. There was deep social cohesion and social conformity and there were universally accepted standards of conduct. These things bound men together and made life peaceful.

Times, however, have now changed and we are called upon, like many other new nations of south-east Asia, to fit into the pattern of a modern nation-state. Neither the social outlook of the past nor the habit of irresponsible obedience we practised when we were a subject people will quite fit us for the responsibilities of a secular democratic nation-state. If, as has been said, " the social experience of belonging to a community and to a place is the fundament of the whole structure of social character ", here in our present set-up, where community is not co-extensive with country, there is deep-seated conflict. The tripartite system of education by which a section of the nation is English-educated, another section is Sinhalese-educated, and yet another Tamil-educated, is a further disintegrating force. Nor has democracy meant either the recognition of the worth of the individual or a genuine sense of community. In fact, far from becoming a democratic nation, we have moved from the harmony of an antiquated way of life to a new order marked by unending contradictions.

We may go farther and see different ideals prevailing among different classes of the nation. The rural peasantry, who owe their ideals more to oral tradition than to school education, have struck many observers as possessing some virtues of a high order: " Honesty, humility, integrity; respect for elders and teachers, family honour; . respect for one another's right, self-help, helpfulness; . . quietness of their ways of life." " In all that stems from simplicity and sobriety of living," they have higher standards than the folk in town, declares a leading American educator in Ceylon.

Perhaps at the other end of the scale are the urban workers. Their production efficiency is rather low and their ethical standards tend to be coarse. Increasingly conscious of the fact that they are under-privileged, they take revenge on society in various ways. Their sons supply the ' gangs ' in the city, while young recruits to these ' gangs ' come also from the class of those who, intolerant of parental rule, abscond from the rural home; the mounting number of cases of juvenile delinquency, petty thefts, sex offences, and hooliganism, are connected with these ' gangs '. On the whole, it is a grave situation, socially and even politically, and something must be done for the moral and material rehabilitation of this disinherited section of our countrymen.

The middle class, the product of English education and the economic opportunities resulting from British occupation, have been the most-favoured section of the nation. The country has

owed much to their leadership; at the same time, the unnatural conditions under which a native intelligentsia subserves the purposes of foreign rule have tended to undermine character, while the recent rapid expansion in the numbers of the middle class has been accompanied by a lowering of standards. Perhaps, the world over, there has been deterioration of standards after the war, but the special reasons suggested explain why there is marked absence of patriotism, of democratic conviction, and of social conscience. They explain why there is so much of careerism and family selfishness, of an unwillingness to put duty first, and often of a lamentable lack of integrity and moral courage. The desire to make 'easy money' and to live on the 'pleasure principle' started with the middle class, but is now widespread in all towns. In terms of child-rearing this means indulgence—with all its consequences in self-centredness and the like.

This, then, is a matter of grave concern—that freedom should find us wanting in those virtues that are necessary for the successful use of freedom.

The Task of Education

The country needs nothing short of a social and spiritual revolution, and to effect that revolution is the supreme task of education. Examples may be cited from elsewhere in the world to show the possibilities of education as a planned environment that may by its persistent pressure gradually alter the intellectual and spiritual orientation of an entire people. But we could demonstrate our proposition from the limited success that has attended certain educational efforts in this country. We have earlier referred to the school as a formative agency so far as the middle class are concerned, and we have pointed out how the Christian community have had certain advantages bestowed on them by education. We may also cite the Jaffna Peninsula as the example of success which has been achieved by fairly intensive educational activity over a period. This northern peninsula, locally spoken of as the Scotland of Ceylon, has had a long lead over the rest of the island in the matter of educational provision, and to this cause, at least in part, must be attributed the fact that the peninsula is noted not only for habits of sober, orderly, and frugal living, but also for widespread interest in education and in other activities like the co-operative movement and rural development, for all of which education is a necessary basic foundation.

Education is therefore the silver lining to the dark cloud that threatens the future. At the same time no greater mistake can be made than the easy assumption that all will be made well by an expansion of educational facilities. Indeed, a great deal of the disorder in society in Ceylon is due not so much to the absence of education as to the absence of guiding values in the education

actually imparted. If public servants have tended to look upon their jobs in terms of emoluments and promotions rather than in terms of duty and patriotic service, if employees in state enterprises have been concerned with their profit and not with the success of the undertakings or with the safety of national property, if professional men trained largely at public expense could regard their great calling as just a means of making money, if citizens could buy and sell votes and traders hold society to ransom when goods are scarce and, alas, if national leaders could lack the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong and the will to lead the nation towards what is good, the situation is nothing less than a moral crisis, and education must take much of the blame for it. It has been primarily a training for careers in a colonial social pattern, not an education for spiritual or social living; at its best it has taught men to play the game according to rules, at its worst it has made them asocial, falling over each other in a scramble for jobs, money, and position. The very process by which the schools creamed off the countryside to introduce the youth to careers and pleasures in the towns destroyed the virtues which fit men for social living either in town or in country.

A revolution in the content and purpose of education is therefore necessary if our education is to be the means of creating a new society and its élite. Its basis must be work and the community; its values the supremacy of the spirit and the reality of the moral law.

This granted, we should interpret education in the widest sense, as much more than the provision of schooling for all. Libraries and playgrounds and community centres are also necessary to take education beyond the school and beyond the school age.

For the creation of an intellectual élite, that will provide the moral leadership so needed at this hour, some priority should be given to the development of secondary education under conditions which will facilitate character training. The residential school, the house system, school prefects, the school council, and the school assembly are particularly calculated to enable young people to break away from an antiquated social outlook and to form desirable new attitudes. There is practical unanimity of opinion that ethical and religious training should be given more place in our schools; it is urged by some that it is not the doctrinal aspect of religion but its ethical content, the lives of great men, and corporate worship that should get the emphasis. Moral teaching at school, and philosophy, in its ethical aspects, at the university, should do much to give clearer standards to the young. Nor should we forget the meaning it will have for young people if social-service groups function on the right lines at school and university.

If the outlook of our education has to change from being an individual-centred education to a community-centred education,

much will depend on the kind of men who become educators. A silent social and moral revolution requires as educators something more than mere teachers; they should be social workers and social reformers with the necessary vision, training, and ardour for the job. There is no room for misplaced economy which brings in cheap, untrained teachers or which cheapens their training.

The task, however, is bigger than the task within the school. We have boldly to undertake the task of transforming the outlook of a nation and along with it the character of the schools. Nothing less than the vision and the heroism that once built a great civilisation on the banks of the Mahaweli Ganga and the Malwatte Oya is now needed to rebuild a new Lanka on the ashes of four and a half decadent centuries.

K. NESIAH.

CHAPTER FOUR

ARAB COUNTRIES

I

General Principles

MORAL education in Arab schools is based both on religious and on secular moral and civic instruction. The essential reason for this combination is easy to understand. Arabs are deeply religious; whether Moslem or Christian, they are strongly attached to their faith. That explains why religious instruction is compulsory in all Arab schools. It is quite natural to use this instruction to inspire the pupils with love for goodness and to impress a strong moral discipline.

However, the lessons on religion do not unite all the pupils; Moslems and Christians are instructed separately. Consequently the inspiration of these lessons is not sufficient to evoke in the pupils civic and moral sentiments which should unite them. It is necessary to add moral and civic instruction addressed to all pupils of all denominations. This special instruction must be independent of all religious faiths and be based on a rational study of human dignity and the needs of social life. The result should be a moral education neither exclusively denominational nor entirely secular; a moral education simultaneously derived from both sources—this is the general principle accepted by the educationists of Arab countries.

Religious Problem

It is evident, therefore, that in the pedagogics of the Arab world a religious problem is present which should be neither disregarded nor exaggerated. To understand the importance of this problem correctly one should know the exact distribution of religious faiths in the Arab countries. It is well known that the great majority of Arabs are Moslem. But there are also large numbers of Christian Arabs; in Egypt 1,350,000; in Lebanon 570,000; in Syria 440,000; and in Irak 150,000. It should be emphasised that all these Christians are Arabs for the same reasons and in the same degree as the Moslems. Arabic is their mother tongue: they pray in Arabic, and they read the Bible in the Arabic translation. They share the same culture with the Moslems, and differ only in their religious beliefs. This is a fact of fundamental importance

which should be borne in mind in studying the religious problem in the Arab world.

The Wrong Point of View

It is a common error in Europe and America to interpret the relations between the Moslems and the Christians in the Arab countries on the analogy of the historical situation in the old Ottoman Empire. It leads to serious misconceptions. In the old Turkish Empire the religious difference was complicated and strengthened by other differences—linguistic, cultural, historical, and political. All the Turks were Moslems and all the Christians were non-Turks. They were Greeks, Armenians, Bulgars, Serbs, etc., and each group had its national language, its national history, and original culture. In these circumstances religious conflicts developed into acute cleavages. One could say that, in fact, these conflicts concealed much deeper and more serious differences beneath their surface. In the Arab countries, on the contrary, the religious division is not accompanied by any linguistic, cultural, or historical differentiation. It is a difference which does not go beyond the limits of dogmas and beliefs and which, in consequence, does not obstruct the formation of a strong national unity. As a result, the leaders of Arab nationalism were able to say in the past as they say at present: "We are Arabs before we are Moslems or Christians." The new generation could therefore repeat the famous saying: "Religion is for God, our country for all of us."

The Survivals of the Ottoman Regime

Certainly the peculiar religious situation of the Ottoman Empire influenced the Arab countries, which were part of it. However, this influence, having no deep roots, could not for long survive the end of the Ottoman Empire, and could not continue in the independent Arab countries. Thus the Arab educationists had not to struggle with insurmountable obstacles to eliminate this influence. They could teach all Arab children—Moslem and Christian—civic and patriotic attitudes which unite them all in love of an ideal of Arab nationalism.

Resolutions of the Cultural Congress

One of the resolutions of the Congress of Arab Culture held in Lebanon in 1947 is very explicit and significant in this respect. One of the commissions of the Congress was charged to study in detail the questions of civic and patriotic instruction. The commission submitted proposals which resulted in a series of resolutions adopted by the Congress, concerning the principles and methods of such instruction. One of the resolutions stated: "It is necessary to show quite clearly in all schools of all Arab

countries that Arab culture (*L'Arabisme*) was never restricted either in the past or at present to one particular community or religion. It is necessary, too, to show that there always existed a strong co-operation between all Arab citizens, both in the past and during the modern Arab renaissance, in spite of the diversity of religious creeds. Denominational dissensions took place among the Arabs only during the periods of foreign domination. It is necessary to strive to develop the spirit of solidarity and co-operation among different communities by making them conscious of their brotherhood, and to convince them that they must place national goals and interests above all denominational considerations." It should be noted that the commission which initiated this resolution elected as president a Christian professor, and included among its members many Christians of Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant Churches. It also included a priest, who took part in the discussions in his clerical robes amidst a great number of members who wore turbans.

II

Lessons on Religion

The programmes of primary and secondary schools devote special hours to religious instruction, and define the purpose of this instruction as the 'development of spiritual and moral life.'

The following table gives the number of hours per week assigned to religious instruction in the official programmes of the first nine years of the school curriculum:

	First	*Second*	*Third*	*Fourth*	*Fifth*	*Sixth*	*Seventh*	*Eighth*	*Ninth*
Egypt	2	2	4	4	3	3	2	2	1
Irak	4	4	3	3	2	2	1	1	1
Syria .	4	4	4	3	3	1	1	1	1
Jordan	4	5	5	4	4	4	3	0	0
Lebanon .	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

(The first nine years include also one part of secondary education.)

Religion Taught

The religion taught in the state schools is the religion of the majority of the pupils, in the denominational schools founded by Missions or Associations the religion of the community in charge of the school. Children of parents not belonging to the religion taught at school are exempted.

However, the majority of schools maintained by Foreign Missions do not conform to this rule, and compel all their pupils to attend religious instruction irrespective of the denomination of their parents.

Egypt prohibited such practice by the law on the organisation of private schools enacted in 1948. Article 12 of this law states: "A private school is not permitted to impart religious instruction

to its pupils of other denominations, even if the parents give their consent."

Religion and Examinations

The subject of religious instruction forms part of the internal examinations necessary for promotion of pupils to the next form. However, religious instruction is excluded from the external examinations instituted by the Ministry of Education for certificates of primary schools or *baccalaureats*.

Jordan is an exception to this general rule. All Moslem candidates, either for the certificate or for the *baccalaureat*, have to pass a special examination in religious instruction. Christian candidates are exempted from this examination.

Programmes and Syllabuses

(As the subject of religious instruction for Christians is well known, we give only a general idea of instruction for the Moslems.)

The official programmes of Moslem religious instruction include various matters which could be classified as follows:

(*a*) The Koran—reading and explanation with memorising and reciting of one part.

(*b*) Prayers and rites of Islam.

(*c*) The *Hadith*—sayings and aphorisms of the Prophet and his advice and recommendations.

(*d*) Short biographies of famous Moslems, who gave the example of a virtuous life and of a spirit of sacrifice.

(*e*) Morality of Islam.

It is clear that the last part is purely moral instruction. In fact, however, moral instruction in the religious syllabus plays a much larger part. The official directives for religious instruction expressly recommend the predominance of moral examples in the choice of subject-matter. For instance, they specifically recommend the choice of those aphorisms of the Prophet for explanation and recitation which have the greatest moral implication. In the same way, those tales should be selected from the lives of famous Moslems which give living examples of high moral virtues, and thus inspire in the pupils the spirit of devotion, duty, and sacrifice.

Some Examples

We give here the translation of some *Hadiths* (sayings of the Prophet) which are part of the moral instruction given. They are taken from a textbook for secondary schools:

> My essential mission [Mahomet's] is to develop and to complete moral virtues and good customs.
>
> Work for this world as if you were to live eternally, and work for the next world as if you were to die to-morrow.
>
> Nobody is truly religious who does not love his neighbour as he loves himself.

God does not help those who do not help their neighbours.

Speak the truth even if it harms you.

The reflection and contemplation of an hour are worth more than the prayers and devotions of sixty years.

A part of the property of each Moslem belongs to the poor and disinherited.

Everything has its key; the key to Paradise is almsgiving to the poor and disinherited.

Seek for knowledge, even if it is in China.

The search for knowledge begins with the cradle and ends with the grave.

The acquisition of knowledge is a sacred duty of all Moslems, men and women.

How great is the number of people who do not gain anything from fasting, except hunger and thirst.

The last aphorism is explained in the following way: " The true end of fasting imposed by Islam does not consist of the abstention from eating and drinking. It is the strengthening of the spiritual life and the abstention from evil thoughts and deeds. People who do not act in this way do not fulfil their religious duties and will not receive the divine grace, in spite of the hunger and thirst suffered during their fasts."

There are many other *Hadiths* which explain the same principle, and which say that " good deeds are worth more than prayers and devotions."

We give here the story of a conversation with the Prophet which clarifies this principle. This tale is one which is included in the detailed programme of religious instruction in Egypt:

One day some people went to the Prophet and said to him, " That man is dedicated to his devotions: he fasts the whole day and prays the whole night." And the Prophet asked them, " And who supplies him with his needs during this time?" And they answered this question loudly: " We do." The Prophet then said to them: " Well, you are worth more than he."

III

Civic and Moral Lessons

The programmes of primary and secondary schools usually allot several hours to moral and civic instruction, independently of the lessons on religion.

The following table gives the number of hours per week allotted to this instruction in the official time-tables during the first nine years of school life:

	First	*Second*	*Third*	*Fourth*	*Fifth*	*Sixth*	*Seventh*	*Eighth*	*Ninth*
Egypt	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—
Irak	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	2	1
Syria	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	3
Lebanon .	1·5	1	1	1	1	1·5	1·5	2	2
Jordan	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—

It should be noted that the above number of hours does not represent the total time devoted to civic and moral instruction. It represents only the direct and systematic part of the instruction. Civic and moral education includes also 'indirect and occasional instruction,' which takes more time and is more important.

The Importance of Moral and Civic Education

The pedagogical directives which accompany the official programmes recommend especially the use of every opportunity for giving moral instruction to the pupils, in addition to civics and patriotism, in order to develop and evoke these sentiments in their souls during their school life and also in special hours consigned to this instruction. The directives also recommend that lessons in recitation, conversation, composition, singing, history, and geography should contribute, each in its own way, to this important part of education. The various free activities in or out of school should also contribute to this subject.

Study of Social Relations

The plan of studies for primary schools in Syria allots four hours per week in each of the first three years of the school curriculum to the study of the 'physical and social environment.'

The study of social environment forms a part of civic and moral education, and prepares the ground for systematic lessons during the following years. The study of social relations forms a part of the secondary education syllabuses in most of the Arab countries.

Recommendations of the Congress of Arab Culture

Without giving further details of moral instruction in the different Arab countries, I would say that civic and patriotic training engages the attention of many Arab educationists; in consequence, 'the methods and the means of this education' formed the most important part of the deliberations of the First Congress of Arab Culture.

I give here, as an appendix, a summary of the resolutions and recommendations of the Congress on this subject.

Resolutions of the Congress

(1) The Congress considers that the aim of civic education should be to endeavour to instil the national spirit in young people, and to evoke in them a social conscience. It must make manifest the ties which unite them to their fatherland, and make young people accept their public obligations. Young people should train themselves to fulfil these obligations by subordinating their private interests to those of the fatherland. 'National spirit' means the fulfilment of duties to their particular country as well as to the whole group of Arab countries.

(2) The Congress suggests giving the title of 'Civic instruction' to this subject in the primary schools, and 'Social and civic studies' in secondary schools.

(3) The Congress accepted the following general principles:

(*a*) To make evident the complete geographical continuity of Arab countries in the continents of Asia and Africa.

(*b*) To draw special attention to the fact that these countries were the cradle of the most ancient civilisation in the world, and that they have rendered invaluable service to humanity as a whole.

(*c*) To bring forward the historical associations of these countries between themselves. In ancient times they were intimately connected. Consequently, during a long period, they formed a political union within the immense Arab Empire, and in modern times very firm ties continued to bind them together.

(*d*) To demonstrate that the world moves towards consolidation and union, and that the Arab League is a manifestation of this evolution. Consolidation does not mean the destruction of the constitutional individuality of the various parts: on the contrary, it will give these countries plans of action which co-ordinate their efforts in the realisation of common aims.

(*e*) To provide evidence that independence is a natural right of all peoples, and that colonisation is a kind of slavery which should be absolutely stopped.

(*f*) To establish clearly that the true democracy gives the best guarantee for the safeguarding of freedom, of justice, and of equality.

(4) The Congress considers that civic education is a continued action which does not end with the completion of school attendance. It is necessary to follow up with the cultural development of adults who have left the school.

SATI EL HUSSRI.

CHAPTER FIVE

ISLAM AND MODERN CIVILISATION IN EGYPT

What Modern Civilisation Means to Egypt

THE culture of Egypt was considerably revolutionised during the nineteenth century. This cultural change was the result of a sudden and powerful impact of the West on a country which had been isolated for centuries from the current of world civilisation. The modern civilisation asserted itself through the material victory of the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. The change was overwhelming to nearly all phases of Egyptian civilisation to the extent that some contemporary European writers called it " the Egyptian revolution ", while some others called it " the regeneration of Egypt ". The Egyptians themselves conceived their country, in the words of Khedive Ismā'īl, as being " no longer a part of Africa ", but rather " a part of Europe ".

The coming of the French had subjected the old culture to a severe test; but in doing so, it had started the nation unceasingly on the road to change. This change towards modernism took place in two stages. The first stage occupied the first half of the nineteenth century, and it dealt with the material aspect of modern civilisation—that aspect which manifested itself more than anything else to the Egyptians. Muhammad 'Alī was determined that Egypt should be strong enough to protect herself from foreign aggression. Furthermore, he wanted what he considered Egypt's legitimate share of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. The West had manifested its superiority in two directions: the military and the scientific. Thus, his first adjustments revolved largely around building up a strong army and using the new science to equip it. A large army demanded supplies; so the mediaeval guilds and small home industries had to give way to modern factories. The industrial revolution was in full swing in Europe, and it had a counterpart in Egypt. Modern factories for spinning and weaving were rapidly established. A linen industry also flourished, as did modern sugar refineries. Foundries were established for the manufacture and repair of machines and weapons. Machines, tools, spinning equipment, weaving looms, even steam engines could be made or repaired in the country. Since then Egypt has tried to keep pace with the material aspect of European progress. Railway trains were

introduced as early as 1852; and motor-cars as early as 1906—in both cases long before many of the Western countries.

The second stage of modernism in Egypt took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. It dealt with the moral aspects of modern civilisation. The intellectuals, who were the product of the schools of the first stage, started to turn towards another important aspect of modern civilisation. Under the pressure of domestic problems which they attributed to political despotism, they increasingly demanded the establishment of democratic institutions. In 1866, a representative body—the Chamber of Notables—was established to participate on behalf of the people in the affairs of the government. One contemporary observer called it " one of the most noteworthy experiments yet made in any Oriental country."[1] In 1878, the principle of ministerial responsibility was established. The movement had gained such force in these few decades that when Khedive Tawfīq refused to convene the Chamber of Notables in 1882, he precipitated a major revolution. Even though these early democratic interests were suppressed by foreign control, there was continued evidence of the fact that the forces of democracy had unmistakably taken root. They burst forth again in 1923, when Egypt organised as a constitutional monarchy and granted universal suffrage to her people.

Thus, in the case of Egypt and in the light of the facts of its historical development, modern civilisation means two things: (1) Science and technology as a means for the development of natural resources; and (2) democratic institutions as a safeguard against despotism.

The Attitude of the People towards Modernism

It is clear, then, that the modern rebirth of Egypt was not framed wholly in the traditions of her own ancient or mediaeval civilisation, but to a great extent in the matrix of the alien civilisation of the West. It is not in the nature of things that such an old and deeply rooted civilisation should yield or willingly clear the way for the new one. As a matter of fact, it resisted strongly whenever any Western element conflicted with one of its cherished values.

From the beginning, the movement had both supporters and opponents. Paton noted that a certain group of the 'ulamā', "some from superior intelligence, some from good nature, and others from interested cupidity", have played an important role in effecting the change.[2] Shaykh Ḥasan Al-'Aṭṭār, a famous professor of the Azhar and later its rector, and Shaykh Rifā'ah Al-Ṭahṭāwī

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[1] Baron De Malortie, *Egypt: Native Rulers and Foreign Independence* (London, 1882), p. 119.

[2] A. A. Paton, *A History of the Egyptian Revolution* (London, 1870), Vol. II, p. 271.

were conspicuous examples of this trend. On the contrary, some other 'ulamā' opposed anatomy on the religious grounds that Islam respected the dead and forbade mutilation.[3] Hamont reported similar opposition in the schools of agriculture and veterinary medicine.[4] Similarly, the abolition of slavery in Egypt during the nineteenth century was strongly resisted.[5]

The question now to be asked is whether Islam as a religion opposed modern civilisation. This will be discussed in the following sections. Suffice it here to say that nearly all the aspects of modernism were defended and accepted through proving that they were genuine parts of the tradition of Islam.[6] In fact, the conflict was not between Islam and science and democracy, but between these modern aspects of human civilisation and the ignorance and prejudice which had developed during the dark ages of the Muslim people under the Turkish reign.

Islam and Science

The Koran and the *Traditions* of the Prophet have nothing explicit to say about science, by way of either commendation or of condemnation. To be sure, they contain many verses praising knowledge and learning; inquiry and investigation. On the other hand, they also include verses the apparent meanings of which are not in harmony with some of the findings of science. Much therefore depends upon how Muslims in different ages interpret and understand these texts.

Very shortly after the rise of Islam, the Muslim people began to assimilate Greek science and philosophy into their civilisation. They had nearly all the Greek texts translated into Arabic. Sciences, including medicine, were taught in mosques, and every important mosque had its library which contained philosophical and scientific as well as theological works. Missions were sent to every country to copy Greek books. The patronage by Muslim caliphs like Al-Manṣūr and Al-Ma'mūn of scientists and translators is well acknowledged in historical records. Many of these translators were Jews, Christians, and Sabians. This shows that the Muslim people put learning above difference in race, religion, or place of birth. Books written by pagan Greeks and translated by non-Muslim scholars were taught in mosques.

Connected with this were the contributions made by Muslim

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[3] A. B. Clot Bey, *Aperçu Général sur L'Egypte* (Paris, 1840), Vol. II, p. 411. Also Clot Bey, *Compte rendu des Travaux de l'École de Médecine* (Paris, 1833), pp. 138–9.

[4] P. N. Hamont, *L'Égypte sous Méhémet-Aly* (Paris, 1843), Vol. II, p. 125.

[5] Baron De Malortie, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[6] Jules Planat, *Histoire de la Régénération de l'Égypte* (Paris, 1830), p. 153.

scientists in different sciences such as chemistry, botany, physics, mineralogy, mathematics, and astronomy. Muslim scientists such as Al-Rāzī (L. Rhazes +925) and Ibn Sīna (L. Avicenna +1037) were the authorities on medicine in Europe through the end of the seventeenth century.

This exhibits the practical response of Islam to science. This interest found formal expression in the works of eminent Muslim theologians like Al-Ghazzālī in the Middle Ages (*d.* A.D. 1111) and Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh in the modern times (*d.* A.D. 1905). Al-Ghazzālī, for instance, wrote:

> As for mathematics, it includes arithmetic, geometry, and cosmography, and nothing in them touches on religion neither by way of refutation nor verification; they are verifiable sciences that nobody can reject if he really understands them.
>
> Those who think to support Islam by rejecting these sciences, are committing a great crime against religion, for religion does not deal with them, neither by way of refutation nor verification, nor is there anything in these sciences that touches on religion.[7]

About physical or natural sciences he wrote:

> As it is not required by religion to reject medicine, so it is none of its requirements to reject those sciences.[8]

Similarly Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh wrote:

> The Koran mentions in a general way the signs of God in the universe just to raise morals, to remind of the benefits (bestowed on man), and to arouse thinking, but not to state the laws of nature or to impose a certain belief concerning the universe.[9]

In summarising his philosophy he also stated:

> God promised to complete His light. . . . And the world will not come to an end until this promise of God will have been fulfilled through having religion and science go hand in hand, and co-operate together in rectifying both the intellect and the feeling.[10]

In case of any contradiction between the findings of science and the apparent meanings of religious texts, Muslim theologians took a very interesting position. This position is well expressed by Muḥammad Farīd Wajdī as follows:

> Islam, having freed reason from its shackles and given it complete sway, recognised that it (reason) would lead man to tackle theories and

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[7] Al-Ghazzālī, *Almunqidh min Al-Ḍalāl* (*Rescuer From Error, or Confessions*), (Damascus, 1939), pp. 90, 92.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[9] Muhammad 'Abduh, *Al Islām wa Al-Nasrāniyah* (*Islam and Christianity*), (Cairo, 1938), p. 51.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 136–7.

> opinions which would contradict the evident literal meaning of the Book. So, those who were versed in the secrets of this religion took the step of establishing a general rule in their fundamental books. This rule is: "In the case of a conflict between the conclusions of reason and the evident meaning of the Koran or the *Tradition*, the conclusion reached by reason should be given the preference, and a new interpretation should be given to the text.[11]

That this is the official position towards science is illustrated by the prominent place which the natural sciences occupy in the curriculum of the Azhar University, the stronghold of Islamic theology. There is no Egyptian Muslim theologian at present who would condemn the teaching of the theory of evolution; nor would modern medical service be opposed on the grounds that religion has its healing function.

Islam and Democratic Institutions

The basis of modern democratic institutions is the ideal of the consent of the governed. The Islamic political theory was based on this ideal. According to this theory, the state belonged to God. It was God's state in the sense that it did not belong to any monarch or priest.

Thus, nobody was endowed with an absolute right to govern. Not even the family of the Prophet had this right. He left the matter in the hands of the people to elect whom they wanted. The sovereign was to be the one most acceptable according to God's standards of justice. So long as nobody could claim a legal right to sovereignty, it was the ultimate right of the people to choose their ruler. The ruler thus elected had to continue to consult with the people upon the conduct of the affairs.[12]

The ruler had the right to be obeyed but only on condition that he followed the rules of the Sharī'ah (religious law) for the interests of the people. When he failed to satisfy them beyond any possibility of reform or reconciliation, it was considered that the people had the full right to depose him. Without this process of election, consultation, and consent, nobody had the right to exercise authority.

The appeal to the consent of the people is clear in the inaugural address of Abū Bakr:

> I was given authority over you but I confess I am not the best of you. If I do the right thing support me; but if I do not, straighten me out. . Obey me so long as I obey (the laws of) God and His Prophet; the moment I neglect them, then I am no more entitled to procure your obedience.

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[11] Muhammad Farīd Wajdī, *Al Islam Dīn 'Ām Khālid* (Cairo, 1932), p. 59.

[12] *Koran*, 3. 153.

'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb hit the same note when he said:

> If you notice any crookedness in me, straighten me out with the edges of your swords.

'Umar's request was actually practised against U'thmān when he ignored the principles of consultation and equality.

This is the Islamic ideal of government. Needless to say that much of this ideal was negated in practice in the later periods of Islamic history, especially under the Turks. But there is no doubt that this Islamic ideal, which still guides the Egyptian people, contains the basic philosophy of democratic institutions in spite of its lack of forms and procedures.

The Present Status of Science in Egypt

Science is an important factor in the culture of Egypt. The empirical method and knowledge about nature were a primary resource of the ancient Egyptians in their early struggle with nature—that struggle which culminated in transforming the Nile Valley from a wilderness of marshes and wild animals to the most fertile and hospitable spot on earth. Their science was peculiarly the result of observations made through the practical necessities of actual contact with their material environment. Their devices in measuring both space and time exhibit their proficiency in mathematics and astronomy. Their skill in embalming explains the fact that they wrote the oldest existing book on surgery in which they established the fact of the localisation of function in the brain. The way they controlled the Nile and built pyramids and temples proves their skill in mechanics. Historians of science well recognise that the Greek science was based on the findings of the ancient Egyptians. The scientific developments of the early Muslim period mentioned above form another element in the scientific tradition of Egypt.

For more than a century Egypt has once again been making an extensive use of scientific knowledge and procedures. The government is basing its projects and plans on experimental research. Most of the government departments maintain experimental laboratories for research in their respective fields. In the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, we find the Cotton Research Board, the Chemical Section, the Laboratory and Experimental Farm, the Botanical and Plant Breeding Section, Spinning Test Section, Mycological Section, the Entomological Section, the Crop Protection Section, the Silkworm Breeding Section, the Horticultural Section, the Veterinary Pathological Laboratory, Animal Breeding Section, and many others. Similar scientific laboratories exist in all other government departments.

Other agencies of scientific research are the three State Universities at Cairo and Alexandria. Many private agencies carry out

scientific research in different fields. Examples of such agencies are the Institut D'Egypte founded in 1859, the Royal Geographical Society of Egypt founded in 1875, Ophthalmological Society of Egypt founded in 1902, Royal Entomological Society of Egypt founded in 1907, Royal Society of Archaeology in Alexandria, the Egyptian Horticultural Society founded in 1915, the Egyptian Medical Association founded in 1917, La Abela Regna Ligo (The Bee Kingdom League) founded in 1930, and the Fouad I Desert Institute founded in 1948.

Science, moreover, occupies a prominent place in the curricula of Egyptian schools. It was fought in 1827 in the School of Medicine at Abu Za'bal near Cairo by the 'ulamā' or professors of the Azhar. A century later the same group of theologians included it in the curricula of their eminent university to be taught side by side with theology. They cannot see any contradiction between the laws of science and their application in the material world and the laws of the Texts and their application in the spiritual life of the people.

But to say that science plays an essential role in the life of the country is different from saying that it is fully utilised or applied in all possible domains of the life of the nation. To give some examples: science, outside the sphere of agriculture, has not as yet been fully utilised in exploiting the natural resources of the country. In the fields of mineral wealth, the resources of the vast deserts, the agricultural and sea products, the chemical uses of herbs, and in many other areas the use of science has not been fully developed.

However, the most serious shortcoming in the manner in which science is utilised lies in the fact that it is still largely confined to the physical realm. But science is not altogether a body of verifiable and dependable knowledge or a set of appliable laws. Science before anything else is a method of thinking which can be relied upon in handling all kinds of human problems—social and moral as well as physical. The moral side of human problems is of special interest from the point of view of this article. In matters of moral judgments and in public questions such as divorce, polygamy, interest on money, life insurance, banking, and the like, heavy weight is placed in the authority of the past. If science is utilised in this sphere such issues should be settled according to their consequences in the common lives of men in the present social conditions in which they live.

Another aspect of this moral and social implication of science is the unfounded beliefs which occupy the mind of the average citizen. Mediation of saints, the use of visiting shrines of dead Imams, the power of charms, and the practice of fortune-telling, are all examples of such lack of scientific outlook. Such beliefs form a stumbling-block in the growth of the nation. They consti-

tute a conflict in the life of the people of which they are not fully aware. Many people appeal to medicine and to charms at the same time. No doubt the new modes of thinking are gaining ground, but the strength of old beliefs persists and hinders the desirable change.

Another aspect of this unscientific attitude is the fatalistic outlook of the masses. Faith in the providence of God as construed by mediaeval theologians has gradually taken the form of a blind faith in predetermination. Hence, serious consideration of problems, intelligent planning, and the effort to shape one's own career and to work out one's own destiny are not a part of the thoughtways of many people. Ismā'īl Ṣidqī Pasha stated the influence of such an outlook in the important domain of business as follows:

> It often happens that the Egyptian trader, misinterpreting the precepts of the Moslem religion, allows himself to lapse into a fatalism which constitutes the very reverse of the commercial spirit. It is God who dispenses good and evil, he says, and relying on this principle, he scarcely takes the trouble to manage his clients or to attract others. Hence the arrogance, the lack of civility, the stubborn obstinacy which can be noted among a number of our business men.[13]

Needless to say that unless the method of science is applied in all domains of individual and public life as the best means at the disposal of man to attain dependable knowledge and pass well-balanced judgment, we cannot assume that we have made full use of science. This is perfectly in line with the spirit of Islam. It amounts to a return to the methods of *ijtihād*[14] and *ra'y*[15] in social affairs as they were used in the golden age of Islam. For example, when 'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb, the second Caliph, abolished punishment for robbery and theft in the year of famine, he actually followed a kind of scientific morality which took its criterion of right and wrong from the existing situations of actual life.

The Present Status of Democracy in Egypt

Perhaps the most conspicuous trend in the present civilisation of Egypt is the struggle to establish and develop a democratic way of life. The nation is supported in this struggle by strong elements in its culture, both Pharaonic and Islamic. Carl Becker said that

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[13] *Journal du Commerce et de la Marine* (Alexandria), issue of October 4th, 1940.

[14] *Ijtihād* means using intelligence in interpreting the Texts. This is the opposite of *taqlīd*, which means sticking to the interpretation made by the theologians of earlier ages regardless of the changing social circumstances.

[15] *Ra'y*, or personal opinion, meant giving new interpretations to the Texts so as to suit emerging situations in social life, hence maintaining the welfare of society and prosperity of the state rather than applying the letter of the law.

the values on which modern democracy stands are " older and more universal than democracy and do not depend upon it; they have a life of their own apart from any particular social system or type of civilisation." [16] If we follow the view of this eminent American historian and philosopher, we can trace some of the moral values of modern democracy in the civilisation of the ancient Egyptians. Historical records show that the ancient Egyptians were the first who talked about 'justice'. As James Henry Breasted remarks:

> It was . . not only religious belief and social axiom, but also formally announced royal policy, that before the bar of justice the great and the powerful must expect the same treatment and the same verdict accorded to the poor and the friendless.[17]

And whatever the practice of government might have been in some epochs of the ancient history of Egypt, never was the idea of equality among men so emphatically and decisively expressed as it was by the Sun-God of the ancient Egyptians when he said:

> I have made the four winds that every man might breathe thereof like his brother during his time. I have made the great waters that the pauper like the lord might have use of them. I have made every man like his brother.

All the documents of democracy functioned only a long time after they had been issued, but stating the policy was of value in itself. This philosophy was strengthened by the democratic tradition of Islam which, as previously stated, established both in theory and in practice the principle of the consent of the governed.

This tradition was behind the democratic movement in the second half of the nineteenth century. The national difficulties which led to foreign interference were rightfully attributed to the despotic system under which the nation had long lived. Soon the leaders discovered that despotism was alien to the authentic Islamic way of life; and official documents show that a return to the Islamic democratic principles was contemplated. But the Islamic traditions did not contain the forms of democratic institutions, which had to be borrowed from the West. The belief of the Egyptian people in democracy is well expressed by their leaders at the beginning of the battle of democracy, when they wrote:

> The welfare of the social order cannot be secured except by justice and freedom which guarantee for every individual the security of his person and property and the freedom of his thoughts and actions so as to be able to pursue his happiness and maintain his own well-being. The only way to achieve this end is to institute a constitutional government unhampered by despotism and corruption.

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[16] Carl L. Becker, *New Liberties for Old* (New Haven, 1949), p. 149.

[17] James H. Breasted, *Dawn of Conscience* (New York, 1935), p. 252.

The realisation of this ideal needed a long time and rather a tough struggle. To be sure, the struggle is still going on, for democracy has its enemies everywhere. The Egyptian Constitution was promulgated in 1923, Article 23 of which reads that "all powers emanate from the people." The legislative powers lie in the two Chambers of the Egyptian Parliament, to which the Cabinet is responsible.

But these governmental forms are not the whole content of democracy. Democracy is a spirit which should permeate all the activities of the nation. This fact is frequently overlooked at present. To give one example, democracy has an economic side. While it acknowledges differences in wealth, it nevertheless demands that a decent standard of living be provided for every individual. This economic aspect of democracy has not as yet been realised. What interests us here is the fact that whatever defects which might exist in the ways in which modern civilisation operates in present-day Egypt, Islam as a force in the lives of the people is not responsible. Such defects are inherent in the forceful drives of human nature, from which religion itself suffers. Such shortcomings represent a challenge to education in Egypt.

Modernism as a Challenge to Education

As appears from the previous discussion there is a conflict of cultures in Egypt. There are the Islamic culture which claims the right to be preserved, and the modern culture which is supported by the spirit of the age and the needs of modern life. Although there is no contradiction between the basic values of both, yet each has its own characteristics which cannot very easily give way for the interest of the other. The Islamic culture, as it developed through the centuries, leans towards conservatism and drawing its standards from the past; whereas modern culture seeks its standards from the context of human purposes under which the nation lives.

This conflict of cultures has been reflected in education. There are two systems of schools—one old, consisting of the Azhar university which represents the old culture, and the other, modern, consisting of the primary and the secondary schools and the state universities which represent the modern culture. Each of these two systems of schools diffuses a certain kind of attitude which suits the particular type of culture it represents. Hence Egyptian education breeds two types of mentality and two ways of thinking:

> So that in any issue that arises or event that occurs, the graduate of the Azhar conceives it in one sense, while the graduate of the modern schools conceives it in another sense. Thus, the two different graduates agree neither in their thinking nor in their evaluation, nor do they agree in judgment and decision; nor in procedure and action.[18]

[18] Ṭaha Ḥusayn, *Mustaqbal Al-Thaqāfah fī Miṣr* (*The Future of Culture in Egypt*), (Cairo, 1938), p. 64.

Therefore the problem of education reflects the problem of culture. This cultural problem can be defined thus: We have an old civilisation which we want to preserve but without being exactly clear about its merits and its shortcomings. And here we have long been adopting modern civilisation but without expending a real effort to integrate it with the old civilisation. The real cultural problem of Egypt is how to build an indigenous Egyptian civilisation which, regardless of the sources of its different elements, should carry the stamp and characteristics of the country.

This defines very clearly the educational problem of modern Egypt. Education is not an abstract process. Unless it reflects a certain culture, meets its purposes, and solves its problems, it cannot be defined. The goal of an educational system cannot be divorced from the goals of the society it serves. Rather than simply transmitting a garbled *status quo*, the task of education is one of dealing critically and selectively with the life of the people. Its ultimate goals should centre in bringing about desirable changes in the culture.

To live successfully in the modern age, Egypt should foster modern civilisation. Since modern civilisation means, in this particular case, democracy as a way of life and science as a means of controlling the environment, education should draw its aims from both democracy and science. The Islamic civilisation is a helpful asset in taking this direction.

An educational programme for democratic living should aim at building the personality of every individual in a way that will ensure his loyalty to the ideal of democracy and which will strengthen his capacity to participate in a democratic society. Since education is always a process of building up character, it should direct its efforts in a democratic country towards building a resolute personality which relies on intelligence more than on external authority; which looks to the present and the future and not merely to the past; which possesses sufficient facts and knowledge to understand and criticise current issues; which has enough resourcefulness to co-operate with others in working out plans and solutions; and which also possesses the strength of will which enables it to stand for its beliefs and convictions.

Similarly, an educational programme for scientific outlook should cultivate in the young a way of thinking which will enable them to control in a more efficient way their physical and social environment. This part of the programme has a negative as well as a positive aspect. On the negative side, education should free the young generation of Egypt from the grip of the outmoded ways of life and thought. On the positive side, it should build in them a habit of scientific thinking which they can use in both their physical and their social problems. Thus, simultaneously with freeing the young from the authority of routine and pressure

coming from without, the school should help them form another guiding force from within.

When this intelligence becomes a common property in the new generation, and they practise it in connection with their national problems, physical and social, domestic and international, the Egyptian civilisation will take an indigenous modern character. The important thing to remember is that modern civilisation does not depend for its success on the moral support of the traditions of the country but on the positive effort which the nation purposefully expends. This is a major responsibility of education in this modern world.

ABU AL-FUTOUH RADWAN.

CHAPTER SIX

KENYA

THE PROBLEMS OF A PLURAL COMMUNITY

The General Background

THE Sahara Desert and its steady encroachment on the land which bordered it, and the arid desert that lies between Ethiopia and the southern part of Kenya Colony, seem effectively to have shut the native peoples of Africa into a cul-de-sac, and, for the most part, to have insulated them from the influences of outside cultures. As far as Kenya is concerned there are, as elsewhere, minor exceptions. For example, the presence of the Luo as a large tribal group in the Nyanza Province to the west is token of a large Nilotic incursion; Galla and Somali pressure from the north has considerably influenced the disposition of certain of the Bantu-speaking people in the centre and east, though with little apparent effect upon their social structure and general culture; contacts between such tribes as the Kikuyu and Masai, both in war and in peace, had minor consequences to the social patterns of both tribes. The only major impacts in earlier centuries were along the East African coast where Arabs, Indian sailors, and Portuguese each sought to establish themselves. This story has been admirably told in Coupland's *East Africa and its Invaders.* But Vasco da Gama's chapel stands in ruins on the shore at Malindi, and Fort Jesus in Mombasa is used by H.M Commissioner of Prisons as a jail. The only survival of those earlier days which is of significance in the Kenya of to-day is the Swahili culture which emerged from the intimate interrelation of the Arabs and the Bantu-speaking peoples of the coast. That, prior to the closing years of last century, was largely confined to the coastal strip itself and to the caravan routes into the interior travelled by the slave-traders.

It is important to assess the outstanding features of this impact of Asia on Africa: the development of a common language; partial miscegenation, but with considerable emphasis on the importance of 'racial purity' on the part of the Arabs; the exploitation of the indigenous peoples through the slave trade; and the trade in ivory.

The 'opening up' of East Africa can be counted to date from January 3rd, 1844, when a small Arab trading-vessel bound from Aden to Zanzibar entered the old harbour at Mombasa after two months at sea. On board are two passengers whose names are to

make history, Dr. J. L. Krapf and his wife. They stayed only a few hours in Mombasa, but long enough to show them that this might well be the starting-place for the enterprise on which their hearts are set, the penetration and evangelisation of Africa from its east coast. Then the vessel, and they with it, completed the voyage to Zanzibar. There they found a welcome from the British consul and from the Sultan, who invited them to stay on the island. But it was not to Zanzibar that they felt called; their intention was to establish themselves at or near Mombasa, with the object of advancing northwards by the evangelisation of the Galla people, back to Ethiopia, from which country they had been expelled. And so they returned to Mombasa in May 1844 with a letter of introduction and commendation from the Sultan:

> This comes from Seyyid Said, Sultan; greeting to all our subjects, friends, and governors. This letter is written on behalf of Dr. Krapf, a good man who wishes to convert the world to God. Behave well to him, and be everywhere serviceable to him.

The signature of that letter by Seyyid Said virtually sealed the end of Arab dominion on the mainland of eastern Africa: the story of what followed is now well known, and need only be briefly recapitulated. Trials and loneliness were the setting in which Krapf started his work, for, in July 1844, Mrs. Krapf and her baby daughter died and were buried on the mainland opposite the island of Mombasa. In memorable words Krapf announced his intention to carry on:

> Tell our friends at home that there is now on the East African Coast a lonely missionary grave; this is a sign that you have now commenced the struggle with this part of the world; and as the Victories of the Church are gained by stepping over the graves of her members, you may be the more convinced that the hour is at hand when you are summoned to the conversion of Africa from its Eastern shore.

For two years Krapf was alone. Then he was joined by John Rebmann, and there began a partnership rare in the annals of missionary history. These two men did more than lay the foundations of a great missionary Church: for it was in the wake of their journeys of discovery into the interior that later travellers and servants of the Imperial British East Africa Company followed, in their turn to be followed by administration, commerce, agriculture, and industry.

The building of the Uganda Railway, a task commenced a little over fifty years ago, is the next feature of outstanding significance to our study. Indian navigators, sailing the Indian Ocean, had been visiting the east coast of Africa for centuries. But it was not until the building of the Uganda Railway was started that large numbers of Indian labourers were brought over to do work which Africans neither could nor would then do, and for which

Europeans were not available in sufficient numbers. Railway workmen were followed by shopkeepers, tailors, and others of their fellow-countrymen, and it was not long after the railhead had halted for a while at what is now the capital, Nairobi, that an Indian trading centre was established. From that time there has been a steady stream of immigrants from India, and the Indian trader has penetrated to the farthest corners of the country, and the Indian artisan has made himself an indispensable part of the Colony's life.

Another element, though much smaller, in the Asiatic population of the country hails from Goa: Goan clerks were employed in most government offices; a few have established themselves as tailors and shopkeepers. They represent a fairly self-contained minority in the Colony's life, mostly Roman Catholic by religion, almost placidly indifferent to local political issues, and very content if they can secure a British passport and continue their vocational pursuits undisturbed.

The other immigrant community is that from Europe. At first largely composed of missionaries and administrators, with only a few pioneer agriculturalists and traders, the 'settler' now greatly outnumbers the other members of the European community, himself taking a leading part on the unofficial side of the Colony's legislative machine, pioneering the establishment of local government, as well as developing the economic resources of the Colony, often in face of considerable difficulty and, particularly in the early days, at very considerable cost for little or no immediate return.

The comparative size of these elements in the population of Kenya to-day is given in the following table, compiled from figures given in the *East African Economic and Statistical Bulletin*, No. 6, December 1949:

POPULATION OF KENYA

Non-Native Peoples		
European	29,660	
Indian	90,528	
Goan	7,159	
Arab	24,174	
'Coloured'	964	
Others	2,361	
		154,846
African, including an estimated population of 193,000 in the Northern Province		5,218,232

There are several features about the population which are immediately apparent. First, the comparative fewness of the immigrant communities. Secondly, when the distribution of the

population comes to be studied, it will be seen that a very large part of the immigrant population is congregated in or near the large towns:

	Total	*Mombasa*	*Nairobi*
European	29,660	2,186	14,049
Indian	90,528	23,892	38,812
Goan	7,159	1,746	3,818
Arab	24,174	13,376	585

Comparison with earlier census figures shows that a large part of the immigrant population is comparatively new to the Colony:

	1931	1948
European	16,812	29,660
Indian	39,644	90,528
Goan	3,979	7,159
Arab	12,166	24,174

In an attempt to deal with the problems presented by indiscriminate immigration into a country already beset by problems of plural community, all entry into Kenya is now subject to the rigorous conditions imposed by the *Immigration Control Ordinance*, 1948.

There is a further feature of the population, not revealed by the bare census figures: that is, the comparative wealth of the immigrant communities contrasted with the fact that the vast majority of the large African population is living at or below a reasonable level of bare subsistence. This is readily apparent to any visitor to Kenya, and easily seen from such facts as these: a total estimated customs and excise revenue in 1950 of £5,551,000 will be derived as to four-fifths from non-Native people, and as to one-fifth from the much larger African population; again, an estimated 'able-bodied' male population of Africans between the ages of 18 and 65 is 850,000 and produces some £669,000 in direct taxation at a poll rate, whereas the much smaller immigrant population produces £176,000 in poll tax supplemented by a further £1,250,000 in income tax. Thus it is that economic disparity between rich and poor, fortunate and unfortunate, is almost completely identical with the distinction between non-Native and indigenous peoples. And it is the growing conviction of many that what now presents itself as a racial or 'colour' issue is primarily one of social and economic disparity.

At the same time, the fact that the racial groups are to such a large extent separate communities makes it extremely difficult to apply the fiscal principle of 'From each according to his capacity to pay, and for each (in social and other services) according to his need.'

Educational Finance

In 1950, within the framework of an estimated recurrent expenditure budget of £8,215,254, the draft estimates of revenue and expenditure proposed to spend £1,092,039 (or roughly 12½ per cent.) on educational services. It is difficult to apportion this on a racial basis, but it is reasonable to say that roughly 45 per cent. of the total figure will be spent on African education, while the remaining 55 per cent. will be divided almost equally between European and Asian education. In this connection, certain differences in the application of educational provision must be noted: there is compulsory education for all European children between the ages of 7 and 15 throughout the Colony; there is only compulsory education for Asian boys, and that only in the bigger towns; and there is no compulsory education for any African children.

In this connection, it is interesting to note the following comment from the *Memorandum on the Draft Estimates of the Colony* for the year 1950 (pages 18–19):

> The Recurrent Estimates of the Education Department again show a considerable increase. They total £1,092,039, compared with £1,004,573 in 1949, an apparent increase of £87,466. The true increase is in fact greater, as Centre C (Jeanes School), which appeared as a one-line vote under Item 198 of the 1949 Estimates and for which provision of £43,090 was then made, has been transferred to the Social Welfare Section of the Administrative Head. The actual increase is therefore £130,556. It should be noted that there has been a reduction of approximately £8,600 in the Centre B expenditure, which is now shown in detail, and there is offsetting revenue which further reduces the net cost of this technical school.
>
> The main reasons for the increase under this Head are the necessity to staff and run new European and Indian schools to enable the Government to discharge its obligations resulting from the compulsory education legislation. Provision has also been made for increased facilities for the education of Indian girls. The increases under African education are mainly to provide for staff and recurrent charges for the extension of existing schools and for the payment of grants-in-aid to existing aided schools and some new ones.
>
> The main increases are as follows:

Administrative and General	£11,559
European Education	£56,908
Indian Education	£25,426
African Education	£41,262

A question which is bound to arise at this stage is that of 'inter-racial' schools. Would it not be better, it may well be asked, to put an end to the provision of separate educational facilities on a racial basis, conducted at differing standards, and provide a common, inter-racial system of state education? Ideally such a proposal has much to commend it, and it will presently be seen that a start is about to be made in technical education on an inter-racial basis.

The question of inter-racial schools was raised by the United Nations Visiting Mission to Tanganyika in 1948; conditions in Tanganyika are very similar to those in Kenya. And there, as in Kenya, it will not be immediately possible to establish inter-racial schools at the primary level for a considerable time: for, not only are there social disparities between the races which would have to be taken into account, but the question of language is an almost insuperable difficulty. In European primary schools in Kenya most of the education is in English, but Afrikaans is used in those parts of the country where there are concentrations of families from South Africa; Tanganyika also has to recognise the need for instruction in Greek. Indian education is conducted both in Urdu and in Gujerati, and Arabic is used for the Arabs. And, while Tanganyika has pursued a more vigorous Swahili policy, so that, for the most part, only Swahili is used for the major part of the primary course, Kenya has followed a more liberal vernacular policy, and some eight major vernaculars are used for a full primary course and a further twelve so-called minor vernaculars are used in the earlier stages of primary education. Until English becomes the common language and is sufficiently well established as such for Indian and African children to be able to undertake primary education in an English medium, there is no question of the practicability of inter-racial schools, even though the reasonability of such a project were established on other grounds.

A minor educational problem may be mentioned here.

Reference back to the census figures quoted earlier in this article will recall the existence of a so-called 'Coloured' population and of a group described as 'others'. This combined minority group contains a number of families which are derived from mixed marriages. The education of children from these families presents a serious problem of long standing. It has been found, as things are at present in the Colony, not to be in the best interests of the children themselves to subject them to the embarrassments which confront them if sent to the Government European schools. The Roman Catholic Church makes provision for the education of children of its adherents who belong to this group, and the Mothers' Union, an Anglican body in Nairobi, ran a school for non-Roman children from this group. The latter school was demolished during World War II, and it has now become neces-

sary to establish a Government Nairobi Central School for the children who formerly attended it.

Recent Investigations affecting the Educational Situation

The Development Committee's *Report,* 1946, included in its provisions plans for the advancement of the education of all races. The Indian proposals were criticised as being inadequate, particularly because they made no provision for hostels for the children who came from outlying trading centres to attend school. The African proposals were strongly criticised at the time, both inside the Legislative Council and outside it, as being thoroughly unrealistic. The most objective statement of that criticism and of the difficulties involved may be obtained from a note by the Member for Education in the Colony's Executive Council:

> The Development Committee, set up at the beginning of 1945, attached great importance to the provision of adequate educational facilities for the child population of both sexes and of all races in Kenya, and found that this problem was one of the most difficult with which it had to deal. It was aware of the insistent demand, both in this country and outside, for the speeding up of the education of all races, but particularly of Africans, and it realised and appreciated all the moral and philosophical arguments in favour of such a course, and that no lasting progress could be made in the advancement of a nation until the people were able to understand the issues involved. The background against which every development scheme had to be examined was that the object thereof should be:
>
> > "To use the natural resources of the country including man-power, in a manner calculated to increase the national income of Kenya in the shortest space of time, so as to raise as soon as possible the standard of living of the majority of the inhabitants."
>
> The Development Committee had, therefore, to consider the question of the provision of a Development Plan for African Education in the light of the criteria referred to above, with due regard to the ability of the Colony to meet the annual costs. The Development Committee examined no less than three plans, and it was with the greatest reluctance that it reached the conclusion that the only plan which could be adopted as being practicable and within the capacity of the Colony to meet the cost, although comprehensive, fell far short of the ideal of education towards a fuller and better life for African people. The object of the plan for the development of African education, as published in the Development Committee's Report, aimed at providing, over a twenty-year period, a universal four-year course of primary education for all African boys and girls, a further two-year course of primary education for 20 per cent. of those children, and secondary education organised in a series of two-year courses, the number admitted to each course being approximately 20 per cent. of those completing the preceding course. This plan was generally criticised on the grounds that a four-year primary course, which was all that 80 per cent. of the school-going population would receive, is of negligible educational value, especially when organised in dual sessions. It was also criticised by the Africa Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies because it did not allow for a sufficiently

large number of pupils to proceed to the School Certificate stage of secondary education. By far the most serious criticism of the plan, however, was that the financing of it, as far as primary education was concerned, depended on the collection of an average fee of *Sh.*15 per pupil per annum, and it is now realised that the attainment of such a high average fee could only be reached in the wealthier districts. For the reasons outlined above, the plan was rejected by the Advisory Council on African Education.

The subsequent history of development planning for African education is outlined below. Other reasons made it necessary for all development plans for all races to be reconsidered.

Very considerable increases in immigration of Europeans in the post-World War II period made the provision of further European educational facilities by the state necessary. With this fact must be coupled the further fact that the other East African Governments, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar, were unable to make full provision within their respective territories, chiefly for climatic reasons, for the education of their own European children; Uganda looks to Kenya to provide both primary and secondary education for its European children, and Tanganyika sends its secondary scholars to Kenya. While it is true that financial adjustments are made between the respective Governments in order to meet the costs of this provision, the responsibility for planning, and for the actual erection of the new schools required, falls solely on the Government of Kenya.

The dimension of the Asian educational system envisaged by the planners has proved wholly inadequate because of the very considerable increase, chiefly natural population increase, in the Asian population of school-going age.

All educational plans have, like most of the other development plans, been made much more difficult to implement because of the sharp rise in building costs.

There has, therefore, been a series of further inquiries into educational provision and planning in the years that followed the publication of the over-all picture of a development plan for the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1946, and reference must now be made to each of these.

A Ten-year Plan for the Development of African Education

This plan was published in 1948. It is best summarised in the words of the Member for Education, writing in the Foreword:

> The main objectives of the new plan are to provide within ten years a full primary course, under qualified teachers, for approximately 50 per cent. of the children of school age; to ensure that there will be an adequate supply of trained teachers; and that a satisfactory number of pupils of both sexes will receive education up to and including School Certificate level.

The implementation of the plan was to be brought about by a system of grants-in-aid to voluntary agencies in addition to a number of Government schools. This system of grants-in-aid had been long established. But the grants at the primary level were now to be paid only in respect of trained teachers. Moreover, the whole cost of primary education was to be carried by local government authorities. This was to prove the major weakness of the plan; for it proved to be that this transfer of responsibility for a particular level of education to a local government body still in the early stages of functional development meant the virtual abandonment of control both of dimension and of quality. Effective coordination between the lower and the higher levels of the African educational system became increasingly impossible. Moreover, the financial burden which the plan placed upon local authorities was completely beyond their capacity to pay, rising, as it proposed, from £100,000 in 1948 to £234,000 in 1957: in the earlier stages it invited local authorities to spend a sum on education which was to become increasingly out of proportion to the amounts spent on other social services for which they were responsible; and in the later stages bankruptcy would have been the only consequence.

The method of financing African education was still a problem; but it was equally a problem in connection with the education of other races. Inquiries were therefore made into the methods of financing education, and the reports which follow were the result.

Report of the Committee on Educational Expenditure (European and Asian)

This committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Bertrand Glancy, made recommendations which may be summarised in the following paragraphs, which are taken from the report itself:

13. The conclusion we have reached is that, though we do not all of us regard the principle of communal responsibility in this matter as an ideal solution, we are prepared to accept it as at present a practical necessity, provided that . . . each community concerned is assigned an equitable share of the contribution that Government can afford to make towards non-Native education.

18. As a practical solution, we are agreed that the allotment made from general revenue to non-Native education should be divided equally between the two communities, Asian and European.

104. (*a*) That the non-Native communities—in particular the European and Indian communities—should be called upon to contribute the difference between (*a*) the provision which can be expected from general revenue for the recurrent educational requirements of the community concerned, and (*b*) the total amount needed for this purpose.

(*b*) That the most appropriate method of recovering such contributions is to be found, for the present at least, in the enhancement of school fees.

(*c*) That school fees should accordingly be increased with effect from the beginning of the next school year (January 1949) to the extent recommended.

(*d*) That, as and when it should appear that the contribution thus received from a particular community will require to be further supplemented, the wishes of the community as to the form which such further supplement should take should be ascertained through its Advisory Council for Education.

(*e*) That Government should endeavour to provide at the cost of general revenue (or surplus balances) for the construction of such educational buildings as may from time to time be found necessary, but that in the last resort, if the provision by Government of a particular building should be regarded by the community concerned as indispensable, and if Government should feel unable to finance its construction in the ordinary way, the Government should at the request of that community arrange for the funds required by means of a loan, the service of which should be borne by the community in question.

The Hartwell Report

The community in respect of which further inquiry was to prove necessary within a short space of time was the Asian community. A committee under the chairmanship of the Director of Establishments, Mr. Hartwell, reported in 1949. It had to take into account communal differences within the Asian community, but its recommendations concerning the establishment of Asian education authorities, complicated as they are by these communal differences, are likely to prove difficult if not incapable of implementation.

Report of the Technical Institute Committee (The Willoughby Report)

The report of this committee, which met under the chairmanship of Mr. G. P. Willoughby, a senior member of the staff of the East African Post and Telegraphs Department, was submitted in the early part of 1949, but its publication was delayed until the latter part of the same year.

It had long been a criticism of educational provision in Kenya, particularly of African education, that it laid too little emphasis on technical and agricultural education in the general school curriculum and made inadequate provision for it as a special subject. In so far as this criticism was directed to African education in larger measure than to that of other communities, it was regarded with a measure of disfavour by Africans, who inferred that such a criticism was designed to do nothing more than to close the doorway to academic advance as far as they were concerned, and to everything except inferior manual occupation. It is only recently that Africans themselves have come to realise the very great importance which attaches to the provision of adequate facilities for technical and agricultural education.

The proposals of the Willoughby Committee come at a time when all communities have an enhanced awareness of the importance of technical education; and it must be emphasised that

the committee was concerned with technical education on a comprehensive basis, not restricted to any one community.

The need for a technical and commercial institute had been adumbrated by the Development Committee in its 1946 *Report*, and the Willoughby Committee worked out detailed proposals for its establishment. Their proposals may be summarised as follows:

(*a*) There should be, on a five-acre site near the proposed Nairobi Cultural Centre, a Kenya Technical and Commercial Institute.

(*b*) The highest possible building priority should be given to its erection.

(*c*) In its initial stages it should concentrate on technical education, leaving commercial instruction to continue in the hands of those responsible for Nairobi evening continuation classes.

(*d*) The accommodation envisaged is for 150 full-time and 545 part-time students drawn from all races; at present no provision for boarding hostels is envisaged, and this will possibly limit the degree to which African technical students will be able to share in the provision.

(*e*) New apprenticeship legislation is proposed.

The committee is exercised about the possibility that African students may not be able to progress at the same speed as the European and Asian students, nor able to assimilate the higher theoretical studies which should accompany the practical work. This is a matter of opinion: experience alone can decide. But the door is open for African participation in the institute. There is also proposed in the *African Education Report* to be mentioned later that there should be a third African trade school under the ægis of the Education Department in Kenya, and that the school of engineering at Makerere should be reopened. There can, however, be no doubt about the value of inter-racial education at this level. This is already proved experience in industry: the East African Railways and Harbours and the Post Office are introducing an increasing number of Africans into posts formerly held by Europeans and Asians after training in their own schools and workshops; commercial undertakings like the Magadi Soda Company have African and Asian apprentices working side by side. There is, too, a widely expressed hope that Makerere College will cease to be a purely African institution, and open its doors to Europeans and Asians.

The Inter-University Council's Delegation to Makerere College

The report of the delegation remains a confidential document, but the burden of its recommendations has become known. Makerere is to be a university college, taken into the protection of the University of London, and the School Certificate Examination will be the basis of entry. One grave criticism of entrance to Makerere has thus been dealt with, namely the setting of an entrance examination of its own which revealed wide disparities

between itself on the one hand and school reports and the School Certificate Examination on the other; but another major criticism remains. Discipline at Makerere has been a subject of controversy; but problems of discipline are likely to remain unsolved while students, whatever their race, are taken into a university college with its freedoms and responsibilities for which no student is adequately prepared by the time he has reached the School Certificate Examination. It is that broadening experience of an English sixth form that equips the English schoolboy for the life of the university; this experience the African student never gets, and he is, in consequence, likely to suffer considerably by being thrust into the life of a university college immediately after completing his School Certificate. More than that, the 'sixth-form' type of education could be provided a great deal more readily, more cheaply, and more appropriately at East African secondary schools than in the preliminary studies at Makerere itself.

There also remains the criticism that Makerere has not yet been made inter-racial. On the one hand, it is argued that there are only limited facilities at Makerere for African students, and to reduce these by two-thirds as a result of the admission of Asian and European students would not be in the Africans' best interests; on the other, it is argued that fewer Africans educated in circumstances which, by being inter-racial, more closely approximated to the true spirit of a university would be of greater value in the problems of the inter-racial situation in East Africa to-day.

There is another associated matter which must be referred to at this point. It is the question of the foundation of a theological faculty at Makerere. This is not the place in which to recite the history of British universities in relation to their theological faculties; but it is certain that, if spiritual values are to assume their rightful place, not only in the educational system itself, but also in the complex social, political, and economic setting in which that education takes place, then the existence of a theological faculty at Makerere will be of inestimable value.

It must not be assumed that Makerere is, as one of the London colleges was once described, a 'godless institution'. There are Anglican and Roman chaplains on the staff, each having a chapel in which to conduct worship, and there is also a mosque for the Muslim students. Courses of studies in theological subjects are arranged as part of the extra-academic programme. But it is felt that the time has come when more is needed. Proposals for a school of religions have not received support outside the college, and it may well be that the theological colleges of the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches, by a closer association with Makerere, will be able to provide for the next step in giving to Makerere its school of Christian theology.

It may be a convenient place to record the number of Kenya

students studying at Makerere in 1949, out of the total of two hundred and twelve men and nine women:

	Men	*Women*	*Total*
Arts	33	1	34
Science .	15	—	15
Education	15	1	16
Veterinary	2	—	2
Medicine	5	—	5
Agriculture	—	—	—
Art .	2	—	2
Adult Course	3	2	5
	75	4	79

Adding to these seventy-nine students from Kenya who are doing courses of higher study in British universities or technical colleges, there are only about a hundred Africans who are receiving education at post-School Certificate levels. This small number is not so small simply on account of the fewness of those able to benefit from such courses. If Africans are to be prepared for effective partnership in the general life of Kenya, then it is essential that greater numbers should receive higher education, both academic and professional. The African Education Committee, to whose report we now turn, called attention to this and recommended the expansion of facilities for higher education at Makerere to such a degree that the annual intake from Kenya would be not less than fifty.

Report of the African Education Committee (The Beecher Report)

Early in 1949 a Committee of Inquiry was set up by the Government of Kenya. The terms of reference of the committee called upon it to examine the scope, content, and methods of the African educational system, to consider the part to be played in that system by local authorities, and to report on a number of associated financial matters. The evidence presented to the committee established three outstanding points; the *Report* says:

> First, it is necessary to restore adequate control to an educational system which had virtually lost those safeguards essential to the spending of large sums of public money. In the absence of centralised control, operated through an adequate inspectorial staff in the field, development was largely unco-ordinated and several aspects of educational activity lacked purpose. Lack of staff and financial provision for administrative purposes in fact prevented the Director of Education from carrying out the provisions for control which the Educational Ordinances contain, and which we propose should be implemented.

> Secondly, the educational system as a whole can only be rendered purposeful by a re-statement of educational objectives, and the implementation of a plan for their achievement. This implies that efforts be made for a qualitative improvement in educational activity. For example, uncontrolled expansion at a low level, with no regard to the quality of the pupils passed out from the schools, or passed on to higher education, and the lack of trained teachers, can only result in a violation of the purposes for which education is conducted. The Committee was impressed by the need for substantial and rapid expansion of Secondary educational provision. We have been at pains to suggest a balanced educational programme with adequate emphasis on the need for well-trained products, in both academic and practical spheres, at a level which makes them potential participants in the Colony's development.
>
> Thirdly, the devolution of sole financial responsibility for African Primary education on Local Authorities had, in our view, created a state of affairs which was leading some Local Native Councils to bankruptcy.

The committee suggests a plan for balanced educational development which depends, for its implementation, on the short-service recruitment of European educationists, a large part of whose task will be the training of African educators and educational administrators who will, in the future, be responsible for carrying out the educational programme. The costs of the plan, after allowance has been made for expected fee revenue, rise from £682,000 in 1951 to £1,071,000 in 1960. At the time of writing, no Government white paper has appeared indicating the degree to which the Government intends to implement the proposals made, nor has the Legislative Council decided what support it is prepared to give in terms of financial provision.

Perhaps the biggest problem which faced the committee and which will face those who have to carry out its recommendations is that which concerns the education of women and girls. The gap between achievements generally in boys' education and that of girls is nearer two generations than one. On this subject the committee says:

> That there is a long, hard road ahead of those responsible for the development of African girls' education, the Committee does not doubt. Many disappointing beginnings may be made, and many projects may fail in the face of sociological facts that will not yield to quick answers or allow much hope of quick results.

Nevertheless, it is in this sphere of girls' education that the genius for co-operation which has already manifested itself between Church and state will have ample scope.

But not only in respect of girls' education does the report recommend the continuation of the partnership, now well established, between the Christian Churches and the Government. Little verbatim evidence is quoted, the committee contenting itself with a digest of evidence which appears as Chapter III, but there is one important quotation of direct evidence which can be repeated here:

We are the products of a Christian civilisation and all that we have to offer is that civilisation. It cannot be detached or dissected into its parts. Evangelisation is as much part of education as anything else, and it would be quite impossible for us to devise a system of education which is entirely and totally secular. This is not to say that it is necessary for us to proselytise Moslems, or indeed for that matter those convinced pagans who insist on remaining pagans, but that in offering what we have to offer we should realise that it is an inseparable compound of our faith and learning.

The committee quotes the principles set out in the white paper on *Education Policy in British Tropical Africa* in 1925. It was on the basis of these that the subsequent developments in Christian partnership in education were founded. And, in the committee's view, those principles are still as relevant to-day as when they were first propounded. It therefore recommends:

That the Government continue to work with and through those voluntary agencies which have the teaching of Christian principles as part of their intention, and that facility for Christian instruction be provided in all schools.

Education and Morals

Enough has been written of the general background and of the particular problems of the educationist to indicate the complexity of the contemporary situation in Kenya. Add to that picture other complicating factors: there is still in Kenya a residual group, very vocal, which has so far resisted the more liberal movement which has otherwise been gaining ground in the European community of late; it insists on the paramountcy of European interests in a situation in which the only real solution is a partnership, for a static concept of trusteeship is no longer of any significance. Over against this is a rising tide of nationalism amongst the African community. And thrust as it were between the two is a keen competition on the part of the Asian community to win the affection of the African community towards an Eastern way of life. Evidence of this is found in the recent offer to African students in eastern Africa as a whole of several hundred places in Indian universities, fifty of which are to carry scholarships. And then, knocking at the door, is the spectre of Marxian Communism.

Where lies the solution?

This topic has been the subject of frequent reference by the Governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell; speaking on 'The Land We Live in' at the Caledonian Society's dinner in 1949, he said:

To those British people especially who are inclined to-day to make little of the Church, to live a purely material life, and pay no heed to spiritual values, I would say that what they are doing is preparing the way for a state of affairs in which materialistic, apathetic, and helpless populations fall victim to some form of ruthless and rigid dictatorship. Those who become indifferent to the Christian faith, or who go further

> and say there is no God, will end by finding that the alternative to God is the Devil, and the Devil in a very unpleasant form, with a large gang of security police, a competent equipment of internment camps, 'people's courts'—that is, organs of punishment and not of justice—and all the rest of the business.
>
> For the plain truth is, freedom is a product of the Christian era in the world's history. Lest anyone should remind me of the glorious democracy of Athens, may I observe that it was founded on slavery, and extended only to those who owned the slaves.
>
> Freedom, justice, and respect for the rights of man, and for the inviolable human personality, are, I repeat, products of the Christian faith; they were unknown before that faith spread upon the earth, and they will surely disappear if that faith should weaken and be overturned, as it has been overturned, at any rate in appearance, in so much of eastern Europe.

There is a growing feeling that the way of solution lies neither in the independent, 'parallel' development of the several communities, nor in miscegenation; nor will it emerge from the liquidation of the immigrant communities, for, even if the European population were persuaded or even forced (say by pressure of economic circumstances) to withdraw from Kenya, the liquidation of the Asian population is a physical impossibility, and it is an unthinkable thing for the African population to be left with no other partner but the Asian community. It lies, so many are coming to feel, in a partnership between the several communities, in the establishment of which the Christian Church has a large part to play, for the very reasons that Sir Philip has indicated.

The diagnosis of the country's problems indicates that they are fundamentally spiritual in nature, and that a spiritual solution is required.

Let us develop this.

The African population suffers considerable hardship from a material point of view: the population, increasing at the rate of not less than 2½ per cent. each year, is faced with land hunger coupled with a decreasing soil fertility and a rising cost of living (the retail price index of African consumer goods in October 1949 was 212 against a figure of 100 for August 1939). All this is very material. But behind all this, and robbing it of inclination and capacity to grapple with that material situation, is a moral and spiritual decline which must be arrested and countered. Outstanding is the breakdown in family life, and the failure to re-establish in twentieth-century Africa that intimate integration of religion with everyday living which was once the dominant characteristic of tribalism.

Nor is this confined to the African community. With a markedly different economic background, the moral and spiritual problems of the European community are much the same. Indeed, it is a rude shock to Africans to see that Western civilisation, as exemplified by so many Europeans, is so little moved about the

application of Christianity to daily living. This is the subject of comment by the American writer, Negley Farson, in his *Last Chance in Africa*:

> I am not criticising the Missions; I am criticising our own failure to live up to the Christian standards of life that, regardless of their particular creed, all Missions preach. I think that, even while he is at the Mission School, the average African begins to suspect that we do not live by the precepts that we talk to him so much about. Later he is sure of it. How could he help it? Eventually comes the alarming conviction that we do not believe in the God that we are still trying to make him believe in. And from that, that we are trying to teach him to believe in many things that we do not believe in ourselves. And that we are doing it for our own good, not his.

It would, of course, be wholly wrong to imagine that the whole of the European population is completely 'pagan' in its behaviour; on the contrary, there has been a steady and marked growth in the life of the Church, amongst Europeans as well as amongst Africans, with such manifestations of vital Christianity in the practical affairs of life as would encourage the hope that the Churches may be able to make a considerable contribution to the current problem.

Two general aspects of the moral and spiritual decline in the African community have been mentioned and must be developed.

First, the breakdown in family life: in most parts of Kenya to-day, the strength of the 'group family' has diminished, in many it has almost disappeared; ties of kinship have considerably weakened, with the consequent weakening of social and economic obligations within the family group. The 'restricted family unit' of father, mother, and children has not about it that strength which is required for social stability. Many factors have contributed to this state of affairs: probably the most powerful is the labour movement out of the tribal area to employment in towns and settled areas, where housing conditions generally and the instability of employment (together with a number of other factors) are not altogether conducive to the establishment of stable family units. Again, the alarming rise in the amount of 'bride price', coupled with the apparent facility with which a temporary 'marriage' may be entered into, are other negative factors. It is not easy to assess the susceptibility of the African people to the example set by film posters and the cinema; but there are many who feel that much of the 'new morality' which manifests itself, particularly in urban African society, owes much to the influence which these have brought to bear. It is certain that no benefit has been derived from screen productions which depict matrimonial tangles, nor from those which show gangsterism or crime in any form.

The absence of strong family ties brings with it a degree of lack

of parental control of African youth. There is a noticeable disinclination to work amongst the youths, and there has been a somewhat alarming outburst of crime. It is, perhaps, easy for critics of the African to use these facts as arguments against African advancement. But it must also be noted that nobody deplores the incidence of crime among the African population as Africans themselves; they suffer from its consequences at least as much as Europeans and Asians, if not more. And, too, an examination of the police and prisons reports does not show that the prison population contains a greater percentage of the African population than of the European and Asian. Indeed, although it would be useless to try to hide or to excuse these undesirable features of African society to-day, they are probably less of a problem, certainly no greater, than the corresponding situations in the populations of Great Britain which are living at a comparable social and economic level. The *African Education Report* writes of the teacher's difficulties in Kenya:

> Little or nothing is done in most [African] homes to inculcate moral standards; the child does not, in consequence, acquire character in its early years which is built up on those principles which alone have any relevance in the modern society of which the child is to become a part. It is therefore the task of the schools to implant these principles, and to do so almost entirely without help from parents.

And, as these words were being written, there appeared in *The Times* a report of a conference of the National Association of Schoolmasters at Morecambe (Great Britain) at which a resolution was passed stating that the Association was "gravely concerned at the decay of family life and the growth of parental irresponsibility, and called upon the Government to strengthen the power of judges and magistrates in dealing with parents who avoided their responsibilities."

This is no place to do more than mention the fact that there are many who are alarmed at the consequences of the spread of betting and gambling amongst Africans; the 'tote' at the racecourse is thronged by them, men and women, and a large-scale participation in lotteries and sweepstakes is a pathetic indication of a hope that a spectacular win may put right at a stroke economic disadvantages which can be set right only by hard work.

The decline of tribal religion, and the breakdown of that integration of religion and life which was a former characteristic of tribalism, have been followed more recently by the appearance of a growing number of 'new religions'. These comprise heretical and schismatic sects which derive, at least in part, from the Christian Church movement in the country, together with revivals of tribalism tinged with certain additions which derive from Judaism or Christianity. To embark on an analysis of this situa-

tion would be impossible here, but it is mentioned as a complicating factor of some magnitude in the situation.

Such, then, are some of the aspects of problems which confront Church and state, administrators and educators, in a country of multiple communities. That the situation is difficult is obvious; that a solution must be found is also obvious, for the time is short in which to find it.

LEONARD BEECHER.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHINA

PART ONE

CONFUCIAN TRADITION

Outline of Educational Aims of the Confucian School

THE aims of education for the Confucian School are briefly outlined in the first chapter of *The Great Learning* (*Ta Hsueh*), which reads:

> The teaching of *The Great Learning* is to manifest one's illustrious virtue, to renovate the people and to abide in the highest good.
>
> The ancients who wished to manifest illustrious virtue throughout the world, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their own families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their own selves. Wishing to cultivate their selves, they first rectified their own minds. Wishing to rectify their minds, they first sought for absolute sincerity in their thoughts. Wishing to be absolutely sincere in their thoughts, they first extended their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consisted in the investigation of things.[1]

We may summarise the educational aims in the diagram which appears on the next page.

Each of the eight items enumerated in the diagram may find explanation in the ancient classics. Some questions concerning the eight items are briefly answered as follows:

(1) How can one achieve true knowledge through investigation of things? The question is answered in *The Doctrine of the Mean* (*Chung Yung*). It reads:

> It is necessary to obtain a wide and extensive knowledge of what has been said and done in the world; critically to inquire into it; carefully to ponder over it; clearly to sift it; and earnestly to carry it out.
>
> It matters not what you learn, but when you once learn a thing, you must never give it up until you have mastered it. It matters not what

[1] Compare this translation with the following three books:
Lin Yutang's *The Wisdom of Confucius*, p. 139.
E. R. Hughes' *The Great Learning And The Mean In Action*, p. 146.
James Legge's *Four Books*, pp. 308–12.
There is a dispute about the words "to renovate", because in the ancient text it reads as "to be near to the people" or "to love." According to Chu Hsi, it was a misprint, and should be corrected. The words "to renovate" do make a better sense and are more consistent with the whole text. The three authors mentioned above agree with this viewpoint.

you inquire into, but when you inquire into a thing, you must never give it up until you have thoroughly understood it. It matters not what you try to think out, but when you once try to think out a thing, you must never give it up until you have got what you want. It matters not what you try to sift out, but when you once try to sift out a thing, you must not give it up until you sift it out clearly and distinctly. It matters not what you try to carry out, but when you once try to carry out a thing, you must not give it up until you have done it thoroughly and well.[2]



(2) How can one be sincere in his thoughts? The answer is found in the sixth chapter of *The Great Learning.* It is said:

> This sincerity should be like the sincerity with which one hates a bad smell, or loves what is beautiful. This is called satisfying your own conscience. Therefore, a gentleman is watchful over himself when he is alone. What is true in one's heart will be shown in his outward appearance. Even when he is alone, he should be watchful over his mind as if there were ten eyes beholding, and ten hands pointing at him.[3]

(3) How can one's mind be rectified? The answer is found in *The Confucian Analects* (*Lun Yu*). It is said:

> Look not at what is contrary to propriety; listen not to what is contrary to propriety; speak not what is contrary to propriety; make no movement which is contrary to propriety.[4]

Again it is said in *The Great Learning* that—

> When one is upset by anger, disturbed by fear, blinded by love, or involved in worries and anxieties, then his mind would not be in its right place.[5]

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[2] *The Doctrine of the Mean,* ch. 20: 19–20.
[3] *Great Learning,* ch. 6: 1–3.
[4] *Confucian Analects,* Bk. 12, ch. 1:
[5] *Great Learning,* ch. 7.

(4) How can one cultivate himself? The answer is found in *The Analects*. It is said:

A youth, when at home, should be filial; and abroad, respectful to elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate the friendship of the good. If, when all that is done, he has any energy to spare, then let him study polite arts.[6]

When we see a man of worth, we should think how to equal him; when we see a man of a contrary character, we should turn inward and examine ourselves.[7]

(5) How can one's family be regulated? The answer is found in *The Book of Rites* (*Li Ki*). It emphasises the cultivation of—

Kindness in the father, filial piety in the son, gentility in the elder brother, humility and respect in the younger brother, good behaviour in the husband, harmonious response in the wife, benevolence in the elders and respect in the juniors.[8]

(6) How can a state be well ordered? The answer is found in *The Doctrine of the Mean*. It enumerates nine cardinal directions:

(1) Cultivating one's personal conduct.
(2) Honouring worthy men.
(3) Cherishing affection for, and doing one's duty towards, his kindred.
(4) Showing respect to the high ministers of state.
(5) Identifying himself with the interests and welfare of the whole body of public officers.
(6) Showing himself as a father to the common people.
(7) Encouraging the introduction of all useful arts.
(8) Showing tenderness to strangers from far countries.
(9) Enlisting the fervent loyalty of the princes of the constituent states.[9]

(7) How can we bring peace and happiness to the world? The explanation is found in *Li Ki*. It is stated as follows:

When the Great Tao (or the Golden Rule) shall finally prevail, the world will be the common possession of all (not belonging to any particular ruling family or ruling class). They will elect the virtuous and the able to take charge of public affairs. There will be mutual confidence and the spirit of accord. Therefore, filial devotion will not be confined to one's own parents; and parental affection will also be bestowed on children other than one's own. There will be provision for the aged, employment for the adult, and the care for the young. The helpless widows and widowers, the lonely orphans, and the cripples and deformed will all be well taken care of. The men will have proper occupations; and the women, their homes. As to the natural resources, the people will not leave them lying idle or being wasted, though they will not have to keep them for themselves. In the case of service, the people will deprecate the failure of doing one's share, though it will not necessarily bring them a personal profit. Thus the selfish designs will cease to exist, and banditry and rebellion will not rise. As a result, there will be no need to shut one's outer gate, even at night. This will be the age of "Tatung" or the "great commonweal."[10]

These are the explanations for the educational aims of the Confucian School.

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[6] *Analects*, Bk. 1, ch. 6.
[7] *Ibid.*, Bk. 4, ch. 17.
[8] *Li Ki*, ch. 9: 3.
[9] *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 20: 12.
[10] *Li Ki*, ch. 9: 1.

The Evolution of Confucianism

Less than two centuries after Confucius's death, the Confucian School was divided into two wings. The Idealistic wing was led by Mencius, the Realistic wing by Hsuntzu or Hsun-Ching. Both accepted the educational aims as set forth in the *Great Learning*; but concerning human nature, their views differed greatly. The Idealistic Confucianists believed that " man receives nature from Heaven ", and the god-given nature is innately good. Education is simply a process of continual unfolding of potential goodness in the human nature. Mencius said that " all things are complete within us. There is no greater delight than to realise this through self-cultivation." [11] On the other hand, the Realistic Confucianists thought that " the nature of man is evil, and his goodness is only acquired training." [12] Mencius pointed out that the human nature may be revealed on two different levels. On the higher level, we find the virtues of Love, Righteousness, Reverence, and Wisdom; on the lower level, the desire of the mouth for flavour, of the eyes for colour, of the ears for sound, and of the body for comfort, etc. Hsuntzu seemed to recognise only the lower level. He, therefore, said:

> The original nature of man is to seek for gain. If desires are followed, strife and rapacity will result.[13]

But Mencius insisted that—

> no man is devoid of a feeling of commiseration, nor of the feeling of shame and dislike, nor the feeling of modesty and yielding, nor of the feeling of plain right and wrong. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of Love; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of Righteousness; the feeling of modesty is the beginning of Reverence; and the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of Wisdom. . . . Since all men have these four foundations of virtue in the soul, let them know how to give them full development and completion.[14]

The fundamental difference between these two philosophers lies in their conception of ' Heaven.' In most cases, Mencius conceived ' Heaven ' as a personal god. He, therefore, believed that the nature endowed by Heaven is innately good. Hsuntzu was a realist; he would not venture to speculate on things supernatural. He said: " The sage does not seek to know Heaven," and " instead of obeying heaven and praising it, why not seize the opportunity to utilise it?" [15] The Realistic Confucianists did not see the goodness in the " God-given " nature as the Idealistic Confucianists did.

Following the unification of China under the Chin dynasty (221–207 B.C.), Confucianism received a heavy blow from the Legalists. The first emperor (Shih Huang Ti) of Chin decreed in 213 B.C.

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[11] *Mencius*, Bk. VIIA, ch. 4: 1.
[12] *Hsuntzu*, Bk. 23, Section 1.
[13] *Hsuntzu*, Bk. 23, Section 1.
[14] *Mencius*, Bk. IIA, ch. 6: 4–7.
[15] *Hsuntzu*, Bk. 17, Section 19.

that all literature to which the non-Legalist scholars look for authority be taken by the local officials and burned. Drastic punishment was proclaimed for those who failed to burn their books. Many Confucianists who violated the command were executed, and hundreds were buried alive.

Fortunately, the Chin dynasty was overthrown before long, and the Han dynasty which succeeded the Chin changed the policy entirely and encouraged learning. Many Confucian practices were again adopted. The Emperor Wu of Han (reigned 140–88 B.C.) formally announced that Confucianism should be adopted as State teaching. The predomination of Confucianism, however, did not mean the extinction of the other schools of thought. The flexibility of the teachings of the Confucian School made it possible to assimilate the thoughts of other schools. As a result, the Confucianism of the later Han period (after the beginning of the Christian era) became, in many respects, a synthetic product to which all other philosophical schools contributed. It was no longer the original Confucianism in the pre-Chin period (before 221 B.C.).

Meanwhile, Buddhism was introduced into China after the middle of the first century. Neo-Taoism and the Taoist religion were also fully developed during the "Six Dynasties" (A.D. 222–558). These new movements gradually overshadowed Confucianism. The best minds were shifting from Confucianism to Buddhism and Taoism. In the later part of the eighth century, however, a revival of Confucianism was started. At first, the revival movement was in opposition to both Buddhism and Taoism, but finally the ideas of Buddhism and Taoism were both absorbed into the Confucianism. The result was the development of Neo-Confucianism.

Neo-Confucianism has been regarded as a synthesis of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, in which Confucianism dominated. To describe it more specifically, the term 'Confucianism' used here refers to the teachings of the Idealistic wing of the Confucian School; the term 'Buddhism' here means Buddhism together with the Taoist philosophy via the medium of Chanism; and the term 'Taoism' here designates specifically the Taoist religion with the teaching of the Yin-Yang School as its essence.[16]

The philosophers of the Sung dynasty (960–1276) turned to the Confucian Classics to find in them new meanings and new interpretations which the Han scholars had never detected. They attempted to reconstruct the classical past on a new foundation of rational philosophy. The Confucian texts were reinterpreted and made intellectually interesting.

Again the Neo-Confucianists were divided into two camps, the

[16] Fung Yu-Lan's *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, ch. 23, pp. 268–9.

Cheng-Chu School and the Lu-Wang School. According to the Cheng-Chu School, in the universe there is only one law (or truth), but its functions are diverse. This universal law existed before heaven and earth. Imparted into each individual being or object, it becomes the rule of life of the animate or the particular principle of being of the inanimate. The universal law is always in existence whether there is mind or not. On the other hand, the Lu-Wang School believed that the laws of nature are legislated by mind. If there is no mind, there can be no law. Knowledge comes to us through the mind; there is no law apart from the mind. Both schools, however, agreed that every man can become a sage through education and through his own effort.

The rational philosophy of the Neo-Confucianists became the fashion of the educated for several centuries. At the end of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), however, it had deteriorated into empty philosophising, and failed completely to face the realities of the political problems of the day. The scholars of the Ching dynasty (1644–1911) tried again to reconstruct the Confucian philosophy to meet the changing circumstances. One group laid emphasis on the new method of critical research. Its influence came later to be known as 'the School of Han Learning' (*Han Hsueh*). Another group challenged the content of Neo-Confucianism and tried to destroy it altogether. The development of the Yen-Li School may be regarded as its result.

After reviewing briefly the evolution of Confucianism, one cannot blame Confucius for everything that happened in China two thousand years after his death, as some of the authors are doing to-day.

The East Meets the West

From the sixteenth century onward, European influence began to be felt more and more in China. In the year 1599, Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) arrived in Peking and introduced European sciences, mathematics, and astronomy, which at once attracted wide attention. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, Hsi Kuang-chi (1560–1644), a Chinese disciple of Ricci, translated the six books of the Euclid in 1607, and also many other works by Western authors. The change of dynasty from Ming (1368–1644) to Ching (1644–1911) did not affect the introduction of Western learning into China. Ricci's work was continued by two of his able successors, Schall Von Bell (1591–1666) and Ferdinal Verdiest (1623–1688), who were greatly favoured by the court for their contributions in astronomical and mathematical studies. During the reign of Kang Hsi (1662–1722), the Jesuits in the employment of the Chinese Government made the first modern map of China. In 1669 Verdiest became astronomer royal to the crown.

The real awakening of the Chinese people to Western influence, however, began in the nineteenth century, when China was repeatedly defeated by the Western Powers. Having learned bitter lessons, China began to realise that unless she adopted the Western way of fighting and manufacturing war supplies, she could hardly expect to be on equal footing with her neighbours in the struggle for national existence. But her attention was still focused on Western technology, especially in shipbuilding and in manufacturing ammunition. It was only the Western technology, not the culture, that China was trying to learn.

Gradually some reflective Chinese minds began to doubt China's attitude towards the Western civilisation. They asked themselves: "Is the military superiority the only thing that Western nations excel in?" and "Is China's problem simply one of military incompetence, or is there something which seems to be weak in her political organisation and her cultural heritage?" Yet they still insisted that the salvation of China lay in the revival of Confucianism by applying Western methods. They tried to protect the Confucian core of Chinese life by an armour of Occidental devices.

After 1895, and particularly after 1900, conditions in China rapidly altered. Profound Chinese thinkers have been convinced that the modern Western civilisation contains many elements which the old Chinese culture lacks, and which are essential for the rejuvenation of the nation. There arose the 'New Culture Movement.' It had many intellectual currents joined into one stream; yet the opinion of Chinese intellectuals was still divided. Some scholars believe that China has evolved a worthy civilisation of her own, which should not be lost in the blind acceptance of Western culture. Great caution should be exercised in selecting the suitable elements from foreign civilisation, which should not be allowed to destroy the traditional value of Chinese culture. These scholars maintain that through a revaluation of the past conducted on the principles of critical research, the Chinese people might hope to find the clue to their salvation in the modern world. This new approach has attracted some of the best minds in the country. It gives the conservative and responsible people a hope for the future in which old sanctities may be preserved and even attain a new reality.

On the other hand, many scholars regard Confucianism as something outmoded. The influence of the great past has been declining, and there is nothing to take its place except the unadulterated Westernism. Some have gone so far as to advocate the complete adoption of Western culture for China. The so-called 'complete adoption of Western culture' means, of course, whole-hearted modernisation. The view is clearly stated by Hu Shih as follows:

The example of Japan gives us some hope for the future of Chinese civilisation. Japan has unreservedly accepted modern Western civilisation and succeeded thereby in rejuvenating her own. By sheer willingness to learn and by determined effort to imitate, she has become one of the Great Powers of the world, and has attained a modern government and a modern culture. The modern civilisation of Japan has been frequently criticised as a mere importation from the West, but such criticism barely touches the surface of things. If we analyse this new civilisation more sympathetically, we shall find that it contains much that must be termed as indigenous. With the rise of general prosperity made possible by the mechanical and industrial civilisation, the native artistic genius of the nation has been able to develop in the course of a few decades a new art and a new literature commensurable with the material progress in the country at large. Her landscape and centres of scenic beauty remain Japanese, only they are better kept, and are made more accessible by modern means of transportation. The love of beauty and cleanliness remain as Japanese as of old, and they now have better and more beautiful things to enjoy.

Let us hope, therefore, that China may yet achieve such a cultural rejuvenation as Japan has done. Let us now begin what Japan began some fifty or sixty years ago. Let us not be swerved from our determination by the apologistic views of our conservative thinkers, or by the fear of losing our own identity. Let us build up technological and industrial civilisation as a minimum basis for our new national life. And let us hope that if there is something truly in us, that something may be able to bloom forth and reach fruition on the new soil of health, wealth, and leisure, made possible by the progress of science and industry.[17]

Some Educational Problems of Modern China

(1) Since 1905, a public school system has been introduced into China. At first it was modelled after Japan, which in turn had adopted the educational practices of the Western nations. In 1922 the school system was again revised after the model of the United States. Since the establishment of the National Government in Nanking in 1927, some students who returned from France tried to introduce the French educational system into China. The whole country was divided into 'University Districts.' In each district, a national university took charge of the administration of public education, but it did not succeed in the long run. Then the English examination system was introduced into China to unify the standards of secondary schools. After 1943 some German educational practices found their way into the Chinese system. At present, everything modelled after Soviet Russia is regarded as of superior value. All these Western practices may have helped China to a certain extent, but an indigenous educational system should be developed to meet the real needs of the Chinese people. What should this new system be? It is a question in the minds of many educators.

(2) The new Chinese Constitution provides that all children

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[17] "Conflict of Cultures," by Hu Shih, *China Christian Yearbook of 1929*, pp. 120–1.

between the ages of 6 and 12 shall receive a 'fundamental education', and that all illiterate adults shall receive a 'make-up education.' Out of about 76 million children of school age in China, there are still 46 million children not yet in school. In order to accommodate these 46 million children, there must be at least one million additional classrooms. There is also a dearth of teachers. Of approximately eight hundred thousand teachers in existing primary schools, some 60 per cent. have had no special training as teachers. The situation is bad enough for the present enrolment; now we need one and a half million teachers for the new programme, for it is estimated that one and a half teachers are needed for each class.

There is not only numerical deficiency; there are also other drawbacks: (*a*) The salary is too low, and many trained teachers have left their work. (*b*) The teacher's salary in the rural districts is lower than in the cities, hence teachers prefer to remain in the cities. This has resulted in a surplus of teachers in the cities and a dearth in the country. Moreover, the increase of classrooms and the number of teachers necessitate the increase of expenditures. The inflation of currency throughout the country multiplies the difficulty of making a budget. This is an acute problem for fundamental education; no satisfactory solution has yet been found.

(3) Chinese education in preceding centuries has long overlooked vocational training. Before 1903 the only training received by the people for a vocation was secured through their parents or through some private tutors. What the parents do would be imitated by their children. The child of a farmer usually learns to be a farmer; and that of an artisan, to be an artisan; that of a merchant, to be a merchant. Through home education children naturally follow in the steps of their parents. Children who learn a vocation from a private tutor acquire it usually through apprenticeship. In this medium of learning, the techniques learned are quite limited, and the obligations on the part of the learner are irksome. It was as late as 1903 that the establishment of industrial schools was included as a part of the Government educational programme. The system was revised in 1912, and again in 1922. Many problems in vocational education remain unsolved. (*a*) The teaching materials used in the vocational schools are somewhat inadequate. What has been taught in vocational schools is largely a miniature of the textbooks used in colleges. Too much theoretical material is crammed into a course, and the necessary practices are often neglected. (*b*) The school equipment is inadequate. The agricultural schools are not sufficiently equipped with 'demonstration farms' or with new farming apparatus. The technical schools have no adequate workshops or laboratories. (*c*) The students in vocational schools do not always

maintain a proper attitude towards a profession. Some of them are too proud to demean themselves by manual labour, and, therefore, are unadapted to the occupations. While learning a vocation, their minds are still wondering about chances to get into a college. They try to use the vocational school as a stepping-stone to college. (*d*) The social environment does not give encouragement to the students. Factory and shop owners still prefer to take in apprentices without previous training rather than the graduates of vocational schools. Nor are the members of a labour union quite ready to receive non-member students just graduated from school.

(4) The most serious problem concerning secondary education is the making of the curriculum for middle schools. Though China has followed the pattern of the United States in establishing junior and senior high schools (called junior and senior middle schools), yet the minimum standards set for middle schools are much higher than those of American high schools. Analytic geometry, college algebra, even elementary calculus are required in the senior middle school. The load is indeed too heavy for the students. Many students break physically during these school years; others become discouraged and lose interest in all subjects. Whenever a committee is appointed to discuss the curriculum, the 'expert' in each particular subject usually pleads to raise the standard for that subject. None of them is willing to lower or reduce the requirements in any branch of studies. Many required courses are crowded into the curriculum, leaving little or no time for electives. Even more serious is the fact that the entrance examination of the college requires a still higher standard. The contention of the college authorities is that they are compelled to be selective as their facilities are so limited and they cannot accommodate everybody who wants to enter college. They, therefore, have to select the best from the group by competitive examinations. For this reason they set the standard high. Meanwhile every middle school is competing to raise its standards to meet the requirement of the college entrance examination. Thus a vicious circle is established.

(5) The important problem in higher education also concerns the curriculum. Over-specialisation or over-concentration in the college curriculum tends to narrow the outlook of the students. The function of a liberal education is somewhat overlooked. Even in the freshman year, we find the tendency for special concentration. Throughout the four years of college many required courses for specialisation are provided in detail for each department; very little room is left for general survey subjects which will broaden the basic knowledge of the students. Even in the field of specialisation, many required courses are introduced with little choice of electives left for students. This is especially true in the small colleges,

where very few electives are offered. Nor has the real meaning of the 'tutorial system' been fully grasped in Chinese colleges. Every student studies under a fully developed course system; very little time is left for private instruction by a tutor. No student is allowed to substitute the additional work with his tutor for one or more provided courses.

(6) There is another serious problem which concerns the conflict of 'political ideologies.' As Professor John S. Brubacher of Yale University has said: "Schoolmen almost universally have deplored the entrance of politics into school affairs." But "in the Communistic ideology, and in the Fascistic as well, it is unthinkable that the schools should lie outside the political sphere. Since the school trains the future citizen, education is far too strategic an instrument to fall into the hands of any save the State." [18]

In recent years the controversies over political ideologies in China have been serious. Schools, especially colleges, have been greatly affected. The Nationalists once agreed to withdraw party activities from schools, but it did not mean the end of the trouble. The 'underground work' of all parties has been very active among both teachers and students. Young men, respectively indoctrinated with different ideologies, are dreaming of various kinds of Utopia. They become not only restless in the school, but also are dissatisfied with existing conditions in the world as a whole. Of course, through dissatisfaction new reforms may be introduced, and new progress achieved. The world cannot be kept in *status quo*. We have no way to prevent the infiltration of political ideology, but we should train students to test the validity of the theories by a scientific method. Time is needed for making experiments in solving this problem.

(7) The problem of educational administration in China is over-concentration of power. The Central Government exercises legislative power over all educational affairs, national, provincial, and local. Everything is regulated in detail, very little opportunity is left for local authorities to take initiative measures to meet the particular needs in their respective localities. On the other hand, the Ministry of Education in the Central Government is overloaded with too many activities and many things are left undone, affecting the efficiency of the administration. However, any proposal for decentralisation would meet with much opposition. The problem still needs careful consideration.

In this short article, the writer tries only to state the facts. No attempt is made to suggest hasty solutions for any of the problems. He hopes, however, that in seeking solutions for these practical problems, some useful educational theories may be discovered.

KING CHU.

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[18] J. S. Brubacher's *Modern Philosophies of Education*, p. 140.

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PART TWO

BUDDHIST TRADITION

As there are different sorts of Buddhists, so there are different sorts of Buddhism, in China as elsewhere. But whatever these differences may be, the overwhelming majority of the people in China are Buddhists either by faith or as a result of their social heritage. In the vast field of this subject the authors propose to discuss, in this article, first the ethics of Buddhism, secondly Buddhism as a social trend, and thirdly the modernisation of Buddhist education on the frontiers of China where the Lamaic form is all-important.

Buddhist Ethics

Disregarding popular superstitions manifested by its followers, Buddhism as a philosophical system has distinctive contributions to make to the development of unfolding personalities. This system may be considered theoretically and practically.

(*a*) *Theoretical Consideration.*—Whether we deem it satisfactory or not, the Buddhist theory of a selfless life constitutes its most elaborate attempt at removing the ground for egoistic thinking. On the one hand the holding on to the self as something permanent is considered a source of ignorance which handicaps individual freedom, while on the other hand individual responsibility as a moral

agent must be maintained to appreciate the law of cause and effect. In fact, the assertion that in the last analysis one can only liberate oneself, and that no outside saviour can be of any help, sets Buddhism apart from other systems of thought which involve vicarious sacrifice. But who is the agent that plants the seeds and reaps the harvest of one's action, and who is aspiring to eventual enlightenment, if the reality of the self is denied? Buddhism solves this problem of paradox by its theory of relational causation. According to this theory all existences are the result of many factors. When the necessary factors are in proper relation to one another there is being or life. When the relationship is dissolved there is non-being or death. Any existence derived from relational causation is subject to change all the time. Nothing is permanent. Nothing is self-caused. Nor is anything caused by any eternal being. We may follow this theory up at three different levels.

At the Hīnayānist or Small-Vehicle level, the reality of the self is denied but the law of an ever-changing phenomenon is recognised. In an event of change the antecedent is regarded as cause and its consequent as effect. If the cause be the motivating power, the effect must be the recipient of this power. The individual as an aggregate of so many factors or elements of this kind of ever-changing phenomenon is thus the moral agent participating in the cause-and-effect chains known as existence. So long as the individual is recognised as an aggregate there is no independent self apart from this causal chain. But the recognition of this selfless nature of the individual is in itself a way of dissolving the binding force of all existences, a way of dissolving the Wheel of Life (*Saṁsara*), a way of Nirvāna. The ignorance to hold on to the apparent reality of the self, which is actually non-independent and non-permanent, makes the individual ever-involved in the chain of cause and effect, in the Wheel of Life. Only a selfless life is the life of freedom, free from ignorance and entanglements.

There are two levels upheld by the Mahāyānists or followers of the Great Vehicle. At one level the reflecting seed-mind (*Ālaya-vijñāna*) is recognised. As this changes, there are events like a causal chain, manifesting an apparent reality of external phenomena and the self. The ignorance of holding on to this as independent, leads one to become entangled in endless misery. Once, however, one recognises the fact that external phenomena and the self are but the reflection of the seed-mind, the latter becomes wisdom. If the reflection is impure, it produces the worldly selves, which, though non-permanent, are regarded as existent. Otherwise there would be no room for the law of cause and effect. What is denied is the permanent nature of the selves. If the reflection is pure it produces Enlightenment, a kind of self characterised by the Buddha. But the Buddha-self itself is non-permanent.

At another level the Doctrine of the Mean (*Mādhyamika*) denies

the permanent nature of both external phenomena and the seed-mind. Both being void, they exist only in name. In the realm of relational causation, those who are involved in misery or are caught in endless births and deaths, are named sentient beings, while those who are enlightened and become free are referred to as Buddhas. The sentient beings and Buddhas are so called in relation to one another. Their existence is only nominal, not self-caused. But the nominal self is recognised as the agent of cause and effect, for otherwise the result would be nihilism. At the same time nominal existence is after all only nominal, being derived from its relative position in the scheme of names and classes. If one considers the nominal existence as real or self-caused, one becomes entangled in attachment and miseries. The Doctrine of the Mean then tries to avoid the extremes of nihilism on the one hand, and realism on the other.

(*b*) *Practical Consideration.*—If the theoretical basis of a selfless life is too abstract, the practical implication of Buddhist ethics is more substantial. We may set forth a few salient points as follows.

First, the 'ten virtues' are universally accepted: (1) not to kill anything living; (2) not to take what has not been given; (3) not to fornicate; (4) not to tell a lie; (5) not to abuse or revile; (6) not to talk foolishness; (7) not to slander; (8) not to be avaricious or covetous; (9) not to think upon doing harm or mischief; and (10) not to entertain heretic notions. By being virtuous one is happy. No one else is responsible for one's misery. The only source of misery is ignorance. One who is ignorant of this fact is tempted by selfish interests.

Second, the belief in one's harvesting what one has planted makes one practise what one considers to be good and avoid what one considers to be bad. If a man is his own redeemer as well as his own destroyer, his sense of responsibility becomes the keenest. By being virtually better and better and less and less bad one may become more and more purified until one is the embodiment of Purity itself, so that the power of becoming a Buddha or otherwise known as God lies within oneself.

Third, the recognition of selfishness as the result of ignorance makes one aspire to attain a selfless life without prejudice. Only this aspiration cannot be realised without strict observation of self-discipline. But to whatever extent the attainment is made, the acceptance of self-discipline as a necessity is already a great help. One advances in accordance with one's progress in discipline.

Fourth, the practice of meditation does away with disturbing thoughts and impulses and sustains what is gained through self-discipline. Thus a kind of consciousness is aroused which is wisdom itself. Through this wisdom one is able to heighten one's power of self-discipline by reconstructing one's personality. An Arhat (solitary saint), a Bodhisattva (one whose purpose is to help

others), and a Buddha (the embodiment of enlightenment) are but different stages in the same process of attainment.

Fifth, the theory and practice of esoteric Buddhism utilise what is generally discarded by puritanical or exoteric Buddhism. The material body, for instance, is used as a means to enrich the spiritual life, and the impermanent world becomes solid enough to build truths in. Consequently pessimism is changed into optimism and mental reconstruction is enlarged into environmental reconstruction. To be more specific, the process of mental creation of all sorts of tutelary images is a method of mental reconstruction, while that of completion is an experiment in vital reconstruction through physiological development by exercising the powers of breath and pulsation, etc.; the practice of alms-giving (material aid as well as spiritual guidance), together with other means of salvation, is straightforward intelligent altruism, whereas the basic standpoint of Buddhist equality and love is to create a classless society on an international scale, nay, even on a cosmic scale!

Social Trend

So much for the moral implication of Buddhism as a philosophical system. Now, what has happened and what is going to happen to Buddhism in China? Actually Chinese thought, art, and other aspects of culture have undergone great changes through their impact upon Buddhism. Without going into detail, we may say that Chinese thought, before the introduction of Buddhism, had primarily been dominated by Confucianism. As the latter was too much concerned with personal relationships, such as those between the king and his ministers, between the father and his sons, etc., people had to seek release in Taoism, which at a higher level cultivates the sense of oneness with the universe by transcending all man-made conventions and differences. As soon as Buddhism was introduced into China, however, people saw in it a point of view even more comprehensive and far-reaching than Taoism. The elaborateness, concreteness, and systematic nature of Buddhist thought far surpassed anything in either Taoism or Confucianism. Consequently sophisticated people adopted Buddhism eagerly, so much so, that one would be ashamed if one were ignorant of its teachings. The violent reaction of ardent Confucianists, such as Han-yü, who protested against Buddhist relics in A.D. 810, in the T'ang (A.D. 618–906), and Sung (A.D. 960–1276) dynasties, was itself an evidence of Buddhist influence. Moreover, many outstanding Confucianist philosophers, such as Chu Hsi (?–1200) and Wang Yang-ming (1472–1528), actually developed Confucianism by incorporating Buddhism into it.

It is a well-known fact that Buddhist architecture, painting, and other forms of image-making have become an important part of Chinese art. The carved figures in Yun Kang, of Shan-si, the cave

paintings in Tun-huang, of Kansu, and many temples of the Sui (A.D. 589–617) and T'ang dynasties are among the treasures of the world.

So far as literature is concerned, the care given to the definition of new terms, the systematic style of treatment, and the scale of collaborative undertaking in translations under the leadership of Western and Chinese Buddhist monks, such as Kumārajīva (A.D. 344–413), Hsuan-chuang (A.D 603–64), Yi-ching (A.D. 635–713), etc., have hardly been surpassed by modern scholars.

Different schools of Buddhism were both introduced directly from India and developed indigenously in China. Important Indian schools transplanted into China were the Mahāyānist Ideationism (Vijñānavāda or Vei-shih) and the Doctrine of the Mean (Mādhyamika or Chung-kuan), the Hīnayānist Realism (Abhidharma-kośa or Chü-shê) and Nihilism (Satyasiddhi or Ch'eng-shih). Those developed by Chinese masters were T'ien-t'ai, Hsien-shou (or Hua-yen, Avataṅsaka), Pure Land (Sukhāvatī or Ching-t'u), and Meditation (Dhyāna or Ch'an, Japanese Zen). In a later stage esoteric Buddhism and the school of Discipline (Vinaya or Lü) were also introduced from India. After Buddhist fluorescence reached its peak, Emperor Wu-tsung (A.D. 841–6) of the T'ang dynasty attempted a wholesale destruction. Only the masters of the Meditation School survived the deluge, for they escaped to far-away hermitages. Since esoteric Buddhism depends upon oral instruction and a Chinese master transmitted its teachings to Kūkai (or Kbo Daishi A.D. 774–835), a Japanese monk who returned to Japan without leaving a Chinese pupil, it ceased to flourish among the Chinese population. Furthermore, later revivals of the T'ien-t'ai, Pure Land, and Discipline schools never reached their former glory.

However, during the troubled years between the end of the Manchu dynasty (A.D. 1911) and the establishment of the Republic of China, many lay Buddhists and monks reacted positively to the wave of Western materialism by what may be called a movement of Buddhist renaissance. They tried to extract Buddhist learning from popular superstitions and started centres for the purpose. For instance, Yang Jen-shan re-edited and printed Buddhist works in Nanking, and Ou-yang Ching-wu and Han Ch'ing-ching propagated Ideationism in the south and north respectively. In the effort to make a systematic acculturation between Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism, which was introduced directly from India in the seventh and eighth centuries A.D., and which embodies both exoteric and esoteric aspects, T'ai-hsü, a progressive monk, established in 1922 a school of Tibetan language and in 1924 a Buddhist college in Nanking. Young monks were enrolled and trained in a comprehensive way without sectarian prejudices. After his visit to Western countries in 1930, T'ai-hsü's vision was farther broadened and preparations were made for the establishment of an

International University of Buddhism, with departments of Sino-Japanese, Sino-Sanskrit, Sino-Tibetan, and Sino-European studies, and affiliated societies to reach the laity. Even though this gigantic scheme was not carried out, it has proved to be a great stimulus to progressive thought and interest. T'ai-hsü's pupils, who were sent to Tibet and Kham, etc., are becoming promising scholars to bridge the gaps between Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism or what is popularly known as Lamaism. At the same time Buddhism as a philosophy and a psychology is drawing into its fold more and more scientific scholars all over China. To mention only a few centres established in recent years, the Sino-Tibetan College of Buddhism in Chungking, established by T'ai-hsü himself, the West China Frontier Research Institute in Cheng-tu, under the leadership of Professor Li An-che, the Western Border Cultural Institute in Chengtu and the International Propagation Centre of Buddhism in Shanghai, under the guidance of Professor Chang Hsü and Mr. Shao Fu-ch'en respectively, and the Bodhic Society in Peking, and many others elsewhere: all are either the direct outcome of the same trend or have been indirectly stimulated by the national crisis of China's resistance to Japanese invasion since 1931. It would be a mistake to think of this revival of Buddhism as an escape mechanism, for it is a movement to unite all China, especially its frontier regions, through a more purified Buddhism. And this brings us to the third part of our discussion.

Modernisation

Although Tibetan Buddhism has existed for more than a thousand years, although Mongolia has adopted it since A.D. 1253, and although Tibetan masters have worked in the interior of China for many centuries, their teaching and Chinese Buddhism as such never influenced each other satisfactorily in the Imperial days. The reason is not far to seek. It was far back in the eighth century after Christ that Chinese masters worked in Tibet, but not until recently that the movement was followed up. When Tibetan scholars came, they contacted only Mongolian and Manchu rulers of China. If they saw Chinese emperors, they received only titles and gifts. In neither case had they any direct contact with Chinese Buddhists. Furthermore, the Manchu emperors made it taboo for the Chinese on the one hand and Mongolian and Tibetans on the other to know each other's language. The fear of a united front on the part of the subject peoples was too great. Incidentally, the limitations of Tibetan diet make it imperative for Tibetan monks to eat meat. This habit and the images of esoteric Buddhism, of which Chinese Buddhists lack knowledge, set the latter apart from their fellow-believers on the frontier.

There are also important gaps in Tibetan and Chinese translation of Sanskrit works. For instance, of the Hīnayānist texts

the Chinese version has the Vibhāṣā-śāstra, the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra, and the Sarvāstivādanikāyapāda, while there is only the portion of the latter by Kātyāyana in Tibetan. In the Mahāyānist field there are no Chinese versions of the Abhisamayālaṁkāra by Maitreya and the works on logic by Dharma-kīrti, such as Pramāṇa-vārttika-kārikā, Pramāṇa-viniścaya, and Nyāyabindu-nāma-prakaraṇa; the Tibetans have no Dvādasa-śāstra and Mahāprajñā-praramitā, by Nāgārjuna, whereas the Chinese lack the Mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti by Buddhapālita and the Madhyamakāvatāra by Candrakīrti; and there is no Chinese version of the works of Anuttara-yoga, the highest in esoteric Buddhism.

Modern scholarship is undertaking the job of making both Chinese and Tibetan texts complete. Many important works by Tibetan masters have already been translated into Chinese. Beginnings are also being made to translate Chinese works into Tibetan. Although the effort is better appreciated by the Chinese, no doubt Tibetan scholars will collaborate more closely once the work gains its own momentum.

From what has been done, it is evident that as soon as there is better mutual understanding, not only will the complete system of Buddhism be enriched and purified in China as a whole, but Tibetan Buddhism in particular will become a more effective means of education on the frontiers through modernisation.

It has been a common misunderstanding that Tibetan Buddhism comprises nothing but superstition. As a matter of fact, however, there are many outstanding points in its system of education, quite apart from its general aspects, which, except for its esoterism, are held in common with Chinese Buddhism. For example: (1) Both moral and intellectual qualities are emphasised in the lamaseries without the disadvantage of modern education wherein the passing on of information is predominant. (2) So far as discipline is concerned, it is expected equally of student-monks and faculty. It is the common creed of both groups, unlike the situation in modern schools, in which the students are set apart as the object of discipline, while the teachers have another code of behaviour. (3) Students and teachers are united purely on a voluntary basis of intellectual and spiritual aspirations, without being handicapped by a credit system or commercialised atmosphere of tuition fees, salaries, and mechanical promotion. (4) The rules, academic and otherwise, are strict, leaving no room for personal favours. (5) Both students and teachers enjoy freedom of individual adjustment without the formalistic restrictions characterised by mass-production. (6) Open debates, group examinations, and public lectures offer facilities for standardisation. (7) This process does not affect the students only, but also the teachers. If one is able to prove one's thesis, even a novel one, it becomes the

common property of the community, because it has been demonstrated in public. There is no room for fanciful theories put forward for the enjoyment of their authors in the name of free thinking. (8) Concentration on certain problems is possible with all the time necessary, therefore, because there is no cramming and no room for being busy merely for the sake of being active.

We have already mentioned a little about esoterism. Besides its symbolisms in so many Lamaic images, which have been the main source of misunderstanding, and which are too broad a subject to be even touched upon here, it is a practical theory much more advanced than puritanical exoteric Buddhism. It is true that esoterism is reserved for the chosen who are properly initiated, but the chosen are those who have taken the vow to make the welfare of others their sole concern. Whatever exists is taken as the necessary material to work with, not to be discarded or kept apart, in order to attain the perfect stage of enlightenment. In the world of individualism and self-righteousness, separatism and even 'pure research', which have been obstacles to real democracy—of the people, for the people, by the people—the lamas alone have long been theoretically conscious of the necessity of being *with* the people. Neither are they merely theorists. They experiment on themselves as part of humanity, nay, of all the sentient beings and the universe. They are in line with those modern workers who stand for interdisciplinary and experimental research in the psycho-physico-cultural realms. Modern scholarship in culture and personality studies through ethnology and psycho-analysis would be enriched immensely by the findings about experimental psychology of the lamas, if only outsiders could learn it. The rich material of biographies of so many Tibetan saints and living Buddhas is something which we cannot long ignore. But apart from research values, the living examples of these lamas have an enlivening effect on the masses in general and will not be gauged for a long time to come until socio-cultural sciences are more advanced. This is why, in spite of many drawbacks, ever since its contact with Buddhism, Tibetan culture has been an integrative and vigorous one.

But if Tibetan Buddhism on the frontiers is so ideal, where comes in the necessity of modernisation? No doubt there are also weak points in its institutionalism. First, the subject-matter taught in the monasteries is too limited to equip the students with the necessary knowledge to live in a modern world. Secondly, the concentration of learning in the monasteries leaves the masses, who are extremely ignorant, without other forms of school education. Thirdly, even the best ecclesiastic education is introvert in orientation and cannot harness the power of nature for the well-being of society.

The task of modernisation of Buddhist education on the

frontiers, then, is something like this. First of all, the lamas should be encouraged to engage themselves in actual educational work for the laity; for to help the people to help themselves is always a better policy than an institutionalised monopoly which does things for them. If Tibetan religion is intrinsically valuable, why not teach it to the people instead of reserving it in the monasteries by simply chanting the scriptures over them? To interest the lamas in the needs of the laity is a problem similar to that in which secularisation of knowledge has taken place in many other parts of the world. "Go back to nature and to the people" is a demand as valid for the Tibetan privileged now as it was for the Europeans in the Middle Ages.

Next to this, the curriculum of monastic education should be broadened. It is a fact that among the subjects taught in the lamaseries are medicine and astronomy, in addition to philosophy and mysticism. To follow the same pattern, other subjects, including modern technique, could easily be added. Modern medicine, though not yet taught in such institutions, has already been recognised by the Tibetans, lay and ecclesiastic, as having a more specific value in certain cases in which traditional medicine does not offer cures. In some places improved animal husbandry and chemical and textile industry are being demonstrated in connection with animal products. There is no reason why these features cannot be more widely carried out.

We Chinese, as non-members of Tibetan culture, have also been instrumental in establishing modern schools apart from the lamaseries, to train the laity in up-to-date citizenship as well as in other basic sciences. As these are being taught in both Tibetan and Chinese and as religious freedom is protected, not only the lay members of the community are giving them enthusiastic welcome, but the ecclesiastics are becoming sympathetic collaborators. Thus, with an increasingly enlightened public on the one hand, and a more progressive religious order on the other, eventual Tibetan renaissance may easily be brought about, by carrying out what is basic in Tibetan religion, together with the secularisation of its teachings, and the addition of scientific techniques both inside and outside the lamaseries.

In this connection it should be noted that the recent revolutionary movement in China is going to be a tremendous force in furthering this trend. The outside world should not be misguided by an assumption that the Communists are anti-religious. As a matter of fact, a policy has been adopted for the protection of religious freedom and minority rights of autonomy. This will further purify Buddhism, among other religions, not only on the frontiers, but in China as a whole.

LI AN-CHE.
FA TSUN.

CHAPTER EIGHT

JAPAN

It is a characteristic of Japanese society that of the deposits of the past very little has been lost. An unusual continuity of tradition marks its culture, where, throughout period after period of history, now one and now another stratum may rub through to the surface, but all the while the generative elements for each generation come up through all the strata that lie below.

Traditional Japanese Morals

This is true of the moral sanctions that press upon every Japanese. To a degree scarcely seen in the West there is an agreement as to what constitutes the moral demand. It applies to everyone in society. For its elements are the accumulated experiences of the same race of people on the same chain of islands with a common ancestry, a common tongue, common neighbours, through common political developments, under one common dynastic line, for nearly two thousand years. Any analysis of morals in Japan must, therefore, take account of the historic experiences and tradition.

The bedrock of Japanese moral obligation lies at the level of all pre-literate societies, in the household and the small neighbourhood. At this stage the 'I ought' has little reality, but only the 'We ought.' Every act is prescribed by custom, and always it is in relation to the group. Within the family the *paterfamilias* is the supporting pillar, and all duties revolve about him. He, in turn, must relate himself to the village or smaller neighbourhood (*bu-raku*), where his duties, again, are clearly defined.

These two orbits of relationships cover every event in the cycle of human life from birth to death, and also the cycle of food supply and all community concerns, including the dealing with natural calamities and wars.

Presiding over all are the forces of nature deified (*Kami*); while within the home hover the spirits of former members, the ancestral genii. And for each village there are tutelary hero-spirits keeping guard. Contact is maintained through 'god-shelves' (*Kamidana*) in every home, and through the village shrine (*jinja*). Proper ceremonies at suitable times are as essential to the maintenance of this harmony between the two worlds as any inter-human transactions can possibly be. To live in conformity with these prescribed

patterns is to follow the 'way of the gods', and this is to be a good Japanese. Religion and morals, both rudimentary, are one.

This is the pattern seen in the earliest Japanese literature, and notwithstanding all the changes that have occurred along the centuries, it still persists. To-day one-half of all Japanese live in just such villages and households, enveloped by the same ancient ways and moral sanctions. And of the other half now living in cities, probably a majority look back with a sense of nostalgia and of partial loyalty to childhood experiences of the same kind of life in some rural community.

By the eighth century the emergence of the Yamato clan, with its strong devotion to its chieftain, and its traditional veneration of the sun, began to put its stamp on the social structure, the religion, and the morals of the Japanese. By this time Chinese culture and letters had poured in, and provided a medium for political reforms, and for the compilation of the first formal literature, the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*. These collections of cosmologies, myths, and proto-historic tales were intended to magnify the line of rulers, to relate them to the *Kami*, particularly through the sun goddess, and so to achieve a centre of unity for all the tribes of the islands.

Thus, the life of the household and of the neighbourhood was drawn into a larger orbit, that of the developing nation; and the religious and moral sanctions, far from being abrogated, were widened and deepened to move about this far more meaningful centre. Shinto, the way of the gods, now had its earthly exemplar in the Emperor, the lineal descendant of the gods and the object of loyalty of every subject.

Many other strands are interwoven in the Japanese moral pattern, though they are, we believe, subsidiary to these just described. The influence of Buddhism has been real. Introduced from China through Korea in A.D. 552, it has for a millennium and a half been a most fructifying force for refinement of manners, artistic creativity, spiritual discipline, and the hope for a future life. But always in times of crisis it has yielded to the more elemental, more demanding moral requirements of the old folk-ways and the national cult. For many centuries Buddhist scholars commended their faith to the people by interpreting it as but another aspect of Shinto (*Ryobu Shinto*). The Zen school was founded in Japan in the fourteenth century at a time of wars and from then until to-day its ascetic practices and exercises for inner control have provided a favourite discipline for military men. To-day, one-half of all Japanese are both Buddhists and Shintoists, and their moral convictions must be a blend of both, but it may be said with certainty that the influence of Shinto predominates.

Confucianism has, of course, entered deeply into the pattern of Japanese moral tradition. In so far as the family has been central, the ethical system of the Chinese sage has been studied and

honoured. As the Japanese home has developed it has followed quite closely the canons of moral behaviour set forth in China. Duties were conceived of as being in terms of the five relationships, three of which are within the home. The fourth, that of friends, is in the neighbourhood. Filial piety (*koko*) is extolled as a very high moral goal. And not only in theory, but in practice as well, many a Japanese life is shaped and all its major decisions made under the requirements of the family code. But, yet, in the orthodox arrangement of priority among the five relationships in Japan there never is any doubt that the primacy is held by that of ruler and subject. The supreme virtue is filial piety raised to the national level in loyalty (*chu-gi*) to the Emperor, the father of the national family.

During long periods of history this pattern has been blurred. There were centuries of neglect of the ruler and court, centuries of civil wars, and then two and a half centuries of dual authority, when the Shogun ruled while the Emperor reigned only in name. But in the modern period it reappeared stronger and more clearly defined than ever, and was made overwhelming by its implementation through all the modern media of education and opinion-making.

When Japan was opened to international contacts in 1854 and found herself helpless amid the forces that were sweeping her into the modern world, she reached back into her past to find a centre of unity and strength, and the result was a combination of Revived Shinto (*Fukko Shinto*), the ancient faith, with a restored Emperor at the centre, and a reorganisation of society as a modern nation-state. This took form in the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

For three decades, under the encouragement of the Western nations, Japan moved into this new world without too much turmoil, and consequently with a degree of freedom in the interpretation of moral requirements for the individual. Under the tutelage of Great Britain and America democratic ideals were cherished, and an eagerness to understand and learn from the traditions of Christendom ran throughout Japanese society. Even as late as the nineteen-twenties there were recurring periods of relaxing of the national demands. But from the time of the war with China (1894) the tensions of a growing nation entering competitive modern life through a series of wars closed in on the people; and to this day there really has been little relief.

We must, therefore, view the current moral standards and code of Japan as abnormally intensified by her history of national struggle and wars. Yet the present generation has known nothing else, so for them this extreme code has had the sanction of unvarying moral demand. Particularly, from September of 1931 until August 1945 there was no let-up at all. The nation moved from one crisis into another, each with an accompanying area of conflict

of widening radius and increased gravity, until it found itself involved in an attempt at ruling the Pacific world to get a base for a successful war against Western Powers ten or fifteen times its strength. It is scarcely to be wondered at that in this matrix of national crisis the leaders of the Japanese nation stereotyped their moral system on the old, trusted pattern, and left little room for individual initiative or dissent.

Morals and the Educational System

In all integrated societies education follows the pattern of morals. This is true of pre-literate societies, and it was so in early Japan. The transmission of the tradition was done without the help of letters or schools. Morals centred in the home, and in the home the training was done. The village, too, had its processes for inculcating the principles of living in the community. These two educational forces still operate in Japan.

Formal education through schools has always been known, but only a select few were included in its privileges. The nobility had their schools, and the temples trained their priesthood. There were even some schools of a public sort held in monasteries and temples (*terako*). In the feudal period there were schools for training the warrior class in military affairs (*bu-toku*). Each of these schools had its particular purpose and trained its pupils under a code appropriate to his class. But there was no such thing as a system of general education until the Meiji Restoration.

When, in 1872, the Educational Code was promulgated and the new system of public schools was established, it was done with a clear purpose in view—that of making citizens. At the upper levels there was differentiation, with some vocational choice. But for the basic training there was only one pattern. Attendance was compulsory, schools were provided for all, textbooks followed a single model, teachers underwent the same preparation and met the same tests. It is generally recognised that as a system of national education for citizenship the Japanese achievement was unparalleled.

The corner-stone of the edifice of public education was national morality (*Kokumin Do-toku*). By the Constitution, individual freedom of religious belief was guaranteed. But in the Educational Code the teaching of any religion in schools was prohibited. This left a clear field for the propagation of the national cult. Shinto as a religion has few if any teachings and little moral emphasis. It stresses sincerity (*Magokoro*), and ceremonial purity, but viewed as an ethical faith it is extremely rudimentary. As developed by the leaders of the Meiji period, however, the national cult came to have sharp ethical definition.

The chief points lifted into prominence were: the divine origin of Japan, land and people; the deity of the Emperor in lineal descent from the Solar Ancestress, Amaterasu O-Mikami, the

derived deity of the Japanese subjects who are all his kinsmen, and the messianic destiny of the nation throughout future years. (For a detailed study of this creed and its propagation, see D. C. Holtom, *The National Faith of Japan* (London, Kegan Paul, 1937).)

The teaching of this creed, together with its application to the life of Japanese subjects, constituted the course in ethics (*Shushin*), and was reserved for instruction by the principal. The textbooks setting it forth were issued by the national Ministry of Education (*Mombusho*). There was no other moral teaching except this orthodox course. Although the basic tenets were implicit from the first, it was during the war years, particularly in the 'thirties, that it took intensive form. (For a translation of these lessons for the six years of the Elementary School Course, together with the annotations officially given teachers for its instruction, see Robert King Hall, *Shushin, The Ethics of a Defeated Nation* (New York, Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1949).)

The mounting tempo of ultra-nationalism that developed as Japan went into war-time crises can be seen from the fact that the edition of official textbooks of 1924 was being used for the language study of children of Japanese parents living in the United States. But by 1932 the new edition was considered unsuitable and its use was abandoned.

Besides the formal instruction there were other even more powerful media for impressing upon pupils the central importance of this national morality. We refer to the ceremonial reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education issued under the seal of the Emperor Meiji in 1890, and thereafter utilised as a virtually religious ritual in all public schools. The recurrence of holidays and national celebrations, greatly multiplied during war, gave occasion for increased use of this ceremony, as well as that of the unveiling of the imperial portraits while the pupils stood bowed in reverence.

Another educational procedure of a ritualistic nature was the official visit of the entire school to a near-by shrine where Shinto priests celebrated rites before the gods of the Shinto pantheon. This gave the opportunity for further instruction and indoctrination in the classroom. The flag, too, came to be treated as sacred, and pupils were instructed to have their families keep it ceremonially wrapped upon a shelf below the household *kamidana* when not in use.

Outside the schools, but also a part of the officially promoted national education, there was the use of broadcasting through the government-directed radio stations. Every day began with the head bowed towards the palace in Tokyo, then came the singing of the national anthem, *Kimi-ga-yo,* which is an invocation for and

to the Emperor. This was followed by repeated reminders of the duty of each member of the household as a subject. The themes of the plays at the theatres and cinemas came to be predominantly patriotic. Public lectures were given in community meeting-places. The Young Men's and Young Women's Associations, numbering upwards of ten million members, had a routine of week-night meetings, workshops, and other promotional projects. Youth schools (*Seinen gakko*) carried on adult education in national duties for former pupils.

Sports were bent to the purposes of national moral education, both in schools and amongst the youth beyond school age. The cult of the Emperor Meiji centred in the great Meiji shrine in Tokyo, where draftees went to pay their obeisance upon entering the service, and where in the stadium national sports came to their climax. Patriotic singing was encouraged, as was the reading of newspapers, magazines, and books officially prepared for mass use by the public.

It was in this atmosphere of heightened national moral demand, with its reaction of emotional and volitional commitment of every person in society, that the final acute years of war were passed. And then, with the suddenness of death, came the defeat and surrender. On August 15th, 1945, the people gathered at their loud-speakers and heard the voice of their ruler for the first time in history. What he said to them, couched in the formal language suited to his rank, was that the war was over and they were defeated. But so incredible was this message that it was listened to by many as an enigma, and later in the day it had to be explained and confirmed by official commentators before it could be accepted.

Japan's Current Moral Dilemmas

Defeat and surrender came as a numbing shock, not only because it had never before come into the experience of the nation, but because it was a bewildering nullification of the entire national morality. Were the *Kami* angry? Was this their wrath (*tembatsu*)? The question was put to the Premier in the Diet, and he had no answer. Or were the deities impotent? And did this include the Solar Ancestress? If so, how about the Testament from Her under which the Emperor ruled? And what of the *Kokutai*—the very structure of national life ordained from ages eternal and inviolate? Had *Kodo,* the Imperial Way, been an illusion? All life for a decade had revolved about the duties of the subject under this *Kodo,* and under its sanctions hundreds of thousands of loyal ones had given their lives. Was it wrong to have followed the vision of *Hakko-Ichiu*, the reorganisation of life for all Asia under Japan's Asian leadership? The last months of the war were fought against overwhelming odds, and in its

extremity Japanese strategy turned to the *Kami*, hoping for a repetition of the propitious wind of intervention (*kamikazé*) such as had once before rescued the sacred land from invasion. The 'suicide squads' that rode missiles to their mark with such deadly effect were in part at least intended to be propitiatory in winning the favour of the gods. But in the end cold steel and the blinding atom-bomb won. One bleak, devastating question thrust itself into many minds: Could it be that there are no *Kami*, after all? To yield to that scepticism would be to pull out the link-pin from life's central system of meaning and value.

Furthermore, the Occupation presented mystifying moral problems. Its acts were without the cruelty or revenge that was expected, they were even dispassionate, and often were marked by kindness. But they threw moral standards into reverse. They seemed to make loyalty to nation a sin, and involvement in war a crime. Yet everyone knew that they were being enforced by a military government of a nation that had gained this alien authority through superior military power, and in a victorious war. Purges removed from office almost anyone who might have taken any responsibility in public life during the eight previous years. This included Diet members, Cabinet ministers, civil officials, bankers, teachers, and writers. The extreme example was that of the War Crimes Trials, which held in the dock for two long years and then brought to execution as criminals over thirty of the most conspicuous leaders in every area of Japanese national life. This was going on at the same time that the Occupation was abolishing the Japanese Department of Justice and calling for the renovation of judicial codes and procedure under the more impartial and democratic principles of Anglo-Saxon law.

In addition to these baffling questions of moral sanctions of religion, civic duty, and law, there lies for defeated Japan the problem of the individual and the group. As we have seen, all through history the tradition has been that the individual belongs in group relations and must guide his behaviour with the larger community in view. During the war years this was made more explicit by contrast with what was construed as the irresponsible selfishness that was called 'democracy' in the Western countries at war with Japan. Moralists of all schools, including Christians, took this view. The more the enemy-West stressed individualism, the more Japanese thought polarised about the superior quality of group-association in loyalty.

With the defeat the Occupation authorities attributed the victory to the superiority of the democratic principle issuing in individual action. While there cannot be much individualism in a war machine or a military government, and this emphasis of the Occupation might have been put down to cynicism, on the whole the Japanese people do not seem to have made this deduction, but

rather to have been puzzled by the possibility that in individual action there may be more power than in the group.

This leads to another, and perhaps the most perplexing, dilemma of moral concern. That has to do with freedom and authority. During the war years Japanese thinkers identified freedom with licence. Especially in a time of crisis, to assert one's independence was to shirk duty and take one's place with the disloyal. But the British-American tradition has been at the opposite moral pole. Freedom is the prerequisite for any responsible ethical decision. Current Christian ethics in the West have strongly supported this view, and the churches, though with some reluctance, have given their sanction to recent wars because they have been fought in the name of freedom.

This creed of the centrality of political freedom has been the keynote of Occupation morals. The Japanese people, who are desperately eager that the protection of the victors shall continue lest a worse fate befall them, are trying to understand this reversal of moral meanings. They watched the removal of controls in the early weeks of the Occupation. All 'thought control' apparatus was broken down. Communist agitators were released from prison and took their place on soap-boxes, or marched through the palace precincts to see how much food the Emperor had on his kitchen shelves. Whether in the police force, in educational circles, or in media of information, all thought control was decried, and expression of individual freedom was encouraged.

Yet how real was this area of freedom, and how far did it extend? At best it could be only the voluntary bestowal of the occupying military Power, and subject to withdrawal without notice. This was soon seen when Communist Party members went too far in their sabotage of labour unions and in the threat of a general strike in 1947. And while Japanese were free to write or say what they pleased about their own society, they were not free to criticise the Occupation, its personnel, or its policies. And to enforce this limitation new control instruments were soon in operation. Intelligence, counter-intelligence, a ubiquitous Section of Civil Information and Education, with its censorship of all reading-matter, all audio-visual media, even of the design of postage stamps, of Shrine Shinto, of military funerals, of festival celebrations, and many other intimate aspects of personal and public life, had taken the place of the old restrictions of former days. In which way did freedom really lie?

Many other illustrations of moral ambiguity at fundamental levels could be cited. There is the question of national defence. The new Constitution in its prologue abjures resort to war by action of government, and says: "We have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world." One glance at the present

international scene in the Far East is a sufficient commentary upon that pledge. To any thoughtful Japanese the moral dilemma must present itself: Is it ethically more meritorious for a nation to defend itself by arms or to commit this task to a conqueror, accepting rather the defenceless position of a satellite?

The place of the Emperor is ambiguous. The Constitution asserts that sovereignty resides in the people, and by implication that the Emperor is their creation. Yet in Article 2 it stipulates that "the Imperial Throne shall be dynastic." The Occupation policy was known to waver at first between removal of the ruler, and presumably his inclusion among the war criminals, and a policy of utilisation of his influence for purposes of smooth administration. The latter course was followed. He has been treated with consideration, but care is taken to let all know that his position is subsidiary to that of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

The Emperor, on January 1st, 1946, in his address to the Diet publicly disavowed his divine origin or the racial superiority or messianic destiny of the nation. Yet months later an official bulletin issued by the government stated that basically the national structure (*kokutai*) has not been changed. Thus the ordinary Japanese is beset by moral dilemmas. The old foundations have been shaken, and parts have been destroyed. It is of little use to proceed far in reconstruction of the edifice until a sure moral base for it has been found.

It should not be forgotten that before the defeat the Japanese people had endured almost intolerable deprivations and strains. The last year of the war brought intense suffering. Most of the cities were pulverised. The defeat brought physical as well as spiritual trials. Food was scarce, housing was a problem. Travel was difficult. Homes were broken and families scattered. Inflation soon set in. Six million servicemen returned home, many of them to continued unemployment. For at least two years after the surrender the shock and fatigue of the ordinary individual were so marked that a lethargy seemed to hang over all society. Only recently has there been sufficient replenishment of body and estate to warrant the expectation of much concentration upon the moral problems we have been surveying. From now on they will occupy a more central place.

The Contemporaneous Moral Scene

Current reports from Japan indicate elements both of danger and of promise in the moral realm. On the negative side, there is said to be much juvenile delinquency. The weakening of the family bonds would help to account for this. This has always been most pronounced in cities, and it is the cities that have suffered worst. There is no evidence that, in the country, crime has increased.

Furthermore, of the juvenile crimes, 83 per cent. are larceny, a comparatively mild offence.

The high incidence of suicide is causing concern. This is not the ceremonial *hara-kiri* prescribed for the defeated warrior in the old feudal code. Of that there has been little. It is chiefly the surrender to fate on the part of disappointed lovers, failed students, hopeless unemployed, and incurably ill, and also, probably of some sensitive, perplexed persons. Again, we have no proof that the rate of suicides is increasing, but only that it is attracting attention.

Inflation and scarcity of goods have produced the usual black or 'moonlight' market. It is generally condemned, and seems increasingly to be coming under control, but it is reported as a moral weakness of some magnitude. Divorce, in 1946, had increased to a 10 per cent. of all marriages. This, however, is lower than in many Western countries. There is evidence of sexual immorality. In 1946 and 1947 there was a flood of pornographic literature and pictures. This is reported to have subsided. But public prostitution is a problem. The abolition of the licensed quarters in most cities and of the system of licensing has resulted in an uncontrolled diffusion of street-walking, solicitation, and prostitution. Western-type cafés, which were condemned during the war, are now flourishing, and, as might be expected, the presence of large numbers of G.I.s, and the Occupation policy of fraternisation, have added an element of increased temptation. Statistics of alliances and mixed offspring are not available, but the numbers are considerable.

On the credit side of the ledger there are factors of positive moral value. Basic to all is the unabated will to survive that has stood the people in such good stead during the worst years of the recent past, and that is frequently noted now by commentators. This *élan vital* has in it the promise of effective action when the moral goals become more clear.

The rural life of Japan was almost untouched by bombing, and has not been intimately involved in Occupation contacts. Most of the post-war measures have been beneficial to the farmer. The re-allotment of land has given tenants a new chance to become freeholders. A famished consumers' market for farm products, especially for rice, the economic base of the country, has given rural people an unusual initiative and prosperity with relation to city-dwellers. The moral life of the Japanese farming home and community, though traditional and conservative, is, nevertheless, the strongest element in the nation. Upon this any moral renovation must build. Essentially it is still sound, though how responsive to modern change it may be, remains to be seen.

Perhaps the most encouraging factor in Japanese life to-day is the new sanity that has come in defeat. During the war years national characteristics of aggressiveness, excessive pride, nervous-

ness, suspicion and fanatical patriotic spirit were common. Now there is a psychological release of tension, a relaxation of mind and spirit. The people seem friendly, neighbourly, and kind. They are hospitable to foreigners and teachable, as in the days of the early Meiji period.

In this atmosphere of unrestraint, balanced judgment to an unusual degree has marked all levels of Japanese society ever since the first day of the Occupation. The old code would have called for revenge, or a sullen non-co-operative resentment. But the people rose above this to a cordial and intelligent acceptance of the new temporary regime, as the only possible step towards survival and recovery. With a sense of balance and direction sometimes approaching clairvoyance, they have made possible a ' government by nudge ', in which a maximum of initiative is exercised without overstepping the bounds mutually understood to exist. Extreme action is deprecated by public opinion, and by general agreement Japan is set to achieve this next ' Showa Restoration ' peacefully, without dramatic alterations or domestic conflict. Much may be accomplished in such a mood.

Education for Morals in the New Japan

At the centre of the educational resources for Japan's moral life is the thorough system of public education. It came through the war and defeat quantitatively not much changed. In 1946 there were over fifty thousand schools, with over six hundred thousand teachers and more than eighteen million students in attendance. In quality the schools need improvement. Property and equipment are below par, classes are overcrowded, teachers are overworked and underpaid. A skilful and systematic infiltration of faculties and student bodies by Communist elements has made administration difficult. Yet as an instrument for the unfolding of personality these schools have an incalculable potential.

The reform measures recommended by the Occupation authorities and implemented by the Japanese Government in 1947 should ultimately bear fruit in a system of education that is more flexible, more free, and yet more efficient than the old one, effective as it was. Professor Robert King Hall, in his *Education for a New Japan* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949), offers a careful study of these changes and weighs their likelihood of success.

The period of compulsory schooling is to be nine years. Boys and girls are to have facilities that maintain parity throughout all levels. Access to universities is to be widened. Private schools are to be given larger encouragement, including the privilege of training teachers for the public schools. The projected International Christian University in Tokyo is a case where an attempt to meet this new opportunity is being made. It starts with a school of education; then political science follows. The excision

of traditional national ethics (*shushin*) from the curriculum has left a vacuum where moral instruction had its centre. Yet it is being found that considerable material even from the old wreck can be salvaged. Intermingled with the extreme emphasis on ultra-nationalism there was much valuable teaching dealing with the character qualities generally recognised as desirable. New text-books are now available in increasing volume, and they inculcate the new emphasis. Greater teacher-pupil interaction in the learning process is being encouraged, and the teachers, though finding it difficult, are making progress in the more liberal methods.

Social education is a powerful resource for moral instruction. Though the shortage of paper still retards publishing output, it is increasing every year. In 1947 there were 10,985 new titles published. Newspapers in size are still a pitiful shadow of their former selves, but the old editions of two and three millions of the *Tokyo Asahi* and the *Osaka Mainichi* are being approached once more. The columns are open to religious and moral contributions. The *Mainichi* is now carrying a weekly supplement devoted entirely to religious subjects. Radio is recovering, and in the seventeen-hour-a-day programmes, space is frequently given to religious and moral matters. The two million paid subscribers indicate a listening public of six millions.

As religious resources for moral direction Japan has a proliferation of faiths, as we have seen. First, there are the shrines. By the famous Directive of December 15th, 1945, the Occupation dismantled the framework of State Shinto. The shrines—eleven thousand of them—remain. They are removed from public support or sponsorship. Attendance is voluntary. But the official report at the close of the year 1949 shows 45,560,000 adherents listed as supporters. The premises of these shrines are as tenderly cared for as ever. The national cultus has been decapitated, but the spiritual folk-ways that cluster about the old shrines show a rugged strength that promises hope for future usefulness if employed in the service of moral welfare.

Buddhism suffered from the war experiences, as did all religions, but most of the temples survived, as they were in small communities and on mountain sides. Forty-three million believers are reported. H. Doi, writing in the July, 1950, issue of *The New Age*, expresses the view that most of these adherents are held by the ancestral graveyards, and that many of the priests are "still slumbering in the shade of contemplation." It may be so, but within Japanese Buddhism there are trends of hope. Tomomatsu, in promoting the Truth Movement, has recovered his radio popularity of the 'thirties, and has an immense student hearing. There is considerable preaching in city temples, and increasingly Buddhists are engaging in social and philanthropic work. Buddhist Sunday schools are not unusual. A central emphasis on com-

passion marks the Amida sects, which are the most numerous of all.

One of the characteristics of the religious world in Japan is the upsurge of new, voluntary sects. Some of these are related to Shinto—ten million believers are in these groups—and some have no traceable lineage or connections. They feature faith healing, make much use of charms or magic, and, especially where they centre in some spectacular personality, elicit much emotional support and enthusiasm. Morally they are viewed as of doubtful value by many observers. Their future trends are unpredictable.

The Christian movement finds itself in a position of large opportunity. It is small; numbering in all scarcely 350,000 members, or less than one-half of 1 per cent. of the population. Its property damage during the war was comparatively serious. Its leadership is over-taxed, and many of its ministers have only a precarious support. But it is in a most strategic position for influencing the new Japan. This is not simply because it is the faith prevailing among the victors. Nor is it because it has had the benevolent smile of the Occupation, missionaries being the only foreign civilians permitted to enter for nearly two years after the surrender. Nor is it just due to the hope that favours may be expected from the Allied chaplains, nor even to the fact that the Imperial household is showing signs of interest in its teachings, the Empress receiving weekly instruction in the Bible from Mrs. Uemura, a Presbyterian pastor in Tokyo, and one of the brothers of the Emperor undertaking the study of Hebrew in order to read the Old Testament in the original. The churches are in a crucial position because it is in Christianity that a clear ethic for human relationships is found which provides for human freedom under Divine sanctions. The frame of reference in a personal God who has moral concern is the unique element in the moral world of Christians—and of no others in Japan, so far as we know. When persons have looked to religion for moral guidance they have been given uncertain direction from the pantheism of traditional Buddhism or the polytheism of Shinto. One has led to humanism, the other to nationalism. In practice, Christianity has a none too enviable record in many areas of ethical behaviour, but at least in principle it should have the answer to every moral dilemma of mankind.

It is an intuitive feeling on the part of large numbers of people in Japan that the solution to their moral problems may lie in the Christian faith. This it is that brings them in crowds to the churches and schools. They are seeking, inquiring, yearning for direction and for strength. Not all are convinced, though twenty thousand baptisms last year attest to some degree of growth. There are other alternatives, of which Communism is chief. It is likely that the majority of the inquirers are thinking of Christianity and Communism as the two live options offering a clue to the

enigma of life in a defeated Japan. Christianity has become naturalised and accepted as one of the legitimate, indigenous faiths of the people. Now it is being looked to, not with tolerance as in the past, but with a degree of expectancy that is sobering.

The Roman Catholic Church seems to be moving more swiftly and with more confidence than the Protestant bodies, but all alike are aware of the challenge of the present situation and are exerting their energy to meet it.

As to the future of moral development in Japan, no predictions can be made. Until political freedom is recovered, and until a peaceful framework of relationships for the nations of the Far East and of the world has been achieved, any moral life will be subject to the distortions and dilemmas created by wars. The solution to Japan's moral problems lies outside Japan. In a normal, peaceful world she may be expected to develop normally; but as a puppet ally in future conflicts, the future for her people would be dark indeed.

C. W. IGLEHART.

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



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